Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 111

Thursday, March 4 2004

• re: Matanot La'evyonim to be distributed in EY
• Re: Seudas Bar Mitzvah NOT on exact day
• Yom HaAtzmaut 5764
• Re: G-d's existence
• Re: G-d's existence
• Bris for Yotzay Dofen
• Re: Delaying a brit until Sunday
• on the 8th
• Re: Pidyon Haben
• Re: Toras Purim 5764
• Toras Purim 5764, Continued: DAR-DAR
• RE: Matanot La'evyonim to be distributed in EY
• RE: Matanot La'evyonim to be distributed in EY
• RE: Matanot La'evyonim to be distributed in EY
• Re: Matanot La'evyonim to be distributed in EY
• Re: Women Reading Megillah
• anthropic principle
• Re: G-d's existence

R' Carl Sherer wrote <<< But the Biur Halacha implies that you're not
m'kayeim the mitzva like that (at least that's how I read him). See also
MB 695:22. The Be'er Heiteiv 695:7 says "nistapakti". >>>

Like R' Aryeh Stein, I find both the Beur Halacha and Mishna Brurah cited
by R' Carl Sherer to be irrelevant, since they really don't address the
point that *your* shaliach is doing *your* action for *your* benefit at
a time when *you're* chayav.

But that Baer Heitev does address that exact point, and explains the
reason being that "since when he appointed the shaliach, he was not
yet chayav."

R' Aryeh Stein asked <<< Why is this different than any other mitzva
(aside from those mitzvas haguf, like shofar, lulav, etc, that shlichus
does not help)? >>>

Let's think of non-guf mitzvos, and ones which one might use a shaliach
for. Gittin is a mitzvah which applies all the time, so one can appoint
that shaliach at any time. Same for tzedakah in general. The Baer Heitev's
question would apply to those which have a specific time of *non*-chiyuv.

Examples: Can I appoint a shaliach for Bedikas Chometz, if I make that
appointment more than 30 days beforehand? Can I appoint a shaliach to
light Chanukah lights for me if it is not yet Chanukah?

One of my seforim directed me to the Aruch HaShulchan on this inyan.
Regarding Matanos L'Evyonim, he writes in 694:2, "It's pashut that one
doesn't have to give personally. He can also give via a shaliach, and
can appoint the shaliach prior to Purim, that he should give Matanos
L'Evyonim on his behalf on Purim."

However in 696:17 he leaves it as a safek whether this would work for
Mishloach Manos! He seems to feel that the Beer Hetev would allow it (even
though RCS and I read that Beer Hetev differently) but his own personal
feeling is that "He is not yotzay because Mishloach Manos must be on
Purim itself. Furthermore, the ikar of Mishloach Manos is for simcha,
and what kind of simcha does he get now from what he sent beforehand?"

The Aruch Hashulchan's use of the word "v'od" ("furthermore") indicates
that these are two independent reasons. The second one seems to be that
the *giver* has to get simcha on Purim from the Mishloach Manos, which
will not happen in the shaliach case. Perhaps for Matanos L'evyonim
there is no requirement for the giver to get simcha, which is why the
AH does allow an advance shaliach for that.

I don't think that the AH amply explained the first of those two reasons,
but from the context, it seems to me that he is agreeing with the idea
that one cannot make a shaliach before the mitzvah applies. But that
leaves me confused why he allows the shaliach for Matanos L'evyonim.

Akiva Miller

[R' Akiva Miller:]
> My experience is that almost no one (in chu"l, at least) is makpid to
> make a Seudas Bar Mitzvah on the exact day. 

i don't know what comunity or area your talking about BUT i have YET
to see a Seudas Bar Mitzvah NOT on the exact day. and i've been to alot
of them......AND that includes BP, Willie, Monsey, Lakewood, Chasidish,
Litvish, yeshivish...you name it....

Simcha G

Many people have asked about the proper day to celebrate Yom HaAtzmaut
this year, and I share with you a recent teshuva written by Rav Gedalia
Schwartz, the Av Beth Din of the Beth Din of America and the chair of
the va'ad halacha of the Rabbinical Council of America, to Rabbi Herring,
the Executive Director of the RCA.

Rabbi Michael Broyde
Dayan, Beth Din of America
Cell: 917-208-5011

Dear Rabbi Herring:

In response to your query concerning the celebration this year, 5764
(2004) of Yom HaAtzmaut, it is my humble opinion that it should be
celebrated on the Fifth of Iyar as usual, beginning Sunday evening, April
25th. The Chief Rabbinate of Israel has delayed this years celebration
to Monday evening, April 26th, because of concerns of possible Chilul
Shabbat for the commemoration of Yom HaZikaron which normally precedes
Yom HaAtzmaut. However, since this Yom HaZikaron is practically not
applicable to us outside of Israel, the concerns of Chilul Shabbat are
not relevant. Therefore, the original date of the Fifth of Iyar should
be observed as indicated above.

Gedalia Dov Schwartz
Av Beth Din
Beth Din of America
305 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1201
New York, NY 10001-6008

Micha wrote:
>3- Yes, the evolution of sentient beings is unlikely.
>However, had the unlikely not happened, we wouldn't
>be here to ask the question. So, one can't ask why
>people are thus and not otherwise?...

>In fact, if we didn't evolve at all, there'd be no one
>to ask the question. Supposed A & B played a game
>in which A gives B $1 if B rolls a six. The odds of rolling
>a 6 are quite low. But the odds that B had rolled a 6
>given that we know A paid B is much higher. The odds
>of our existance is quite low. The odds that we exist
>given that we're wondering about the odds is 100%.

If I can state this in other words, this is a Bayesian proof (as dicussed
here <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol04/v04n227.shtml#07>). When given
two possible frameworks - either evolution or creation - and assigning
the existence of humans in the first framework to be of a very low
probability and in the second framework to be of a very high probability,
the existence of humans indicates strongly that the second scenario is
correct. It is not an absolute proof but a strong indication. (Granted,
one can argue about the assignment of probabilities. But given my
assumptions, the conclusion is valid.)

Another example: There are two barrels. One has 99 red balls and 1 blue
ball. The other has 99 blue balls and 1 red ball. You close your eyes,
turn around in a circle a few times, stick your hand into a barrel without
knowing which one, pull out a ball, and then find that you have a blue
ball in your hand. In which barrel did you stick your hand? We don't
know for sure but the smart money is on the second barrel that has 99
blue balls.

So, too, while the evolutionary model has many possible outcomes, the
development of human life in it is so unlikely while in the creation
model the development life is so likely that the existence of human
life strongly implies that the creation model is correct. It is not
an absolute proof and one can always *believe* that, against the odds,
the evolutionary model is correct. But that is not where the smart money
should be.

Of course, one can always challenge the assumption that human life is
unlikely in the evolutionary model and likely in the creation model.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

On Wed, Mar 03, 2004 at 03:49:20PM -0500, Gil Student wrote:
: Micha wrote:
: >3- Yes, the evolution of sentient beings is unlikely.
: >However, had the unlikely not happened, we wouldn't
: >be here to ask the question. So, one can't ask why
: >people are thus and not otherwise?...

: >In fact, if we didn't evolve at all, there'd be no one
: >to ask the question....                     The odds
: >of our existance is quite low. The odds that we exist
: >given that we're wondering about the odds is 100%.

: If I can state this in other words, this is a Bayesian proof (as dicussed
: here <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol04/v04n227.shtml#07>). When given
: two possible frameworks - either evolution or creation - and assigning
: the existence of humans in the first framework to be of a very low
: probability and in the second framework to be of a very high probability,
: the existence of humans indicates strongly that the second scenario is
: correct. It is not an absolute proof but a strong indication...

It's not the proof you state. Yours is an argument in favor of a Creator,
you quoted my representation of an argument against. You actually
quite well describe the first variant of the anthropic principle. The
unlikeliness of man proves the likelihood of G-d.

The third variant, which you quote here, focuses on the idea that
the probability of humans given that there are humans to ask about the
probability is 100%. Not comparing an unplanned-big-bang-through-evolution
vs creation, but about the unplanned version alone. Because it's not
about choosing between two explanations for a result, it's not a Bayesian
argument.

And, as I wrote, it's platantly flawed -- slight of hand even. It tells
the listener not to ask about how something so a priori unlikely happened
because looking a postoriori it's not so unlikely. It would be like
someone who found a diamond on the floor being told not to wonder about
his luck because given that he found the diamond, the odds of finding it
became 100%. The question isn't answered, the person is being misdirected
to look at a different question.

The second version of the principle likens to the finder who asks "Why
did I find it and not him?" and answers "Because whoever was the finder
would be asking that question. Someone had to be the finder, therefore
someone had to be the wonderer."

As I wrote, this is flawed in that the belief in a him who could find it,
an infinity of other universes, is no less religious, no more the topic
of science as the Deity they're trying to avoid.



BTW, one need not invoke the likelihood of man to get a sense of the
improbability of existance. The universe had to start out with little
entropy. Entropy grows as processes continue. Had the universe started
out with more entropy, there would be no possibility for anything to
happen. If the universe we an even cloud of particles, it would be at
equilibrium. The cloud would be at rest. Nothing would occur.

Given that there are roughly 10^60 (read: 10 to the 60th power, i.e. a
1 with 60 zeros after it) protons and neutrons in the universe, the
probability of the universe leaving the singularity of the big bang in
a low entropy state is 1:10^10^123. Picture a 1 with 123 zeros after
it. Now, picture a 1 with that number of zeros after it. The odds are
one in that.

That's not the odds of human life, or of life in general. It's the odds
of a universe with a concept of change and event.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905      

In the thread "Delaying a brit until Sunday", R' Elly Bachrach wrote:
<<< Even on the 8th day we are not mechallel shabbos for the bris of a
yotzei dofen, so it isn't a blanket 8th day din.>>>

R' Carl Sherer responded <<< That's because a yotzei dofen could be
"timed" to come out whenever you want (assuming, of course, that the
fetus is viable).>>>

My understanding is that there's a different reasoning behind why a bris
for a yotzay dofen will not take place on Shabbos.

It's based on the first two psukim in Parshas Sazria. That's where the
"eighth day" business originates, but it is tied to the phrase "isha
kee sazria v'yaldah zachar". Torah Temimah Vayikra 12:4 says that the
word "sazria" is extra; the pasuk could have simply said "kee saylayd",
and so the Gemara Nida 40a concludes that the whole parsha only applies
"if the baby comes out the same way as the zera went in". The yotzay
dofen didn't do that, so his bris doesn't have to be on the eighth day,
so it does not override Shabbos.

That's the short version. For more details, I suggest most of the Torah
Temimah on those two psukim (Vayikra 12:1-2), or at least the bits of
Gemara that are quoted there.

Akiva Miller

>> Does the heter chilul shabbos elevate the bris of the 8th day to being
>> more special halachically than a nidcheh? Even on the 8th day we are
>> not mechallel shabbos for the bris of a yotzei dofen, so it isn't a
>> blanket 8th day din.

> That's because a yotzei dofen could be "timed" to come out whenever 
> you want

Not quite. There is an opinion in the g'mara that because of the proximity
of "kiymei nidas d'vosah titma" to "uvayom hash'mini yimol," only if
the mother is t'meiah tumas leidah is there a din of the eighth day.
Hence, a yotzei dofen could have his bris even on the day of birth.

The din of milah dochah Shabbos is derived from " 'bayom hashmini'
 -- afilu b'Shabbos," so a yotzei dofen is not docheh. However, it's
a question whether the opinion that the eighth day does not apply is
lahalachah. We therefore adopt both chumros: bris on the eighth day,
in case milah bayom hash'mini is not dependent on tumas leidah, but not
on Shabbos, in case the two _are_ linked.

As for scheduling a delayed bris on Sunday, see the Shach at the end of
Hilchos Milah, discussing the opinion that a delayed bris should not
be done on Thursday because the danger is greatest on the third day
and thus chillul Shabbos may be necessitated. He rejects the opinion
and paskens that it should be done on Thursday, since milah is a d'var
mitzvah and in such a situation we do not consider the possibility of
causing a chillul Shabbos because of pikuach nefesh. If there is nothing
wrong with an unnecessary delay, why the insistence on not waiting?
(B'didi hava uvdah: my b'chor was premature. On the 26th day, at noon,
the doctor said he was big enough to withstand milah. At the insistence
of my father z"l, the bris was done that day, at 4:00 PM.)

RCS:
>That's because a yotzei dofen could be "timed" to come out whenever
>you want (assuming, of course, that the fetus is viable).

This last statement is not true. A. I don't think this metzius was
always available. B. See Machlokes Amorai Shabbos 135b and Machlokes
Rishonim(eg Meiri) there.

Shlomo Goldstein

> Why do you call it an exception? The only place that the Shulchan
> Aruch says zrizin makdimim is by a bris.

(To tie two threads together) Although, since one shouldn't eat before
being mekayem the mitzva of matanos l'evyonim and mishloach manos, one
would probably want to do those mitzvos first thing after getting home
from shul.

KT and Purim Sameach,
Aryeh

In Avodah V12 #108, RYGB wrote:
> Bereishis 3:18
> V'KOTZ V'DARDAR TATZMIACH LACH V'ACHALTA ES EISEV HASADEH

> V'KOTZ - this is Egypt...
> V'DARDAR - this is Amalek...
> EISEVE HASADEH - these are all other opressors...

And what is TATZMIACH LACH (which RYGB didn't address)? Perhaps "...es
avdi tzemach" (and also see Zech. 6:12): his arrival on the scene is a
response for your benefit (LACH) to the continued (up until that time)
existence of Qotz v'Dardar -- after his arrival, V'ACHALTA, you'll "eat"
all of your enemies for lunch.

All the best from
 -- Michael Poppers via RIM pager

At 06:53 AM 3/4/2004, MPoppers@kayescholer.com wrote:
>And what is TATZMIACH LACH (which RYGB didn't address)?  Perhaps "...es
>avdi tzemach" (and also see Zech. 6:12): his arrival on the scene is a
>response for your benefit (LACH) to the continued (up until that time)
>existence of Qotz v'Dardar -- after his arrival,
>V'ACHALTA, you'll "eat" all of your enemies for lunch.

In Selichos this morning we said, in the pizmon:
    TZAR V'OYEV HILTISH EINAV, PIHU PA'AR LISH'OF ANAV...

Rabbi Rosenfeld translates that as:
"The adversary and enemy (Haman) glared fiercely (against Mordechai);
he opened his mouth wide to swallow the meek man."

B'mechilas kevodo, it is very difficult to say that the "anav" here
refers to Mordechai - that is not one of the prevalent kinuyim given
to Mordechai.

Rather, it is pashut that this refers to Moshe Rabbeinu a"h (MRAH). And,
of course, Chazal tell us that Haman rejoiced when the Pur fell on Adar
because that is the month in which MRAH was niftar.

But why?

This, too, is pashut.

MRAH corresponds to the sefirah of Netzach. Amalek is the antithesis of
netzach - "achariso adei oved" - in netzach there is no room for Amalek.
Moreover, an essential component of netzach is anavah: "va'anavim
yirshu aretz."

[See RAEK's definition of anavah (p. 137) based on Yerushalmi Shabbos 1:3:
"That which chochmo has made a crown for its head, anavah has made a
heel for its sole, as it says: Reishis chochmo yiras Hashem and it says:
Ekev anavah yiras Hashem." RAEK writes that to be a true anav one should
not equate oneself with the point of a pin in stature. One must realize,
rather, that one's stature is akin to that of the Himalayan Mountains -
and then realize how small one is in comparison to the Infinite. True
greatness is a prerequisite to true Torah anavah, and that only when one
reaches the outer limit of one's chochmo does one reach the beginning of
anavah. Clearly, then, anavah is the capacity to reach into one's kesser,
that which is beyond one's chochmo - which, as the Nefesh Ha'Chaim points
out, only MRAH really accomplished. And zeh l'umas zeh asah Elokim:
"Bilam and Amalek are connected because Amalek is the kesser of kelipah
and Bilam its daas" (R' Tzadok Machshavos Charutz 64b, Takkanas HaShavin
43b). This is clearly because, as opposed to MRAH who brought the nistaros
down to the niglos: "Amalek's will is to completely sever the nistaros
from the niglos" (M"C 10b).]

Amalek, on the other hand, is mushrash not in netzach, but in "me'dor
dor." Netzach, as the Rogatchover writes in Hil. Nezirus 3:14 (based
on the Narvoni on the Moreh pesicha to chelek 2) transcends time:
"Kol davar she'ein lo keitz havah kemo shelo hischil, keivan she'ein
shum nafka mina ba'zman she'nahag keivan d'l'olam ha'davar chal alav."

That which is l'olam transcends time.

By contrast, dor dor is the domination of time. As the Rogatchover
writes in Terumos (116-117): "Kavanas ha'Tosefta b'Eduyos perek aleph
[actually, 2:11] gabei mispar doros d'amar sham, v'af al pi she'ha'yamim
v'ha'sha'os k'chut ha'se'arah,v'zeh retzono lomar kemo chelek she'eino
mischalek... aval doros shayach behu geder hischalkus, v'im ken havah
davar nimshach..."

Indeed, the unique language "me'dor dor" indicates that Amalek is mushrash
in dor dor (the mem connoting origin), and, more so, that his shoresh is
the severance of generation from generation - no vav ha'chibbur. This is
the opposite of "Elokayich Tziyon l'dor va'dor," or "Dor l'do yeshabach
ma'asecha," which connote the hiskashrus of the doros one to another,
from the Beriah through Matan Torah to L'Asid La'Vo, and the attempt
to impose Malchus Hashem on the different situations of the different
generations (the lamed connoting imparting).

Of course, that is why Haman's ta'anah (to Hashem!) is "Yeshno am mefuzar
u'mefurad." Divisiveness is at the core of Amalek. Primarily, however,
it is to utilize the seder of mikreh (just as Bilam attempted to do,
by seizing on the rega of the day) to insinuate himself between Hashem
and Am Yisroel. Haman is: "the source of the power of delusion to say
'we are Yisroel'" (M"C 81a) and he "thought that Hashem had certainly
chosen him instead of Yisroel" (M"C 17b, 49b). He went so far, as the
Ba'alei Machashavah say about the eitz gavoha chamishim amah, as to
think that he would attain the 50th gate of binah - greater than MRAH!

V'al pi zeh muvan the Zohar that Ispashtusa d'Moshe b'kol dor - it is the
continued "yadav shel Moshe" (which is why davka Yehoshua was nitztaveh -
"V'sim b'oznei Yehoshua" - as the continuity in the next dor of MRAH)
b'kol dor va'dor (that is an intentional allusion to the paragraph in
the Hagadah) that is the l'umas zeh of Amalek's dor dor. Yadav shel
Moshe don't make or break war - they uplift libam shel Yisroel l'avihem
she'ba'shamayim. For that is the core of the refuah for the makkah of
Amalek. Amalek aspires to all the greatness of the Jews - but without
avodah, if possible (mikreh, finding the right "wormhole"), and certainly
with no lishma - the bond in liban shel Yisroel to Hashem Yisborach. It
is the lishma that is the whole nafka mina and the point to address.

[I once asked RSZ Broide zt"l if in Slabodka they really believe that
if Eisav walked into a Beis Medrash he would be wearing a frock and
homburg and we would put him on the Mizrach as a great Rosh Yeshiva,
and he said, yes, of course! What is the nafka mina between the chazir
of Eisav and Yisroel? The lishma!]

U'b'tocheinu, the Gra writes that there is a segment of the Jewish people
that are Ba'alei Machlokes "v'heim nikra'im Amalekim v'ein Ben Dovid ba ad
she'yisba'aru min ha'olam v'aleihem (!) ne'emar timcheh es zecher Amalek"
(Aderes Eliyahu to Devarim 1:1).. No wonder R' Tzadok writes: "Omnom gam
b'Olam Ha'Zeh nitzrach kol nefesh limchos me'lebo es mah she'b'yechalto,
ki zeh ikkar eisek ha'adam b'Olam Ha'Zeh" (Pri Tzaddik, Zachor #5).

And, of course, that is why al pi rov parashas Zachor is read with
parashas Tetzaveh, the only parasha with no mention of MRAH...

V'yesh l'hosif.
YGB

To illustrate the issue that Carl and I have been debating, I am
excerpting two different appeals for matanos l'evyonim.

Appeal # 1 (from a letter sent from the gabbai tzedaka of my shul,
dated March 2, 2004)
"First, we wish to thank all those who are donating Matanos L'Evyonim for
Purim. In anticipation of your donations, we have arranged to distribute
funds in both Baltimore and Israel on Purim. Your gifts help to replenish
the account for our outlays....."

I would agree that if I give money to this fund now, I am probably
*not* fulfilling the mitzva of matanos l'evyonim (but I am, of course,
fulfilling the mitzvah of tzedaka.

Appeal # 2 (from an e-mail (from torah.org) on behalf of Ezras Yisroel
Organization)
"YES! I would like to join Ezras Yisroel in bringing joy to so many
broken hearts. I understand that my entire donation will be distributed
to the needy on the day of Purim, thereby fulfilling my obligation of
Matanos L'evyonim."

I think that if I give money to this fund now, I *am* fulfulling the
mitzva of matanos l'evyonim (if it is given to the poor on Sunday).
But I assume that R' Carl would disagree.

KT and Purim Sameach!
Aryeh

On 4 Mar 2004 at 10:50, Stein, Aryeh wrote:
> Appeal # 2 (from an e-mail (from torah.org) on behalf of Ezras Yisroel
> Organization)
> "YES! I would like to join Ezras Yisroel in bringing joy to so many
> broken hearts. I understand that my entire donation will be
> distributed to the needy on the day of Purim, thereby fulfilling my
> obligation of Matanos L'evyonim."

> Me:  I think that if I give money to this fund now, I *am* fulfulling
> the mitzva of matanos l'evyonim (if it is given to the poor on
> Sunday).  But I assume that R' Carl would disagree.

I would say that it's a safeik (I actually found the Aruch HaShulchan that
RAM posted last night pretty persuasive, although I actually saw another
sefer today that claims that the AhS holds that you're not yotzei!).

I'm still not persuaded that you can perform mitzvos in advance by
remote control. And the Be'er Heiteiv brings this exact case (OH 695:7)
and says "nistapakti" if he's yotzei, and the Magen Avraham (695:13)
compares Matanos la'Evyonim to Mishloach Manos, and I think you agreed
that we can only be yotzei Mishloach Manos bo ba'yom.

So I have nothing against giving tzedaka in advance. But I wouldn't rely
on it to be yotzei Matanos la'Evyonim on Purim.

 -- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son, 
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much. 

> Me:  I think that if I give money to this fund now, I *am* fulfulling 
> the mitzva of matanos l'evyonim (if it is given to the poor on 
> Sunday).  But I assume that R' Carl would disagree.

RCS:
> I would say that it's a safeik (I actually found the Aruch HaShulchan 
> that RAM posted last night pretty persuasive, although I actually saw 
> another sefer today that claims that the AhS holds that you're not 
> yotzei!). 

I get Avodah in digest form, so I haven't seen RAM's post yet. I actually
took a quick look at the MB, BH and the AhS last night, but it was after
1 am, and I don't think I was fully functioning at the time.

RCS:
> I'm still not persuaded that you can perform mitzvos in advance by
> remote control. And the Be'er Heiteiv brings this exact case (OH 695:7)
> and says "nistapakti" if he's yotzei,

I still don't think that the Be'er Heiteiv is speaking about our case
at all. We are talking about shlichus; the BH is referring to when I
personally hand the evyon money prior to Purim day. In the case that
we are discussing, the money does not reach the evyon's hands until
Purim day.

RCS:
> .....and the Magen Avraham (695:13) compares Matanos la'Evyonim to
> Mishloach Manos, and I think you agreed that we can only be yotzei
> Mishloach Manos bo ba'yom.

Well, I do agree that we can only be yotzei Mishloach Manos bo ba'yom -
but I also believe that we can appoint a shaliach (before Purim day) to
deliver shaloch manos for us (on Purim day) - just like matanos l'evyonim.

RCS:
> So I have nothing against giving tzedaka in advance. But I wouldn't 
> rely on it to be yotzei Matanos la'Evyonim on Purim. 

I agree. But when I give Matanos la'Evyonim to my shliach to deliver
on Purim day, *I *am *giving *Matanos *la'Evyonim *on *Purim *day -
*so *I *am *yotzei!

After all of the discussion about the inyan, I am going to be
super-machmir on Purim day. When I hand the envelopes with checks to
the evyonim I deliver to on Purim day (on behalf of the local Tomchei
Shabbos type organization), I will add some cash from my own pocket to the
envelope. This way, I am 1000% guaranteed to have fulfilled the mitzva -
even l'shitas RCS!

Kol Tuv and Purim Sameach
Aryeh

On Thu, Mar 04, 2004 at 07:35:21PM +0200, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
: I'm still not persuaded that you can perform mitzvos in advance by
: remote control...

Isn't that what shelichus is? Appointing someone in advance to do a
mitzvah for you? The mitzvah is not in advance, the chalos is when
then shali'ach does it. It's only the appointment that is.

I'm curious to know why you think one can't rely on this delayed
chalos WRT qiyum mitzvos, but there is a delayed chalos WRT a sheli'ach
leholakhah. VIDC?

 -mi

Rav Ariel's Teshuva on this question:
(short and to the point, in Hebrew):
<http://www.yeshiva.org.il/ask/print.asp?id=5621>

Shoshana L. Boublil

[Micha:]
> For the fine tuning of the laws of physics, it requires believing
> that there are many existing universes. Or, that the universe expands,
> collapses, and undergoes another big bang yeilding another set of
> laws of physics. IOW, many universe at once, sequentially in time,
> or a combination.

to be pedantic - actually only simultaneous infinite universes works.
If they are consecutive then it is the gambler's paradox. i.e. the fact
that the last thousand throws of the dice has given 6 says absolutely
nothing about the probability of the next throw (assuming fair dice)

 -- 
Prof. Eli Turkel,  turkel@post.tau.ac.il on 3/4/2004
Department of Mathematics, Tel Aviv University

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> The odds of our
> existance is quite low. The odds that we exist given that we're wondering
> about the odds is 100%.

> I think RET is speaking to this variant in particular. But, rather than
> picking an obvious "special case" to our pattern seeking minds, there
> is an added bit: The only thing that makes the way things turned out
> similar to a run of sixes, ie something to wonder over, is the result
> that we're here to wonder.

> Frankly I think this one just avoids the question. It doesn't justify
> the a priori improbability, it simply asks you to ignore it by looking
> at the a postoriori likelihood instead.

But the fact is... that we ARE here to wonder. No matter how unlikely
the probability of an evolutionry cause is, the fact of existence and
the POSSIBILTY of an evolutionary cause makes the probability question
moot. As I said earlier, something had to happen some way and and this
is what happened V'Ha Rayah here we are. So an a priori improbability is
besides the point, isn't it? The causality of our existence by a Creator
may be a more likely scenario but not a necessary one.

[Email #2. -mi]

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> That's not the odds of human life, or of life in general. It's the odds
> of a universe with a concept of change and event.

Why speak of odds when speaking of possible explanations for
existence. Does it make any difference to the last winner of the powerball
lottery that her odds of winning were so low that she was a hundred times
more likely to ber struck by lightening? The fact is that she won. The
same thing can be argued for a non-Creator theory of existence. True,
the odds are a diffrent order of magnitude but the argument works
the same way. As long as it is POSSIBLE, than that's all one needs to
explain existence.

HM

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