Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 123

Friday, March 19 2004

• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Marc Shapiro's New Book]
• Re: Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Zebus and Leghorn Chickens
• Re: Zebus and Leghorn Chickens
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book
• Re: Zemanim (was: Ikkarim of dwarves)
• Re: Zebus and Leghorn Chickens
• Re: why chabad is eruvless
• Re: Zebus and Leghorn Chickens
• RE: Zebus and Leghorn Chickens
• why Chabad is Eruvless
• Torah and Science
• The Semitic Perspective
• The Influence of RYBS on Culture Education and Jewish thought
• Re: Rishonim -Psak
• Re: Ikkarim of Dwarves/ Marc Shapiro's New Book

David Riceman wrote:
>Are you claiming that these gedolei yisrael, were they
>alive today with their old views, would be inadvertant
>heretics rather than heretics?

The answer to that question is the same as the answer to the question of
whether, if Rabbi Hillel were alive today, his view would be considered
heretical.

But the entire premise of the question is wrong because if they were alive
today then, perhaps, they would be mevatel themselves to the overwhelming
contemporary and historical consensus or, perhaps, the consensus would
be swayed by the weight of these giants. I am not the one saying that
these ideas are beyond the pale. It is the force of centuries of Jewish
history that is.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

I'm commenting on several things together: three footnotes and one
(related) comment by RGS.

1. Several people have gently hinted that my memory of the Hazon Ish was
not precise. In fact the Hazon Ish merely removes the din of moridin
v'lo maalin without denying the status of Epicurean (the reference is
YD 2:16, all of siman 2 is relevant). He says that moridin v'lo maalin
applies only in an era of nisim gluyim.

There are two problems: first, he doesn't provide any evidence, and
second, my impression is that he's being historically inaccurate. What I
had remembered him saying was in fact my attempt to solve those problems:
substitute rational examination and you have the Hovoth HaLevavoth (more
details below) as evidence, and the period of philosophically acceptable
k'firah coincides with (what I imagine to be) the period of demise of
moridin v'lo maalin.

Incidentally shehita is quite a complex example: see seif katan 18.

2. With regard to the reason for Spinoza's excommunication I had
relied on Otzar Yisrael (s.v. Spinoza, pp.199-200). "After his father's
death ... he attended synagogue rarely and devoted all his time to his
Christian companions. Only after he left his sister's house to dwell
with his Christian teacher did his teachers ... feel themselves obliged
to excommunicate him."

RDE quotes Encyclopedia Britannica that it was due to his doctrine, and
that is also the opinion of Cordasco in his bibliographic introduction
to Dover's edition of Spinoza's works. WADR, I suspect that these are
philosophers writing for a Christian audience, who may not appreciate
the distinction between Christian excommunication, normally based on
doctrinal dispute, and Jewish excommunication, normally based on behavior.

3. RDE pointed out that my citation of Hovoth HaLevavoth (Feldheim
edition, vol. 1 pp. 30-32) attributed my conclusion to the author.
What he says is that the Sanhedrin has no authority to decide issues
which can be determined by reason, only disputes based on authority.
My deduction was that no other halachic procedure has more authority
than the Sanhedrin in this regard.

Here's an argument. Imagine that I'm wrong. Say that KK New York has
decided that God has a body (as many psukim and maamarei Hazal seem
to indicate), and that anyone who denies that God has a body deserves
capital punishment. Say that KK New Jersey has decided that God lacks a
body, and that anyone who believes that God has a body deserves capital
punishment. Imagine that my son decides to marry a girl from KK New York.
We have the wedding in a neutral spot. I, however, decide to travel to
NY for my grandson's bris. I am tried and executed on the spot.

Now for normal halachos I need merely to adopt minhag hamakom while
I visit, or, in extremis, the humros of both places. With regard
to knowledge, however, it is well nigh impossible to adjust myself
accordingly. Hence I contend that if the Sanhedrin has no authority
to apply a uniform standard, no standard can be more general than a
personal one.

4.  RGS wrote:
> I apologize for misunderstanding you. We seem to be talking about two
> different things. I am talking about what is heresy and who is a heretic,
> while you are talking about whether an indvertent heretic is really
> a heretic.

We are talking about RMS's book, which lists gedolei Yisrael who disagreed
with the Rambam's 13 Ikkarim, presumably because they believed, on what
they considered good grounds, that they were false. You claim that their
ideas are today heretical, and that a person who adopted them today
would be a heretic. I claim that you do not give them the deference due
to gedolei Yisrael, and you do not give their opinions the deference
due to opinions of gedolei Yisrael.

I claim that their opinions, for that reason, have an a priori assumption
of being true, and hence not possibly heretical. You claim, on the
contrary, that you lack the capacity to determine whether anything is
true, and that you are making no judgment about whether God considers
their opinions true, only that you rather suspect that they approximate
something untrue since you deem them heretical (again, this is not meant
as a snide remark, I'm trying to summarize an opinion I find quixotic
and degrading as best I can).

<<Note: why degrading? The Rambam at the beginning of the MN says that
Tzelem Elokim means intellect, and intellect means distinguishing truth
and falsehood. RGS, by denying us the capacity to determine truth from
falsehood, denies that any of us has a tzelem elokim.>>

Are you claiming that these gedolei yisrael, were they alive today
with their old views, would be inadvertant heretics rather than
heretics? Perhaps if you translate that phrase into Hebrew I'll manage
to figure out what it means.

David Riceman

Rabbi Dr. Shnayer Leiman's shiur this past shabbos was on the subject of
the book by what he termed "my good friend, Marc Shapiro." The following
is a brief summary of his shiur, not my own views (not having read
Dr. Shapiro's book, I cannot comment).

Despite his friendship, he proceeded to attack the book on the basis of
methodology. Specifically, he read sections of the Rambam's letter on
T'hiyyat haMetim, where he responded to claims that he thought t'hiyyas
hamesim was only allegory and there would be no actual t'hiyya in bodies.
The Rambam denies it and repeats his view that the Olam haBa is the
ultimate reward, but that an actual return to physical bodies would
occur at one point, and that this view is one that all Jews agree to.
R. Leiman said that Dr. Shapiro supported the view that the Rambam really
thought that t'hiyyas hamesim was only an allegory for the ultimate
reward, and said that it is methodologically unsound to hold that an
author does not believe what he says.

In terms of the entire book, he said that the main problem was that
Dr. Shapiro documents how many rishonim disagreed with one of the 13
Principles or another, but does not make the point that those who disagree
with one generally agree with the others. Although one can find a rishon
who disagrees with any specific principle, we have an overwheleming
majority of rishonim who agree with the 13 Principles as they are; we
find no rishon at all who claims that there are no principles or that the
Rambam's 13 are completely untrue; and some even claim that the error
of the Rambam is that he omitted additional important ones. Therefore,
it is not only modern Orthodoxy that considers the 13 normative, it is
the consensus of the rishonim.

He also said something that Steve Weiss quotes Dr. Shaprio as admitting:
that the language he used in his book is intemperate. Scholars can
disagree with people without calling their views "ridiculous," and
without cavalierly dismissing views of respected rabbonim. He gave
several examples of how careful scholars will disagree with rabbonim or
their opponents strongly but without disrespect, along the lines of "I do
not understand how to reconcile this view with what is stated by..." or
"I do not understand Rabbi Ploni's view in light of..."

R. Shnayer indicated that he has told Dr. Shapiro most of his hassogos
and he will likely publish a review of some sort where he goes through
them more fully.

Seth Mandel

R' David Riceman wrote:
>Now in addition to the inherent problem of saying that a rishon was
>wrong, the methodology stands out. The methodology of the Hatham Sofer
>(aharei rabim) seems to permit you to deduce falsehood by majority vote.
>In addition to being folly, that contradicts an explicit Hovoth HaLevavoth
>about the limits of aharei rabim l'hatoth.

I wrote:
> I am not sure what the statement of the chovas Halevavos - that
>Sanhedrin did not deal with issues that could be determined by pure
>intellect - has to do with the limits of acharei rabim. It is not
>whether Sanhedrin had anything to do with the discussions in the gemora -
>in particular with R' Hillel. It is not clear whether the Sanhedrin of
>Yavneh was actually a Sanhedrin. In other words one can not generalize
>from the Chovas HaLevavos as to the relationship between majority and
>the definition of ikkarim through the ages.

R' David Riceman wrote:

I was generalizing. What he seems to say is that issues that can be
determined by reason are not subject to determination by normal halachic
procedures, i.e., you don't determine truth or falsehood by vote.
I applied it more generally than Sanhedrin.

Yes, it's my reading of him, plausible (in my opinion) but not necessary.

DE

On Tue, Mar 16, 2004 at 02:23:37PM -0500, David Riceman wrote:
: Now in addition to the inherent problem of saying that a rishon was
: wrong, the methodology stands out. The methodology of the Hatham Sofer
: (aharei rabim) seems to permit you to deduce falsehood by majority vote.

No, it allows you to deduce sufficient chazaqah with which to pasken.

I raised the subject of niskatnu hadoros vs dwarves atop giants because
it allows us to hold such a chazaqah in the face of their statements.
But it's not an issue of disproof by authority, it's allowing odds
of falsehood plus halachic process produce a pesaq.

The gemara already cited here twice makes a point of saying that R'
Papa's and Abayei's generations did actually know more than their
predecessors. There is no question of whether it's theoretically possible
that we know more than rishonim did, given that we have their precedent.
(Despite the "rupture and reconstruction", the change of era, between R'
Yehudah and R' Papa or Abayei (3rd gen amora'im).

Amora'im knew more than tana'im, at least of texts, and yet were less
willing (or according to the CI unable) to dispute them.

There is no principle that earlier generations knew more Torah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org        you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org   You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905        - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Thu, Mar 18, 2004 at 03:00:23PM +0200, Carl M. Sherer wrote to
Areivim:
: My son called home Motzei Shabbos and asked if I heard "the story 
: about the meat." I had not. But apparently it was in all those 
: freebie Charedi papers last Friday. And here it is.... 

: [RAZ - feel free to correct me if I miss anything]

: It seems that for some time now, nearly all the Glatt meat in Israel 
: has been coming not from Israel, but from Latin America. (Shshsh... 
: don't tell anyone). 

: In Latin America, the standard beef cow is not a cow, but a Zebu. A 
: Zebu looks a lot like a normal cow, but it has a hump. It seems that 
: the Zebu was subject to a dispute between the Chazon Ish and Rav 
: Herzog some 60 years ago. Rav Herzog paskened that it was mutar, but 
: the CI paskened that it was assur because we have no mesorah with 
: respect to it. As such, the Zebu was not supposed to be a part of the 
: Badatz EC supervised Charedi diet in Israel. But apparently, it has 
: been for a long time.... 

: Somehow this just came out now. (Somehow, none of the shochtim in 
: Latin America - who are mainly Israelis - noticed the hump all these 
: years). AIUI, some of the major poskim had answering machines on 
: their phones last Thursday and Friday that said, "if you're calling 
: about the meat, and you cooked it already, you can eat it. If not, 
: wait until Tuesday." 

: My son told me that some of the boys in his yeshiva did not eat the 
: cholent on Shabbos....

: What was supposed to happen on Tuesday (and if it happened, I have 
: not seen it yet) was that Rav Elyashiv was supposed to issue some 
: sort of psak/summary of the state of the halacha. 

: And no one knows where the meat for Pesach will come from yet..... 

 From Leghorn chickens?

Kidding aside, if Leghorns, which are poultry and don't have the usual
feet, can be grandfathered in once they're considered chickens, why
not a beheimah like the Zebu?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org        you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org   You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905        - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

> What was supposed to happen on Tuesday (and if it happened, I have
> not seen it yet) was that Rav Elyashiv was supposed to issue some
> sort of psak/summary of the state of the halacha.

Why is there a problem? Since the Zebu and regular cows can crossbreed (and
have fertile offspring) they are Kosher. (IIRC that is the test the Gemara
brings).

Akiva

RDR
>If someone has, by rational examination,
>convinced himself that God does not exist he would not be a heretic.
>That at least is the psak of the Hazon Ish.>
RGS
> You are basically setting up a system whereby anyone can hold any belief
> and, since he considers it to be true, can claim that he is not a kofer.
RDR
>Yes, if he can demonstrate it rationally. You have a postmodern faith
>in the impossibility of rational discourse which I do not share.

While the CI doesn't specifically deal with this issue, the Radbaz
does (radbaz 4:187) - where he specifically says that anyone who holds
by a heretical belief because his reason led him to such a belief is
considered an anus, and is not considered a kofer - nor do the halachic
stringencies of kofer apply. The CI would also seem to imply that at
least some of the halachic consequences of being a kofer (moridin velo
ma'alin) don't apply in some one deemed an anus - which is understood
quite broadly in terms of the intellectual influence of the surrounding
community and culture - thus removing the underpinning from RGS's attempt
to separate the halachic consequences of kfira (deemed purely halachic)
and the intellectual issues of truth of the proposition


WRT to RDE's citation of the Ginat Veradim - it actually deals with a
different issue - the problem that halachically, we need to determine
the status of a sefer torah - and we do it by majority vote (as per (I
believe the yerushalmi) that they determined the proper text of the torah
by majority combination of the three sefarim that were in the hechal)
- but he distinguishses that from the truth statement - which is why
a sefer tora following a minority opinion is bdiavad kasher. RGS is
talking not only about determining what we believe as a community -
and what we teach - but determining kfira which inherently requires
determining truth versus falsehood.

To show how different these are viewed, recall the debate that occured
around the publication of the perush to chumash attributed to rav yehuda
hachasid, where he suggests that there were major alterations in the text.
Rav Moshe Feinstein tried hard to forbid the publication of this sefer,
arguing that the fact that it was kfira meant that it had to be a forgery.

Consider, instead, if there was a manuscript being published that said,
for example,that rabbenu tam used to count the women for a minyan
(not that one exists, but to pick an issue that was very hot at the
same time). What would the reaction have been? While people would
have strongly argued that this was wrong as it goes against all known
positions, no one would have assured publication, and people would have
said that well, either this manuscript is a fraud, or, even if true, the
halachic consensus is against it now, so it is halachically meaningless.
We reject from the halachic consensus many shittot rishonim.

This was not the reaction to the rav yehuda hachasid - no one said well,
it was ok for rav yehuda hachasid to hold by this position, but the
halachic consensus has rejected it so it is now kfira - rather, it was
quite clearly felt that the only options were 1) manuscript is a fraud
2) position was held by RYH and therefore is not kfira 3) position was
held by RYH, which therefore changes our assessment of RYH's place in the
mesora. Clearly, assessing kfira follows different guidelines than other
halachic issues, and (RMF at least) would seem to reject RGS's position.

Meir Shinnar

Isaac A Zlochower <zlochoia@bellatlantic.net> wrote:
> I cited the current
> acceptance of the views of the Vilna Gaon and R' Shneur Zalman on when
> bein ha'shemoshot starts, in opposition to the view of the mechaber of
> the Shulchan Aruch which is based on the shita of Rabbenu Tam. I do not
> see where in hilchot Mila (e.g. Y.D. 262 or 266) the Mechaber deviates
> from what he paskened in O.H., hilchot hachnasat shabbat. If there is
> a subtle difference, that would not still indicate a withdrawal of his
> earlier view. Such an important halachic matter would require a very
> clear renunciation of a prior Pesak if that earlier ruling were felt to
> be in error.

See YD 266:9, and Shach 266:11. The Mechaber very clearly rules that
bein hashmashot starts immediately after sunset, not nearly an hour
later, as he ruled in hilchot Shabbat. This is not a subtle difference,
it's a complete reversal of his earlier psak. And it is this reversal
that RShZ cites in _Seder Hachnasat Shabbat_ as authority for his own
similar reversal.

Eli Turkel <turkel@post.tau.ac.il> wrote:
> Similar dinim apply to chanukah candles where many poskim advise
> lechatchila to light candles shortly after physical sunset which is too
> early according SA (Rabbenu Tam and many other rishonim).

Actually, the Shulchan Aruch explicitly says that one should light
immediately after sunset (OC 672).

>> Rav Herzog paskened that it was mutar, but the CI paskened that
>> it was assur because we have no mesorah with respect to it.

> Why is there a problem? Since the Zebu and regular cows can
> crossbreed (and have fertile offspring) they are Kosher. (IIRC
> that is the test the Gemara brings).

Huh? I thought the criteria (not brought down in the Gemara, but yes
in the Bible) is that the animal has to have split hooves and chews
its cud. Why is there an issue about cross breeding or a need for a
Mesorah about the animal? Isn't a check for the presence of simanim all
that's needed?

Avi Burstein

simchag@att.net (SimchaG)
>>> It is the nature of people that once they become accustomed to
>>> carrying on Shabbos, announcements and/or notifications that the Eruv
>>> is pasul will not be heeded and hence stop them from carrying. 

> so..are we trying to outsmart Shloimeh Hamelech?

What's Shlomo Hamelech got to do with it? Shlomo Hamelech took an area
where carrying was permitted (a shared reshut hayachid), and banned
carrying unless one performs a ritual (eruv chatzerot). In the context
of this thread, the term 'eruv' refers not to an eruv chatzerot, but to
a mechitzah enclosing areas where carrying is not allowed, in order to
permit it.

On 18 Mar 2004 at 21:32, Avi Burstein wrote:
> Why is there an issue about cross breeding or a need for a
> Mesorah about the animal? Isn't a check for the presence of simanim all
> that's needed?

AIUI the CI was m'chadesh the need for a mesora about animals. 

-- Carl

> Huh? I thought the criteria (not brought down in the Gemara, but yes
> in the Bible) is that the animal has to have split hooves and chews
> its cud. Why is there an issue about cross breeding or a need for a
> Mesorah about the animal? Isn't a check for the presence of simanim all
> that's needed?

Rabbi Ari Z. Zivotofsky has a good article on the subject here:

http://www.kashrut.com/articles/buffalo/

Akiva

No -- those who don't rely on eruvim are not trying to outsmart Shloimo
HaMelech -- Eruvim do have their place but

Halachas of carrying are Halachas of carrying and just as there are
poskim who hold one should go over Hilchos Shabbos every year to avoid
inadvertent aveiros one should realize that many halachos go into both
what constitutes a valid Eruv and what can and cannot be carried within
an Eruv (or what can be carried on YomTov for that matter) -- and it is
very easy to become casual if one takes an Eruv for granted.

Peretz Davidson

This topic is very relevant to tomorrow's daf yomi; I'd be interested
in how the chevra sees some of these gemaras. Mar'eh mekomos, all from
Chullin:

57a, top of page. The goy "shechting" someone be'achizas einayim in
order to get his father's kishkes to return to where they belong.

Later same amud: the Gemara (actually, Rabbi Yosi bar Chanina) has no
problem proclaiming the gadol hador (see Rashi) as being unfamiliar with
chicken anatomy (thereby implying that his pesak was not worth taking
seriously). And saying THAT belashon bedichusa.

57b, various types of veterinary "medicine" : skull transplantations
and the like.

Same amud, Raban Shimon ben Chalafta's experiment with the ants (noted
agav: the word for ants is shumshemani, which reminded me of my daughter's
only partially facetious rule that those who like to pick up the poppy
seeds that fall off the challah and absentmindedly eat them, should
refrain from doing so in the sukka for reasons that should be obvious!)

Finally, after RSBC's inability to "prove" the pasuk, his depending on
emunas chachamim (or, as Rashi puts it, emunas ruach hakodesh) for the
veracity of the statement in Mishlei. If someone could give me a good
explanation of Tos D"H Eizel ve'echezei, I'd be further along towards
understanding the Gemara.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

> On Sun, Mar 14, 2004 at 11:15:02AM -0500, Sholem Berger wrote:
>: In the context of this claim, how would you define "objective,"
>: "subjective," and "accurate"?

[Micha:]
> I'll give what I was thinking of, which is apparantly not the same
> as RML's.

I do agree with Micha. As an example, it has been pointed out that
the concept of syllogism, uses the concept of equating to determine if
somethin is or isn't. We, Jews, have a concept of hekesh which states
that is something is similar in one regard, it is also similar in
another regard. Similarity or relatedness, not equivalence. It goes
wihtout saying that syllogism is very blunt instrument that misses a
great deal of real phenomena.

I give an example:

If you went to the railroad station for the first time in your life
and met the ticket clerk in full regalia, you'd become familiar with
the uniform. When you sit in the train and the ticket checker goes by,
wearing only uniform pants, blue shirt and hat, you assume that he also
works for the railroad. Then, you migh take a walk and see the guy
who is loading in the coal; he is naked form the midriff down,except
that he is alsowearing the railroad cap. By syllogism, you could not
identify him as also belinging to the railroad staff but by analogy and
similarity, you definitely would. In daily life we use rabbinc thinking,
not Aristotelean logic.

M. Levin

FWIW- my notes from one of the sessions at the Van Leer conference re:R'YBS

STUDIES EXPLORING THE INFLUENCE OF RABBI JB SOLVEITCHIK ON CULTURE
EDUCATION AND JEWISH THOUGHT

An international conference commemorating the centenary of his birth.

Panel Debate: Inherent Tensions in Modern Orthodoxy.

The participants were Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, Rabbi Yitz Greenberg,
Rabbi Carmi Horowitz, and Professor Aviezer Ravitzky

Each of the speakers addressed the topic from a different viewpoint.
Rabbi Horowitz explained that Modern Orthodoxy contains a natural tension,
since Orthodoxy is conservative and modernity is forever changing.
Thus there were inherent tensions recognized by Rabbi Soloveitchik.
The Rav did criticize Modern Orthodoxy when appropriate, e.g. the lack
of deep religious experience\passion. (This reviewer wonders about the
thought expressed by his son concerning Orthodoxy in general - "having
lost the touch of his presence they seek now solace in the pressure of
his yoke.") Rabbi Horowitz also pointed out the Rav's opposition to the
historical approach to Halacha and Jewish philosophy and in particular
to the academic study of text. Rabbi Horowitz posits that perhaps this
opposition was more limited to the analysis of the Written Law.

Rabbi Lichtenstein spoke about the heritage of Rabbi Solveitchek and
in particular pointed out that there were a number of individuals who
tried to extend the Rav's approaches past where the Rav would have
been comfortable. (This reviewer understood this as an anti-left wing
Orthodoxy argument.)

Professor Ravitsky discussed the differing approaches between Rabbi Kook
and Rabbi Solveitchek. To oversimplify, he felt that Rabbi Solveitchik
defined the basic unit of existence as the individual whereas Rabbi
Kook defined it as the collective of the Jewish people. There are real
practical differences as to whether an individual must be a complete unit,
(i.e. try to fulfill a broad range of expectations,) or can the family
or the people of Israel be the unit and thus individuals can specialize
in only one area and have the others take care of the rest.

Rabbi Greenberg spoke at length about the tension of modernity and
Orthodoxy. He felt the role of Modern Orthodoxy is to deal with the
choices presented by the new culture and he felt that Maimonidies had
done this by reinterpreting Jewish philosophy in light of "modern"
Muslim culture. (e.g. corporeality.) Rabbi Greenberg defined the
role of Modern Orthodoxy as being the removal of the obstacles to
credibility and the representation of belief in a form that inspires
loyalty within the new society while at the same time insisting on no
change in authority. This is harder now since there is no agreement
to modern society that Revelation even exists whereas in Maimonidies'
times there was an agreement that Revelation was real. This is the
unique contribution of Rabbi Solveitchek to Jewish philosophy and Rabbi
Greenberg feels that we must not ask what Rabbi Solveitchek said about
something but understand that society around us continues to change and
we copy the Rav's approach which may yield different results today.

> The authority of Taanaim vs Amoraim vs Rishonim vs Achronim and the

See R Elchanan re Rav Tana UPalig in Kesuvos. Amoraim could but rarely
dissagreed withTanaim. A Tana and an Amora were on the same level because
they both learned from purely oral sources. An Achron can dissagree
with a Rishon . RHS elaborates on this issue at length in his shiur on
whether TSBP is dynamic or static in nature.

The best source on this that I know in English is Zvi Lampel,
Dynamics of Dispute (Judaica Press)where he discusses this isssue in
detail. Basically, he proposes a novel idea: the Amoraim only did not
disagree with Tannaim becasue the Tanna could be basing himself on a
Halacha L'Moshe Misinai of which fact an Amora may not be aware. However,
in matters when this is not a concern, such as which posuk a known
halacha is derived, they did argue.

M. Levin

WRT to RDE's citation of the Ginat Veradim - it actually deals with a
different issue - the problem that halachically, we need to determine
the status of a sefer torah - and we do it by majority vote (as per
(I believe the yerushalmi) that they determined the proper text of the
torah by majority combination of the three sefarim that were in the
hechal) - but he distinguishses that from the truth statement - which
is why a sefer tora following a minority opinion is bdiavad kasher. RGS
is talking not only about determining what we believe as a community -
and what we teach - but determining kfira which inherently requires
determining truth versus falsehood.

Ginas Veradim states that the halachic Sefer Torah is to be viewed as
the one that was given at Sinai. He acknoweldges that the specific text
can vary over time depending on the majority vote. Thus the Rambam's 8th
principle seems to be understood as not literally true but halachicly
true.

[Email #2. -mi]

David Riceman wrote:
>2. With regard to the reason for Spinoza's excommunication I had
>relied on Otzar Yisrael (s.v. Spinoza, pp.199-200). "After his father's
>death ... he attended synagogue rarely and devoted all his time to his
>Christian companions. Only after he left his sister's house to dwell
>with his Christian teacher did his teachers ... feel themselves obliged
>to excommunicate him."

>RDE quotes Encyclopedia Britannica that it was due to his doctrine, and
>that is also the opinion of Cordasco in his bibliographic introduction
>to Dover's edition of Spinoza's works. WADR, I suspect that these are
>philosophers writing for a Christian audience, who may not appreciate
>the distinction between Christian excommunication, normally based on
>doctrinal dispute, and Jewish excommunication, normally based on behavior.

Encyclopeida Judaica:
On July 27, 1656, Spinoza was excommunicated. The rabbinical
pronouncement, signed by Saul Levi Morteira and others, states: The
chiefs of the council make known to you that having long known of evil
opinions and acts of Baruch de Spinoza, they have endeavored by various
means and promises to turn him from evil ways. Not being able to find
any remedy, but on the contrary receiving every day more information
about the abominable heresies practiced and taught by him, and about
the monstrous acts committed by him, having this from many trustworthy
witnesses who have deposed and borne witness on all this in the presence
of said Spinoza, who has been convicted; all this having been examined
in the presence of the rabbis, the council decided, with the advice of
the rabbis, that the said Spinoza should be excommunicated and cut off
from the Nation of Israel.
Spinoza was then anathematized and cursed, and all in the Jewish community
were forbidden to be in contact with him.

Daniel Eidensohn

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