Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 069

Saturday, January 3 2004

• Re: Janthina as the chilazon--new data
• Re: Mrs. Cohen's dilemma
• Re: Midrash
• Re: Midrash
• Some historical thoughts re Chanuka
• Some historical thoughts re Chanuka
• Wives of Tanaim and Amoraim-Addendum
• Re: Some historical thoughts re Chanuka
• Re: Differences, if any, between Jews and goyim
• Re: Mrs. Cohen's dilemma
• Ramban/Shechinah
• RE: Tzaar Baalei Chayim and Kashrus
• Re: FW: FW: Tzaar Baalei Chayim and Kashrus
• Re: Mrs. Cohen's dilemma
• Re: Mrs Katz's dilemma
• Re: Mrs Katz's dilemma
• Re: Money
• Some historical thoughts re Chanuka

Micha,

As usual, when it comes to this subject, I'll pop up with a few bones to pick.

At 04:17 AM 12/30/2003 +0000, you wrote:
>On Mon, Dec 29, 2003 at 11:28:29PM +0200, Moshe Feldman wrote:
>: The P'til Tekhelet organization believes that the chilazon is the Murex.
>: In contrast, Rav Herzog favored identifying chilazon with Janthina
>: (because its description fulfills more of the criteria found in the
>: gemara)...

>R' Herzog's objections to the murex were:
>1- The dye is more purple than blue,
>2- The murex's shell is white, and didn't fit "domeh layam".

Actually, Rabbi Herzog felt the murex failed to meet any of the statements
in Menachos. Aside from gufo domeh l'yam, it's shape is not anything like
a fish (briaso domeh l'dag), it doesn't have anything like a periodicity
of at least several years (if not many), and even the expensive part it
fails because, as he said, the reason it is expensive is because of the
1 in 70 years characteristic - not because it gives little dye substance
per snail.

>If you look at www.realtekhelet.com, you'll notice that janthina's fit
>is no less dochaq. E.g. relying on airbubbles that it uses to float to
>fit the "gufo domeh ledagim", by looking similar to scales. We really
>don't have any candidate that fits the description unequivically.

one could argue that the cuttlefish meets the description pretty well
(even the 1 in 70 years), but the dye process used is another story.

>However, he concluded that the chilazon must be the murex because both
>techeiles and non-Jewish royalty used the same source for their dyes
>(Shabbos 26a and Rashi sham). And since royalty is associated bedavka
>with royal purple, whose source is known (porphyra = murex), it would
>be the likely candidate based on non-chazal data. That's the Aruch's
>conclusion, FWIW. Purphyra also appears in the Targum of Eichah 2:17,
>and it's assumed to refer to HQBH's figurative tallis. See MB 555:1,
>who gives this as a maqor for not having worn (lashon avar intentional)
>a tallis before chatzos on 9 beAv.

Rabbi Herzog does go in to this discussion, but he does *not* conclude
that murex is the chilazon. The Aruch does not say this either. using
Purphyra to designate Royal Robes can be likened to HQBH's tallis (not,
techeiles) without meaning that the source for the dye in the royal
robes is the same as for techeiles.

>Then there's the kaleh ilan (indigo) connection.
>...
>: Do any of you who are Murex supporters have second thoughts?

>Last, the Tif'eres Yisrael doesn't require that techeiles come from
>chilazon. Any colorfast sky-blue dye (which R' Herzog does not believe
>would include the Radziner dye, it's too dark) is kosher. Just that
>chazal only knew of one such dye.

It is hardly clear that techeiles is supposed to be sky blue (domeh
implies similarity, not equivalence). Tosafos Chulin 47b says that indigo
is like the sky, but that indigo only slightly resembles techeiles (domeh
k'tzat) - implying that techeiles is not sky blue. It also says there
that indigo and techeiles can be distinguished before sunrise, contrary
to the claim often made that techeiles is visually indistinguishable from
techeiles. of course, in ancient times, the dye process undoubtedly had
variation (both for indigo and techeiles), and indigo dyeing can imitate
many shades depending on the dipping technique, so it would be hard to
know the difference between techeiles and indigo. But, from Tosafos, the
color generally associated with indigo is not *that* close to techeiles.

mendel

From: "Seth Mandel" <sm@aishdas.org>
> Halakhically this is not an issue. In the k'subba he has specifically
> written "va'ana 'eflah v'oqir v'ezun va'afarnes yatikhi ... k'hilkhot
> guvrin y'udain..." "I shall serve, honor, support and sustain you
> as Jewish men do" [to their wives.] This is more than a m'hila on his
> kovod; this is a contractual obligation that requires him to do for his
> wife as Jewish men do for their wives.

Are you sure this is more than a financial obligation? Admittedly "eflah"
sounds physical, but it normally refers to employment rather than service
("sheiruth" in Hebrew; I don't know what the Aramaic equivalent would be).
"Oqir" would then refer to the degree of financial obligation (according
to Mishnaic law it depends on the status of both spouses).

In spite of the Arukh HaShulhan, the plain reading of the Rama is that it
requires an act of m'hila before someone can use the kohein as a servant.
I suggested in my original email that marriage may itself be construed
as an act of m'hila for customary husbandly behavior, but I don't think
this clause proves that. I'm still hoping for some documentary evidence,
however.

David Riceman
(not a Kohein, if anyone was worried)

In Areivim Digest V12 #200 dated 1/1/04  [R Steve Brizel, <Zeliglaw@aol.com>
wrote:]
>> Differences,  if any, between Jews and goyim

> If there are such inherent differences between Jews 
> and Gentiles, why did HaShem offer the  nations of the world the Torah in 
> the first instance ? 

1. Because He didn't want them to have the opportunity to complain later.

2. To demonstrate for US what He ALREADY knew. Analogy: Why did He have
to ask Avraham to bring up Yitzchak, and why did Avraham have to go
through all those steps of actually bringing Yitchak, putting him on the
mizbeach, etc? Didn't He already know without the demo that if asked,
Avraham would accede? Yes, but WE had to know.

3. Who says the medrash is meant literally? That He literally went around
and asked each nation if it wanted the Torah? Maybe the whole meaning of
the medrash is precisely: Hashem didn't give Yishmael the Torah because
He knew they were ganavim, didn't give Esav the Torah because He knew
they were rotzchim, etc.

Segue to subject I really want to write about at length one of these days,
IY"H and B"N:

Our list member R'n Simi Peters has written an outstanding book called
*Learning to Read Midrash.* I am reading it with great hana'ah.

 -Toby Katz

On 1 Jan 2004 at 18:22, T613K@aol.com wrote:
> 3. Who says the medrash is meant literally? That He literally went
> around and asked each nation if it wanted the Torah? Maybe the whole
> meaning of the medrash is precisely: Hashem didn't give Yishmael the
> Torah because He knew they were ganavim, didn't give Esav the Torah
> because He knew they were rotzchim, etc.

This ties in with the idea that midos are to some extent innate.
While one can work on his midos, they cannot be taught. Rachmanim,
bayshanim v'gomlei chasadim is part of the very nature of a Jew, and
not of a goy. But in each case, they can be worked on and refined.

-- Carl

RGS wrote in vol 12, #197 [in Areivim, later bounced here]:
<<A correction to my earlier post, the article was by R' Gerald Blidstein
in the Fall 2001 issue of Tradition.
He suggested that the reason Chanukah is essentially missing from the
Mishnah is that it was really a victory of Traditionalist Jews over
Hellenist Jews. Thus, it was intentionally kept out of the Mishnah
either out of an embarrassment that Jews could become so Hellenistic
(a very difficult suggestion) ...>>

I don't think that this suggestion is so far-fetched. In Mip'nei HaRav,
p 145, HaRav Herschel Schechter writes the following in the name of RYBS
(my free translation): "The war of the Chashmonaim was not against the
Greek gentiles, but against Jewish Hellenists . . . The text of "Al
HaNissim" and the text of the Gemara [dealing with the Chanuka episode]
is euphemistic, as Chazal were very careful not to speak ill of Jews".
This view seems consistent with Rav Blidstein's suggestion (which I have
not myself read) that Chanuka was kept out of the Mishna so as not to
embarrass, or speak ill of, Helenist Jews.

Kol tuv,
Dov Kay
Melbourne, Australia

>The text of "Al HaNissim" and the text of the Gemara [dealing with the 
>Chanuka episode] is euphemistic, as Chazal were very careful not to speak 
>ill of Jews".

This is perfectly consonant with a Sicha from the L Rebbe that I heard
last year over Chanukah (the following is a vague recollection of what
I think I remember):

The text of Al HaNissim says:

You delivered:
a. The mighty  into the hands of the weak
b. many        into              the few
c. tamei       into              tahor
d. r'sha'im    into              tzaddikim
e. zeidim      into              oskei torah

Now, he says (I think): (a) and (b) are real nissim. But what about
(c), (d), and (e)? Wouldn't we expect (on some spiritual level) that
the tamei will fall to the tahor, and r'sha'im to the tzaddikim, etc.?

The answer is that in each of the five pairs above, the first of the
pair are the Hellenistic Jews and latter are the Chashmonaim.

The reason (a) and (b) happened, was _because_ the Chashmonim were
tahor, tzaddikim, and oskei torah. In other words, the miracle was that
_despite_ the fact that Hellenists were mighty and many, the zchus of
the Chashmonaim allowed them to win out.

I hope the above makes sense, and that it reasonably represents what I heard.

-- Sholom

+-------------------------------------------------------+
|   Sholom Simon     | sholom@aishdas.org               |
+-------------------------------------------------------+
| proud daddy to Joshua Ari  4/18/93 - 27 Nissan 5753   |
|        and Eliana Rebekah  3/12/95 - 11 Adar-2 5755   |
+-------------------------------------------------------+

I found another wife of an Amora whose name is given in the Gemara:

Taanis 23b-the wife of Rav Yitzchak ben Elyashiv was named Chana.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

I wrote:
>[R' Gerald Blidstein] suggested that the reason Chanukah is essentially
>missing from the Mishnah is that it was really a victory of Traditionalist
>Jews over Hellenist Jews. Thus, it was intentionally kept out of the
>Mishnah either out of an embarrassment that Jews could become so
>Hellenistic (a very difficult suggestion) ...

Dov Kay wrote:
>...in the name of RYBS... "the text of the Gemara [dealing with the
>Chanuka episode] is euphemistic, as Chazal were very careful not to speak
>ill of Jews".

>This view seems consistent with Rav Blidstein's suggestion...

And the Sadducees? Boethusians? Jewish-Christians? Talmudic literature is
full of references to them, most of them unflattering.

Gil Student
gil@aishdas.org
www.aishdas.org/student

In Areivim Digest V12 #201 dated 1/2/04 Gershon Dubin
<gershon.dubin@juno.com> writes:
> << because their rejection of mitzvas sukka proves Him right
> retrospectively.

> assumed, in the future, rejection.

> The fact that something of that importance can be predicted (not via
> prophecy, either) casts some doubt on the bechira the gentiles are
> assumed to have in the gemara.>>  --R' AA

> It's also not clear that every single gentile will reject the opportunity
> to adopt mitzvas sukka; I read it as a prediction of the general response.

1.  We have several gerei tzeddek on our list
2. My husband has had extensive dealing with bnai Noach over many years

Obviously goyim have bechira. They have the capacity to become Jews,
and they have the capacity to become G-d-fearing bnai Noach.

However, the vast majority will do neither. As RGD says, the Gemara
deals with generalities.

That is also true of "Esav sonei leYaakov" a rule to which there are many
honorable exceptions. Yet the rule remains, sadly, all too predictive
of what we can expect from, say, the population of France and the faculty
at Harvard.

I must add

3. Many Jews are not particularly good people, some are unethical and
some are downright criminals. Nevertheless as a broad predictor the
rule of "rachmanim bayshanim gomlei chasadim" remains remarkably true
across the spectrum of Jews, including those who are least Jewishly
knowledgeable or observant. And goyim who share these quissentially
Jewish midos often find themselves powerfully attracted to Jews. To join
them, or to marry them.

 -Toby Katz

From: "David Riceman" <driceman@worldnet.att.net>
> From: "Seth Mandel" <sm@aishdas.org>
>> In the k'subba he has specifically
>> written "va'ana 'eflah v'oqir v'ezun va'afarnes yatikhi ... k'hilkhot
>> guvrin y'udain..." "I shall serve, honor, support and sustain you
>> as Jewish men do" [to their wives.]

> Are you sure this is more than a financial obligation? Admittedly "eflah"
> sounds physical, but it normally refers to employment rather than service
> ("sheiruth" in Hebrew; I don't know what the Aramaic equivalent would be).
> "Oqir" would then refer to the degree of financial obligation...
> In spite of the Arukh HaShulhan, the plain reading of the Rama is that it
> requires an act of m'hila before someone can use the kohein as a servant. I
> suggested in my original email that marriage may itself be construed as an
> act of m'hila for customary husbandly behavior, but I don't think this
> clause proves that.

plh does not mean employment. The obligation to work to support the
wife is in ezun va'afarnes. Plh is Aramaic for Hebrew 'bd, and is used
for the Jews serving the Egyptians (scarcely employment). Furthermore,
if it did mean "to be employed," how could it be in the group followed by
yatikhi (otakh in Hebrew). Being employed is intransitive. Similarly,
'oqir means to honor, period. The financial obligation stems from the
honor that they are obliged to show each other. You are taking these
words out of their plain meaning and inventing meanings, much as a person
who thinks that it is his wife's obligation to support him is obliged
to distort the meanings of the k'subba.

Since this is m'furash in the k'subba, and therefore is a contractual
obligation the Kohen has taken upon himself, no one, including the
R'mo, ever thought that the exclusion of the wife of a kohen from the
obligation needed a special s'if in the SA. Similarly if a kohen would
hire himself as a workman he would be obliged to do the work, and that
does not need a special s'if. You are also interpreting the R'mo as
excluding the husband with his mention of m'hila; if the R'Mo really
meant the husband to be included in that he would have mentioned it.

Did the Ramban on Shechinah (46:1) - shiur that normally lasts 45m went
1hr overtime! Finally understood that the Tanya means "chelek eloka
me'ma'al mamash" literally. Always thought like the Rambam that Shechinah
is a kavod nivra, but I see Ramban strenuously objects (nafka mina to
daven to Shechinah), and holds Shechinah is not separated from HKB"H,
that Pnei Hashem is Shechinah, and it can be seen and much more. Needs
more reflection!

YGB

> Tzaar Baalei Chayim does not override issurei shabbat. 

Of course it does -- see the law about milking a cow on Shabbos.

Akiva

On Wed, Dec 31, 2003 at 07:24:28AM +0200, R' Akiva Atwood forwarded from
R' David Sears:
: >>>animal's suffering means absolutely nothing to him. But when a person
: >>>does something for an articulable reason, and which incidentally causes
: >>>an animal to suffer, he is not exercising or encouraging a bad middah,
: >>>and there is no reason to prevent him from doing it.

: "No reason?" So why do Chazal allow one to be mevatel a kli on Shabbos
: to rescue an animal in distress? Or to milk a cow on Shabbos to relieve
: her distress? Just to teach "middos tovos?"

Why not? Isn't the teaching of middos tovos central to Yahadus?

For that matter, if you believe that all ill that befalls another is
min hashamayim -- which isn't a given hearabouts WRT people, nevermind
animals, but if you believe it WRT people... then

Doing harm to another person is still prohibited. Even though one's
choice causes no suffering that wouldn't have happened anyway. Why?
Isn't it because of the effects of the act on the actor, not the
recipient?

...
: And we have numerous examples of "maaseh rav" where Gedolei Yisrael
: intervened to save animals in distress lifnim mishuras ha-din --
: indicating that although there may not be a chiyuv to do so, it is
: nevertheless a mitzvah if one so chooses...

...
: He is telling us something more -- that we should behave in a manner of
: lifnim mishuras hadin re. tz'b'ch because animals are sentient creatures...

But an actual issur wouldn't imply that the product of that issur were
actually assur behana'ah / achilah. Nevermind a violation of lifnim
mishuras hadin.

Gut Voch!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org        for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org   the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905      

From: "Seth Mandel" <sm@aishdas.org>
> plh does not mean employment. The obligation to work to support
> the wife is in ezun va'afarnes.

Ezun v'afarnes if I have the money. Eflah if I don't. A normal creditor
can't force his unemployed debtor to work.

> Plh is Aramaic for Hebrew 'bd, and is used for the Jews
> serving the Egyptians (scarcely employment).  Furthermore, if it did mean
> "to be employed," how could it be in the group followed by yatikhi (otakh
> in Hebrew).  Being employed is intransitive.

An object following a group of verbs need not be the object of them all.

> Similarly, 'oqir means to honor, period.

How is that clause legally enforceable?

By the same token zn means to feed, not to provide the means to aquire
food. Is not spoon-feeding your wife (or, for that matter, not grocery
shopping and cooking) a violation of your contractual obligation to your
wife? Is it grounds for a Bes Din to order a divorce?

Hazal say that one may be doresh the text of the kesuba, but I don't
know to what extent such drashos are legally enforceable. To pick
your example of plh, may a wife treat her husband as she does a slave
(e.g. insisting that he do what halacha defines as her work), citing
this clause as justification? If he refuses to act like a slave is that
grounds for a Bes Din to order a divorce?

She's entitled to reasonable and customary treatment from him, both
financial and otherwise. My question is to what extent that entitlement
overrides the prohibition of hishtamshus. For example, I am arguably
obliged to accompany my wife to the cemetary if one of her relatives dies.
Would a kohen be so obliged, or would the issur of tumah override that
obligation? I think we all agree that issur of tumah does override it.

Our case is different because the kohen has the capacity to be mohel.
You imply that having the capacity implies having an obligation. I don't
believe that, but I would like to see some evidence.

Another example: supposing he does take the garbage out, but like Poo-Bah,
keeps muttering "Oh, the degradation, that I, a kohen, am taking out the
garbage."  Even the Arukh HaShulhan would agree in that case she has
violated the issur of hishtamshus (according to the AH the issur is inducing
bizayon, and m'hilah is simply confirming that the requested activity is not
degrading).  Yet he certainly fulfilled what you maintain is his contractual
obligation to take out the garbage.  The kesuba doesn't specify that he not
feel bizayon when he works.

> The financial obligation stems from the honor that they are obliged
> to show each other.

Wow! That's certainly not true, for example, of kibud av vaem. I thought
the financial obligations came from the Biblical obligations of shearah
and ksusah.

[Email #2. -mi]

I responded to Rabbi Mandel quickly and incoherently before Shabbos.
Over Shabbos I realized that I should respond in a more orderly fashion.
Here goes.

Rabbi Mandel made two claims which I believe are false:

RMC1: The husband's mehillat kavod is an inherent part of the marriage
contract

RMC2: "Eflah" in the kesuba constitutes a commitment to do household
errands like taking out the garbage.

"O philosophers may sing of the troubles of a king
But the duties are delightful and the privilege is great,
And the privilege and pleasure which we treasure beyond measure
Is to run on little errands for the Minister of State."
<sorry, that just slipped out>

Consider a Jewish king. He is halachically incapable of mehillat kavod
("melech shemahal ein k'vodo mahul"). It follows from RMC1 that he
cannot marry. Since the conclusion is false (H. Melachim 3:2 IIRC)
the premise, RMC1, is false.

Now consider the following two pleas to a Beis Din:

P1: My husband refuses to get a job, and he cannot support me as he
is halachically required to do without working. Please force him to
divorce me.

P2: My husband refuses to take out the garbage. Please force him to
divorce me.

P1 is grounds for a coerced divorce (EH 154:3). Unless there is a
lacuna in my Shulhan Aruh P2 is not grounds for a coerced divorce.
According to RMC2 P1 and P2 are equal violations of the kesuba, and
should be treated the same. Hence RMC2 is false.

A recent guest asked me if I would advise a real Mrs. Cohen to ask her
husband to take out the garbage. I asked her the old riddle:
"What's the difference between theory and practice? In theory there's
no difference between theory and practice. In practice there's a huge
difference between theory and practice."

In practice any kohen in his right mind is mohel his kavod all the time,
including taking out the garbage for his wife and passing the salt to
total strangers.

In theory, however, Rabbi Mandel is wrong. The kohen has the prerogative
not to be mohel his kavod to his wife, and we have not solved Mrs. Cohen's
dilemma.

David Riceman

In message <002001c3cfd5$da19e660$6500a8c0@newlaptop>, Seth Mandel 
<sm@aishdas.org> writes
>Ishto k'gufo probably halakhically does not apply: it means that his wife's
>honor is his own and his interests are his wife's.

In general I would agree (as cited, this rule does not apply to other
obligations on a kohen such as to avoid tumas meis). However, this
whole din is one of kavod (we know that by the fact that he can be
mochel, a kohen cannot be mochel on his obligation not avoid tumas
meis, except in the particular circumstances mandated by the Torah).
On that basis, might it not be argued, just as you have said above,
that because his wife's honour is his own, his honour is his wife's?
Is there not a concept of honouring the wife of a Chaver on this basis?

Shavuah tov
Chana
-- 
Chana Luntz

From: "Chana Luntz" <chana@KolSassoon.net>
> >Ishto k'gufo probably halakhically does not apply: it means that his wife's
> >honor is his own and his interests are his wife's.

> In general I would agree (as cited, this rule does not apply to other
> obligations on a kohen such as to avoid tumas meis).  However, this
> whole din is one of kavod (we know that by the fact that he can be
> mochel, a kohen cannot be mochel on his obligation not avoid tumas meis,
> except in the particular circumstances mandated by the Torah).   On that
> basis, might it not be argued, just as you have said above, that because
> his wife's honour is his own, his honour is his wife's?  Is there not a
> concept of honouring the wife of a Chaver on this basis?

To be sure, there is an obligation on the wife to honor the husband,
just as much as there is for him to honor her. In the case of taking out
the garbage, however, these mutual obligations cancel each other out,
or else neither would be allowed to ask the other for help at all.

I am arguing that once they are canceled, the outside obligation not
to make use of a kohen or a talmid chochom is not the deciding factor
anymore, because of the obligation the husband has taken upon himself
in the k'subbo; only if the wife's request is indeed not in accordance
with the honor due to a Jewish husband does the latter possibly reassert
itself.

But the mutual honor is indeed the optimal basis for a marriage. The wife
wants to spare the husband the chore of taking out the garbage, so he will
have more time to learn; the husband wants to spare the wife the chore,
so that she can rest from all of the chores of taking care of the house.
If the husband is good at washing dishes (unlike I, with only thumbs on
both hands), it is an admirable tradeoff for him to wash the dishes that
have been dirtied by her cooking...

Now, in light of the nature of my codisputant, I will pose an entirely
serious question:

it is forbidden to make use of a talmid chochom, presumably because
of the honor due to his Torah, not because he may or may not hold any
official position. That being so, would it not be forbidden to make
use of someone like R.n Luntz? In her particular case, this is not a
question about the marriage arrangements, because her husband is also
a talmid chochom so their mutual obligations balance each other out.
But are those who are arguing that there should be a problem with having
a husband who is a kohen take out the garbage also argue that there is
a problem with having a wife who is a talmid(at) chachomim take out the
garbage if her husband is not?

Seth Mandel

On Tue, Dec 30, 2003 at 12:02:59AM -0800, Rabbi A Seinfeld wrote:
: In Chumash, there is Gen. 23:16 that seems to refer to standardized
: currency.

... and near the top of this thread, I used the phrase "oveir lasocheir"
to argue there was *NO* standard currency. If some sheqalim are Ol"S
and some not, the implication is a lack of standardization.

As to the notion that Terach invented coinage, I would like to see the
medrash to see what we're talking about.

Gut Voch!
-mi

From: Sholom Simon sholom@aishdas.org
> The text of Al HaNissim says:
> You delivered:  a. The mighty into the hands of the weak
> b. many into the few    c. tamei into tahor
> d. r'sha'im into tzaddikim    e. zeidim into oskei torah

> Now, he says (I think): (a) and (b) are real nissim. But what about (c),
> (d), and (e)? Wouldn't we expect (on some spiritual level) that the tamei
> will fall to the tahor, and r'sha'im to the tzaddikim, etc.?

IIRC, I saw many years ago the SR z'l bring a pshat on this from the
CS z'l.

He says that the Chashmonoim, who were tzadikim, insisted on keeping
mitzvos even during their wars. Therefore when - lemoshol - they had to
eat, they spent time looking for water for netilas yodayim, they had
to take time off war to davven 3 times a day, they had to seek Kosher
food and similar restrictions and extra needs - all because they were
'Tahorim, tzadikim and oskei sorosecho'.

Their enemies, OTOH, had none of these difficulties. So, besides the
obvious nes of 'giborim beyad chaloshim' and 'rabim beyad me'atim'
thee were the additional miracles of c,d and e...

The SR uses this CS to explain Dovid Hamelech's tefileh "Shomro Nafshi
Ki chosid oni". Why did DH's nefesh need extra shemira p because he was
a chossid?

He answers, that for DH who was involved in wars with enemies, his
'nefesh' was his nation - whom he was defending. And, as did the
Chashmonoim, so did his soldiers insist on obeying all the halochos and
even mili de chasidus - 'lifnim mishuras hadin'. Doing this could be
a real disadvantage in wartime - and that is why he asked the RBSO -
"Shomro Nafshi ki chossid oni." ie, to guard his nefesh [the nation],
because we need extra help - to cover our being sticklers in following
the Torah...

[Another pshat the SR says, quoting the gemoro Brochos about Chassidim
Horishonim - who spent 9 hours a day in Tefileh. The gemoro asks,
spending so much time in prayer - "what about their Torah?" It answers
that because they were chasidim "toroson mishtameres/misboreches".

This time, the SR says that the 'nefesh' of DH was his Torah, and as
we know that DH was a chosid [velo chosid ani...?], and probably also
davvened like the chassidim horishonim - 9 hours a day. And he was
concerned that because of this he may lose his Torah.

So he asked HKBH to guard his nefesh - his Torah...

SBA

*********************


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