Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 074

Thursday, January 8 2004

• Re: Gam zu l'tova & Bechira
• Re: 10 Tevet
• 10 Tevet
• Re: RYBS conference
• Re: shape of the menorah
• Gzeira/tzibbur
• Re: Mrs Katz's dilemma
• Re: Ramban and geography
• gam zu l'tova and bechira
• suffering
• Rav Matishayhu Solomon on attacking resha'im
• 10 Tevet
• Gerrer Rebbe on Yosef, his brothers and tefillas haderech
• 10 Tevet
• Re: shape of the menorah
• Re: Admin: Subject Lines
• Re: suffering
• Re: Mrs Katz's dilemma

R' Sholom Simon's son asked <<< How do we reconcile "everything is for
the good" with "free will"?>>>

First, we must reflect back on a recent thread regarding Hashgacha
Pratis. There is a view that HaShem has chosen to step back, let nature
take its course, and refrain from getting involved in relatively minor
events; it seems to me that "gam zu l'tova" is NOT compatible with that
view. If nature and the laws of physics govern what happen, then there
is nothing to insure that everything is for the good. "Gam zu l'tova"
(it seems to me) can only work where HaShem intervenes in each event,
to insure that it is indeed for the good.

That said, my guess is that -- like many aphorisms -- an important part
of "everything is for the good" was omitted, and that is what's causing
this confusion. As RSS's son pointed out, *not* everything is for the
good. I *can* make wrong choices, and that would be bad.

A fuller phrasing of this saying might be "everything that happens TO
ME is for the good". Whatever events cross my path, HaShem set them up
for my benefit in some way. But things that I DO might not be good for me.

This does not contradict the fact that my choice will affect others. And
it will affect them for the better, even if for me it was for the worse.
For example, if I do something bad and it affects Reuven, it is still
"gam zu l'tova" for Reuven. HaShem saw that Reuven needed to be affected
by this event, and for his benefit, else He would have arranged for
Reuven to be elsewhere. But it is still a negative point on my own record.

Akiva Miller

R' Jonathan Baker asks <<< One of the things that 10 Tevet mourns is
the translation of the Torah into Greek. How do we square this with the
clearly positive assessments of the Greek language ...>>>

We've mentioned on the pages, the idea that not everything which is
thought should be said, not everything which is heard should be repeated,
and so on. Similarly, not everything which *can* be done *ought* to be
done, and the fact that a Greek Torah is kosher is really irrelevant to
our mourning for it. The Torah is now accessible to people whom we wish
it had remained unaccessible to, and that is so sad that it justifies
the fast.

Akiva Miller

> So I've got a question that has nothing to do with dechiyat shabbat.
> One of the things that 10 Tevet mourns is the translation of the Torah
> into Greek. How do we square this with the clearly positive assessments
> of the Greek language and the Greek translation in Megillah 8b (Mishnah)

As I recall (don't have it available now), the source in the beginning
(mishnan 6?)meseches sofrim speaks of 5 zkeinim tanslating the Torah on
which they made the taanis. This may have been a different translation
then the Septugiant (70), of which they were many versions.

Curiously, the Jews of Alexandria celebrated a YOmTov on the anniversary
fo the translation while in megilas taanis it is listed as a sad day.

Here is a partial list of places where Greek words were darshined as if
they were Hebrew. See Genesis Rabba 36,12, Megila 8b-9a, Shabat 31b,
and 63b, Yerushalmi Megila,1,Baba Kama 82b, genesis Rabba 36, Pirkei
DR. Eliezer 38,. See Pesachim 61a where Syrian is similarly expounded.

In BK 82b the gemara makes a distinction between Greek langugae and
"Greek wisdom".

M. Levin

Dr. Korn's discussion of RYBS's position, from a November presentation,
can be found online at <http://tinyurl.com/yrp2p> [Reduced from a Boston
College URL. -mi]

Dr. Berger's different (and IMHO very convincing) approach from the same
conference can be found at <http://tinyurl.com/2xf4r>

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

                                                         Bs"d
Seth, in your absolutely brilliant essay on the shape of the menorah,
you wrote:
>(The g'moro says explicitly that whereas certain oils are preferred and 
>certain forbidden for Shabbos, there is no preference whatsoever for 
>Hanukka. There was a custom of some to light with olive oil (not minhag 
>Ashk'naz, which was to light with wax), but some rishonim interpret that 
>as having to do with the brightness of the flame. I plan to discuss this 
>at greater length in a subsequent post, b'n).

When I showed your essay to a friend, he pointed out that in fact,
there is a Kol Bo, quoted by the Darkei Moshe in tuff reish eyin gimmel,
which says that "the mitzvah min hamuvchar is with olive oil, because
the miracle occurred through it." Based on this Kol Bo, HaRav Elyahshiv,
shlitta, says that one should try and use edible olive oil for the
mitzvah, and not the stuff that's sold only for lighting.

Kol tuv,
Eli 

We're all familiar with the concept of a gzeira not taking affect because
the tzibbur couldn't abide by it. Did chazal when making the original
gzeira have to predict that the tzibbur would be able to accept the
gzeira? What is the status as far as needing capara for those who did
not abide by the gzeira before it became clear that the tzibbur would
not abide by it?

KT
Joel RIch

In message <001901c3d522$830f2cc0$09cc4b0c@Ricemanhome1>, David Riceman 
<driceman@worldnet.att.net> writes
>From: "Chana Luntz" <chana@KolSassoon.net>

>> Lets go back a bit further.  The reference to giving priority to a kohen
>> in terms of reading first from the Torah and benching is found in
>> Nedarim 62ab ....

>No, the source of the issur of hishtamshus is a Yerushalmi (Brachos 8:5,
>12b, column 62 in the Akademiah L'lashon HaIvrit edition [which I strongly
>recommend]).  There it really is a case of personal service, not priority.

I didn't say that the source of hishtamshus is Nedarim 62a-b. What I
said was that the source of giving priority to a kohen in terms of
reading first from the Torah and benching is found in Nedarim 62a-b.

BUT, Nedarim uses v'kidashto as the pasuk on which it hangs its din.
The Rambam uses v'kidashto for the source on which he hangs his din of
kavod for kohanim.

According to the Mishna Brura (as quoted by you) the source of the
hishtamshus din is v'kidashto (it was on that basis that you said it
was a din in kedusha).

Therefore, on the basis of Nedarim and the Rambam, the fact that the
basis is v'kidashto does not contradict the fact that it is a din kavod
(which is what I was arguing, in fact, the pasuk is already being used
by the Bavli and the Rambam in relation to a din kavod. If you say
that the Yerushalmi is saying something different about this pasuk,
arguably you have a contradiction between the two, in which case, why
would we not follow the Bavli.

But it is not necessary to say that there is a contradiction, if you
understand that the essence of the din is a din kavod, despite the way
one might naively read the pasuk reference.

>> Note also that Rama does not say that being hishtamesh b'kohen it
>> actually being moel bakodesh, just that it is k'moel bakodesh.

>But Shmuel, cited in the Yerushalmi, does say maal.  You can make hay from
>the fact that the Rama added the kaf hadimyon, but the flavor of the hay is
>somewhat speculative.

I think the "k" is very suggestive, especially where he is deviating
from the source text.

BTW what we really need here, and I do not currently have access to,
is the precise language of the Mordechai on the basis of which the Rema
brings his din. It is noteworthy that the Beir Hetev understands the
Mordechai as specifically talking about kavod, given that after all,
he is the basis that this halacha as brought by the Rema.

>> I suspect that RSM would concede
>> that the obligation in the ketuba to do menial labour is only in
>> circumstances where the person was not able to finance somebody else to
>> do it (pay the  butler and the maid, shall we say).

>No, my impression of RSM's position is that the obligation is of physical
>service.

Perhaps RSM can speak for himself .

>> But a king is not allowed to ever be poor (see Horayos 9a) so he will
>> always have the alternative of paying somebody else to do the labour.
>> However, a kohen (who is not a kohen gadol, the same din prohibiting
>> aniyus relates to a kohen gadol) may indeed be poor, and hence may not
>> have the other alternative of financing others available.

>This is a major hiddush you are proposing, and it will take me time to
>assimilate it properly.  As far as I knew there were two types of husbandly
>obligations: physical (e.g. onah) and financial.  You are proposing that
>some obligation may straddle these two categories.

>Now I am aware of certain contingent obligations, e.g., if a husband is
>sufficiently wealthy he must hire servants for his wife (Kethuboth 5:5).
>Those servants, however, are to perform her obligatory labor, not his
>obligatory labor.  I know of no source obliging a husband to perform labor
>for his wife, and though you and others have postulated such a halacha, I
>would like to see it in print.

I was actually responding to the argument posited by you, which was that
it was impossible for there to be such an obligation in the ketuba,
given that a king could not do it. All I was stating was that one
way of fulfilling certain types of obligations is by paying somebody
else to do it. It is clear in the halacha, in the converse case, ie in
relation to the maintenance (baking, washing, weaving etc) obligations
of the woman to the man, these are alleviated in circumstances where
she brings maidservants into the marriage. It seemed to follow to me
that the converse would also be the case. Therefore you argument about
a king was not a valid argument against such an obligation.

BTW, do you agree that the wifely obligations involve some physical, and
some that are either physical or financial, depending on her financial
circumstances?

>Incidentally I cited previously EH 154:3, that voluntary poverty is grounds
>for a coerced divorce.  I didn't mention the dispute about involuntary
>poverty (Pithchei Tshuva ad. loc. and the sources he cites, e.g. Rama EH
>70:3).  No one I saw mentioned the option of substituting the husband's
>physical labor for his financial obligations.  I'd expect to see it
>somewhere.

Do you therefore believe that in cases where the same result was achieved
by physical labour (ie he grew all his own food, so there was no need
to buy food for her - or he grew the flax, span and wove the cloth,
and presented her with the finished item to wear ), anybody would still
hold that there was grounds for an involuntary divorce, ie it would not
be an acceptable alternative? On the other hand, that kind of menial
labour is precisely what a king should not do, so he could not utilise
this mechanism, even if others may.

>> Well but you still run into the basic problem raised by the Taz, that
>> the same din of kedusha is involved when a cohen marries a gerusha, and
>> why do we not say that he can be mochel on that?

>> You have to posit some distinction between this and that ...
>> "thinking highly of kohanim" translated into halacha is kavod, and
>> delimiting it is about being able to be mochel,

>As I hinted, I'm not very happy with the approach I suggested, but I don't
>think this is a telling objection.  There's a difference between the
>presence of kavod and the absence of bizayon, and the issur of hishtamshus
>is to prevent bizayon, not to produce kavod.

It is a fair enough distinction in and of itself. But you would then be
saying that hishtamshus is a din in preventing bizayon and the cases set
out in Nedarim and the Rambam are about kavod (despite being based on
the same pasuk). But bizayon surely has a lower threshold than kavod -
so what are you gaining by defining it as a din of bizayon, it all seems
rather unnecessary?

>> But there are stories in the gemora of famous rabbonim being found on
>> all fours bouncing children on their  backs, which is about as unkovodic
>> as it comes, so I don't think that can be the reason

>My point was his apparent disbelief in an obligation to help his wife, not a
>point about kavod.

Sorry, since I have assumed from the start that the whole discussion is
about kavod, I have been arguing on that basis.

Regards
Chana Luntz

On Sun, Jan 04, 2004 at 10:22:56AM +0200, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
: Then how do you understand the Ramban at the end of Sefer Dvarim 
: (after the Peirush) where he accepts Rashi's view on the location of 
: Kever Rachel? 

I can't. But I am *forced* to conclude that when the Rambam speaks of a
Beis Lechem that is between Y-m and Beis El, one of the cities named
"Beis" can't be ours. And since he says the location of Beis Lechem
is in Binyamin, it must be Beis Lechem.

However, as a 1st step to identifying the problem, note that this means
that the Ramban reports his own experience and reports Chazal. As though
the two were different universes.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             Until he extends the circle of his compassion
micha@aishdas.org        to all living things,
http://www.aishdas.org   man will not himself find peace.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Albert Schweitzer

Sholom raised the question of a "gam zu le'tova" attitude vs. bechira
in the following manner:
> My 10-yr old son raised an interesting philosophical problem ...
>How do we reconcile "everything is for the good" with "free will"?

The problem, as I see it, arises from the interpretation of "gam zu
le'tova" as "everything is for the good" rather than "everything that
Hashem does is for the ultimate good of mankind - even if it doesn't
appear that way on a personal level". In contrast, what people do based
on their free will may or may not be good on a personal or global level.
The intersection of human free will and Divine action is nebulous and
poorly understood. Only very few individuals can expect to fall under
Divine protection under all circumstances. The rest of us will be
subject to a greater or lesser extent to accident and the whims of human
choice. We will also be subject to the consequences of our own choices.
When ostensibly bad things happen to us, we can still benefit by using
those occurrences as a goad to self improvement and strengthening our
ties to the Divine. Nonetheless, the ability of thinking people to
believe in "gam zu le'tova" on a personal level is a sign of a good
relationship with Hashem.

Yitzchok Zlochower

[RDE:]
>:                            Within this same category, however,
>: there is  a class that is even higher than this. There is suffering 
>:that comes to a Tzadik who is even greater and more highly perfected 
>:than the ones discussed above. This suffering comes to provide the 
>:help necessary to  bring about the chain of events leading to 
>:mankind's ultimate perfection....

[Micha:]
> It's the Besh"t's peshat in chevlei mashiach.

I once read a claim that the earliest references to suffering on 
behalf of others comes as a result of the first crusade and the
inability to explain the destruction of communities of scholars in any 
other manner

-- 
Prof. Eli Turkel,  turkel@post.tau.ac.il on 08/01/2004
Department of Mathematics, Tel Aviv University

[Originally submitted to Areivim under a different title. -mi]

I was asked if there had been any shmuessen or the like in Lakewood
concerning the Grama book. My son brought me a tape tonight of a shmuess
given earlier this week by Rav Matisyahu Salomon in which he deals with
the topic.

This is a continuation of a series (he apparently says shmuessen on
one topic for several weeks; the previous one was on talmidei chachamim
marbim shalom ba'olam, about 5 tapes) on velamalshinim al tehi sikva,
so some references to the previous shmuess (my son owes me a tape)
went over my head.

He asks the obvious question of when we daven that the resha'im should
be destroyed, as in this beracha, and when we daven yitamu chata'im velo
chot'im. Of course, the same question could be asked on David Hamelech
himself, who sometimes (va'ani bachalosam levushi sak, other places)
davens for yitamu chata'im, and other places he mentions, such as yachres
Hashem sifsei chalakos, etc. where he davens for the destruction of the
resha'im. Also Yirmiya davened for the downfall of the anshei Anasos.
When one way and when the other?

The general answer he gave was from a sefer by someone whose name I
didn't catch but whose whole derech is explanations of the Gra. Someone
who is still a ma'amin, despite his evil actions, still merits that
we daven for him to do teshuva. OTOH, someone who is a kofer be'ikar
(he quoted a Gra who says that nachash karuch al akevo lo yafsik, aval
akrav mafsik, that akrav, osios ba'ikar, shows that someone who is kofer
ba'ikar is mafsik the deveikus of kelal Yisrael to Hashem.) has no hope
and velamalshinim is meant for him.

Also, someone who is a ba'al lashon hara, such as Do'eg or anshei Anasos,
is included in velamalshinim. The explanation (from this sefer, not
Rav Matisyahu) is that if anshei Anasos had not spoken L"H on Yirmiyah,
his words of musar would have been heeded and the beis hamikdash would
not have been charev. Thus, a ba'al lashon hara also, by removing the
authority of a navi, serves to break our relationship with Hashem and
deserves the tefila of velamalshinim.

Yiftach bedoro kiShemuel bedoro: even though we have no nevuah, the
attempt to degrade the kavod and authority of talmidei chachamim puts
one into the category of velamalshinim. Although we certainly cannot
know if there is meenus involved, nor can we daven about specific people
in birchas haminim, but we have in mind both kofrim be'ikar and ba'alei
lashon hara and we leave it to Hashem to sort out the specifics.

The question is why this situation came about. Just as David Hamelech said
about Shim'i that "Hashem amar lo kalel", likewise we need to examine
why this kilkul in kavod chachamim umora'asam came about on our watch,
even though it was done al yedei benei adam. He mentioned that the intent
is for us to have more kavana in birchas haminim and that can bring the
geula. Clearly this was a reference to a previous shmuess.

His explanation is based on the opposites in al hanisim-rabim beyad
me'atim, etc. all of them opposites. The only one that is not clear is
zeidim beyad osekei Sorasecha. To this end he brought the pasuk zeidim
helitzuni ad me'od miTorasecha lo natisi: attacks by zeidim need to give
us the impetus to be more davuk in Torah. (This he quoted from a Beis
Yosef in hilchos Chanuka).

He mentioned in this context a Rambam sof hilchos me'ilah that David
Hamelech,when attacked by his enemies, was mosif deveikus baTorah. We
need to have more kavana in the beracha and the concept of asher bachar
banu mikol ha'amim venasan lanu es Toraso.

He ended with an impassioned plea for more kavana in Alenu. He mentioned
that the pamalia shel Ma'ala gather to hear kelal Yisrael say Alenu,
which was composed by Yehoshua himself, and what a bushah it is to toss
it off without kavana. He said (the only English in the shmuess) that
"we don't mince our words" and say "shelo asanu kegoyei ha'aratzos velo
samanu kemishpechos ha'adama....shehem mishtachavim lahevel velarik...
Think what you're saying and this is the greatest tikun for the attacks
of the zeidim.

He continued by describing, in the second half, al ken nekaveh lecha, the
majesty of the tefila and what we ask for, lesaken olam bemalchus Shakai,
etc. Is it any wonder that if we are mezalzel in this beautiful tefila,
that we are in turn subject to zilzul? He continued by noting that it
calls for "kol benei vasar yikre'u viShmecha" and "lehafnos Elecha kol
rish'ei aretz" making it quite clear that this means everyone, Jews and
nonJews alike.

The tape is available for loan; contact me off list.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

>Perhaps the difference is in the purpose of the translation.

IIRC, the Jewish community of Alexandria relied on the Septuagint
(LXX) and no longer understood Hebrew. For them, the translation of the
Torah into Greek symbolized the translation of Judaism into Hellenistic
terms. This is the community which produced Philo, and Letter of Aristeas
- their legacy was preserved only in Greek, outside the Jewish tradition.

I read Aristeas in college - it tells the story of the translation
of the LXX and is intended to inspire Alexandrian Jews to be proud of
their heritage. It includes elaborate praise of Eretz Yisrael, the Beit
HaMikdash, etc. - but the praise is all within a Hellenistic frame of
reference (e.g. the Sanhedrin are experts in Greek philosophy).

It was mentioned that the severity of 10 Tevet is due to the fact that the
siege of Jerusalem set in motion a long process of destruction. Perhaps
the translation of the LXX set in motion an analogous process in
Alexandria. The "walls" - nimshal: the external observances of Judaism -
remained intact for some time. But inside, the "population" - nimshal:
the beliefs and understandings - were "starving" - nimshal: they were
no longer nourished by Torah, but by Hellenistic thought.

In this case, the problem with the LXX is Hellenism, not Greek.

> Compare/contrast it with our arguments over Mendelsohn's Biur vs RSRH's
> Pentateuch.

Compare also the issue of davenning in the vernacular. Conducting
synagogue services in the vernacular is an attempt to transform Judaism
and has been condemned in the strongest terms. But individual baalei
teshuvah are encouraged to daven in a language they understand if they
don't know Hebrew - that brings them closer to Judaism.

 - Ilana

In a weekly e-mail of divrei Torah from Rav M. M. Weiss shlit"a of
Staten Island, NY that I just got (distributed by Mr. Shelley Zeitlin
<ZeitlinShelley@aol.com>), the following is stated

> Yosef HaTzadik planted the royal goblet in the sack of Binyomin, the
> brothers set out to return home. The posuk informs us that, before they
> got too far on their return journey, Yosef summoned his men to recall
> them. Why does the Torah stress that Yosef was careful to send out his
> men before they got too far away?

> I have always thought that the reason was simply to ensure that his men
> would be able to catch up with them. However, the Gerer Rebbe, Shlit"a,
> was not satisfied with this explanation. And, upon further reflection,
> I guess it's quite lame to think that Yosef, with the vast resources
> and speedy horses of the royal stable, had to worry about catching up
> with the brothers. The Gerer Rebbe offers an alternate suggestion of why
> the posuk was so insistent that Yosef set out to recall them quickly.
> He quotes from the saintly Rav Chaim Vital, Zt"l, Zy"a, that there is a
> guarantee that one who says Tefilas HaDerech, the special blessing of the
> traveler, can be assured that he will come to no harm on his journey.
> Therefore, Yosef desired that his men should encounter the brothers
> before they said the Tefilas HaDerech prayer.....

Is anyone familiar with such a teaching of Rav Chaim Vital and can they
shed further light upon it ?

Mordechai

From: "Jonathan Baker" <jjbaker@panix.com>
> One of the things that 10 Tevet mourns is the translation of the Torah
> into Greek. How do we square this with the clearly positive assessments
> of the Greek language and the Greek translation in Megillah 8b (Mishnah)

I think the question is usually asked, that Moshe Rabenu himself
translated and wrote the Torah in 70 languages..

Now I have to try and remember the answers.

SBA

On 7 Jan 2004 at 23:02, Eli Linas wrote:
> When I showed your essay to a friend, he pointed out that in fact,
> there is a Kol Bo, quoted by the Darkei Moshe in tuff reish eyin gimmel,
> which says that "the mitzvah min hamuvchar is with olive oil, because
> the miracle occurred through it." Based on this Kol Bo, HaRav Elyahshiv,
> shlitta, says that one should try and use edible olive oil for the
> mitzvah, and not the stuff that's sold only for lighting.

WADR to Rav Elyashiv, I don't understand how he derives this chiddush. Ain
hachi nami that the neis came through olive oil. But the olive oil
involved in the neis was olive oil for the menorah. Does kasis
necessarily imply edible? If so, from where do we learn that?

-- Carl

mailto:cmsherer@fandz.com      mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

On 7 Jan 2004 at 9:59, Kenneth G Miller wrote:
> I'd like to ask everyone to pay more attention to the subject lines on
> their posts.
...
> There are two groups of people who are at a severe disadvantage when
> this occurs: Those who get Avodah as individual posts (rather than as
> a digest) who then sort their email by subject line. And those who use
> the Avodah archives to research an old discussion. Both of these people
> can easily miss half of a converation, or even more.

While you're right in this case, I would not make an absolute rule 
out of it. 

Sometimes a discussion goes off on a tangent, which can result in the 
subject lines becoming irrelevant. 

-- Carl

>I once read a claim that the earliest references to suffering on 
>behalf of others comes as a result of the first crusade and the
>inability to explain the destruction of communities of scholars in any 
>other manner

Sanhedrin(39a): There was a certain heretic who asked R' Abahu :Your G-d
seems to be a comedian because He told Yechezkiel to lie down on his
left side and then on his right side?. ... He answered: G-d said that
the land should lie fallow in the 7th year in order to demonstrate that
it belongs to Him. However the Jews did not obey this command and were
punished with exile. Now it is commonly found with a human king that when
his subjects rebel he will kill them all if he is cruel. If he is merciful
he will only kill half of them. However if he is extremely merciful he
will only punish his greatest subjects with suffering and not death. Thus
G-d afflicted Yechezkiel in order to erase the sin of the Jews.

Shabbos(33b): [[For R. Gorion-others state, R. Joseph son of R.
Shemaiah-said: When there are righteous men in the generation, the
righteous are seized [by death] for the [sins of the] generation; when
there are no righteous in a generation, school-children are seized
for the generation. R. Isaac b. Ze'iri others state, R. Simeon b.
Neizra-said: Which verse [teaches this]? If thou know not, O thou,
fairest among women, Go thy way forth by the footsteps of the flock,
etc., and we interpret this as [referring to] the goats which are taken
in pledge for the [debts of the] shepherds. Thus this proves that he
said on account of slander too. This proves it.

Moed Koton(28a): [[Said R. Ammi, Wherefore is the account of Miriam's
death placed next to the [laws of the] red heifer? To inform you that even
as the red heifer afforded atonement [by the ritual use of its ashes],
so does the death of tie righteous afford atonement [for the living they
have left behind].

Shemos Rabbah(35:4): [[the sanctuary stands as a pledge, so that if the
enemies of Israel4 became deserving of destruction, it would be forfeit
as a pledge. Moses said to God: 'Will not the time come when Israel shall
have neither Tabernacle nor Temple? What will happen with them then? '
The divine reply was: ' I will then take one of their righteous men and
retain him as a pledge on their behalf, in order that I may pardon all
their sins.' ...

Zohar(3:56b): [[They continued: "Whenever the righteous are removed
from the world, punishment is removed from the world and the death of
the righteous atones for the sins of the generation. Therefore we read
the section dealing with the death of the sons of Aaron on the Day of
Atonement that it may atone for the sins of Israel. God says: Recount
the death of these righteous ones, and it will be accounted to you as if
you brought an offering on that day to make atonement for you. For we
have learnt that so long as Israel are in captivity, and cannot bring
offerings on that day, the mention of the two sons of Aaron shall be
their atonement. For so we have learnt, that Abihu was equal to his two
brothers Eleazar and Ithamar, and Nadab to all together, and Nadab and
Abihu were reckoned as equal to the seventy elders who were associated
with Moses; and therefore their death was an atonement for Israel."

Rebbitzin Luntz reminds me that not everyone who disagrees with me
agrees with each other on this subject. I'm going to try to summarize
what I think are the opinions, and then I will address Rebbitzin Luntz's
specific comments in a separate post.

Originally I cited the halacha "assur l'hishtamesh b'kohen", and asked
several questions which I hoped would help explain the issur, which I
deemed extremely unusual.

A. Several people claimed that there is a parallel prohibition against
hishtamshus of a talmid hacham. I questioned whether such an issur
existed, since no one cited a source I will take it as a mistaken claim
until I am given a source.

B. Several people cited reasons for the issur not to apply to Mrs. Cohen:

1. RCL claimed it's a din in kavod, and Mr. and Mrs. Cohen share their
kavod. I disputed that and claimed it's a din in kedusha; we have not
yet resolved this.

I will leave most details to another post. I do want to introduce one new
idea here. In principle there can be two types of actions detrimental to
one's kavod: actions which are inherently detrimental, and actions which
are detrimental only because they are done for someone else. The issur of
hishtamshus (and even the word) specifically relates to the latter type.

We know of issurim of the former type, e.g., "keivan shenissmaneh adam
parnas al hatzibbur assur lo laasos melacha (meaning manual labor)."
I know of no such issurim for a kohen (unless you count the separately
enumerated issurim in the psukim). So if this is a din in kavod it's
a very special type of kavod - because he is mishamesh hkbh he may be
mishamesh no one else. To me that seems to tell against it being a din
in kavod.

2. Several people suggested that my particular example (taking out the
garbage) is not an example of hishtamshus: Mr. Cohen is a member of
a community and his obligation is as a part of the community, not as
shimush of anyone else.

This may be a nice heter, but it doesn't help us understand the issur
of hishtamshus.

3. Several people have claimed that a husband is required to be
m'shamesh his wife. I asked for sources. Several people cited passages
in the Kesuba. I suggested an alternative explanation, and pointed out
passages in Hilchos Geirushin which harmonized with my explanation, and
I pointed out that according to the other explanation certain halachos
in geirushin ought to exist which don't. So, as in A above, I will take
this as a mistaken claim until I am given a source.

I think that's where we are now.

[Email #2. -mi]

From: "Chana Luntz" <chana@KolSassoon.net>
>If you say that
> the Yerushalmi is saying something different about this pasuk, arguably
> you have a contradiction between the two.

I think "arguably" is the operative word here.  It seems just as plausible
that there are two aspects to the mitzva of v'kidashto: a positive offering
of kavod by "liftoah rishon ul'varech rishon", and a negative protection of
kedusha by "assur l'hishtamesh".

> I think the "k" is very suggestive, especially where he is deviating
> from the source text.
> BTW what we really need here, and I do not currently have access to, is
> the precise language of the Mordechai

He cites the Yerushalmi "Harei zeh maal".  No kaf.

> BTW, do you agree that the wifely obligations involve some physical, and
> some that are either physical or financial, depending on her financial
> circumstances?

Yes.  See my previous post of today.  My major contention here, which may be
irrelevant to your opinion, is that the husband has no obligation to perform
menial labor.

> what are you gaining by defining it as a din of bizayon, it all seems
> rather unnecessary?

(a) The words of the Rama can be read naively
(b) Mrs. Cohen has no special status (again making the Rama read naively:
I'd expect the Rama to spell out such an important exception)

David Riceman

*********************


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