Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 126

Tuesday, March 23 2004

• Re: The Semitic Perspective
• Re: The Influence of RYBS on Culture Education and Jewish thought
• zebus and leghorn chickens
• For Those Web Sites That Want You to 'Register'
• Re: Rambam, Torah and philosophy
• zebus
• why chabad is eruvless
• Re:Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Mordechai was also called Pesachya
• Re: The Beis Medrash of R Akiva
• Re: The Beis Medrash of R Akiva
• Re: why chabad is eruvless
• Re: why chabad is eruvless
• soft matzah
• Targum Sheni - 'sheeyeh peeyeh'
• ketuva
• chametz in the kinneret
• SA OC Sha'arai T'shuvah 3:1
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book

On Fri, Mar 19, 2004 at 10:19:49AM -0500, Mlevinmd@aol.com wrote:
: I do agree with Micha. As an example, it has been pointed out that
: the concept of syllogism, uses the concept of equating to determine if
: somethin is or isn't. We, Jews, have a concept of hekesh which states
: that is something is similar in one regard, it is also similar in
: another regard. Similarity or relatedness, not equivalence...

This subtlety beyond all-or-nothing of the Semitic perspective is also
the reason for a number of other things we've discussed in the apst:

1- Whether or not one accepts that eilu va'eilu actually means that both
are equally true, it would be impossible to even suggest the possibility
from within the Yefetic perspective.

2- We've analyzed the laws of safeiq, in particular the case of 2
chatichos cheilev ve'1 shel shuman, in terms of a logic that allows for
distance from an atteribute rather than having it or not.

3- When phrasing a tenai, we do not assume that "I will do X" necessarily
implies "I will refrain from not-X" and therefore ideally both are
said. There are possibilities beyond all or nothing.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org               The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                - R' Binyamin Hecht

On Fri, Mar 19, 2004 at 01:20:24PM -0500, Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
: FWIW- my notes from one of the sessions at the Van Leer conference re:R'YBS

I had a couple of points that I didn't notice having already been raised.

...
: Rabbi Horowitz explained that Modern Orthodoxy contains a natural tension,
: since Orthodoxy is conservative and modernity is forever changing.
: Thus there were inherent tensions recognized by Rabbi Soloveitchik.

I think this switches cause and effect. RYBS held that the human condition
was inherently dialectical in nature. This perspective lends itself to
seeing value in both sides of conflicting values -- including advance
and retreat, Adam I and his technological progress as well as Adam II
and his devotion to an unchanging covenent... Many of these dialectics
are more readily expressed when embracing both modernity and orthodoxy.

IOW, RYBS wasn't neo-Kantian because he was MO, he was MO because as
a neo-Kantian he saw value in both M and O.

...
: Rabbi Greenberg spoke at length about the tension of modernity and
: Orthodoxy. He felt the role of Modern Orthodoxy is to deal with the
: choices presented by the new culture and he felt that Maimonidies had
: done this by reinterpreting Jewish philosophy in light of "modern"
: Muslim culture. (e.g. corporeality.) Rabbi Greenberg defined the
: role of Modern Orthodoxy as being the removal of the obstacles to
: credibility and the representation of belief in a form that inspires
: loyalty within the new society while at the same time insisting on no
: change in authority...

Notice how much this touches on our debate over RMShapiro's position.
I do not see these two definitions as identical. The former "choices presented
by the new culture" doesn't bother me.

The latter, however, presumes an authority to the modern, and therefore
one whittles away whatever of mesorah doesn't fit. As long as one doesn't
compromise authority -- which is now being limited to non-philosophical
questions, ie not only limited to halakhah but only to those halakhos
which have affect in chovos ha'eivarim.

He also misrepresents the history of machshavah by making it sound like
non-corporeality was taken from Islam. The Rambam vehemently took sides
in an extant debate. It wasn't the whittling away of mesoretic consensus
to fit the zeitgeist.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org               The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                - R' Binyamin Hecht

[Micha:]
>>From Leghorn chickens?

> Kidding aside, if Leghorns, which are poultry and don't have the usual
> feet, can be grandfathered in once they're considered chickens, why
> not a beheimah like the Zebu?

Just to clarify:
leghorns were not grandfathered in, nor do they in fact have unusual
feet.
leghorns are regular chickens which were originally permitted bc they
were chickens and were permitted again two weeks ago bc it was verified
that they are indeed regular chickens.
the purported anomalous toe structure was in error.

ari

On Areivim, someone recently posted a link to a site which seems to offer
valid user names and passwords to a variety of websites, so that we would
not have to register ourselves and surrender personal information in a
time-consuming procedure.

I can certainly understand the appeal of this, but I'd like to discuss
the ethical and halachic implications. If an entity - such as the New
York Times or Jerusalem Post - offers to share its information with us
in exchange for our sharing our information with them, what excuse do
we have not to do so?

In other words, if you don't want to go through the process of registering
at a website, fine. But if you use a fake name and password (and I
think this includes cases where I actually go through the registration
process, but by entering a fake mailing address, or fake email address,
or deliberately misstating my income or areas of interest) then I am
benefitting from their work without their consent.

The only halachic argument I've heard in favor of these fake UserIDs is
that the owner of the website doesn't actually lose anything. I would
get something of value, but not at their expense. I think that this
is not accurate -- There is a minimal amount of electricity they spend
on their computer systems when it responds to my clicking. Less than a
pruta, sure, but more than zero. In addition, they may send email ads
to my inbox, and if I've used a fake email address, that too costs a few
microprutos. And if they try sending real mail to my fake street address,
that *is* real money.

Does anyone have any justification for these things that I missed?

(Es chatoai ani mazkir hayom. I've done some things along these lines,
but I'm really trying hard to either stop doing it, or find a real heter.)

Akiva Miller

On Wed, Mar 17, 2004 at 08:18:38PM -0500, Shinnar, Meir wrote:
: No where in the More Nevuchim does the rambam ever take issue with a point
: that has been philosophically conclusively decided....

That's STILL the cart before the horse.

How does the Rambam decide what has been "conclusive" and what not?

Isn't that the entire question: Whether to assume the philosophy is
flawed, that it is not conclusive, or to assume one's understanding of
the Torah is?

The Rambam never argues with something he believes was conclusively
decided because is he argued he obviously would have to label the argument
"inconclusive".

...
: RMB
:> I, OTOH, would say that the reason why the Rambam knew that the eternity of
:> matter was in doubt was because it contradicted mesorah. That's the point of
:> his second clause.

: When things apparently contradict mesora, they get analyzed closely -
: but the rambam doesn't say that the eternity was in doubt because it
: contradicted mesora, and therefore there was a logical problem - his line
: of reasoning is different. He is quite careful to say "vechova behechlet
: levaer kol ma shepshato neged hahochacha" - if some thing is proven, one
: is obligated to reinterprete any mesora whose pshat is against the proof.

: WRT to the second point - the rambam is not actually saying that he
: would reject aristo, if it was proven - he is saying that if such a
: contradiction arises- it would require extremely drastic reinterpretation
: of the entire fabric of the mesora (rather than of some psukim or some
: ma'amre hazal) - which puts the entire issue of concordance between
: reason and mesora to the test - so that such conflicts are best avoided.
: As he concludes the perek (II:25)

And how does one avoid such conflicts? He denies the validity of drastic
reinterpretations of mesorah. He denies the possibility of the conflict
being real. He'd therefore be forced to conclude the philosophical proof
was flawed and then find the flaw. Which he did quite well.

What you inadvertantly hide behind the phrase "to the test" is that he
considers the possibility of real conflict impossible. As he writes,
"If, on the other hand, Aristotle had a proof for his theory, THE WHOLE
TEACHING OF SCRIPTURE would be rejected, and we should be forced to
other opinions." (RYQafeh: haysah nofeles kol haTorah!) Assuming the
validity of A's proof would mean falsifying kol haTorah kulah. Not some
re-interpretation to preserve what's left.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org               The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                - R' Binyamin Hecht

> Why is there an issue about cross breeding or a need for a
> Mesorah about the animal? Isn't a check for the presence of simanim 
> all  that's needed?

> AIUI the CI was m'chadesh the need for a mesora about animals.

Actually this is daf yomi material!!
CI quotes Shach and Chaye Adam as his basis. The Shach is not clear
whether he requires a mesorah for kashrut of the animal or only to
distinguish between a behemah and a chayah. However, Chaye Adam is fairly
clear (though not everyone agrees).

If one looks in the CI he talks at length about not introducing new
food into our diet because of Reform Jewry. So his reasoning seems to
be as much sociological as chumrah. In the same letter to R. Herszog he
also stresses that mesorah does not pass from one community to another
and that it is only based on great people and not ordinary folk.

He concludes the letter by stressing that he is not interested in being
machmir for the sake of being machmir.

 From what I read R. Elyashiv basically reiterated the issur of CI.
According to the note in JP some professors claim that the Zebu has
been in Israel for centuries and all cows in Israel are cross breeds
with Zebus. However, as CI says we don't trust professors.

kol tuv

-- 
Prof. Eli Turkel,  turkel@post.tau.ac.il on 3/21/2004
Department of Mathematics, Tel Aviv University

> Would one expect that someone who grows up in mea shearim and is only
> exposed to kosher food, if they would end up in an area where there is
> non kosher food that they would eat it?

> What's the difference? In my opinion Hinuch.

> We do a good job of Hinuch in regards to the laws of Kashrut (or
> somewhat well at least), but do a horrible job in regards to the laws of
> Hotzaah.

> Now, it could be that a community determines that the best way for them
> to teach Hotzaah is by not having an eruv. However, in my layman's
> opinion this seems like a cop-out.

A few points of rebuttal:

1. Your logic of "it's a cop-out" could probably be applied to a whole
host of gezeiros.

2. You write "the best way to teach hotza'ah" -- that's not the issue.
The issue is _living_ and _experiencing_ the melachas. As someone once
put it, there are a whole lot of Jews in E"Y who live with 38 relevant
issurei melachos.

3. As far as chinuch goes -- it seems every time we have guests from
E"Y into our community some of them end up being oveir on hotza'ah.
It never even _occurs_ to some of them to ask if we have an eiruv.
They just assume we do. (In particular, it's the young single women who
bring purses or pocketbooks to shul on shabbos).

But, as far as I understand it -- the main point is #2. Going through
life trying to avoid 38 melachos on shabbos is an imcomplete experience
to life. (I'm sure some L folks can articulate this a whole lot better
than I can).

-- Sholom

WRT to R Leiman's reported critique of the book:
It is understood (or widely believed) that there was consensus amongst
the rishonim - and RMS does talk about the fact of this consensus.
However, the novel fact (not appreciated or even disputed by some)
that there was disagreement on many of them - and the fact that those
who disputed one may have agreed with the other 12 doesn't change the
fact that this rishon disputes what many today hold to be an ikkar that
determines whether you are a kofer.

WRT to the apparent universal consensus, I am curious:
Can one get a list of rishonim who specifically deal with the issue
of ikkarim, and either endorse the ikkarim in general, or deal with
them each individually, as binding (rather than merely true - eg, the
raavad on anthropomorphism, even if one understands him as not supporting
anthropomorphism, clearly holds that even if anthropomorphism is false,
it isn['t kfira) ,without, in another place, contradicting the specifics
of one (eg, allowing piyutim to malachim). For the purposes of this,
we will view the eighth ikkar as (per RDE) allowing one to accept minor
variations in the text as due to human error. I am not sure that the
list is actually that long....(the endorsement should be specific,
rather than merely presumed from lack of opposition..)

[Email #2. -mi]

WRT to RI Kasdan's post:
He suggests that the eighth ikkar, as understood by the Rambam, allows
for the opinion that Yehoshua wrote the last eight psukim.

Two separate issues:
First, there is a fundamental problem about interpreting the ikkarim from
their formulation in other places - because the formulation in the yad is
clearly quite different than their formulation in the perush hamishna -
leading to questions about the rambam's own views about the 13 ikkarim.

If one looks at the eighth ikkar as formulated in the hakdama to helek
(my translation from the kapah edition)

the eighth principle is torah from heaven. and that is that we should
believe that the entire torah (found in our hands today is the torah)
that was give to moshe, and that it is entirely from hashem..

the part in parentheses does not appear in the standard printed editions.
Note that rambam in the ikkar is addressing two separate issues:
1) revelation of the text - that the torah was given to moshe by hashem,
in spite of the philosophic issues in understanding this, and that is
not of human origin
2) The text that we have is the same that moshe has. (this is relevant
to the thread and discussion with RDE about the gan veradim) He goes on
to say (as cited by Micha) that every letter in it has wisdoms and
wonders to who whom hashem has given understanding.

Second, R Kasdan, (IMHO) is seriously misunderstanding the gmara about
the last eight psukim. The issue was not (and could not be) about who
was the mechanical writer of the last eight psukim - a very minor issue -
after all, moshe remained in full physical power to the end - but rather
whether to whom they were revealed - did hashem reveal them to yehoshua,
or did he reveal it to moshe - for the tanna who holds that yehoshua
was the one who wrote them, the suggestion that they were revealed to
moshe who then revealed them to yehoshua who wrote it down just doesn't
make sense (except as an attempt to reconcile with the rambam, but not
as pshat) - the problem the gmara has is the past tense of vayamot -
and the opinion that yehoshua wrote it rejects the interpretation that
this was binevua - therefore, moshe could not have said it - however,
if moshe could have transmitted it, surely he could have written it.

Meir Shinnar

David Riceman wrote:
>We are talking about RMS's book, which lists gedolei
>Yisrael who disagreed with the Rambam's 13 Ikkarim,
>presumably because they believed, on what they
>considered good grounds, that they were false...
>I claim that their opinions, for that reason, have an a
>priori assumption of being true, and hence not possibly
>heretical.

And what about when rishonim contradicted each other on issues of
ikkarim? Both views cannot be "true", so (at least) one must be false and,
according to you, heretical.

Meir Shinnar wrote:
>The CI would also seem to imply that at least some
>of the halachic consequences of being a kofer (moridin
>velo ma'alin) don't apply in some one deemed an anus
> - which is understood quite broadly in terms of the
>intellectual influence of the surrounding community and
>culture - thus removing the underpinning from RGS's attempt
>to separate the halachic consequences of kfira (deemed
>purely halachic) and the intellectual issues of truth of
>the proposition

No. Even if the person loses entirely his "shem rasha" because he
is a tinok she-nishbah, the views he espouses are heretical and may
not be studied (except for those who have a heter to pursue those
studies). Furthermore, a heretic may not teach because he might lead
his students to heresy (see Tur and SA, YD 153 & EH 22). Presumably,
this has nothing to do with a "shem rasha" and even a tinok she-nishbah
would fall under these parameters.

>RGS is talking not only about determining what we
>believe as a community - and what we teach - but
>determining kfira which inherently requires
>determining truth versus falsehood.

No. I am precisely talking about determining what we believe as a
community, or rather what beliefs are contained within our community.

>No, this means something else - a desire to shield our generation
>from such objectionable passages -and we know that current
>censorship and attempts to shield are not just limited to kfira
>(MOAG is a prime example)

MOAG was considered lashon hara, which is irrelevant to our
discussion. One People, Two Worlds was considered inter-denominational
dialogue which the banners deemed prohibited. Again, irrelevant
to our discussion. Do you think that RSZA was petty or would act
extra-halachically in censoring the text of a rishon?

[Email #2. -mi]

Perhaps the most relevant aspect to this list of Marc Shapiro's book
has yet to be mentioned.

On p. 23 of the book, in listing scholars and organizations that
adhere to the Rambam's 13 ikkarim, Shapiro includes AishDas as
one. He was certainly referring to the Avodah membership agreement
(http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/agree.shtml) that includes:
>The parameters of "darchei noam" and the Rambam's
>Thirteen Principles of Belief (and/or The Ani Ma'amins
>and/or the Yigdal) are baseline standards for our discussion
>group.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

From: "Yisrael Herczeg" yherczeg@barak-online.net
> From Sefer Oheiv Yisrael by Rav Avraham Yehoshua Heshel of Apta, on
> Purim:
> I found a sefer that says that Pesachya is Mordechai and there is a
> siman for this in the possuk, "Your beginning will be small, but your
> end will be very abundant" (Iyyov 8:7)...

Brought [IIRC without source] in the Taamei Haminhogim.

SBA

> Actually, we learn nearly all of halakhah from that beis medrash!

What about the sugya in Menachos re the kutso yel yud and the
tagin? Please set forth any halacha that we learn from that sugya?

Steve Brizel
Zeliglaw@aol.com

On Mon, Mar 22, 2004 at 05:41:13PM -0500, Zeliglaw@aol.com wrote:
:> Actually, we learn nearly all of halakhah from that beis medrash!

: What about the sugya in Menachos re the kutso yel yud and the
: tagin? Please set forth any halacha that we learn from that sugya?

I'm confused by your reply. You said that we don't know anything from
Rabbi Aqiva's beis medrash. I pointed out that on the contrary, half of
the medrashei halakhah and the mishnah itself come from that beis medrash.

Why would that translate to my knowing what the beis medrash's methodology
produced about a particular sugyah?

To the contrary, the question is not why we didn't learn from the beis
medrash that Mosheh Rabbeinu visits in that ma'aseh. Rather, it's why all
the material we have from that beis medrash doesn't match the description
in the medrash.

This is why I suggested that the idiom about learning piles upon piles
of halakhos from the tagim HQBH was tying on the osiyos was more about
Rabbi Aqiva's syntactic approach than the study of halachos from features
that reoccur every time particular letters do.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org               The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                - R' Binyamin Hecht

On Mon, 2004-03-22 at 15:35, Sholom Simon wrote:
> 1. Your logic of "it's a cop-out" could probably be applied to a whole
> host of gezeiros.

Except AFAIK there is no gezeirah to assur eruvs.  Eruv is perfectly
acceptable within Halacha theory as well as practice.

> 2. You write "the best way to teach hotza'ah" -- that's not the issue.
> The issue is _living_ and _experiencing_ the melachas. As someone once
> put it, there are a whole lot of Jews in E"Y who live with 38 relevant
> issurei melachos.

Eruv is part of the mitzva of not being Hotza'ah, I think its very
unfair to characterize people who use an Eruv as not living with the
mitzva of not being Hotza'ah.

> 3. As far as chinuch goes -- it seems every time we have guests from
> E"Y into our community some of them end up being oveir on hotza'ah.
> It never even _occurs_ to some of them to ask if we have an eiruv.
> They just assume we do. (In particular, it's the young single women who
> bring purses or pocketbooks to shul on shabbos).

So doesn't that prove my point?  It's a chinuch issue, and we do a bad
job at it.  We need to do better.  I know in my community in the US a
big deal is made about calling up the shul every friday afternoon to
find out if the Eruv is up.

> But, as far as I understand it -- the main point is #2. Going through
> life trying to avoid 38 melachos on shabbos is an imcomplete experience
> to life. (I'm sure some L folks can articulate this a whole lot better
> than I can).

Since when is using an Eruv trying to avoid a melacha?  If one wants to
be pedantic, Eruv doesn't help you in a case where the torah forbids
carrying, it only helps you in a case that is not part of the 39
melachos.

On Mon, Mar 22, 2004 at 06:08:28PM -0500, Shaya Potter wrote:
: Since when is using an Eruv trying to avoid a melacha?  If one wants to
: be pedantic, Eruv doesn't help you in a case where the torah forbids
: carrying, it only helps you in a case that is not part of the 39
: melachos.

Moreso:

Eiruv and shituf mevo'os create situations which were excluded in the
original gezeirah. (To answer R' Akiva Miller's question in passing,
by Shelomo haMelekh's beis din.) They aren't loopholes created by later
batei din. They aren't even, like pruzbul, loopholes identified or
popularized by later batei din but only implied in the original.

As R' Zev Sero carefully phrased it, "Shlomo Hamelech took an area where
carrying was permitted (a shared reshut hayachid), and banned carrying
unless one performs a ritual..."

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure.
micha@aishdas.org        It preserves health, promotes convalescence,
http://www.aishdas.org   and helps us cope with adversity.
Fax: (413) 403-9905         - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei"

Here's a blog post by a friend of mine on Sfardi soft matza
<http://yutopia.yucs.org/archives/000590.html>

So this leads into 2 questions.

1) Is there anything that would really prevent ashkanazim from using
this for the seder (Besides tradition)

2) If one can argue that it's inappropriate for the seder, is it
possible to use it for all the rest of the the chag?

thanks,
shaya

From: Dov Bloom <dovb@netvision.net.il>
<<Why should there be a correct pronunciation of an acronym? it is just a
"rashei teivot" not a vocalized word!>>

Rav Yaakov Kaminetsky says that the proper pronunciation for an acronym
is that which allows one to say it most easily.  

In most case that means all patachs (think of some acronyms, from chazal
to tashbar to lahadam
to ramatkal to etc.etc.

Gershon <gershon.dubin@juno.com>

On Mon, 22 Mar 2004 14:16:02 -0600, Avodah wrote:
> Some pronunciations  in the ktuba to check out:
> ze-hav with a shva or zahav with a komatz ...

does any of this matter? It is the written not spoken version of the
ketuva that counts

-- 
Prof. Eli Turkel,  turkel@post.tau.ac.il on 3/23/2004
Department of Mathematics, Tel Aviv University

As every year there is a controversy over chametz in the kinneret.
This year with Shinui in the government they refused to stop the supply
of water from the kinneret during Pesach with the claim that there would
be damage to the water supply of Israel.

The kinneret needs about 13cm until it reaches the top line. So far about
1.4 meters have already been pumped back into underground reservoirs and
the claim is that during Pesach they need to continue pumping water into
the reservoirs.

On the halachic side I have never understood the problem.

1. Before Pesach any chametz should be batel in 60 water
2. Chametz put into the kinneret on Pesach should have a minute chance
of diffusing through the lake and reaching the pumping stations.
Even once it reaches the pumps it goes through filters and would take
some time to reach an individuals house.
3. The filters would remove any noticeable piece of bread and so only
a minute portion would go through the pipes and this would then be
spread among many houses. 
If one truly believes that "ma-she-hu" includes one portion in billions
and trillions then everything is prohibited.
There are particles of Chametz in the air which dissolves in water in
one's glass. Water in wells are all connected underground to
reservoirs. Hence, a piece of chametz that entered a reservoir would
filter into all wells in the neighborhood (eventually).
4. ROY claims that we assume that fish ate the chametz just like we assume
that birds eat the chametz in the backyard (at least for safek chametz).
5. Are there any gemarot or rishonim that say that one can't drink
from water in a river because of chametz that might have been thrown
in upstream?
6. What do most people outside of Israel do with their water supply?
In sum is this a "new" chumrah or has this been around for ever?

Which leads to the non-lalachic question of how far the state is supposed
to go to support some Chumrah and not requires the machmirim to but
bottled water (For Areivim).

Chag Kasher Vesameach,
Eli Turkel

Anyone know who MaHaRaM Poppers (assuming that is his surname) is?
This Poppers would love to know :-). Thanks!

All the best from
-- Michael Poppers via RIM pager

From: "Gil Student" <gil@aishdas.org>
> And what about when rishonim contradicted each other on issues of
> ikkarim? Both views cannot be "true", so (at least) one must be false and,
> according to you, heretical.

You have committed a fallacy. False does not imply heretical even though
heretical implies false.

With regard to your general point: rishonim contradict each other
about all sorts of things. Our normal response is not to take sides
by saying that both are legitimate readings of Torah, but only one can
be normative halacha. We don't say shiv'im panim laTorah about heresy.
By labelling one side of a dispute as heretical you are taking sides.

David Riceman

**********************


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