Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 035

Thursday, October 30 2003

• Re: flood
• Re: flood
• Re: RYBS on Heter Meah Rabbanim
• Re: RYBS on Heter Meah Rabbanim
• DT
• Re: DT
• IE and Qadmus
• Re: RYBS on Heter Meah Rabbanim
• Heter Meah rabbonim
• Re: Tochachah
• Hatafas Dam Bris
• Why do some brachot start with "and"
• Re:Morid hatal
• Re: saying chazak before post-aliyah bracha
• Basics for Philosophical discussions
• Re: IE and Qadmus
• creation of sun & moon
• MN 3:18 [was Re: MN 3:38]
• Re: Naked and Cunning

Eli Turkel wrote:
>i.e from bereshit I understand that 5764 years ao the sun and moon
>and the stars were created. If this is true than previous worlds
>don't help us. The only way out is that only life (or perhaps only
>the dinosaurs) were destroyed.

RYGB wrote:
>Nowhere does it say there that the sun and moon were created on Day
>4... The word creation does not appear in that context at
>all. And the word "Va'ya'as" later refers to execution, not creation.

It's a mefurash Rashi on Bereishis 1:14.

Gil Student

In Avodah V12 #34 dated 10/29/03 "Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer"
<sbechhof@casbah.it.northwestern.edu> writes:
>> If the mabul covered the entire world and destroyed everything how
>> come we have trees with more than 6000 rings on them? ...

> You think these questions have no resolution other than declaring an entire 
> parasha in the Torah to be a fairy tale?!

I do not remember who wrote the question you quote and refute here, but
IIRC there are NOT any trees with more than 5000 rings. Any scientists
out there who can confirm this?

Anyway, the trees were created full grown. If you had cut down a big
redwood in the Garden of Eden on the day it was created, presumably it
would have had many rings.

I point out the above as an obvious explanation for many rings, even
though I hasten to add that I don't believe G-d created an old-looking
world on purpose to deceive us.

 -Toby Katz

Gil Student wrote:
> "Ethical considerations also prompted the Rav's refusal to participate
> in granting a heter me-a rabbanim to husbands whose wives were unwilling
> to accept a get. The Rav explained that his policy was based upon the
> realization that, if the shoe were on the other foot, corresponding
> procedures would not be available to the wife."

> R' Walter Wurzburger, "Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik as Posek of Post-Modern
> Orthodoxy" in Tradtion 29:1 (1994), p. 17

I am not sure that the term "ethical considerations" is appropriate.
The idea of balancing the rights of the husband and wife is itself a
halachic principle. I would assume that Rav Soleveitchik was concerned
that the hetair was being used in a way that had not been intended -
to create an unfair disparity between the rights of the man and woman.
However this is just conjecture on my part.

E.H. 117:11

A person who knows that his wife is an epileptic and wants to divorce
her but lacks the money to pay for her Kesuba can force her to accept
the get (and this is not a violation of Takanos Rabbeinu Gershon that a
woman can't be divorced against her will). And pays what he can afford
and the rest when he gets it. If she refuses to accept the get then he
is not obligated in food, clothing and marital relations. Rema: This is
only concerning a major blemish such as epilepsy that if the man had it 
we would force him to divorce her according to the law of the talmud. 
Rabbeinu Gershon did not make his takana to give the woman advantage 
over the man (Teshuvos HaRosh 42)....

Teshuvos HaRosh #42:

If a man - who can not be divorced except with his consent but never
the less we force him to divorce her and give the kesuba if he develops
and unbearable blemish, a woman who can be divorced against her will
isn't it logical that she can be forced to accept a get when she
develops an unbearable blemish? While it is true that Rabbeinu Gershon
created restrictions in this matter, however isn't it logical that
it never occurred to him to prevent a divorce in this case where she
has developed an unbearable blemish and to isolate the man and prevent
him from fulfilling his obligation of having children? Therefore it is
quite obvious he can divorce his wife and give her the kesuba because
the Takana of Rabbeinu Gershon was not to give to give advantage to the
women over the man. The fact is he saw his generation had degenerated
and was degrading women by forced divorce and he made a takana in order
to create a parity between the power of women and men. Just like a man
can not be divorced against his will also the woman would henceforth
not be divorced against her will. But he never created his takana so
that in a situation where the man would be forced to divorce his wife
that she could not be forced to accept the divorce...

                   Daniel Eidensohn

Gil Student wrote:
> "Ethical considerations also prompted the Rav's refusal to participate
> in granting a heter me-a rabbanim to husbands whose wives were unwilling
> to accept a get. The Rav explained that his policy was based upon the
> realization that, if the shoe were on the other foot, corresponding
> procedures would not be available to the wife."

> R' Walter Wurzburger, "Rav Joseph B. Soloveitchik as Posek of Post-Modern
> Orthodoxy" in Tradtion 29:1 (1994), p. 17

I am not sure that the term "ethical considerations" is appropriate.
The idea of balancing the rights of the husband and wife is itself a
halachic principle. I would assume that Rav Soleveitchik was concerned
that the hetair was being used in a way that had not been intended -
to create an unfair disparity between the rights of the man and woman.
However this is just conjecture on my part.

E.H. 117:11

A person who knows that his wife is an epileptic and wants to divorce
her but lacks the money to pay for her Kesuba can force her to accept
the get (and this is not a violation of Takanos Rabbeinu Gershon that a
woman can't be divorced against her will). And pays what he can afford
and the rest when he gets it. If she refuses to accept the get then he
is not obligated in food, clothing and marital relations. Rema: This is
only concerning a major blemish such as epilepsy that if the man had it 
we would force him to divorce her according to the law of the talmud. 
Rabbeinu Gershon did not make his takana to give the woman advantage 
over the man (Teshuvos HaRosh 42)....

Teshuvos HaRosh #42:

If a man - who can not be divorced except with his consent but never
the less we force him to divorce her and give the kesuba if he develops
and unbearable blemish, a woman who can be divorced against her will
isn't it logical that she can be forced to accept a get when she
develops an unbearable blemish? While it is true that Rabbeinu Gershon
created restrictions in this matter, however isn't it logical that
it never occurred to him to prevent a divorce in this case where she
has developed an unbearable blemish and to isolate the man and prevent
him from fulfilling his obligation of having children? Therefore it is
quite obvious he can divorce his wife and give her the kesuba because
the Takana of Rabbeinu Gershon was not to give to give advantage to the
women over the man. The fact is he saw his generation had degenerated
and was degrading women by forced divorce and he made a takana in order
to create a parity between the power of women and men. Just like a man
can not be divorced against his will also the woman would henceforth
not be divorced against her will. But he never created his takana so
that in a situation where the man would be forced to divorce his wife
that she could not be forced to accept the divorce...

                   Daniel Eidensohn

>DA'AT TORAH

>ATTITUDE #1: The Individual accepts the binding jurisdiction of a posek
>voluntarily in matters of halakha. On non-halakhic matters, persuasive
>reasoning is the proper ground for decision making, whatever its source.

>ATTITUDE #2: Recognition of the authority of one or more posekim, should
>lead the individual to serious deliberation on, and usually to comply
>with, the non-halakhic judgments of those posekim in recognition of
>their outstanding wisdom and insight.

>ATTITUDE #3: The individual who has accepted the authority of one or
>more posekim on matters of halakha is bound by the judgment of those
>posekim also in non-halakhic areas when the posekim so dictate.

>ATTITUDE #4: Gedolei Torah, recognized as such by the people, have
>the authority to bind both the individual and communities to comply
>with their dictates in all aspects of life, without having to provide
>technical halakhic justification of their position.

>RYGB clearly holds #4 while MF is somewhere around 2 to 3.

RYGB (someone I happen to know quite well...) actually holds #2.

I cannot vouch for what RMF holds.

Kol Tuv,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org  or  ygb@yerushalmionline.org
essays, tapes and seforim at: www.aishdas.org;
on-line Yerushalmi shiurim at www.yerushalmionline.org

RML quoted RSBerman:
: DA'AT TORAH

This article isn't particularly relevent for two reasons.

First, RSB makes a spectrum of positions by comparing various attitudes
about how far the rav's role goes beyond that of poseiq. But he stays
in the realm of lem'aseh and travels along the axis from Torah to chol.
We, OTOH, on moving on the perpendicular axis. We're staying within Torah,
and moving away from the lema'aseh realm of pesaq.

Second, the question of a poseiq's authority most often revolves around
deciding between shitos. In fact, if the halachah was discussed since
the days of tana'im, and now some acharon wants to introduce a new pesaq
based on a sevara that contradicts all of that history, no one would
grant him the authority to do so. But that's the parallel to our case
of taking a new direction in parshanus based on data other than mesorah's.

The Gra and RSRH both question the Rambam's approach in Hil Yesodei
haTorah and MN. At some point one is no longer using modern thought to
frame one's Torah but is instead fitting Torah non-Torah assumptions and
structure. Which is why many simply omit these from the curriculum.
The Rambam obviously disagrees with these acharonim as to where the
line is.

But this puts the question of "who is authorized" in very lofty territory
-- we're not 100% the Rambam was. I'm not going to talk about whether RAL
presumed to make changes where inappropriate from a translation of a
summary of his shiur.

Does this mean the Rambam had no concept of such distinction between
changes that are rewriting Torah and those that are recasting the old
into new vessels? Or are we claiming that allegorizing the mabul is on
the proper side of the Rambam's definition?

The same exploring about where the line ought to go is the problem RHM
is having in defining whether one is utilizing "legitimate alternate
interpretations", looking at the same data through a different prism,
or whether it's a change in the substance itself.

We're debating the Rambam's defintion right now. I will comment on that
after spending more time with the sources. But it still seems to me that
the Rambam only considers the field of parshanut opten when it's untilled.
Or, as in the case of ma'aseh bereishis, there's an eilu va'eilu from
back in the days of the tana'im, opinions of Torah itself. If there is
TSBP on the subject, how can someone declare it wrong? Unlike RGS's read,
I don't think the MN2:16 is asserting that the darkhei bi'ur or sha'arei
peirushim are always open. Not one pereq after he said that Aristo
can be accomodated because, in part, the nevi'im and our chachamim
do not dictate a contradictory position.

In any case, those who do put the Moreh's approach outside of the pale
lo kol shekein would find this allegorization to accomodate scientific
theory outside as well.

Ber 6:17 is pretty unequivical about the scope of the mabul. Beyond simply
speaking of "ha'aretz" or "kol ha'aretz". "Leshacheis kol-basar asher-bo
ru'ach chaim mitachas hashamayim." Would seem to /have/ to include all
of the inhabited world, at least; more plausibly every part of the world
that has any basar, not only humans. But even the smaller claim of the two
is still too much to allow one to wiggle out of the archeological issues.

Can one call redefining this pasuq as the same Torah in a different
light? How is being the first to say "to destroy all flesh under
the heaven" doesn't mean the end of all human civilization *not* the
declaration that parts of Torah can be shaved off to fit?

Does this mean that RSRH or the Gra would not consider a need for
a single truth that reflects both Torah and science? Of course not,
particularly those two acharonim.

I am not, as RYGB is, dismissing the strength of a scientific theory.
However, like he, I'm unafraid of leaving my religion falsifiable. It's
not being flippant (as RSG understood RYGB), it's having real emunah
that science and Torah won't really conflict.

My own position is still closer to RSG's own. Emunah means that one
accepts the conclusions derived from mesorah to be as sure as we are
of that derivation. No less than science from its data. Both ought
be inviolate. If one has that sort of confidence in both systems
ignoring data points from either is the real intellectual dishonesty.
The conflicts should be explored, struggled with, and perhaps shelved
while we await more data. Not dismissed in some alchemical ignoring of
data that doesn't fit the theory. Not if you really consider both as data.

There is a parallel within physics today. Quantum mechanics, the standard
model, has been the most successful theory in history in predicting
experimental results. Meanwhile, general relativity and its concept of
gravity have also been well proven. Each is used in different domains:
QM deals with the very small, relativity with the cosmic scale, the
very massive or the very fast. However when trying to combine the two
to merge gravity into quantum theory one gets infinities that just won't
go away. It doesn't work.

And yet, each theory is so well established than scientists don't question
either. Instead, they expect a resolution is just over the horizon.

Speaking of how science works, scientific theories produce predictions
that are progressibly better, as opposed to declaring the old equation
out-and-out wrong. As RAA wrote. However, the philosophy justifying
the equation does often chnge drastically. Paradigm shifts abound. The
shift from Newtonian determinism, from a predictable clockwork universe,
to quantum randomness, to give an example that came up on the hashgachah
thread.

We're discussing future resolutions of science and Jewish philosophy.
It is therefore the possibility of drastic change of underlying
concept that it relevent. That the equations approximate eachother in
all previously explored domains, and therefore the predictions undergo
successive refinement, is less so. Hope for resolution in that quarter
is not as dismal as painted.

But neither is it safe to say that today's theories are of no value
because they're bound to be subject to such paradigm shifts.

Last, RAF's notion of "resorting to miracle". It's not a last resort
to invoke the concept of miracle in exploring an event that the Torah
tells us was a neis. Yes, it's unsatisfying to say "that too was part
of the miracle", but that doesn't make it false.

(I could make a case that the evidence is exactly what I'd expect from
a neis. We, those people who do not merit to experience nissim, would
not witness physical evidence of nisim. For similar reasons. OTOH, nissim
exist to influence people, and the human record for the mabul is
very large. Fllod legends are ubiquitous, they can even be found in
such unlikely places for flooding as atop the Andes. Including the
possibility of neis, there is MORE non-Torah evidence in favor of a
flood than such evidence against a miraculous mabul.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure.
micha@aishdas.org        It preserves health, promotes convalescence,
http://www.aishdas.org   and helps us cope with adversity.
Fax: (413) 403-9905         - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei"

RMFrankel asked why anyone would assume the IE held of qadmus. He
writes that most of his contemporaries did not. I don't know who those
contemporaries are. I could use mar'eh meqomos. TIA.

After all, beri'ah yeish mei'ayin dates back to Rabban Gamliel. I know
of no maqor for qadmus. SO there's a burden of proof to be crossed if
one wants to insist in a difference that has implications beyond the
looser ruled domain of parshanut.

Rashi and the Ramban both assume gaps in the naarative in Gen 1. I
assume that it is something we would agree most rishonim held. So, how
does the IE's shitah that it's not in the peshat of the pasuq imply
that he holds it's not in the history of the beri'ah?

The possibility of ma'aseh bereishis not being meant as a literal history
goes back to the mishnah and "ein doreshin". It's a different kettle of
fish than nidon didan anyway.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             A cheerful disposition is an inestimable treasure.
micha@aishdas.org        It preserves health, promotes convalescence,
http://www.aishdas.org   and helps us cope with adversity.
Fax: (413) 403-9905         - R' SR Hirsch, "From the Wisdom of Mishlei"

Gil Student wrote:
>>"Ethical considerations also prompted the Rav's refusal to participate
>>in granting a heter me-a rabbanim to husbands whose wives were unwilling
>>to accept a get. The Rav explained that his policy was based upon the
>>realization that, if the shoe were on the other foot, corresponding
>>procedures would not be available to the wife."

I replied:
>I am not sure that the term "ethical considerations" is appropriate.
>The idea of balancing the rights of the husband and wife is itself a
>halachic principle. I would assume that Rav Soleveitchik was concerned
>that the hetair was being used in a way that had not been intended -
>to create an unfair disparity between the rights of the man and woman.
>However this is just conjecture on my part.

Just spoke with Rav Shurkin. He said he knew of a case where the wife 
was mentally ill and Rav Soleveitichk agreed to a hetair meah rabbanim

Daniel Eidensohn

When I first saw this, I couldn't beleive that the same person I had known
as my REbbi, had said such a thing. The power imbaance is not something
new and it was present at the very inception of this takkana. Did the
Rav argue with R. Gershom?! I think that this is a misquote somewhere
along the line.

M. Levin

On 29 Oct 2003 at 12:34, gil@aishdas.org wrote [to Areivim -mi]:
> Avi Burstein wrote:
>>I distinctly recall learning that the blanket statement has been made. I
>>just never bother to remember sources.
>>Something along the lines of "A certain amora, or rishon, stated that
>>no one in his time was qualified to give tochacha, so kal v'chomer,
>>in our time no one can do it right."

> Shu"t Maharam Lublin, no. 13; Ahavas Chesed, 17; Mitzvas HaShalom, pp.
> 330-335.

Thanks for posting this. 

I looked at the Mitzvas HaShalom this morning. He brings the Ahavas 
Chesed (it's ois 17 from the Marganesa Tava at the end of Ahavas 
Chesed - not in the main body of the Ahavas Chesed) as well as the CI 
in YD 2:28 (if I recall the reference correctly). The Ahavas Chesed - 
as quoted by the Mitzvas HaShalom (I didn't look it up in the Ahavas 
Chesed itself) brings the Maharam without saying where it is.   

BUT - as I understand all of these mkoros, they are not saying that 
we are patur today from giving tochacha. They're saying that no one 
today can (apparently both because of a general inability to do so 
and because one has to be a tzadik gamur in order to do so properly), 
and therefore that today there is no mitzva to hate someone who is a 
sinner - even one who is a sinner b'meizid. But that DOESN'T mean 
that WE are patur from giving (or at least trying to give) tochacha. 

Moreover, in past discussions of this and related issues, people on 
the list have suggested that because there is no one who is able to 
give tochacha today, there is no such thing as a halachic rasha who 
is classified as aino oseh ma'aseh amcha. I understood the Mitzvas 
HaShalom very differently. He seems to be setting up an intermediate 
category where we have no obligation to hate a sinner, but where 
there is also no obligation of v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha, at least 
in cases where someone commits violations of clear issurim d'oraysa 
b'meizid.  

 - Carl

mailto:cmsherer@fandz.com      mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

(Forwarding to Avodah - HM)

"Shoshana L. Boublil" <toramada@bezeqint.net> wrote:
> The child was born Mahul, and in consultation with medical professors,
> expert Mohel(s) and Chief Rabbi(s) the psika was that there will not be a
> brit on Sunday.

> Therefore the baby was named in Shul this morning.

I was under the impression that if a Zachar is Nolad Mahul that there
is still the requirement of Hatafas Dam Bris.

a) Is this true? and 
b) If so, is this only an Ashkanazic Psak?

HM

I noticed that only in Nusach Ashkenaz do 2 brachot begin with "and":
 - Velamalshinim
 - VeLirushalayim

Though a connection between each of the above and the previous brocho can be 
explained, if need be, I was wondering:

 - Why only these 2 brochos?
 - Why only in Nusach Ashkenaz?

Where else do we see a brocho starting with "and"?

 - Danny

Re R'SBA's side comment that:<<true nusach ashkenaz does not say Morid 
Hatal at all. My side comment is:

The Gr"a  did not omit it and also did not say "morid hatal".  He said 
"Mashiv haruach umorid hatal".

I admit that the Gr"a is not standard Ashkenaz but he's certainly 
closer to it than to chasidut.

I made no comment when, a short time ago, someone wrote that "there is 
general agreement" that hatal is written with a kamatz under the tet. I 
take this opportunity to repeat some of my previous comment on that.

This subject was well covered on list in the past.  Because the 
printers showed the phrase on a separate line, R' Yitzhak Satanov 
decided it was followed by a hefsek. So he changed geshem in Ashkenaz 
siddurim to the pausal form gashem. Despite R' Moshe approving of 
gashem, of late it has been noticed that there should not really be a 
hefsek in this list of Hashem's activities. So many siddurim have 
changed back to geshem.  I am not talking of those many who retained 
the old forms and never accepted the kamatz.

If there is no hefsek after hageshem, it follows that the hatal also 
should not have a pausal form and, therefore, should be with a patach.

There have been attempts, on list, to justify the presence of a kamatz 
in tal by d'rash or mysticism that never convinced me. So, I don't like 
the siddurim with kil'ayim. Either both non-pausal or both pausal.

k"t,
David

From: Kenneth G Miller <kennethgmiller@juno.com>
> Question 3: I understand that the person who gets an aliyah for "Chazak"
> should *not* say "Chazak" along with everyone else, as it would be
> a hefsek before his post-aliyah bracha. According to those opinions,
> why doesn't the same apply to the haftoros? Why isn't recital of this
> out-of-place pasuk considered a hefsek?

just an interesting note about this last question.

at my son's 'oufruf' a number of years ago on Parshas Vayechi, we had
the zchus to have with us Reb Dovid Smith ZT"L from London (he was also
refered to as Vilna Rav)...he was in the states at the time to promote
one of his seforim and his host, being a close friend of mine, brought
him along to daven with us at the oufruf.

knowing about the difference of opinions regarding the person who gets
the 'chazak' aliyah if he should say chazak along with everyone else,
i decided to be mechabed Rav Smith with this aliyeh..

my sons AND Rav Smith's host caught on right away my motive, we silently
motioned to one another and and watched to see what he will do

Rav Smith ZT"L DID say 'Chazak' with everyone else..BEFORE his post-aliyah
bracha

Simcha G

I cannot claim to be following this intensive debate. However, I am a
little puzzled that AFAIK nobody has quoted from an extensive chunk in
Shu"t of the Rashbo. There was an intensive debate about a proposed (&
enacted) ban on the study of philosophy by young men (it seems the women
were OK BG).

One of the arguments stated in favour was that students were denying the
literal extistence of tales in Bereshis and allegorised Adam & Chave as
Choimer Ve'Tzura (Or was it the other way round ? I've not read it for
decades) etc.

ER

Micha Berger wrote:
>After all, beri'ah yeish mei'ayin dates back to Rabban
>Gamliel. I know of no maqor for qadmus. SO there's
>a burden of proof to be crossed if one wants to insist
>in a difference that has implications beyond the looser
>ruled domain of parshanut.

Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim 2:26 quotes Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer ch. 3 as
supporting beri'ah yeish mi-yeish.

>So, how does the IE's shitah that it's not in the peshat
>of the pasuq imply that he holds it's not in the history
>of the beri'ah?

I think this is a profound comment on how to understand peshat
commentaries on the Bible. One must ask whether Ibn Ezra (or Rashbam)
is explaining what he believes to be an historical truth or merely the
simplest explanation of the text.

Gil Student

Nowhere does it say there that the sun and moon were created on Day 4. As
the Lubavitcher Rebbitzen translates, literally (1:14): "And the godly
spirit of law and order said: 'Let there be luminaries in the atmosphere
of Heaven..." etc. The word creation does not appear in that context at
all. And the word "Va'ya'as" later refers to execution, not creation."

The "standard" explanation is that that creation refers to yesh
meayin. Hence, since the sun and moon were formed from pre-existing
material there is no need to use the word "barah". This has absolutely
nothing to do with previous cycles.

Again I am not excluding previous cycles as a possible explanation but
that is far from claimong that this is simple pshat in the pasuk. I am
extremely doubtful that most rishonim thought that way. And agaun it
certainly is not the obvious pshat in the Gemara notwithstanding some
medrashim. It would not be the first time that medrashim disagreed.

BTW I saw in Aviezer's book the claim that the entire universe including
the sun and moon were created (or made) on the second day and not the
fourth and that on the fourth day the size of these bodies changed.

In any case it still is not clear to me according to the theory of cycles
what PHYSICALLY happened on the fourth (or second day). Was the entire
universe destroyed and then re-created (asiyah) or only the solar system
or perhaps only earth or perhaps only living matter on earth.

Eli Turkel

From: "Arie Folger" <afolger@aishdas.org>
> Well, I made a mistake when I wrote the chapter # in my palm. It should have
> read MN III:18, one of the chapters dealing with hashga'hah. I still need
> help, though.

See Moreh HaMoreh ad. loc. If you're troubled by universals Wolfson
has several discussions of the Rambam's opinion, e.g. The Philosophy of
Spinoza II:30-31. If that is your problem let me know and I'll try to
find a more extensive discussion.

I suspect you're more worried about the issue of shefa. Ibn Falaquera
(Moreh HaMoreh) points you to II:12 and his discussion there. See also
Feldman "Alfarabi Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect" pp. 200-205 and
Even Shmuel's peirush on MN II:36-37 (unfortunately he died before
finishing and got only up to III:13).

David Riceman

Kenneth G Miller wrote:
> In yesterday's parsha, we are told (2:25-3:1): "And the man and his
> wife were both arum and were not ashamed. And the nachash was more
> arum than all the other animals..."
...
> Ibn Ezra on the spot sees this very question, and seems to say that
> it is merely a rhetorical device ("tzachus b'lashon") to which no
> special significance should be given. He even cites two cases in
> Sefer Shoftim where such homonyms were used not merely in adjacent
> psukim, but in the very same pasuk.

> Still, that was Navi and this is Chumash....

At the end of the mabul (Ber 8:4), HQBH writes "vatanach hateivah" --
what else would No'ach's teivah do? His yonah "lo matz'ah mano'ach
lekhaf raglahh" (v 9). The water recedes "halokh vashov" (v 3), not
only "vayashovu". But then, the oreiv too is "halokh vashov" (v 8).

We also have Sarah say "tzechoq asah li E-lokim" upon Yitzchaq's birth
(Ber 21:6) and 2 pesuqim later she sees Yichma'el is "metzacheiq" (v
8). Yitzchaq is "metzacheiq es Rivqa" in Avimelekh's palace (26:8),
thereby giving away the ruse.

Eliezer's finding Rivqa involves a paragraph of gamal (camal) and
gamal (as a verb, gemillas chessed).

These things are actually quite common in chumash as well.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger           "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org      excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org 'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (413) 403-9905    trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

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