Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 101

Tuesday, February 24 2004

• (Fwd) Ask! - Bargaining with Terrorists
• e-tzniut issues
• Re: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos
• Necessity of G-d's Existence
• what makes a posek
• Re: e-tzniut issues
• R' Aviner on women's group megilla readings
• Re: Women Reading Megillah - R' Shlomo Aviner's Position
• Re: kol isha al hayam?
• RE: S'char for a BT vs. FFB
• RE: S'char for a BT vs. FFB
• Re: Necessity of G-d's Existence
• Gemtrios (with specific reference to Purim)
• Re: e-tzniut issues
• Re: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos
• HAneitz? HEneitz//HOneitz!
• Re: Eye Surgery (d'Oraysa) on Shabbos

I believe this question - from Ohr Sameyach's Ask the Rabbi list -
is something that we have discussed in the past.

-- Carl

From: Adam Blumenthal

Dear Rabbi,

  I was wondering if you could discuss the laws pertaining to
  Pidyon Shevuyim (redeeming captives). I know it is cited as a great
  mitzvah. However I was wondering if there is a point where it should
  not be allowed under the grounds of either inequitable exchange or
  in the event that it could encourage more enemies to take captives,
  since our enemies consequently know the value that Jews hold for the
  redemption of their captives. Basically, I was wondering if there is
  a point at which we should not redeem our captives because it may in
  the long run do more harm than good. Thanks and Shabbat Shalom, Adam.

Dear Adam,

While it is beyond the scope of this column to evaluate any general
policy or specific case of redeeming Jewish captives, I will present to
you what our sources say about the subject.

Redeeming captives is included in the Torah commandment of charity.
In fact, the Rambam writes, "the mitzvah to ransom captives takes
precedence over supporting and clothing the poor. Indeed, no commandment,
be it ever so important, can compare with [it], since the captive is in
the category of those who suffer hunger, thirst, nakedness, and are ever
in mortal danger. One who is willfully slack in aiding to ransom a captive
transgresses the commandments: 'You shall not harden your heart, nor shut
you hand from your needy brother' (Deut. 15:7); 'That your brother may
live with you' (Lev. 25:36); 'Deliver them that are drawn unto death'
(Prov. 24:11) - besides many other similar commandments. Truly, no
commandment, be it ever so important, can compare with the ransom of
captives."

Given the great importance of this mitzvah, it would seem that
there should be no limit to the amount of money to be spent to redeem
captives. It is interesting, then, that our Sages asserted, "Captives are
not to be redeemed for more than their monetary value, as an enactment
for the good of society". Two reasons for this restriction are offered in
the Talmud: to prevent the impoverishment of society and to discourage
kidnapping. This is precisely the reason that you suggest. If Jews are
willing to pay any sum to redeem their captives, there will be no end
to kidnapping Jews. However, a Jew who is taken captive, G-d forbid,
must not be left to suffer captivity. Therefore his monetary value
(generally accepted as his productivity worth, or alternatively the
"going rate" for captives) was fixed.

There are some exceptions to the limit imposed upon redeeming
captives. An individual may redeem himself for any price, because
the Rabbis did not expect one to be able to uphold this enactment
regarding oneself. Similarly, one is permitted to redeem his wife
at any price because the Torah view is that one's wife is considered
"as oneself." Another exception is in ransoming or trading prisoners of
war. In such a case, a much more flexible approach may be taken because
redeeming POWs at an unfavorable exchange rate will not give the enemy
an incentive to start another war - countries don't go to war because
of an anticipated favorable POW exchange rate.

The issue of exchanging Jewish captives for terrorists is more
complicated. Here, there is no formal war such that inequitable exchange
wouldn't be considered the cause of a new war. On the contrary, terrorists
are interested in a prolonged conflict, and unequal exchange gives
them more incentive to kidnap and obtain more concessions. And even an
"equitable" exchange is not necessarily acceptable here because releasing
terrorists creates an additional potential threat to the public.

However, based on the writings of Rabbi Yosef Karo (author of the
Shulchan Aruch, the authoritative code of Jewish law) this may be a
tolerable risk. He writes, "The Jerusalem Talmud concludes that one is
obligated to place oneself in possible danger in order to save someone
who is in definite danger. It appears that the reason for this ruling
is that one is in definite danger, while the other is only a doubt,
and he who saves the life of a fellow Jew is as though he has saved
an entire world". On the other hand, since a released terrorist is not
exactly interested in buying Israel Bonds or planting trees for the JNF,
the danger may be more definite than doubt, in which case the exchange
should perhaps not be made.

I'll conclude with a true, documented story. Rabbi Meir of Rotenburg
(1222-1293), one of the greatest Torah scholars of his time, was captured
while trying to flee the harsh edicts of Emperor Rudolf I of Hapsburg. The
Emperor imprisoned him in the Tower of Ensisheim, and demanded an
exorbitant ransom from the Jewish community for his release. Fearing
other despots might pursue a similarly lucrative practice by kidnapping
other rabbis, Rabbi Meir refused to allow the community to pay the 23,000
talents of silver ransom they were willing to pay. Despite the community's
appeals, Rabbi Meir languished in prison for seven years until his death.

But since he forbid his ransom even after death, his remains were not
released for burial until fourteen years later, when a wealthy Jew could
no longer bear the disgrace, and paid the much lowered ransom. So ended
one of the most remarkable acts of martyrdom and sanctification of G-d's
name recorded in the annuls of Jewish history. Rabbi Meir's selfless
dedication to his people's welfare and his utter self-denial in their
behalf ensured that Torah luminaries were never again held hostage for
the extortion of huge ransoms from the Jewish people.

Sources:
 - Rambam, Mishna Torah, Zeraim, Hilchot Matanot Ani'im, 8:10
 - Gittin 45a, Mishna
 - Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 252:4
 - Ketuvut 52a, Tur, Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 78
 - Tosafot, Gittin 58a
 - Beit Yosef, Choshen Mishpat 426
 - Masters of the Mesorah, Rabbi Zechariah Fendel, p110
 - Maharshal, Yam shel Shlomo, Gittin 4:66

(C) 2004 Ohr Somayach International - All rights reserved.

I have been following this list for some time, although I've never posted
before. Following the discussion on tzniut (revolving to a large extent
around my home town of Bet Shemesh) and the one on practical actions vs.
philosophy / ideology in defining levels of religious commitment, I'd
like to pose the following question to this forum of e-mail savvy and
Torah savvy individuals:

What, if any, are the paramenters of tzniut on e-mail? While clearly
certain types of e-mail content are off limits, what about e-mail/chat
friendships between members of the opposite gender? Are there concepts
of virtual yichud in chatroom or in an inbox (whether hashkafic and/or
halakhic?), seeing as it is a private place, even if there is no danger
of actual yichud outcome? Does it matter if these people know / see each
other in "real" life or not?

In the case of married people, are there issues regarding exclusivity
of the e-contact which undermines the spouse by it's very nature, unless
s/he is cc-ed? (This reminds me of R. Hutner's Pakhad Yitzkhaq on Hannukah
(Ma'amar Aleph) - that TSHB"P was quite intentionally not written down
as it is our exclusive brit with HQBH - and anything that undermines
this exclusivity, no matter how small or innocuous, is crucial to our
relationship with G-d and therefore assur.)

And where does bitul Torah factor into all of this? Can one posit that
by definition any time consuming friendship / interaction between the
(married or non-shidduch interested or non-professionally related) genders
is simply a waste of precious time as it can clearly (or hopefully)
go nowhere. (Is it like relationship Disney, to pick up on another
thread?) What of an online inter-gender Havruta (one-on-one)?

But I digress. What are our norms as a community regarding married
people sending friendly, chatty, non-tachlis mails - ie: not an avodah /
areivim post:) - with 100% kosher content and intent - to other married
people? Are there limits to this type of "qirva"? Is it the same or
different as person-to- person contact that does not include four people,
but two? (And what of this, if there is no halakhic yichud involved?)

I guess it all boils down to this, both in the actual and the virtual
worlds, but most pointedly in the virtual one: To what extent is tzniut
(esp. regarding matters of gilui arayot) and its gedarim a matter of
imagination / exclusivity, in which case the (innocuous but private)
contact itself might be the problem, and to what extent are they only
intended to prevent further sin?

For the sake of full disclosure, I have a not-yet-published novel
manuscript (not of the Artscroll or Feldheim variety, to pick up
on yet another thread) on this very topic of imagination, loyalty,
platonic relationships, morality, and e-mail, although the halakhic /
Orthodox hashkafic component was left out, as the book is intended for
secular audiences.

However, the topic fascinates me from all perspectives, and I would be
interested in your thoughts.

B'vrakha,
Sara Eisen

Would Dr. Avraham also permit killing a louse on Shabbos? It could be
argued that it is the same issue. If science/nature has changed from
the time of Chazal, should we revise halachah accordingly - at least
lechumrah? Many, but not all, would say yes.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

I am learning Ramchal's Derech Hashem with someone and we were discussing
the end of the first chapter where, among other things, the Ramchal writes
that G-d must exist. Not only does G-d exist but he MUST exist, presumably
because a perfect being's perfection necessitates His existence.

I cannot, al regel achas, recall seeing this anywhere in the rishonim. If
anywhere, it would probably be somewhere in the depths of Moreh
Nevuchim. Has anyone seen this in an earlier work? Or could it be the
influence of Descartes?

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

Apropos the thread on women as rabbis, I'd like to ask a tangentially
related question: What makes someone a posek? (I am referring now to men,
not women.) Many of us know talmidei chachamim who have vast knowledge
of halacha and are still not thought of as poskim, and indeed do not
get asked shailos (although they may be asked for information and
mekorot). Clearly, some of these people don't get asked because they
refuse to answer shailos, but some just don't get asked--or so it seems.
It also seems that some people become poskim simply by virtue of being
asked shailos. (This is how Rav Moshe described the process by which
he became the posek hador in America.) Poskim don't get appointed;
they just happen.

So, is psak related to shimush? Personality? A combination of halachic
knowledge and chochmat chaim? A combination of halachic knowledge,
chochmat chaim and tzidkut? A willingness to take responsibility/risks?
Some intangible quality? Is there a "legal mind" in the halachic sense
as there is in the secular sense, or is psak of necessity different?
It seems obvious that psak is not just a matter of knowing the material.
And I'm guessing that psak differs in some essential way from other
processes of interpretation. Does anyone talk about how the posek arrives
at psak (in traditional sources, not academia--though I'd settle for
that if there's nothing else on the subject.)

Kol tuv,
Simi Peters

Sara and David Eisen <dseisen@bezeqint.net> wrote:
> What, if any, are the paramenters of tzniut on e-mail? 

Off the cuff answer: 

The Gedarim revolving around the 3 issues you raise seem to me to be three
very different issues. 1 is the issue of general Tznius not nercessarily
related to Erva issues. the 2nd issue is related to Erva issues, and
the 3rd is whether the entire enterprize is Battalah, especially for men.

As to issue number one, I do not see any differneces between cyber-Tznius
and Stam Tznius, Tzneh Haleches applies in all cases.

Issue number three is somewhat more complex. One man's Battalah is another
man's Limud HaTorah. This concept is seen in the reason for allowing
Mechanchim to be paid for teaching Torah even though technically one
is not allowed to take Schar for teaching Torah. The "loophole", if you
will, is that we are paying for the Melamend's Schar Bitul, because he
could be learning something else, instead of teaching and re-teaching
year after year the same subject matter. We see from this that it is
considereed Bitul to speak even in Inyanim of Torah if we can put to
better use our time spent on learning. OTOH someone who would spend his
time on even greater forms of Battalah, then this list can be seen as
a form of learning, especially on the Avodah side.

Issue number two is a lot more complex. Issurei Erva are issues
directly related to Arayos. Discussion of sexually related topics can
cause Hirhurim on occasion. The problem is that there are different
thresholds for different people. One can I suppose draw a line that is
subjective to each individual and say that whatever that individual's
threshold is, is the line of Issur for him... and him only. Halacha
defines Erva in concrete terms, such as exactly what part of an
uncovered body is considered Erva and what part is not. Less clear is
"topical Erva". ...That is, discussions revolving around discussions
of areas that touch upon Erva, without actually seeing it except in the
mind's eye. This question is valid not only in cyber-space but even in
real-space. Can mixed genders have discussions face to face about these
kinds of topics? In what context. Need it be classroom, or is it OK even
in a casual context amongst a group of freinds? Is there a difference
between married couples discussing it and mixed singles? To what extent
is any sexually based discussion permissible?

Cyber-space adds an additional barrier between the discussants but as we
all know cyber-space can be a very dangeroous place to be when involved
with members of the opposite sex. Theoretically two members of this
list can continue off list, any discussion we have on list about the
most intimate of matters and end up having a cyber-affair, Chas V'Sholom.

So what are the parameters and Gedorim that need to be employed by
the participants on this forum to prevent Michshol? I'm not sure. I
suppose this problem is just another facet of the general problem with
the internet and all of its associated dangers. The potential for abuse
is exponentially great and the slippery slope is extremely steep.

Charedi solutions are to simply Assur the internet entirely. But to me
that is just not a viable solution because of the great resource the
internet is and, at least for me, e-mail lists like this one are great
resources for Halacha and Hashkafa discussions.

My solution is to be responsible. One must know his strengths and
weaknesses and know how to deal with them accordingly. Any tool can be
abused, including this e-mail list.

HM

From: "Gil Student" <gil@aishdas.org>
> A post on Mail-Jewish directed me to the following recent teshuvah from
> R' Shlomo Aviner. My attempted translation loses some of the flavor of
> his Modern Hebrew:

I read it at the posted location, and was looking for a forum in which
to comment on it.  Thank you.

Some of this seems to be based on odd arguments...

See http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/english/tfila/frimer2.htm as my main
source of counter-arguments.

Does anyone know why mail-jewish.org is down for the past couple of days?

> I was asked a question in the following language:

> We are a group of women who want to organize for Purim a megillah reading
> only by women because we heard that it is permissible for a woman to read
> for herself or for a friend. We do not want to be forced in a side but
> in the center of the event, as it will be when a woman is the reader.
> Particularly in these days, when women learn Torah, we see a blessing
> in this. This new way of worshipping G-d is more appropriate for us
> and better.

He was really asked in that language, which seems unnecessarily confron-
tational?  There are ways to ask questions.  "Can I take mixed karate
classes?"  vs. "To advance beyond the grey belt, I need to take mixed 
classes; what should I wear?  how should I handle this?"  It's almost
asking to be rebuffed.

> This is my answer to them:

> 1. Since you want to worship G-d [better] (and certainly not worse), you
> must first know that when a woman reads megillah she enters a doubt over
> how to recite the blessing: "al mikra megillah" or "lishmo'a megillah"
> (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 689:1-2). And, as is known, a situation
> in which there is a doubt over the blessing is not ideal because it
> is possible that you are not reciting the proper blessing. Therefore,
> the best way in the worship of G-d is that a woman should hear megillah
> reading from a man.

Or, her posek rules on which bracha to say, and they do it.  That's the
way of psak.  Or is one bracha "better" than the other?  Does the *exis-
tence* of a doubt in the nusach of a bracha detract from either the say-
ing of the bracha or the act over which it is said?

> 2. Additionally, what is mentioned in halachah is that a woman should
> read for herself or for another woman. It does not discuss her reading
> for many women (Tosafos, Sukkah 38a sv "be-emet am'ru"; Korban Netanel,
> Megillah ch. 1 nos. 40, 60; Sha'ar HaTziyun, 689:15; Kaf HaChaim, ad loc.

However Tosafot Harosh on Sukkah 38a, which is generally regarded as
a more accurate version of Tosafot, holds that Tosafot only ruled
against women reading for *men*.

It seems to be Korban Netanel's chiddush that bans women for reading 
for a group of other women.  Citing that Tosafot without citing the
alternate version of ThR seems disingenous.

> no. 17). The great R' Mordechai Eliyahu went so far as to say that
> even bedieved one should be strict and hear [megillah] again from a man
> (Sefer Hilchot Arba Parshiyot uPurim, p. 100 n. 5). The better worship
> of G-d is to hear [megillah] from a man.

> 3. Also, the Magen Avraham cites the Midrash Ne'elam on Ruth that a woman
> should not read [megillah] for herself but, rather, should hear it from
> a man (Magen Avraham 689:6; A"B [???]; Gra; Mishnah Berurah, no. 8; Kaf
> HaChaim, no. 18; Ba'er Heitev, no. 3). While there is no obligation to be

that's very interesting, since R' Frimer cites Mishna Brura in Shaar Hatziyun
as arguing with the Magen Avraham over his paskening from the Zohar.  Further,
the M"A seems to say one way in one place, and the other way in another.

> strict like the Zohar over the Shulchan Aruch, the Chida writes that we
> do not find a custom of women reading the megillah (Machazik Berachah,

Lo rainu eino raaya, no?

> no. 2). In practice, it has been ruled that, if there is no man to read
> [megillah] for her, a woman should read for herself but not if there
> is a man to read [megillah] for her (Chayei Adam; Mishnah Berurah,
> no. 8). Thus, if you are looking for the optimum it is to hear
> [megillah] from a man.

Both late, and both generally machmir.

> 4. Generally, one should not change the customs regarding the forms of
> prayers (Responsa Rashba, vol. 1 no. 323. Cf. Orach Mishpat, no. 35). The
> forms of prayers that extend [back] hundreds or thousands of years are
> very good.

And so both forms of the bracha are old, no?  How is this relevant?

> 5. This brings us to the question of what urgency there is to establish
> new forms. Do we think that the forms that we used constantly for
> generations are not good? Do we have complaints against them? The great
> R' Moshe Feinstein writes that even if there are new ways of prayer
> that are not prohibited, but they come from complaints, are prohibited
> because of the motive (Iggerot Moshe, vol. 4 no. 49). An example is when
> the Children of Israel requested a king, of which they are commanded,
> but they did so with complaints (Sanhedrin 20b); they [did so] with a
> desire to imitate the nations.

And we got a king, and the royal line is a necessary part of yemot
haMoshiach - not a great counterexample, if you ask me.

> 6. This brings us to a more general point: We should not create new ways
> to worship G-d, as the Netziv writes in his commentary on the Torah to
> the verse "Do not follow after your hearts and after your eyes." If there
> were additional good ways then the beneficient Master of the Universe
> would not have hidden them.

"Creating new forms"?  You mean, resurrecting old forms.  As in, the Gemara
in several places speaks approvingly of women reading *for men*, and the
only early source that presents a problem is a Tosefta that rules against
women reading *for men*. Is the Tosefta, as extra-Mishnaic material,
dispositive? Or is the gemara dispositive as batrai?

These forms were hardly hidden, if there is a considerable talmudic and
responsa literature regarding them.

> Throughout all the generations there were women who were great in wisdom
> and chessed, who reached great heights, but never attempted to read
> megillah for themselves. Beruriah did not read megillah, nor Yalta,
> nor the daughter of R' Shmuel ben Eli the gaon of Baghdad, nor Rashi's
> daughter, etc. etc. In the ways that G-d has given us, 600,000 women

And how does the rav know this? AFAIK, history is silent on whether
these women leined megillah.

> achieved prophecy. Therefore, if a woman wishes to rise in the worship
> of G-d, praiseworthy is she and her portion. The path in which she will
> see light is the study of Messillat Yesharim; from there she will rise
> up high.

Has the rav then ascended to the level of prophecy, to know that which
cannot be known without ruwahh haqodesh?

   - jon baker    jjbaker@panix.com     <http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker> -

On 23 Feb 2004 at 13:48, Gil Student wrote:
> 1. Since you want to worship G-d [better] (and certainly not worse),
> you must first know that when a woman reads megillah she enters a
> doubt over how to recite the blessing: "al mikra megillah" or
> "lishmo'a megillah" (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 689:1-2). And, as is
> known, a situation in which there is a doubt over the blessing is not
> ideal because it is possible that you are not reciting the proper
> blessing. Therefore, the best way in the worship of G-d is that a
> woman should hear megillah reading from a man.

I don't recall where I got this from (and it may have been just from
learning the MB on my own), but AIUI, when I read Megillah for women
(as I do at least for my wife every year) and I have heard it in shul
already, I have one of the women make lishmo'a megilla rather than being
motzi them in the bracha myself.

As I am reading Rav Aviner, it might be better for me NOT to hear Megillah
in shul if I have to read for women outside of shul so that I can make
al mikra megillah for them.

And just to segue into another topic which is going on Areivim right
now :-) there is a CI chumra that the person who reads Megillah for a
tzibur should be yotzei with them (this came up in our house last year
and two years ago when our eldest son read Megillah on Purim d'Mukafim
for the Ma'arava boys who came from Bnei Brak for the chagiga and even
though they had already heard Megilla on Purim d'Prazim, they insisted
that AY NOT hear Megillah in shul here before leyning for them).

 - Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son, 
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much. 

RAM wrote: 
> ....I went there, and was surprised to find that article's translation
> of that pasuk (Shmos 15:21) as <<< ... And Miriam chanted for them
> (masculine suffix): Sing to the Lord, for for He has triumphed gloriously;
> Horse and driver He has hurled into the sea" ...>>>

> Previously, my understanding had been that the women separated from the
> men, and sang among themselves. But this is not tenable, if the word
> "them" is masculine, and indeed it is "lahem" (not "lahen"), and I thank
> the author of that article for pointing that out.....

See the Lekach Tov who asks, b'sheim someone else, (and answers b'derech
drush) several questions on this pasuk:

1) Why does the pasuk say "lahem" and not "lahen"? (He presumes that
Miriam sang with the women separate and apart from the men.)

2) Why does the pasuk use the word "vataan" - "she answered"?
What question was she answering?

3) Why did Miriam pick specifically that pasuk of "Sing to the
Lord...Horse and driver He has hurled into the sea."? Out of all the
pesukim of the shira, why that pasuk?

Answer:

When Miriam took the women aside to sing, the women asked Miriam:
"Why should we be so happy? The whole point of yetzias mitzrayim is the
kabalas haTorah at Har Sinai, and we don't even have a mitzvah to learn
the Torah?"

So, Miriam _answered_: "Lahem!" - we, the women do have a chelek in
Torah - by allowing our husbands to learn, we get s'char too!

And Miriam specifically sang that verse to show the women that the horses
got punished equally with the mitzrim - the horses that were the tools
that the mitzrim used to pursue the Jews. So, al achas kamah v'kamah,
the women, who will be instrumental in allowing their husbands to learn
the Torah that we will receive on Har Sinai, will get the same s'char
as the men.

Not exactly pashut p'shat, but....

KT
Aryeh

> There is a well-known (Gemara?) that in a place where a baal teshuva
> stands, a tzadik gamur cannot stand....My understanding of this has been
> that the baal teshuva knows why he is avoiding treif, and he remembers its
> taste, so he is not merely avoiding it passively the way a frum-from-birth
> does. Rather, his avoidance has a positive aspect to it which the FFB's
> avoidance lacks. This is closely related to the concept of "z'donos
> naaseh zechuyos", when sufficient teshuva occurs.

> My b'chor challenged all of the above. His point is that the BT has a
> clear understanding of right and wrong, and has deliberately chosen to
> keep the Torah. He has defeated his yetzer hara for these things. The
> FFB should therefore get more s'char than the BT, because the FFB has
> to keep fighting his yetzer hara.

A simple answer to your b'chor's question is that, when it says "a place
where a baal teshuva stands, a tzadik gamur cannot stand," it does _not_
mean that the baal teshuva's place is higher/better than the place where
a tzadik gamur stands. All it means is that the BT has a special place
reserved for him, not that a BT is necessarily better than a tzadik gamur.
(I heard this pshat a long time ago from an adam gadol, who used it to
answer the question: "Does this mean that a BT automatically is better
than Rashi, R' Moshe Feinstein, etc...."

KT
Aryeh

> A simple answer to your b'chor's question is that, when it says
> "a place where a baal teshuva stands, a tzadik gamur cannot stand,"
> it does _not_ mean that the baal teshuva's place is higher/better than
> the place where a tzadik gamur stands. All it means is that the BT has
> a special place reserved for him....

I don't know if anyone has mentioned this yet, but it is a machlokes
in the gemara (Berachos 34b) about whether a BT gets more schar than a
tzadik gamur.

KT
Aryeh

In a message dated 2/24/04 5:40:36 PM EST, gil@aishdas.org writes:
> I am learning Ramchal's Derech Hashem with someone and we were discussing
> the end of the first chapter where, among other things, the Ramchal writes
> that G-d must exist. Not only does G-d exist but he MUST exist, presumably
> because a perfect being's perfection necessitates His existence.

> I cannot, al regel achas, recall seeing this anywhere in the rishonim. If
> anywhere, it would probably be somewhere in the depths of Moreh
> Nevuchim. Has anyone seen this in an earlier work? Or could it be the
> influence of Descartes?

See Pirush on the Rambam Hil. Yesodei Hatorah 1:1 "Motzui Pirush Mchuyov 
Hametzius"

Kol Tuv,
Yitzchok Zirkind

http://www.innernet.org.il/article.php?aid=221

> Discussion of sexually related topics can cause Hirhurim
> on occasion....discussions revolving around topics that
> touch upon Erva, without actually seeing it except in the
> mind's eye. This question is valid not only in cyber-space
> but even in real-space. Can mixed genders have discussions
> face to face about these kinds of topics? 

If it's the topic of discussion that causes hirhur (and that hirhur is 
forbidden), it should make no difference if it's with members of the 
opposite sex or not. 

Avi Burstein

Gil Student <gil@aishdas.org> wrote:
> Would Dr. Avraham also permit killing a louse on Shabbos? It could be
> argued that it is the same issue. If science/nature has changed from
> the time of Chazal, should we revise halachah accordingly - at least
> lechumrah? Many, but not all, would say yes.

This subject came up a few times during RYGB's Daf Yomi Shiur in
Chicago. IIRC, R. Aaron Soloveichik held that anyone who Paskin's that
killing Kinah on Shabbos should be put into Cherem. Is my memory serving
me correctly?

If it is then I take from that that RAS must hold that once Chazal Pakin'd
that a Kinah does not reproduce sexually which is a requirement for the
Issur, than it doesn't matter what we dicover subsequently about its
nature. The Psak stands eventhough the stated reason for Chazal's Psak
was that Kinim do not reproduce sexually.

HM

Someone wrote: <<< It was at 7:30. Netz had nothing to do with it. >>>
RMB corrected: <<< The word you're looking for is "haneitz". Sorry for
the nit-pick, but...>>

one nit begets another.  while the classic gotcha correcting neitz to 
haneitz is ever popular, there  seems no reason to offer it in lieu of the 
better attested (Kaufmann codex) both HEneitz and HOneitz .  see exchange 
between myself and prof steiner in mail jewish, vol 37 #89 and references 
therein. 
(http://shamash3.shamash.org/listarchives/mail-jewish/volume37/v37n89).    
MF

David Hojda wrote:
>The case involved a man who was in Haddassah with a detached retina that
>had occurred erev shabbos. The surgeon scheduled the repair for Shabbos
>AM. The man's brother called two major poskim and they both said that he
>may not have the surgery, even though it would lead to loss of vision
>in that eye, as modern medicine would not consider an eye injury to be
>a situation of sakkanas nefashos.

Rabbi Bleich (Contempoary Halachic Problems II page 234-235):

"Since, at present, medical science recognizes little or no hazard
in physiologic jaundice, physicians routinely advise their patients
that circumcision may be performed on the eighth day without fear of
endangering the infant even though the child manifests clinical signs
of physiologic jaundice. Parents thus reassured are anxious to fulfill
the mitzvah of milah in its proper time and are reluctant to delay
circumcision until after the jaundice has disappeared. Support for
this practice has also been expressed recently by Dr. Michael Amit in a
contribution to the first volume of Halakhah u-Refu'ah, edited by Rabbi
Moshe Hershler (Jerusalem, 5740) . Medical opinion notwithstanding,
Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 263: 1, rules quite clearly that a child
should not be circumcised when signs of jaundice are present. This
provision of Jewish law is, to be sure, predicated upon considerations
of health. Nevertheless, it is well established that matters which in
rabbinic sources are regarded as posing danger to life must be considered
in that light even if contemporary science fails to recognize a potential
danger. Thus, Shabbat restrictions must be ignored in order to treat a
patient deemed by Jewish law to be afflicted with a dangerous condition
even if physicians deny that any danger exists. Bach, Orach Chayyim 328:4,
states unequivocally that physicians, in espousing such Opinions, are
in error. Language which is even more emphatic in nature is employed
by Pri Megadim, Eshel Avraham, Orach Chayyim 328:2. The matter can
perhaps be put into a more felicitous perspective by recognizing that
a talmudic statement expressing that a certain malady is dangerous in
nature engenders, at the very minimum, a state of doubt. Although it is
indeed possible that "nature has changed" (nishtaneh ha-teva) and that
a given danger no longer exists, or that such a pronouncement was based
upon inaccurate medical assumptions which were current at the time, it is
also possible that the Sages may indeed have been privy to information
not available to physicians of subsequent ages and that at some future
time medical science may again perceive the hazard as veridical. [3. Cf.,
R. Yonatan Steif, Teshuvot Mahar; Shteif, no. 52. ] Certainly, absence
of evidence of known danger does not exclude the possibility that danger
may occur in even a single instance. [ 4. See Teshuvot Maharam Schick,
Yoreh De'ah, no. 24. See also R. Moshe Sternbuch, Moladim u-Zemanim, VII,
no. 205, who cites an observation attributed to the late Brisker Rav to
the effect that untoward effects of circumcision of an infant suffering
from physiologic jaundice may not become manifest until "many years
have elapsed"; hence, in the absence of proximate temporal succession,
medicine has understandably failed to discover a causal connection
between circumcision in the presence of physiologic jaundice and the much
delayed onset of a life-threatening condition.] With regard to neonatal
jaundice in particular, while it may readily be granted that physiologic
jaundice poses no known danger to the child, there does exist a distinct
possibility that the jaundice is, in fact, the effect of a liver or other
disorder and is misdiagnosed as physiologic jaundice. This consideration
itself might wel1 have been sufficient cause for the Sages to prohibit
circumcision in all cases of jaundice. The halakhic rule is that even
the possibility of hazard must be treated as a danger. Accordingly, any
matter considered by the Sages as posing a threat to life must be regarded
as constituting a possible hazard for all purposes of Halakhah. Indeed
the attitude of Jewish law with regard to possible threat to life is
succinctly stated in the final sentence of the statement codifying
the prohibition against circumcizing a child who exhibits sIgns of
jaundice. Rambam, Hilkhot Milah I: 18 and Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah
263: 1, declare, "It is necessary to be extremely careful with regard to
these matters. It is forbidden to circumcise a child in whom there is
a suspicion of illness since danger to life takes precedence over all
else, for it is possible to perform circumcision at a subsequent time,
but it is never possible to restore a single Jewish life." ...

Shemiras HaGuf v'HaNefesh page 54): The sefer Nishmas Avraham (14:4)
quotes R' Sherira Gaon and R' Avraham ben HaRambam that the medicinal
cures mentioned in the Talmud are only reflections of the medical
knowledge of those times and thus are outdated. The author cites this
view as one of the reasons why these cures should not be utilized today.
However R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach commented that this view should not
be classified as a primary reason but only as a minority view. Therefore
the other reasons cited by the Nishmas Avraham should be considered the
proper explanation. I asked R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach which rabbinic
authorities have rejected the view of R' Sherira Gaon and R' Avraham ben
HaRambam? He wrote to me the following: "At the present time I don't
remember if there was anyone who actually rejected this view or even
whether there is anyone who is authoritative enough to disagree with them.
But since many write that the reason is because nature has changed and no
one mentions the reason that modern medical knowledge is an improvement -
therefore I commented that it is best to classify their view as a minority
opinion. In particular since in regards to Shabbos there are those who
permit melacha [in cases where the gemora indicates that there is danger] -
even though doctors don't consider that there is a danger at all.

       Daniel Eidensohn

**********************


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