Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 113

Monday, March 8 2004

• Re: Learning as much as possible
• Delaying a brit until Sunday
• Re: on the 8th
• Re: Pidyon Haben
• RE: Pidyon Haben
• RE: G-d's existence
• havdala for women on motzei shabbos purim
• purim questions
• Re: G-d's existence
• Re: G-d's existence
• Purim and Bechirah
• RE: mishloach manos and matanos l'evyonim
• Toras Purim 5764: DAR-DAR, noch a kneitch
• Uncle Mordechai?
• Re: Matanot La'evyonim to be distributed in EY
• Re: mishloach manos and matanos l'evyonim
• Re: purim questions
• Re: Matanot La'evyonim to be distributed in EY
• RE: assur to see Passion?
• Re: purim questions
• Re: purim questions
• Essay - parshat zakhor from R Klapper

 From: "Carl M. Sherer" <cmsherer@fandz.com>
> Micha Berger wrote:
> Are you saying that other mitzvos .. should> only be done when one
> can't learn? For example, if I can learn every> evening, I shouldn't
> the volunteer for tomchei shabbos deliveries?

R. Carl-
> Not unless you can change the Tomchei Shabbos deliveries to a time when
> you don't have a regular seder..... Otherwise it seems to me that you
> should not be m'vateil from learning to do other mitzvos

While not wishing to be seen as a champion of non-learning, it yet
seems to me that RCarl's assertion, along with a number of similar
remarks from other posters that I recall from my -- these days -- very
episodic perusals of avodah, ought not be left unchallenged. It is also
another manifestation of the fundamental issue which I restate thusly
-- if learning is more important than anything and I must "hogisoh
boh yomum vo'loiloh", how could I take time to do ANYTHING else in a
time we could be learning -- and we should be learning continuously,
day and night. The Israeli yeshivish world at least has, with admirable
intellectual consistency, recognized the logical imperatives of this
rhetorical formulation and seems, to this outsider, to be acting on it.

Briefly r Carl is proclaiming the radical faith of the litvak as developed
by R. Chaim Voloshiner and his successors, which today surely encompasses
much (all?) of the "yeshiva velt". But there is an alternative perspective
best expressed in m'qoros from Chasidic sources. The first, quoted in the
name of the Besht, extols the virtues of learning the mishnoh of machlif
poroh b'chamor v'yoldoh, but extolling even more one who actually is
m'qayeim in real life the financial split according to halochoh. i.e.
chasidim have definitively weighed in on the Talmudic machloqes of
limmud or ma'aseh with the answer -- ma'aseh is greater. The second is
from R. Levi Yitzchoq (Bais Hal-levi on Ovos) who extolled the living
"torah" virtue of one who conducted his everyday business according to
the precepts of torah honesty. V'hogisoh boh yomum voloiloh is a way of
conducting life, not just a way of learning. As for learning itself, it
is very important and certainly everybody should learn torah every day,
but not necessarily all day.

Thus, while R. Chaim's radical and (in some instances) innovative
formulations have carried the day in current yeshivish oriented
society, there is plenty of intellectual pedigree for an alternative
weltanschauung. RCarl and the other posters are entitled to their litvak
faith but it is not one everybody shares, or even should share.

Mechy Frankel
michael.frankel@osd.mil
mfrankel@empc.org
michaeljfrankel@hotmail.com

<<RCS: That's because a yotzei dofen could be "timed" to come out whenever
you want (assuming, of course, that the fetus is viable).>>

Are you sure that's the reason? Doesn't this also apply for an emergency
C-section?

 - Ilana

On 4 Mar 2004 at 10:09, S Goldstein wrote:
> RCS:
>>That's because a yotzei dofen could be "timed" to come out whenever
>>you want (assuming, of course, that the fetus is viable).

> This last statement is not true. A. I don't think this metzius was
> always available. 

Which metzius? 

 - Carl

On 4 Mar 2004 at 12:44, Stein, Aryeh wrote:
>> Why do you call it an exception? The only place that the Shulchan
>> Aruch says zrizin makdimim is by a bris.

> (To tie two threads together) Although, since one shouldn't eat before
> being mekayem the mitzva of matanos l'evyonim and mishloach manos, one
> would probably want to do those mitzvos first thing after getting home
> from shul.

According to R. Tzvi Cohen (Purim v'Chodesh Adar 16:11), Rav Elyashiv 
is matir to eat before Mishloach Manos and Matanos la'Evyonim. 

If you're going to be oser, how will you know when your shaliach has 
been m'kayeim your shlichus to allow you to eat? :-) 

-- Carl

RCS:
> According to R. Tzvi Cohen (Purim v'Chodesh Adar 16:11), Rav Elyashiv 
> is matir to eat before Mishloach Manos and Matanos la'Evyonim. 

As I just posted, RSZA holds otherwise.  

RCS:
> If you're going to be oser, how will you know when your shaliach has
> been m'kayeim your shlichus to allow you to eat? :-)

As long as the shaliach eats first, that's fine. :-) Seriously, I do try
to make sure to give at least shaloch manos first thing in the morning
to be yozei the chiyuv.

As for matanos l'evyonim, you have the same problem - when you give the
money (on Purim morning) to the people making the collections, you also
don't know when your money will actually be given to the ani. Ela mai,
once I give the money to my shliach (whether a week before Purim or on
Purim morning), I can go ahead and eat right away, as my physical action
of giving has already been accomplished.

KT, Gut Shabbos and Purim Sameach
Aryeh

Sholem Berger <sholemberger@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> *Setting aside for the moment, of course, the fact that "evolution" and
>> "creation" are not mutually exclusive. 

RHM wrote:
> No they are not and in fact are quite compatible as they must be. The
> question is rather whether evolution was a random event or directed by
> a Creator. Furthermore, a concession to a Creator does not eliminate the
> infinite time factor that would allow for the natural selection process
> of Darwinian evolutionary theory.

If the "random" event of life was not too improbable, then you do not
need the auxiliary hypothesis of a Creator. This is what materialists
hope to achieve with evolution -- in that case religion is just the
opiate of the people.

[The Darwinist establishment despises theistic evolution. They view
theistic evolution as a "weak-kneed sycophant, who desperately wants the
respectability that comes with being a full-blooded Darwinist, but refuses
to follow the logic of Darwinism through to the end. It takes courage
to give up the comforting belief that life on earth has a purpose. It
takes courage to live without the consolation of an afterlife. Theistic
evolutionists lack the stomach to face the ultimate meaninglessness of
life, and it is this failure of courage that makes them contemptible
in the eyes of full-blooded Darwinists (Richard Dawkins is a case in
point)." (Quote from Dembski 1998).]

On the other hand, if life is improbable, then you do need a Creator
(or you relegate yourself to explaining existence as a "brute fact"). In
that case, undirected evolution is an infantile escape from reality.

The theory of evolution (and other materialistic explanations) perforce
accept an undirected non-teleological explanation of life.

I believe it is better not to trade on ambiguity. Leave materialists
with their word "evolution" (undirected and non-teleological), and let
us argue for the Creator and "Creation".

[Email #2. -mi]

I forgot to mention that (undirected) evolution is the Amaleki shita of
mikreh ("asher korcha baderech").
Very nogea to Purim.

A freilichin Purim ... Jonathan

good morning.

The halachos listed in the ezras torah luach indicate that havdala is
said after kerias hamegilla. I understand this to be an issue of not
drinking prior to fulfilling the mitzva. Am I correct?

The nafka mina is for women who are going to the second keria - I am
suggesting there is no reason for my wife to wait for havdala until after
she hears the megilla at the second reading, since she isn't drinking
the wine anyway.

thanks
elly

--
Elly Bachrach
Engineering Intent http://www.EngineeringIntent.com
mailto:EBachrach@EngineeringIntent.com

1- what determines yerushalayim for shushan purim purposes? municiple
boundaries? if new shchunot are added they get the same halacha?
if it urban-sprawled out to suburbs, would they take on the halacha
by contiguity?

2- looking to find a list of all the psuking that there are minhagim to
repeat phrases-- lifnehem-bifnehem, be'omram-k'omram . i saw in a sefer
sorer-shorer but have never heard that done

3-- in regard to these repeats i have seen in practice 3 customs -
just the word, a whole phrase repeated [v ish lo amd lifneihem], and
the whole pasuk ; but i cant remember who is noheig the whole pasuk and
where that is brought down

Those following this thread might be interested in the book "God and
Other Minds: A Study of Rational Justification in Belief in God," a work
of philosophy by the Christian analytic philosopher Alvin Plantinga at
Notre Dame. In it he summarizes arguments for and against major rational
arguments for God, and then presents his own take on a newer variety: the
analogical argument, according to which knowledge of God and knowledge
of "other minds" (i.e. that other people have minds like our own) are
in the same epistemological boat.

It's difficult but clearly written and well worth it.

From: Harry Maryles <hmaryles@yahoo.com>
> So, even though I do so with great trepidation I must, in the spirit
> of intellectual honesty, respond that reasonablity is unnecessary to
> one seeking to find truth without the precondition of the existence
> of a Creator. The scientist would say that until one can prove the
> existence of a Creator one should assume non-existnce, sort of like
> the set up of the scientific method where one wants to prove the
> "null" hypothesis...

If I understand you correctly I don't think I disagree. There is no reason
that a scientist need to assume divine intervention when considering a
scientific hypothesis. We clearly don't assume that the laws of nature
are regularly superceded but quite the opposite, open miracles are quite
unusual and G-d typically tries to deemphasis even these. But to base
one's world view and understanding of historical reality on something
which is merely 'possible', regardless of probability, and at the same
time ignore evidence which is generally not considered part of the realm
of the natural sciences DOES NOT strike me as a reasonable position but
rather as accepting the position that grants one the most liberty to
follow one's desires.

We generally explain the randomness of the pur of Purim in terms of
hashgachah and hesteir panim.

However, a different approach hit me during my pre-Shabbos commute.

First we encounter Achashveirosh -- a man who had plenty of power,
but no goals. He therefore sank to alcoholism, could be pushed around
by Mehuman to agree to things he regrets the next morning, etc...

Mordechai has little political power (other than his later power via
Esther). So, while he has what to strive for, he has little with which
to implement those desires.

Haman, OTOH, gets power in the begining of the story, which he immediately
puts to use for thr wrong purposes.

This notion that bechirah is the combination of opportunity and motive
in this way becomes a recurring theme in the megillah.

Through the course of the megillah, we see Esther develop in both ways.
She starts out being silent about her identity, because she was told
to. She won't take anything other than what Heigai recommends, etc...
She is given power, but doesn't use it. Until the critical moment, when
she realized "ka'asher avadti avadti". Then, she becomes the protagonist
of the book. She becomes the sole person who fully and properly implements
her bechirah.

The role of free choice becomes the basis in one of the critical
responses to the neis. "Qiymu veqiblu haYhudim", finally there was a
willing qabalas haTorah, in contast to the kafah aleihem hahar kegigis
of ma'amad Har Sinai.

Gut Voch!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure.
micha@aishdas.org        It preserves health, promotes convalescence,
http://www.aishdas.org   and helps us cope with adversity.
Fax: (413) 403-9905         - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei"

R' Aryeh Stein wrote <<< I saw it Halichos Shlomo, from RSZA. ...
According to RSZA, it was a davar pashut that matanos l'evyonim and
mishloach manos should be no different than davening, shofar, etc. (i.e.,
mitzvos that should be performed before eating.) >>>

Does he discuss why (or whether) one may eat before eating the Seudah?

My guess is that he doesn't discuss it, and that this is why: If one
would eat an amount of food that constitutes a seudah, then it is no
problem, because that could count as *being* the seudah, so there's no
violation. And if one eats *less* than that, again there is no violation,
because the issur of eating prior to a mitzvah (such as prior to Shofar,
prior to Chanuka lights, prior to Bedikas Chometz) is only on eating a
*seudah*. Most people are careful to avoid even noshing prior to these
mitzvos, but it really is not required.

(Eating before davening in the same category. But eating before
*Shacharis* is an exception to this, because is has the additional problem
that one should be more concerned with his neshama than his stomach.)

Akiva Miller

There are two big letters in the Megilla (that I noticed, at least):
The Ches of Chur and the Tav of Vatichtov.

Ches-Tav in Gimatria = Dor Dor (which is written chaser in Shemos, 17:18,
and of course in Bereishis 3:18).

Moreover, if you take the remaining letters - the vav and reish of Chur
and the vav, chaf, tav and beis of Vatichtov you get Ledoros (always
spelled chaser)!

GV, AFP!
YGB

Our Chaver Reb Ari Zivotofsky once wrote a piece in Jewish Action re
the common error of referring to Mordechai as Esther's uncle - when it
clearly states in the Megillah [2:7] that they were first cousins.

I recalled this because in the Shabbos edition of the Melbourne Age, there
was a 'religion' piece by John Levi, the former head of Reform/Liberals
here in Melbourne, which repeated this fallacy.

I mentioned it to someone here, noting that I feel like sending a letter
to the editor correcting this mistake. This TC told me to first check the
Targum Sheni - as he recalls that it does decribe Mordechai as her uncle.

I looked it up [at the back of the Torah Temimoh chumash] and lo and
behold found, that while the TSh writes "...Esther haves bas achoy
d'ovoy deMordechai" - the Hebrew translation there 'Pas'shegen Haksav'
translates it as " VeEsther hoyso bas achi Mordechai".

I have no doubt that there is a printers error ain PH and it should read:
"...bas achi oviv shel Mordechai.."

Has anyone seen anything to justify the PH as is it is [and lehavdil
(sorry REMT) JL] ?

SBA

On 5 Mar 2004 at 17:28, Micha Berger wrote:
>: 2. The chalos of a get is never the holacha - it's the kabala. The
>: kabala is chal whenever the shaliach makes the delivery and not at a
>: specific time. You don't designate a time when the kabala can be
>: made. (And if someone did make a get al tnai that it be delivered at a
>: specific time? Tzarich iyun whether the get would ever be good - can
> we be m'tzamtzem to a specific time?)....

> Here the tenai is even more fundamental. It's not so much a straight
> tenai as a term in the instructions to the shali'ach, a detail about
> the duty for which he was appointed. So yes, if you designate someone
> to give matanos la'evyonim, you are designating a time.

> Of course we can -- we do by ten'aim without the shali'ach. The whole
> inyan of le-achar 30 relies on this point.

I think there's a difference between le'achar shloshim (which could be
anytime le'achar shloshim) and a specific time (only on that day and
only during the day time).

[Email #2. -mi]

On 5 Mar 2004 at 17:28, Micha Berger wrote:
>:> I'm curious to know why you think one can't rely on this delayed
>:> chalos WRT qiyum mitzvos, but there is a delayed chalos WRT a
>:> sheli'ach leholakhah. VIDC?

>: 1. The bracha. The she'he'cheyanu that's made before Megillah in the
>: morning is meant to cover Seudas Purim, Mishloach Manos and Matanos
>: la'Evyonim. If you've been yotzei already, that bracha is a hefsek for
>: you. If you've appointed a shaliach (e.g. bedikas chametz), you don't
>: make a bracha - the shaliach does. And if you'll tell me that the bracha
>: is still being chal on Seudas Purim and Mishloach Manos, Purim Meshulash
>: b'Mukafim yochiach...

> Li nir'eh any one seasonal mitzvah warrants a shechiyanu. This is a
> general klal on every chag. 

Ain hachi nami. It's Purim M'Shulash in Yerushalayim. It's Friday 
morning. There's no seuda today and no Mishloach Manos (those are 
both done on Sunday). You've already given Matanos la'Evyonim. You 
heard/made She'he'cheyanu last night. Why isn't She'he'cheyanu by the 
Megilla a hefsek for you? (I would argue that it is). 

> We don't say Sukkah requires the
> shehechiyanu but not the 4 minim. There's no reason to say any
> particular one of the three is the target of the shechiyanu to the
> exclusion of the others.

But we don't make She'he'cheyanu two days in advance of performing a 
mitzva either. See above. 

> Besides, this wouldn't show that the person isn't yotzei, it would (in
> theory) show that someone who appointed a shali'ach in advance
> shouldn't make shehchiyanu in the morning!

See above. 

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son, 
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much. 

On 5 Mar 2004 at 8:57, S Goldstein wrote:
> previous quote, I forget from whom ['Twas  RCS -mi]
>> Why do you call it an exception? The only place that the Shulchan
>> Aruch says zrizin makdimim is by a bris.

> This is also quoted by lulav.  See SA OH 652:1

You're right.... So why is vasikin only packed on the first day of 
Succos and not the rest of the chag? :-) 

-- Carl

On 5 Mar 2004 at 9:59, Newman,Saul Z wrote:
> 1- what determines yerushalayim for shushan purim purposes? municiple
> boundaries? if new shchunot are added they get the same halacha? if it
> urban-sprawled out to suburbs, would they take on the halacha by
> contiguity?

Many people in Ramot keep both days. I believe that in Rav Shternbuch's
shul in Har Nof there are both Yud Daled and Tes Vav readings, but
that everyone actually keeps Purim on the 15th. With respect to my own
neighborhood, RSZA paskened before his ptira that we (who are between
Ramot and the rest of the city) should keep the 15th.

RSZA held in general that the municipal boundaries are kovea (it will
be interesting what will happen to Mevasseret if it is ever co-opted
into the city, as is often discussed).

The rule - AIUI - is samuch v'nireh. This has been extended to include any
place that can see a place that is samuch v'nireh. In our neighborhood,
despite the distance, from the upper floors of many buildings (I believe
including my own - I live on the ground floor), you can see Har HaBayis
from the windows.

> 2- looking to find a list of all the psuking that there are minhagim
> to repeat phrases-- lifnehem-bifnehem, be'omram-k'omram . i saw in a
> sefer sorer-shorer but have never heard that done

IIRC, Lifneihem - Bifneihem is repeated, but be'omram - ke'omram is
ksiv u'kri. You omitted l'hashmid (v)'la'harog ul'abeid. Ask me these
questions after I read the Megillah (for my wife) tonight :-)

> 3-- in regard to these repeats i have seen in practice 3 customs -
> just the word, a whole phrase repeated [v ish lo amd lifneihem], and
> the whole pasuk ; but i cant remember who is noheig the whole pasuk
> and where that is brought down

I think that everyone here is noheig the whole pasuk, although yesterday
the ba'al korei only repeated the phrase timche es zeicher/zecher Amaleik.

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son, 
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much. 

[RCS:]
>: The she'he'cheyanu that's made before Megillah in the
>: morning is meant to cover Seudas Purim, Mishloach Manos and Matanos
>: la'Evyonim. If you've been yotzei already, that bracha is a hefsek for
>: you. If you've appointed a shaliach (e.g. bedikas chametz), you don't
>: make a bracha - the shaliach does. And if you'll tell me that the bracha
>: is still being chal on Seudas Purim and Mishloach Manos, Purim Meshulash
>: b'Mukafim yochiach...

[Micha:]
> Li nir'eh any one seasonal mitzvah warrants a shechiyanu. This is a general
> klal on every chag. We don't say Sukkah requires the shehechiyanu but not
> the 4 minim. There's no reason to say any particular one of the three is
> the target of the shechiyanu to the exclusion of the others.

The morning Shehecheyanu, like its evening counterpart, is made on the
M'gillah reading. The Shlah added that one should also have in mind
the other daytime mitzvos, but if it wasn't thought about, no one says
that it should be made for the other mitzvos. (S'faradim yochichu: they
say that since, after the night reading, it is no longer a new mitzvah,
Shehecheyanu is not said by day. The other mitzvos do not require it.)
In general, where do we find a mitzvah not requiring a birchas hamitzvos
which has a Shehecheyanu?

[RCS, cont.:]
>: 2. The chalos of a get is never the holacha - it's the kabala.  The
>: kabala is chal whenever the shaliach makes the delivery and not at
>: a specific time. You don't designate a time when the kabala can be
>: made. (And if someone did make a get al tnai that it be delivered at a
>: specific time? Tzarich iyun whether the get would ever be good - can we
>: be m'tzamtzem to a specific time?)....

Yes, one can designate a time (and a place, if he so desires). When a get
is delivered by a shaliach, he is asked if there are any limitations on
his shlichus, whether he was to give it by a certain time or not give
it until a specific time. It's not a t'nai; it is a limitation of the
shaliach's authorization.

> I have heard (but have not seen any evidence) that some of the New Age
> Medicine (NAMs) practices may constitute avodah-zarah, and may also
> contain anti-semitic leanings.
> I would be interested in any specific examples or information on this.

Some schools of "energy healing" are AZ, according to Rav Hillel.

As to Anti-semitism -- while there are many New Age Leaders who are
Anti-semitic (and/or Anti-Established-Religion in general) I've never
heard of a NAM that is inherently Anti-Semitic.

Akiva

On 7 Mar 2004 at 13:30, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
>> 3-- in regard to these repeats i have seen in practice 3 customs -
>> just the word, a whole phrase repeated [v ish lo amd lifneihem], and
>> the whole pasuk ; but i cant remember who is noheig the whole pasuk
>> and where that is brought down

> I think that everyone here is noheig the whole pasuk, although
> yesterday the ba'al korei only repeated the phrase timche es
> zeicher/zecher Amaleik.

I was wrong about this. The ba'al korei tonight did not repeat *any* 
psukim. In the morning, I daven in a different shul.... 

Freilichen Purim. 
-- Carl

On 8 Mar 2004 at 1:29, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
> I was wrong about this. The ba'al korei tonight did not repeat *any*
> psukim. In the morning, I daven in a different shul.... 

Neither did the ba'al korei this morning.... But when I read for my 
wife and daughters, I repeat.... The Brisker influence of my 
youth.... 

> Freilichen Purim. 
> -- Carl

[Forwarded by RMP. Becaue of MIME issues in how it was forwarded, some
words may be split. I fixed some of them, but I ran out of time. -mi]

Amalek and Eden: Some thoughts on the Relationship between the Sacred
and the Good (Please note: This essay was originally delivered orally
last year, when the Torah reading that corresponded to Shabbat Zakhor
was the opening of Vayikra. I have revised it somewhat but not had the
opportunity to transform it structurally.)

Leviticus deals largely with what academic observers might call "the
sacrificial cult of Judaism", the rules and regulations governing the
offering of slaughtered animals and other products to God. This topic as
a whole is not in tune with modern Western sensibilities, which resonate
rather to the occasion al statements found in the Prophets denouncing
those who offer sacrifices while oppressing their fellows. I have argued
elsewhere, following Yoma 69a, that the capacity to experientially relate
to the sacrificial order is the positive side of the "evil inclination
for avodah zarah". The Talmud there records that this "evil inclination"
was subdued sometime during the period of the Men of the Great Assembly,
and that as a result it left the Holy of Holies in the form of a lion
(the shape of the fire on the altar). I have, accordingly, no expectation
of making these rites directly meaningful in our day, at least to those
in whom that "evil inclination" has not been successfully revived.

However, I can offer an "intellectualization" of what that experiential
understanding might be. The sacrificial rites are a process intended to
restore humanity to Eden. Thus "cherubs" appear twice in Torah, once
guarding the path back to Eden and once atop the Ark of the Covenant,
with the voice of God being heard from a dimensionless space between them.
It seems reasonable to conclude that the path to Eden leads through the
Holy of Holies. One can similarly understand that Cain and Abel focused
their relationship with God on sacrifices as an attempt to regain what
their parents had lost, a nd that Noah sacrificed immediately after
surviving the flood in the hope that, as the new Adam, he would be
restored to the original Garden.

However, the Torah does not explicitly frame the sacrificial order this
way. Rather, the Torah's continual frame of reference is "kedushah",
sanctity. It seems reasonable to conclude that kedushah and Eden are
analogous terms, that the quest for kedushah is synonymous with the
quest for Eden. Thus, again, the path to Eden leads through the "kodesh
kodash im". [This may also help us understand the association between
"tum'ah" and death, as death and the original Expulsion are intimately
linked. However, I have not as yet thought through the connection between
taharah and kedushah].

A central motif of the Eden narrative is the category tov/ra, which
for better or worse we can translate as good/evil. More specifically,
knowledge of tov/ra is antithetical to the Eden experience. My argument,
accordingly, is that kedushah and tov are at best parallel lines that
never meet, and at worst in conflict. (A word of caution: what I am
offering here is a broadbrush understanding of the sacrificial rite,
not an account of each of its myriad details. It may well be that some
details of particular sacrifices, especially those that allow those
with lesser economic means to accomplish the same ends via cheaper
sacrifices, are grounded in tov considerations, but I don't think this
affects my argument.)

We like to believe that, as regards individuals, kedushah and goodness
are intimately and inextricably linked. However, I suspect that most
of us can cite examples of individuals who seemed very holy, but who
nonetheless, or perhaps as a result, had less than positive relationships
with their fellow humans. Similarly, I think most of us know people
whose interpersonal behavior is superb but who nonetheless seem to have
nothing of the Divine about them (alt hough this is not as obvious).
My argument is that our observations are correct, that kedushah and tov
do not necessarily go together.

This argument also responds well to those who would reduce the sanctity
of sexual relationships to the interpersonal behavior of the parties
involved. Just as there can be perfectly valid kiddushin between people
who are cruel to each other -- the kedushah is not dependent on their
having a "tov" relationship -- so too, being kind and considerate in a
relationship does not make it kadosh.

All this brings us to today's maftir, the commandment to expunge the
memory of Amalek (and yet simultaneously to remember their deeds!).
I have at other times offered comments on various efforts at providing
an ethical rationalization for what is at core a commandment to commit
genocide; what I wish to suggest today is that such efforts are in
principle the result of a category error.

Ethics are on the tov/ra axis; Amalek should be understood as a mitzvah
of kedushah.

Maimonides understands the disjunction between Eden and tov/ra along
something resembling the following lines; Tov/Ra are not abstractions,
but relate to particular situations. In other words, one cannot say of
any particular action that it is tov or ra absent a concrete context.
Killing another human being, for example, can be either murder (if the
victim is wholly innocent), permitted (if the victim accidentally killed
a close relative, or if the victim is fighting for the other side in an
optional war), or obligatory (if the victim is illegitimately seeking to
kill someone else, or has been sentenced to death by a legitimate court).
My extension of this is that Tov/Ra always relate to the real, not the
ideal world. Those who focus their efforts along the tov/ra axis seek
to improve the world rather than to perfect it.

Kedushah, by contrast, can be understood as a purely abstract quality that
inheres in objects or persons regardless of their context. The kedushah
of kohanim, for example, is independent of their actions generally,
and never dependent on their ethics. Kedushah-centered commandments,
i.e. commandments whose telos is the maximization of kedushah in this
world, must seek to replace the non-kadosh elements of this world with
new kadosh elements rather than raising the kedushah level of the
existing elements.

Understanding mechiyyat Amalek as a kedushah-centered mitzvah,
accordingly, entails the realization that carried out partially it is
likely to have grievous consequences, as its purpose is not to improve
this world, but to re place it. Carried out partially, it will leave
this world in place, and not improved.

On the tov/ra axis, it cannot but be considered murder. And accordingly,
it is halakhically appropriate to seek every avenue for limiting the
mitzvah to eschatological fulfillment, as, for varying reasons, many
halakhists have done. The Torah itself limits the mitzvah to times at
which complete peace from all surrounding enemies has been achieved.

(Note that Amalek is not a "surrounding enemy", in other words that they
are defined as a group having no territorial dispute with the Jews.) Note
for example Yishav ev Sofer (cited in Sefer HaMafteiach), which, on the
basis of Smag via Hagahot Maimuniyot, says that mechiyyat Amalek becomes a
mitzvah only after we've conquered the whole world! (As Amalek is nomadic,
one can conquer the whole world geographically without subduing them.)

Note also the positions that the mitzvah applies only to the community
and not to individuals, and to the comm unity only when it is headed
by a monarch. Note also that the Torah always speaks of Amalek in
eschatological terms (midor dor, reishit/acharit). (As for the obvious
problem with this thesis, that Samuel ordered Saul to seek the destruction
of Amalek, many halakhists have already declared that episode eit her
a) a potential but failed eschatological moment or b) a horaat shaah
(action taken on the basis of a temporary suspension of ordinary law.)

Note also the position that Amalekites can convert to Judaism; I would
suggest that the commandment would be fulfilled by mass conversion
as well as by mass executio n, perhaps more so. Genocide generally
does not lead to the erasure of memory, but rather to its perpetuation.
Eliminating both the physical existence and the memory of Amalek would be
accomplished far better by the complete transformation of their culture
to the point that no one any longer identified with their past.

To sum up -- mechiyyat Amalek cannot and should not be ethically
rationalized, as it is a command that cannot be effective in a real
world with real world consequences. It can only work if it accomplishes
the complete transformation of a world to the extent that the new
world is unrelated to the old. In other words, it can work only if
this-world consequences are irrelevant, as its this-worldly consequences
are inevitably horrific. It functions in much the same way as various
other utopian schemes that have rested on the notion that the barrier
to utopia is the existence of particular people, e.g. the bourgeois or
the aristocrats or the Jews, and those Jews inclined to look forward to
its fulfillment would do well to learn from history lest they repeat it.

Final note: In essence, this dvar Torah is an expansion of an idea
I originally read in (now Rabbi) Nachum Spirn's writeup in Hamevaser
of a shiur by Rav Aharon Lichtenstein Shlita, and which (now Rabbi)
David Mouvsas later found for me in the Likkutei Chafetz Chayyim al
HaTorah. R. Lichtenstein sought to explain Shaul's loss of the monarchy,
working on the assumption that excessive mercy would not be a sufficient
explanation for that punishment. Accordingly, he assumed that the sparing
of Agag could not be the act that cost Shaul the monarchy. Instead,
he argued, Shaul's failure to kill Agag indicated that he believed the
killing of the rest of Amalek to be rationally/ethically justifiable,
that he understood the other killings sufficiently to be able to be
doresh taama dikra (fathom the reasons behind a Biblical commandment)
and pasken accordingly. However, the truth is that there is no ethical
justification for genocide, and the only possible legitimization of
such an act is its performance solely as the fulfillment of Divine
Will. Since Shaul performed it after a process of moral evaluation,
his killing of the other Amalekites is considered mass murder, and mass
murder is a fit cause for losing the monarchy.

This explanation has long been important to me for its legitimation
of ethical discomfort with acknowledged Divine command, and its mere
existence, and by implication the existence of it's originators, has been
a continual religious comfort to me. On an analytic level, however, I
have noted critically in the past that this explanation is paradoxical, in
that it posits that certain mitzvot are not subject to ethical evaluation,
and yet the determination of which mitzvot fall into that category
can only be the result of ethical evaluation (ethical evaluation serves
to determine the parameters of all but the most ethically problematic
mitzvot, which are left unaltered by the process??!!).

Furthermore, it may be dangerous, as it provides a ready defense for
anyone committing the most heinous acts in the name of Halakhah.
My version attempts to solve this problem by limiting all such
commandments to the eschatological realm, but, as noted above and
emphasized in conversation by my wife, who is quite opposed to the
thesis set out in this essay, it still provides such a defense if one
simply claims that one had retrospectively false or frustrated Messianic
expectations. I am not sure, however, that there is ever a way of removing
the profound dangers inherent in the fact that messianism seems, at
least in the short term, readily counterfeitable.

Author's Note: If you've made it all the way to the end, you probably
enjoyed this essay. You can sign up for my weekly parashat hashavuah
study sheet by emailing me, and an extensive archive of my past
study sheets, as well as other essays and source-sets, can be found at
www.summerbeitmidrash.org. Let me add also that I think this essay serves
as an excellent introduction to the work of the Summer Beit Midrash,
and that the Summer Beit Midrash really needs your help, especially
this summer as we are trying to meet the request of numerous budding
talmidot chakhamot for a women's program without yet having successfully
funded the existing program. Please feel free to contact me for more
information about the program, or to apply, or to volunteer. Checks,
should you be so moved, should be made out to The Summer Beit Midrash
and mailed c/o Rabbi Klapper to 10 Allen Court, Somerville, MA 02143.
Shabbat shalom and Purim Sameiach!

**********************


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