Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 077

Tuesday, January 13 2004

• Re: 10 Tevet
• Re: Mrs. Kohen's dilemma
• Re: Mrs. Cohen's dilemma
• Re: Mrs. Cohen's dilemma
• Re: Mrs. Cohen's dilemma
• Re: Mrs. Cohen's dilemma
• Re: Gam zu l'tova & Bechira
• Re: Ramban/Shechinah
• Re: 10 Tevet
• Re: Gzeira/tzibbur
• Re: shape of the menorah
• Ramban on teva
• Re: Ramban/Shechinah
• final redemption requires a suffering tzadik
• using Mormon archives
• Meaning of "l'zecher" and "zichrono"
• Re: Meaning of "l'zecher" and "zichrono"
• FW: Niheyeh v niheyah
• Re: Mrs. Cohen's dilemma
• Re: final redemption requires a suffering tzadik
• Re: Mrs. Cohen's dilemma
• Re: Ramban/Shechinah

In a message dated 1/7/04 3:26:19 PM EST, Mlevinmd@aol.com writes:
> Here is a partial list of places where Greek words were darshined as if
> they were Hebrew. See Genesis Rabba 36,12, Megila 8b-9a, Shabat 31b,
> and 63b, Yerushalmi Megila,1,Baba Kama 82b, genesis Rabba 36, Pirkei
> DR. Eliezer 38,. See Pesachim 61a where Syrian is similarly expounded

See todays Shiur Rashi Breishis 49:5 from the tanchuma.

Kol Tuv,
Yitzchok Zirkind

R. David Riceman: <I think we're winding down here.  I have one major
disagreement with Rabbi
Mandel, and a few nits to pick.  First the major disagreement:>

SM: <The groom is obligating himself to treat his wife just as all
Jewish men are supposed to treat their wives, with honor and respect....
That may include taking out the garbage or it may not; if it does, he
cannot say "but I am a talmid chochom" or "but I am a kohen" and
therefore exempt. He already contracted that he was not exempt from
normal husbandly duties.>

RDR: <Rabbi Mandel seems to believe that standard behavior is normative,
i.e. that one rule of behavior fits all husbands (he doesn't say this
explicitly, but I think it'll come out more clearly below, when I
discuss his treatment of Mrs. King).
I claim, on the other hand, that if Mrs. Cohen knew when she was getting
married that her husband was a religious fanatic who had dedicated his
life to restoring kedushat kehuna, she and he would have read the kesuba
in that
light.>
I would agree with you as far as meqah ta'ut goes, and even might agree
as far as other things -- were it not for the k'subba.  I see no other
possibility of reading "k'hilkhot guvrin y'hudain" other than saying it
refers to standard norms of behavior of Jewish men.  You cannot sign
something like that and claim "but I meant that I can do things in the
way I expect to do them, regardless of what most men do."  You can only
claim that you didn't know what you were signing, but that is a claim
that doesn't work in civil court, nor in BD either.

SM: <I would expect that the k'subba for a melekh would be significantly
different than for us, hoi polloi.>
RDR: <The problem is that there's considerable discussion of hilchos
melachim in Hazal Rishonim and aharonim.  As far as I know (though I'm
not widely read) no one says this.>
I don't think this is a problem.  The rishonim bring the dinim of a
k'subba in several places; they don't just present a nusakh and say
"this is it."  When the Rambam brings nuskhaos, he is careful to say
"nahagu Yisrael likhtov shtar X b'nusakh zeh," i.e. our particular
nusakh is a minhag, and binding as a minhag.  But the minhag developed
after there were no longer any kings.  The k'subba of a king would have
to conform to the halokhos in the g'moro, but not to the customary
nusakh.
Further, AFA I understand it, if the entire section of "va'ana eflah
v'oqir" etc. that we are discussing were omitted, it still would be a
valid k'subba, although it would be against established minhog, which is
binding.

RDR: <1.  Rabbi Mandel gave a nice summary of the history of the Rama's
opinion (there's also a Smag and a Hagahoth Maimonioth, for any
fanatical students of history on the list) and a plausible attempt to
harmonize it with the Rambam.  The Gaon (Biur HaGra ad, loc.) held that
the Rama was disagreeing witht he Rambam.  There's no need for Rabbi
Mandel to agree with the Gaon about this (the Gaon's opinion requires
some justification he didn't give), but Rabbi Mandel's explanation is
not universally accepted.>
Perhaps I did not make myself clear.  I meant to convey that the Rambam
disagrees with the Mordekhai based on Rabbenu Peter, the source of the
R'Mo.  My purpose in bringing the history of the R'Mo's opinion was not
to be pedantic, but to show that even according to the R'Mo, where the
issue is m'hila, a kohen can become an eved, and qal vahomer that he can
obligate himself in "serving" his wife.  I then took a step back, noted
that the Rambam disagrees with R. Peter's idea that a kohen can be mohel
his kavod, and explained how the Rambam would deal with the fact that a
kohen can sell himself to be an eved, and also noted that the Rambam
doesn't make any statement about an issur of hishtamshus; he talks only
about kavod, although that may include the former.  Finally I noted that
the Taz argues that the opinion of Rabbenu Tam is not like R. Peter, and
explains R. Tam in a way that is similar to my explanation in the Rambam
(although not identical), and says that we hold like R. Tam, not R.
Peter.  Neither the Rambam nor the Taz would agree with the Mordekhai,
who just quotes R. Peter.  (And, for R.n Luntz: I agree that Rabbenu
Tam's opinion is not clear.  I just stated that the Taz says he
disagrees with R. Peter, and noted that the language in Tosfot also
supports that position.)

"David Riceman" <driceman@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> 2.  Rabbi Mandel wrote:
>> A melekh, when faced by a wife who refused to do his bidding, could
>> have her executed as a mored b'malkhus.

> This almost convinced me that no one in her right mind would marry a king.
> Just in case there's someone on the list whose youthful hope and mature
> aspiration was to marry a king, I'll point out that there's an old and
> honorable distinction between a king's legitimate commands and any other
> commands he gives.  See H. Gezeilah 5:14, Hidddushei HaRamban BB 55a.  in
> the light of Rabbi Mandel's terminology the diyuk of the Ramban about
> "malchusa" is particularly interesting.

Surely there's a difference between the law of 'dina demalchuta',
which is subject to a dizzying variety of interpretations by the
rishonim, and the law of 'mored bemalchut', which seems much simpler.
It may well be, depending on which rishon you pick, that the king
has no power to make certain kinds of laws, or even any laws at all,
and that many purported laws are not binding on people; but it seems
pretty clear that a direct command from the king is binding, not
as 'dina' but as kavod, and failure to obey such a direct order is
merida bemalchut, because it is an insult to the king.

It is interesting to compare this to the case of a navi, who cannot
change dinim at all - if he says that from now on beef is treif
or pork is kosher we are commanded to ignore him - but he can give
a horaat shaah which must be obeyed, e.g. he can say that today you
must not eat beef, or today you may eat pork, and what he says goes,
not because the din has changed, but because a direct command from
Hashem (transmitted by a navi) overrides the din.  Similarly, a king
may not be able to change the laws of the country (or may be limited
in how he can change them), but he can give a specific person an
order, and out of kavod for the king the person must obey.

Cf the archetype of mored bemalchut, Uriah Hachiti, who received
a completely unreasonable order from the king, disobeyed it, and
the gemara tells us that the king therefore had the right to have
him executed, but went about it in the wrong way.  (Or could we
speculate that Uriah was different because he was a soldier, and
David was his Commander In Chief, so disobeying the order was a
breach of military discipline, which is clearly a form of treason,
whereas a civilian receiving such an order would not have to obey
it?)

-- 
Zev Sero                    "I will do whatever the Americans want,
zsero@free-market.net       because I saw what happened in Iraq, and
                             I was afraid."
                                                - Muammar Gadaffi

R' Seth Mandel wrote <<< The groom is obligating himself to treat his
wife just as all Jewish men are supposed to treat their wives, with honor
and respect.... That may include taking out the garbage or it may not; if
it does, he cannot say "but I am a talmid chochom" or "but I am a kohen"
and therefore exempt. He already contracted that he was not exempt from
normal husbandly duties. >>>

R' David Riceman wrote <<< Rabbi Mandel seems to believe that standard
behavior is normative, i.e. that one rule of behavior fits all husbands
... I claim, on the other hand, that if Mrs. Cohen knew when she was
getting married that her husband was a religious fanatic who had
dedicated his life to restoring kedushat kehuna, she and he would have
read the kesuba in that light. >>>

R' Riceman, can you please offer us your interpretation of the phrase
"k'hilchos guvrin Yehuda'in"? If this does not mean that there is a
normative standard for *all* Jewish husbands, then what *does* it mean???

If a talmid chacham or kohen -- or melech, for that matter -- does not
willingly accept the obligation to meet that normative standard, then he
had better make sure to word his kesuba differently, else what's a
contract for?

Akiva Miller

Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
> On 12 Jan 2004 at 18:03, Zev Sero wrote:

>>Cf the archetype of mored bemalchut, Uriah Hachiti, who received
>>a completely unreasonable order from the king, disobeyed it, and
>>the gemara tells us that the king therefore had the right to have him
>>executed, but went about it in the wrong way.  

> Why do you consider his disobedience to the order unreasonable? All 
> David told him to do was to go home to his wife.... 

This was not a gross invasion of his privacy? Maybe he and his wife
were fighting? Maybe she was a niddah? There could be all sorts of
reasons why he might prefer to stay with his unit, and for the king to
order him to go and ***** his wife seems beyond what any man has a right
to tell someone else. Certainly no government or king has the right
to make such a law, and any such law would be invalid, not binding, no
matter which rishon's shita you take in 'dina demalchuta'. But apparently
David did indeed have the right to give him such an order, and he had a
duty to obey; I can only imagine that this is because disobeying it is
an insult to the king, even when the king was wrong to give the order;
or perhaps, as I suggested, because military discipline is necessary
for the security of the kingdom, and a soldier who disobeys an order is
inherently mored bemalchus.

 -- 
Zev Sero                    "I will do whatever the Americans want,
zsero@free-market.net       because I saw what happened in Iraq, and
                             I was afraid."
                                                - Muammar Gadaffi

On 12 Jan 2004 at 18:03, Zev Sero wrote:
> Cf the archetype of mored bemalchut, Uriah Hachiti, who received
> a completely unreasonable order from the king, disobeyed it, and
> the gemara tells us that the king therefore had the right to have him
> executed, but went about it in the wrong way.  

Why do you consider his disobedience to the order unreasonable? All 
David told him to do was to go home to his wife.... 

 - Carl

On Tue, Jan 06, 2004 at 03:16:29PM -0800, R Harry Maryles wrote:
: The idea expressed by Gam zu l'tova is that in God's universal plan
: everything is ultimately for the good. That is, that as far as His
: divine plan is concerned, the result of our earthly actions are for
: the good... and therefore for our good as well, even if we cannot
: understand it.

Something can even be "for your own good" and still be something you
want to avoid. At least, so goes the prototypical father's line.

It is in our best interest to experience the consequences of our
mistakes. It's the only way to learn from them. However, that doesn't
mean it's okay to make the mistake -- or repeat it.

Similarly nisyonos, yissurim shel ahavah, and other Divine learning
experiences which don't proceed from our errors.

Another issue:

R' Nachum ish "gamzu" assumed "Gam zu litovah" regardless of the event
in his life. R' Aqiva (who, notably, was his talmid) makes a more limited
claim. "Kol da'avad Rachmanah" may exclude "kol de'avad enosh".

So, I can't see how R' Nachum can hold like the Or haChaim, that another's
bechirah can interfere with hashgachah peratis.

Which brings us to RSBrizel's post. On Tue, Jan 06, 2004 at 08:23:31PM EST,
Zeliglaw@aol.com wrote:
: 1) HaShem lets us exercise good will to make the right or wrong choice
: ( attributed to R Velvel ZTL)

This opens the door to suggesting a "gam zu letovah" that can work even
within the OhC's shitah. The current trevails are "letovah" if they are
a necessary side-effect of the exitance of bechirah.

To take this position, one has to believe that bechirah is a good that
outweighs all the evil man ever did and ever will do. Without bechirah,
the person suffering wouldn't be a person. Bechirah logically must be
of greater import than any single component of human experience.

: 2) There is evil in the world that is here, regardless of how the
: cause. Our job is to try to eradicate it ( RYBS in Kol Dodi Dofek)

This is a non-answer. RYBS says that man cannnot explain the cause. Attempts
to do so will perforce be either intellectually dishonest or emotionally
unsatisfying (or both). He points us to a more productive question, not
an answer.

: 3) We have a complete choice to be in our own lives as good as Moshe
: Rabbeinu or as bad as Yeravam ben Navat . Our sins impact on a macro and
: micro level with respect to Klal Yisrael ( See SR and RYH on the Shoah)
...
: 5) HaShem constricts Himself in order to allow man to fully do right
: or wrong ( Tzimtzum based on Rashi on Chet HaEgel and Moshe Rabbeinu's
: request to be told how HaShem functions).

Aren't these the same as #1 and eachother?

-mi

PS: I do realize that slight variants of some of my points were already
posted by RAMiller and RYZlochower. I just wanted to show the train
of thought.

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905      

On Sat, Jan 10, 2004 at 11:13:35PM -0500, Mlevinmd@aol.com wrote:
: In terms of sefiros, there is in fact a machlokes whether they are real or
: concepts...

Nisht azoi pashut that there is even a chiluq.

Mequballim often read like Platonists. If one is an Idealist (ie a
believer in a higher world of Ideas), are general concepts unreal?

-mi

On Thu, Jan 08, 2004 at 12:07:14AM -0500, Moshe & Ilana Sober wrote:
: IIRC, the Jewish community of Alexandria relied on the Septuagint
: (LXX) and no longer understood Hebrew. For them, the translation of the
: Torah into Greek symbolized the translation of Judaism into Hellenistic
: terms. This is the community which produced Philo, and Letter of Aristeas
: - their legacy was preserved only in Greek, outside the Jewish tradition.

However, the gemara's version of the story has them making the translation
under compulsion by one of the Ptolmeys. Which is where I got the idea
that the LXX was made to facilitate the accretion of Judaism into the
Greek pantheon.

-mi

On Wed, Jan 07, 2004 at 03:31:00PM -0500, Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
: We're all familiar with the concept of a gzeira not taking affect because
: the tzibbur couldn't abide by it. Did chazal when making the original
: gzeira have to predict that the tzibbur would be able to accept the
: gzeira? What is the status as far as needing capara for those who did
: not abide by the gzeira before it became clear that the tzibbur would
: not abide by it? ...

I can't answer the later questions, but the first one can be disproven
by counterexample. Taqanas Ezra (WRT miqvah) failed because the tzibbur
didn't accept it. And yet we have record of the taqanah being attempted.

-mi

On Sun, Jan 11, 2004 at 09:41:40AM +0200, Eli Linas wrote:
: >WADR to Rav Elyashiv, I don't understand how he derives this chiddush. Ain
: >hachi nami that the neis came through olive oil. But the olive oil
: >involved in the neis was olive oil for the menorah. Does kasis
: >necessarily imply edible? If so, from where do we learn that?

: Off the top of my head, how about a back door raya: the shemen for menachos 
: had to be edible, and oil for the menorah was kosher for menachos.

A syllogism isn't identical to its converse.

IOW, the idea that shemen for menachos is kosher for menorah doesn't
mean that only oil kosher for menachos is.

-mi

Thanks to looking up Bereishis 46:1 for the discussion about Shechinah,
I had the fortune of seeing his comments on pasuq 16. There he defends
the notion that Yocheved was born while they were entering Mitzrayim.

The IE argues against chazal's position because it would mean that Moshe
Rabbeinu was born Yocheved was far older than Sarah was when she gave
birth to Yitzchaq. If so, why wasn't the neis reported in the chumash?

(One defense is that there is no way the span could be bridged in two
generations with no neis.)

The Ramban's position is based on the notion that everything is miyad
Hashem. Teva only differs from neis in that the latter are preannounced
by a navi.

Someone before REED who pretty explicitly says that teva is an illusion.

Now to resolve this with his statement on Ma'aseh Bereishis that nissim
were written into the beri'ah. Both statements identify neis and teva
as basically equivalent. However, one is saying it's all teva, the other
that it's all neis.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905      

Yet another maqor. There is a conflict between Berachos 6a and 6b that
a number of rishonim address. On amud alef it says that the Shechinah
comes to the minyan before the people do. However, on amud beis it says
that when Hashem gets to shul and doesn't find 10 people, He is angered.

But given that the Shechinah arrives /first/ wouldn't that mean that
ch"v He is always angry?

The Aterest Rosh suggests that while the Shechinah comes first (the
statement on 6a), HQBH does not. Ie they are not the same "Thing".

(Other answers are listed at Kollel Iyun haDaf's
<http://www.dafyomi.co.il/berachos/insites/br-dt-06.htm>.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905      

It appears strange to me to find some classical Christian positions 
being voiced on this list as if they were also mainstream Judaism.   
This was true of the resurrected mashiach figure that was being promoted 
in some Chabad circles,  and now we have the "need" for the mashiach to 
atone for our sins with his suffering.   Now,  Rav Daniel Eidensohn has 
brought some classical sources for the latter opinion including the 
Zohar, sefer Chassidim, and Ramchal.   His talmudic source in T.B. 
Sanhedrin is, however, equivocal in terms of any real suffering or any 
atonement as a result of such afflictions, and the biblical source is 
not so interpreted by most commentators.  The chapter in Yeshaya (Is 53) 
is normally taken to refer to the people of Israel as Hashem's suffering 
servant,  while the observer represents the nations amongst whom the 
Jews lived in suffering and persecution. (Rashi,  Ibn Ezra, Radak, R' 
Yosef Kara, etc.).   Read R' Eidensohns' translation and see how well 
the description fits the actual historical regard and treatment of Jews 
in Christian Europe.   We were characterized as ugly, unrefined, 
obstinant,  and not worthy of pity.   Our sufferings were considered 
well merited.   When they finally awaken they will find that the 
"classical" Jew was their creation and a reflection of the living 
conditions imposed upon him.  The Jew had to be reviled so that he would 
not become a teacher.  He had to be deformed so that he would not be 
admired and emulated.    All this has nothing to do with an alleged 
vicarious atonement of the sins of the generations by a suffering 
messianic figure.    That is not the Judaism that I was taught or 
subsequently studied.

Yitzchok Zlochower

The Mormons keep incredible genealogical records as part of their plot
to baptize everyone posthumously. A lot of people researching their
family trees, including a lot of Jews, have found the Mormon archives
to be a treasure trove.

Is there a shailah of AZ involved in using this resource, given their
motives in compiling it?

 -Toby Katz

The words "l'zecher" and "zichrono" as in "l'zecher nishmas" and
"zichrono l'vracha" are commonly translated respectively as "in memory
of [the neshama of]" and "[of blessed] memory". It would seem to me,
however, that the more nuanced translations might be "in mention [of
the neshama of]" and "his mention [should be for a blessing]" or "in
remembrance" and "his remembrence." See, e.g., Mishlei 10:7 on the pasuk
"Zecher tzaddick l'vracha . . ." (and see the Rashi and Ibn Ezra on that
pasuk as well as the prior one; see also the Torah Shleimah on Breishis
7:1 os daled citing the the Tanchuma), which Artscroll translates --
"Remembrance of a righteous one brings blessings . . ."

Is anyone aware of sources that discuss exactly what these words are
intended to convey? Also, for whom is the b'racha intended -- the deceased
or the live individual who mentions the deceased's name or both? Also,
why is there a b'racha at all by virtue of the "memory" or "menton"
of the deceased?

Finally, the makor (source) for "zichrono l'vracha lechaya haolam haba"
and "zichrono l'vrcaha" are found in Kiddushin 31 and S'A, YD 240:9.
What is the source for the use of "l'zecher nishmas" in the context of
giving or sponsoring a shiur or the giving of t'zedakkah?

On Mon, Jan 12, 2004 at 11:06:46PM -0500, I Kasdan wrote:
: The words "l'zecher" and "zichrono" as in "l'zecher nishmas" and
: "zichrono l'vracha" are commonly translated respectively as "in memory
: of [the neshama of]" and "[of blessed] memory". It would seem to me,
: however, that the more nuanced translations might be "in mention [of
: the neshama of]" and "his mention [should be for a blessing]"...

Doesn't this go back to the debate as to whether the Gra said that
"zekher" means "memory" and "zeicher", "memorial" or the other way
around? (The reason why we read the pasuq he translates "destroy all
memorial of Amaleiq" both ways.)

-mi

Does anyone know why in the broche, "sheh hakol niheyeh bidvaro",
nusach Ashkenaz places a segol in the word niheyeh while the nusach of
the Gra, there is a kamatz (niheyah)? Does the Gra view the word niheyah
as the niphal form of the verb hayah? That makes sense to me, but if so,
what is the logic of the nusach Ashkenaz to place a segol in the word.
Isn't the kal or pa'al form of the verb for "we will be"?

Arnie Frishman
email:  arniefrishman@mail.ogc.umn.edu

On 12 Jan 2004 at 19:23, Zev Sero wrote:
> Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
>> On 12 Jan 2004 at 18:03, Zev Sero wrote:
>>>Cf the archetype of mored bemalchut, Uriah Hachiti, who received a
>>>completely unreasonable order from the king, disobeyed it, and the
>>>gemara tells us that the king therefore had the right to have him
>>>executed, but went about it in the wrong way.  

>> Why do you consider his disobedience to the order unreasonable? All
>> David told him to do was to go home to his wife.... 

> This was not a gross invasion of his privacy?  Maybe he and his
> wife were fighting?  

In which case, he would still have to obey. 

> Maybe she was a niddah?  

In which case he could go home and not have relations with her.
Certainly the King could not order him to do something which is against
din Torah. But her being a Nida would not prevent him from going home
to her.

> There could be all
> sorts of reasons why he might prefer to stay with his unit, and for
> the king to order him to go and ***** his wife seems beyond what any
> man has a right to tell someone else.  Certainly no government or king
> has the right to make such a law, and any such law would be invalid,
> not binding, no matter which rishon's shita you take in 'dina
> demalchuta'.  

A (Jeiwsh) King's prerogatives go far beyond Dina d'Malchusa. 

> But apparently David did indeed have the right to give
> him such an order, and he had a duty to obey; I can only imagine that
> this is because disobeying it is an insult to the king, even when the
> king was wrong to give the order; or perhaps, as I suggested, because
> military discipline is necessary for the security of the kingdom, and
> a soldier who disobeys an order is inherently mored bemalchus.

Nope. Nothing to do with military discipline. The King has the right
to tell him to go home to his wife (not to have relations with her if
she is a Nida, but certainly to go home to her). Or to do anything else
which doesn't contravene the Torah (Rambam Hilchos Melachim 3:8- 9).

Interesting that you almost assume that it's an issue of relations
- Rav Nebenzahl in the last Sicha of his Sichot on Sefer Breishis
brings a Zohar that says that Uriah NEVER had relations with Batsheva,
based upon the pasuk in Natan's tochacha to David, "va't'hi lo K'BAS"
(as opposed to Megillas Esther where it says that Mordechai took Esther
"L'BAS," which the Zohar interprets as "l'Bayis" - as a wife).

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son, 
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much. 

>The chapter in Yeshaya (Is 53)
> is normally taken to refer to the people of Israel as Hashem's suffering
> servant,  while the observer represents the nations amongst whom the
> Jews lived in suffering and persecution. (Rashi,  Ibn Ezra, Radak, R'
> Yosef Kara, etc.).

I agree with your concerns. However if you look at the sources that
I brought - they all refer back to Yeshaya 53 - Even Rashi. Thus I am
not putting a spin on anything - I am pointing out something that some
might find a chidush. I agree that traditionally Yeshaya 53 is taught
as an allegory concerning the Jewish people - but it is necessary to be
aware that other authoritative understandings exist.

>   All this has nothing to do with an alleged
> vicarious atonement of the sins of the generations by a suffering
> messianic figure.    That is not the Judaism that I was taught or
> subsequently studied.

The simple question is whether this is a legitimate broad based
view. Whether it is part of your education or mine is not relevant. This
is similar to the other thread about the Shechinah. I personally feel
more comfortable with a Hirschian view - but I can not deny that Kabbalah
and Chassidus view things differently.

Is this forum merely meant to reinforce what we know already or
is to educate and illuminate the full nature of Yiddishkeit? Or to
paraphrase Rabbi Yisroel Salanter "Everything I need to know I learned
in kindergarten". I would also agree that these issues should not be
presented in every public forum - but I rely on the proven wisdom of
the moderator to decide whether it is appropriate for this one. If I
were teaching hashkofa to a group of high school students - I might well
teach only the traditional view.

Daniel Eidensohn

From: "Kenneth G Miller" <kennethgmiller@juno.com>
> can you please offer us your interpretation of the phrase
> "k'hilchos guvrin Yehuda'in"? If this does not mean that there is a
> normative standard for *all* Jewish husbands, then what *does* it mean???

I pointed to EH 76:3 in my previous post.  It says there that a talmid
hacham may spend two or three years away from home studying without his
wife's permission, and that a normal person may elect to become a talmid
hacham without his wife's permission.  Now the avowed subject of that
halacha is onah, but someone who is out of town generally can't take out the
garbage or do any other normal husbandly practices.  In addition, itinerant
scholars were generally impoverished and could not afford to hire servants.
So that halacha clearly implies that not all husbands treat their wives in
the same manner, i.e. that "hilchos guvrin yehudain" depends on profession.

David Riceman

At 11:13 PM 1/10/2004, [RML] wrote:
>It seems to me though that you understand kavod nivra as a concept; in 
>fact, RSG seems to understand it as an actual created physical entity that 
>serves to indicate Hashem's presence, such as a cloud that descended when 
>Moshe spoke to Hashem. F.E. , in Emunos, Command and Prohibition, Ch.5, 
>also G-d, Ch.12 (all citations are from  S. Rosenblatt's excellent English 
>translation).  It also appears form Creation, Ch.2 that RSG implies the 
>idea of creation out of Divine; how this relates to the idea of Tsumtsum 
>is unclear to me at this time. BTW, that RSG prefigured Besht's idea is 
>pointed out by Betsalel Naor's introduction to God' Middlemen..., a book 
>about Chabad.

Kavod nivra I understand *not* as a concept but as, in fact, as often a
physical reality (although not necessarily so). It is a broad term for
the reflection of connection to Hashem, which can either by physically
manifest or spiritually sensed.

>In terms of sefiros, there is in fact a machlokes whether they are real or 
>concepts. Some mekubbolim (I think R. Yisroel Sarug) did hold that they 
>have an actual existence. The prevailing view is that they are a concept 
>or way-station as presented in the beginning of Pardes. The etymology of 
>the word would be from cipher, a number +10. As numbers, sephiros are not 
>real but are concepts. However, if you derive the word form saphir, it 
>points to their transparency but they still have a true existence.

This is way out of my sphere of interest, but I believe that R' Yisrael
Sarug (and, IIRC, his talmid Rama' meFano) are considered outside the
mainstream of the Kabbalistic tradition. I would be interested in being
educated concerning their shittos. To the extent that sefiros might be
considered realities, I can only understand that if we assume that the
malachim associated with sefiros (viz., Michoel with Chesed, Gavriel with
Gevurah, etc.) or the individuals associated with them (viz., Avrohom
with Chesed, Yitzchok with Gevurah, etc.) are those realities. Otherwise,
I do not as of now understand how the concepts can be "real."

>Tsror Hachaim also refers to Malchus, with tiferes and bina illuminating 
>from inside it. The idea seems to be that tsadikim cause a deeper zivug of 
>zeir anpin and malchus through their actions. See Pardes Shaar 23, Ch. 23\

This does not seem to be what the Ramban and R' Bechayei are saying
in Vayechi.

YGB

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