Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 025

Friday, October 24 2003

• Re: hashgacha pratit
• re: HP
• Re: hashgacha pratit
• Re: Hashgocah Protis - Sifsei Chaim's view of Gra
• Re: HP
• Re: Hashgocah Protis
• Re: new birth control?
• Re: Rabbi Yosef Bechhofer & Eruvin
• Re: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• Re: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• Re: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• Re: Allegorization of Scripture
• RE:Basics for Philisophical discussions
• Re: Allegorization of Scripture
• RE: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• RE: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• Re: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• Re: Allegorization of Scripture
• Re: Allegorization of Scripture

WRT to the debate between RYGB and RDE over whether one has to include
all the shittot, including hassidic, or only those that one personally
subscribes to - RYGB seems to hold a philosophical version of the modern
tendency of being hoshesh lechol hashittot..

Meir Shinnar

R' Eli Turkel wrote about two opposing viewpoints: <<< ... even though
G-d, in general, does not concern himself with individual animals or
leaves. I understood the Besht as claiming that every leaf that falls
in a forest without any effect on any human still falls only because
G-d decrees it. >>>

It seems to me that the difference between these two is mostly semantic.

If a leaf falls in a distant forest and does not affect a person, then
either G-d caused that it to fall, or something else caused it to fall.

If it was "something else" which caused it to fall, then that other thing
either had some degree of independent decision making (such as to cause
this leaf to fall before or after another leaf), or it had no degree of
independence at all.

If one says that it had some degree of independence, that would be
polytheistic, no? After all, if it has some degree of independence,
why not daven to it?

So we are left with: Either G-d Himself caused the leaf to fall, or some
non-bechira tool of His caused the leaf to fall.

To me, this sounds like arguing whether *I* put the food in my mouth, or
whether my *fork* put the food in my mouth. Is this what the discussion
is about, or am I missing something?

Akiva Miller

On Thu, Oct 23, 2003 at 03:27:56PM -0400, Shinnar, Meir wrote:
: WRT to the debate between RYGB and RDE over whether one has to include
: all the shittot, including hassidic, or only those that one personally
: subscribes to - RYGB seems to hold a philosophical version of the modern
: tendency of being hoshesh lechol hashittot..

If I understood him correctly, and if not, this is my own position:

One should allow the student to form his own opinion. This isn't
halakhah where there is a process of pesaq that pre-constrains the
talmid's choices.

A book that only presents one view and doesn't even note dissent in a
footnote and yet is presented as based on a professor's introductory
course to machshavah is therefore flawed.

To my mind the issue is pedagogic, and I'm therefore a little surprised
as to how long this discussion ran.

 -mi

 -- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Rabindranath Tagore

gil@aishdas.org wrote:
>R' Eidensohn, you stopped translating the Sifsei Chaim at the most
>important part! It is the second quote from the Gra that contains the
>real proof and the justification for the SC's earlier leap from knowledge
>to providence.

Perhaps you will continue the translation. I don't see any chiddush. As
pointed out the Kuzari (5:20) states that there are direct and indirect
paths of Divine expression. Only the direct one is called hashgocha
protis. The second quote is repeating the idea that nature is a non
random expression of G-d's will. This is not hashgocha protis. Tosfos
(Nida 16b) acknowledges that everything is theoretically controlled by
Heaven but that G-d does not usually intervene. This non intervention
is also an expression of G-d's supervision and judgment - but it is
not hashgocha protis. The Chabad understanding of the Besht is that
since the world is constantly being recreated by the direct will of
G-d it is being determined every second what happens to every molecule,
plant and person. In contrast according to the passive attitude of the
Rishonim - and the Gra can readily be understood that way - G-d set up
the mechanism of nature as intermediary and He allows it some degree of
independence. Thus nature is midos hadin. Hashgocha protis - the active
intervention in response to an active of bechira - is rachomim.

Eli Turkel wrote:
>If one assumes that HP applies
>to sechar ve-onesh in this world then that includes a tree falling on
>one's house and animals dying etc. since that affects the owner of the
>animal and house. This applies even though G-d , in general, does not
>concern himself with individual animals or leaves.

>I understood the Besht as claiming that every leaf that falls in a forest
>without any effect on any human still falls only because G-d decrees it.

Your point is well taken. The distinction between hashgocha and sechar
ve-onesh is not clear. The Rambam has them listed as two distinct
principles in his 13 principles. It is possible to view the actions
of animals as being part of nature and thus not connected with reward
and punishment. If one sticks his head in the mouth of a lion - is
it hashgocha protis that he gets bitten? On the other hand there are
a number of sources which state that wild animals are messengers to
execute G-d's judgment. This goes back to the gemora Shabbos 55 where
the question is raised whether a person only suffers because of sin.
There is a significant debate in the rishonim how to read the gemora and
in particular what the conclusion is. Thus a falling leaf or a biting
snake might be taken as deliberate judgments or they can be viewed as
natural processes. The issue needs more clarification. My point was that
how you understand hashgacha protis in relationship to animals and plants
- does change the way you relate to the world

 Daniel Eidensohn

I haven't been following this discussion very closely, since it seems
to be an argument about pedagogy rather than doctrine. Nonetheless,
upon reflection, I don't understand some of the terminlogy.

 Let me first review what I think I understand of the Rambam and Ramban's
opinions, then mention the opinion Rabbi B attributes to the Besht
(henceforth ML for M'yuchas L'haBesht, or possibly MK for m'yuchas
l'hakalam, see below), then explain why I'm puzzled.

Two caveats: I have selected the first two of these because for me they
are girsa d'yankusa. I do not assert that either of them are the first to
hold their respective positions (and, in fact, I doubt that they are).
Second, all three of these hold similar views of Divine Omniscience.
Other rishonim disagree, so a discussion of hashgacha pratis (henceforth
HP) which included them would be even more confusing. Nonetheless, for
these three, HP is not a doctrine about God's knowledge or foreknowledge
of earthly events, and all acknowledge that it is perfect.

The Rambam wanted his philosophy of Judaism to accomodate miracles
without requiring miracles. He insisted that God almost always mediated
his action in the world through nature. He went to great lengths in
several places to minimize the importance of miracles. Nonetheless he
believed that schar v'onesh was an ikkar, i.e. that God rewards and
punishes people appropriately. For the most part he solved this problem
by saying that schar v'onesh were deferred to olam haba. For the Rambam
HP is a mechanism to enable schar v'onesh in olam hazeh. That is, HP is a
modest form of nevuah enabling people to avoid some natural catastrophes.

Here's a mashal hedyot. Suppose someone has two cows, Bessie and Nessie,
and wishes to shecht one of them for Shabbos dinner for the whole town.
Bessie is kosher and Nessie is treif, but he doesn't know that. In the
normal course of circumstances he has 50% chance of shechting a treifah.
If he merited HP it might enable him to select Bessie.


The Ramban asks an amazing kasheh on the Rambam. We say in the second
paragraph of Shma that if we're good God will give us good weather.
This fits neither the Rambam's definition of nature, nor his definition
of miracles. For the Rambam how can doing mitzvoth result in good
weather? The Ramban's response is to redefine nature and miracle to
include an intermediate type called neis b'soch neis (one of my high
school rebbeim called it neis nistar). So that for the Ramban there are
two types of nature: nature as studied in laboratories, which the Rambam
acknowledges, and nature corresponding to the Hindu concept of karma,
i.e. responding to virtue and vice. In addition (see Breishis 18:19)
the Ramban acknowledges that there is Maimonidean HP for a few special
people (though a cursory search did not indicate the mechanism by which he
thinks HP works, for him it may well be nisim gluyim rather than nevuah,
see below).

Why does the Ramban acknowledge the existence of HP in spite of having
a (semi) natural method of providing the same results? I suspect it's
because, unlike the Rambam, he puts miracles at the center of his
philosophy (see, e.g. hassagah on SHM Aseh #1). The concept of neis
b'soch neis is so strong that unless there were HP there should be no
need for nisim gluyim.

The third opinion is that which the Rambam attributes to the Kalam,
and which Rabbi B attributes to the Besht. That is that there is no
nature, that God supervises everything that happens in the world without
mediation, and that not only is a person appropriately rewarded and
punished in olam haba, but that each event of his life is appropriate.

The Rambam demolishes this argument at the end of part 1 of the MN by
asking why we observe regularities in nature, when, according to this
opinion, there is no reason for such regularities to happen. My puzzle is
more mundane. Why is it called hashgacha pratis? For this opinion there
is no other form of hashgacha, and, in fact, there is no distinction
between God's knowledge and God's action.

Incidentally I took a poll of one randomly selected Jew, and much to my
surprise, the only doctrine of HP of which he was aware was that of MK.
I had always thought the Rambam was standard among scientists and the
Ramban among humanists, and that the Kalam had long been relegated to
the dustbins of history.

David Riceman

R Harry Maryles wrote:
>>> Of course it does. If a car doesn't have a motor, is it still a
>> car?

>> And if semen doesn't have sperm, it could still be zera!

> ??? You're answer seems to indicate that a car is still a car even
> without a motor. IMHO a car without a motor is not a car at all.

I assumed you heard what you yourself wrote. If a *what* doesn't have
a motor? Yes, we still use the word car.

If an eigel can't tow an agalah, it's still an eigel.

An unfertilized apple seed is still a zera.

>> Science doesn't define halachic terms.

> No, but it informs Halacha which is precisely my point.

No, your point is that since science now focusses on only one part of
semen, so ought halachah.

>> For example, science may be able
>> to measure death of the relevent part of the brain ever more
>> carefully, and the local doctor might use that definition. But if
>> you don't buy into the parallel to the gemara's case of someone
>> without a mo'ach, then death is cessation of heartbeat.

> Although most Poskim do not believe brain death is death there is
> controversy about it...

My point was the machloqes is about where does halachah put the line.
Not how well the one shitah's version of that line can be defined
scientifically.

R Akiva Miller wrote:
> I have vague recollections of a gemara...
> The conclusion was that only the "beginnings" of the zera is
> capable of producing a child, and not the later drippings.

> If the above is accurate, then it would seem that Chazal WERE aware
> of a distinction between "zera which is capable of producing a
> child" and "zera which is *not* capable of producing a child" --
> even if they has no concept of the difference between "semen" and
> "sperm".

> If so, that would support RHM's contention as I quoted him above.

It supports his maskanah, but not his sevrah. Thereby also avoiding
my complaint. Their definition is functional, not based on the
microscopic. The chalos is on the potential for reproduction, an attribute
of an experiencably sized entity.

As a lignuistic side note: If RAM does recall correctly, it's "*zera*
which is not cabable of producing a child". The word is used despite
the incapacity. As the norm with words: based on usual function, not
the actual function of this particular.

 -mi

 -- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Rabindranath Tagore

On Mon, 20 Oct 2003 16:22:08 -0400 (EDT) Jonathan Baker wrote:
>OK, it was something I heard. The closest I can find is Y. Eruvin 3:2
>and 7:9, with a nice story about two women on a chatzer or mavoi 
>making peace with each other because they could send their kids out 
>with food for the other.

I believe you are talking about the Prisha in o.c. 395:1 and the Kuzri
mamer 3 ois 50-51.

[Email #2. -mi]

On Tue, 21 Oct 2003 00:28:33 -0400 Gershon Dubin wrote:
>If you are referring to the rule of halacha kedivrei hamekil be'eruv,
>that does NOT include mechitzos, which is of course the nidon of all
>the metropolitan "eruvin".

You state that halacha kedivrei hamekil be'eruv does not include mechitzos
when actually it is a machlokas rishonim and achronim. Here is a partial
list of the sources that hold it also pertains to mechitzos. Ha'Ram in
the Mordichai, perek 1 siman 482; Rosh, perek 2 siman 4 (see the Gra
siman 358:5 and the Bais Shlomo siman 42); Mharash Elgazi in Halichos
Eli, klali 5 ois 251 brings the Rabbeinu Chananel, Rambam and Tosfos;
Mayim Rabbim, siman 36,38; Chacham Tzvi, siman 59; Bach Ha'Cadash,
kuntrus achron siman 3; Yeshuas Ya'akov, siman 363:5; Chasam Sofer,
6:82; Maharsham, 4:105, 8:58:5, 9:18

I would also like to know which metropolitan eruvin established their
mechitzos (besides maybe [city deleted to avoid flamebait]) utilizing
halacha kedivrei hamekil be'eruv I don't think it's true.

Shmuel Pultman

At 04:03 PM 10/23/03, Zoo Torah wrote:
>So if someone argues that it is not possible to interpret this section of
>the Torah allegorically, without refuting the enormous evidence proving
>that there was no global flood, then he is effectively condemning many
>fine Torah Jews as apikorsim. Denying the evidence isn't an option for
>them. On the other hand, while allegorizing this part of the Torah puts
>one on a slippery slope, this not render it impossible. So we should be
>careful not to condemn it as beyond the range of acceptable beliefs.

Since I am one of the most adamant in this area, I would like to clarify. 
We are not branding the allegorizers apikorsoim. We are regarding them as 
ketanei amanah (an apt term, as it is used WRT Noach)...

YGB 

At 03:16 PM 10/23/03, Arie Folger wrote:
>Yes. You read the text of the Torah, and see how heavily the Torah leans
>on any particular difficult passage, and see how much you would alter
>the internal coherrence by reinterpreting something. Perhaps I didn't
>do a good enough job of describing the method, but I don't think that
>it fails the intellectual honesty test.

Where is the license to make such judgements procured?

YGB 

From: "David Riceman" <driceman@worldnet.att.net>
>> R Harry Maryles wrote:
>>> As I said there is much overlap but IMHO the dividing line has to be
>>> belief in Torah MiSinai as far as C and O are concerned.

> C and O are sociological distinctions rather than halachic ones.

No, they are not. C and O are based on specific religious philosophies.
These are the background against which the halachic differences come
to light.

> You speak as though they are disjoint sets. In my experience there are
> plenty of people who firmly straddle the middle, and most of those who
> are firmly in one camp or the other define themselves, not by their
> beliefs, but either by their friends or by their actions.

Many people go through life following the path of the parents and friends
without bothering to analyze it. They keep halachah from habbit, not
from true belief. The same is true for many secular jews. It takes a
special kind of courage to examine the basis for your own (and your
family/neighbour's) beliefs and attempt to reach a conclusion.

> I suspect that those of us on this mailing list are peculiar in thinking
> that peoples actions are motivated by consistent beliefs. I have a friend
> whose favorite examples of this is a quotation from the Hafetz Hayyim,
> who said that if people just understand that saying lashon hara was as
> assur as eating tarfus they wouldn't do it.

The members of this mailing list are the exception to my above comment.
Here they think, examine and challenge their beliefs daily. The members
know that there are people who can keep halachah for a lifetime without
ever examining it. The same is true for other religious/secular groups.

One of the reasons for the great number of jews who left religion
when coming to America is this specific issue -- that when they found
themselves forced to examine their lifestyle, they found that they didn't
have a reason for their behavior -- and the result was that many left the
religious lifestyle. Others maintained it only as a social way of behaving
("everyone" goes to shul, eats kosher etc.) -- and some of their children
left when the children tried to examine their religion and couldn't find
answers (not b/c there aren't any -- but b/c they didn't know where to
look, and they didn't come in contact with someone who could show them
where to look).

Shoshana L. Boublil

Jonathan Baker <jjbaker@panix.com> wrote:
> RYGB:
>> The argument is specious, perhaps Leibovitzian, but incorrect. Basically, 
>> what you are saying is that one can allegorize anything that will not alter 
>> halacha but not what does affect halacha. Huh? Then in essence you are only 
>> restraining yourself at that point arbitrarily. Is this even intellectually 
>> honest?

> And yet, it's essentially the same point as made by the Meiri on "derashot
> shel dofi". And not too far from the second Rashi on Bereshit Bara -
> if you can't take the text literally, darshen it allegorically.

The difference between Maaseh Bereshis and the Mabul is that the Torah
is not specific when it states that God created Man. So we are more
free to interpret it through the lens of evolution. But the Mubul is the
Mubul and by allegorizing it you change it from an event that happened
to one that didn't. There is no lens of interpretation that doesn't
change the fact itself. Does allegorization of a stated occurance make
one an Apikores? I'm not sure. But once you start doing that you are
on a slippery slope that can end up allegorizing the entire Torah. At
that point your theology becomes virtually identical with C's theology,
if not their Halachic practices.

HM

RMB
> I could equally say that your position is that the two are incompatible,
> and therefore scientific thought must always overrule. But they're both
> dishonest simplifications.

> IOW, I would answer that it's not that they're inherently
> incompatible. It's that we found something that looks like an
> incompatitibility. If you actually give *both* weight, then you don't
> reject the results of *either* system of thought because of evidence
> from the other.

What is the difference between us is that to me, the mesora itself
supports the validity and value of knowledge obtained by other means -
especially factual knowledge rather than issues about values - and the
mesora itself supports the use of allegory and other means of reconciling
scientific knowledge with the simple pshat of the mesora. It isn't
that scientific thought must always overrule two conflicting sources,
but that mesora itself gives scientific thought priority in many areas.
It is the refusal to recognize the importance (within the mesora) of
intellectual integrity and the value of knowledge from other sources
that is problematic.

There is a pithy statement of RY Lebowitz that is apt (even though one
need not adopt his entire philosophy)- lo yarad hashem al har sinai
lelamed et bne israel astrophysica - and I would add that putting
astrophysical and historical issues at the core of what we learned on
har sinai is to distort the tora.

Meir Shinnar

RHM:
> JJB:
>> RYGB:

>>> The argument is specious, perhaps Leibovitzian, but incorrect...
>>> what you are saying is that one can allegorize anything that will
>>> not alter halacha but not what does affect halacha. 

>> And yet, it's essentially the same point as made by the Meiri on
>> "derashot [sorry, megaleh panim batorah shelo kehalacha]
>> shel dofi". And not too far from the second Rashi on Bereshit Bara
>> - if you can't take the text literally, darshen it allegorically.

> The difference between Maaseh Bereshis and the Mabul is that the
> Torah is not specific when it states that God created Man. So we are
> more free to interpret it through the lens of evolution. But the

It's more than just "evolution".  Read that second Rashi on Bereshit
Bara.  The text itself is so self- contradictory that it cries out
"Darsheini!"  And not just between the first and second stories, but
within the first story itself.  Where does the water come from on the
first day?  Where does the light go?  These are problems that Rashi
brings.  Given how we often take Rashi's possibly local statements as
klalim (e.g., "I do not depart from the pshat"), perhaps this too is
general: that any internally contradictory text cries out "Darsheini"
 - interpret me non-literally?

> Mubul is the Mubul and by allegorizing  it you change it from an
> event that happened to one that didn't. There is no lens of
> interpretation that doesn't change the fact itself. Does
> allegorization of a stated occurance make one an Apikores?  I'm not
> sure. But once you start doing that you are on a slippery slope that
> can end up allegorizing the entire Torah. At that point your theology
> becomes virtually identical with C's theology, if not their Halachic
> practices.

Read the Meiri on Avot 3:15 (R' Elazar Hamoda'i). He classifies things
into that which can be allegorized and that which can't.  And by
"allegorization" I include all non-literal interpretation.  As someone
pointed out, there's an argument in the Gemara as to whether the Mabul
covered EY or not - so there's clearly room even in traditional readings
for non-literal readings of the Mabul.  I don't think Meiri allows for
complete allegorization out of literalness, but he does allow for under-
standing certain aspects as hyperbole (guzma).

   - jon baker    jjbaker@panix.com     <http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker> -

R' Micha Berger asked <<< But what if mesorah says "this is meant
kepishuto", explicitly ruling out this option? Which I am arguing is
the case by Noach. It's not like TSBP is silent. Nor does it offer us
any pure-allegory shitos or that which implies such shitos.>>>

What about the Chazals which state that Eretz Yisrael was not flooded?
Doesn't this give us an opening to suggest that the story was at least
partially allegorical? To say that perhaps other lands were spared as
well? Or to at least say that some people were in EY and thereby survived
the flood?

Akiva Miller

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R' Micha Berger asked <<< But what if mesorah says "this is meant
kepishuto", explicitly ruling out this option? Which I am arguing is
the case by Noach. It's not like TSBP is silent. Nor does it offer us
any pure-allegory shitos or that which implies such shitos.>>>

What about the Chazals which state that Eretz Yisrael was not flooded?
Doesn't this give us an opening to suggest that the story was at least
partially allegorical? To say that perhaps other lands were spared as
well? Or to at least say that some people were in EY and thereby survived
the flood?

Akiva Miller

David Riceman <driceman@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
> C and O are sociological distinctions rather than halachic ones.
> You speak as though they are disjoint sets. In my experience there are
> plenty of people who firmly straddle the middle, and most of those who
> are firmly in one camp or the other define themselves, not by their
> beliefs, but either by their friends or by their actions. Some day
> you should skim through Emet V'Emuna, which purports to be a C creed,
> to find out how little belief has to do with even the official movement.

I have skimmed through my own copy of Emet V'Emuna and you are right.
In fact they are all over the place sociologically. They might even
include one who has all Orthodox beliefs as fitting within the parameters
of the movement, although they would of course reject the exclusionist
position of those beliefs.

My debate over this issue is not so much how they define themselves as an
identifiable group. It is how they see themselves theologically, through
their intellectual thinkers... their "Gedolim" that I am debating. When
Schechter took the helm at JTS, he set the course with his "Catholic
Israel" and "Historical Judaism", and then people like Ginsburg and
Kaplan refined and espoused their own theological positions there which
were both accepted as valid viewpoints within the movement. Later on
Finkelstein... Cohen and Schrosch...Heschel and Lieberman, all contributed
to the theological makeup of the Conservative movement. This is what leads
them to accept "higher critisizm" and the scientific study of the Torah,
over traditional Mesorah, which makes the movement (albeit perhaps not
all the members of the movement) heretical.

HM

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Jonathan Baker <jjbaker@panix.com> wrote:
>> The difference between Maaseh Bereshis and the Mabul is that the
>> Torah is not specific when it states that God created Man. So we are
>> more free to interpret it through the lens of evolution. 

> It's more than just "evolution".  Read that second Rashi on Bereshit
> Bara.  The text itself is so self- contradictory that it cries out
> "Darsheini!"  And not just between the first and second stories, but
> within the first story itself.  Where does the water come from on the
> first day?  Where does the light go?  These are problems that Rashi
> brings.  Given how we often take Rashi's possibly local statements as
> klalim (e.g., "I do not depart from the pshat"), perhaps this too is
> general: that any internally contradictory text cries out "Darsheini"
> - interpret me non-literally?

Which is precisely why we can Darshan more freely on this portion of
the Torah. The descriptions cry out for Darshaning. But the Mabul is
more explicit. There was a flood. It is more difficult for us to say,
"No, there wasn't". But, again, I am simply not certain if allegorizing
one event based on doubts raised through archeological evidence qualifies
as Apikursus. It may... or it may not.

> Read the Meiri on Avot 3:15 (R' Elazar Hamoda'i). He classifies things
> into that which can be allegorized and that which can't.  And by
> "allegorization" I include all non-literal interpretation.  As someone
> pointed out, there's an argument in the Gemara as to whether the Mabul
> covered EY or not - so there's clearly room even in traditional readings
> for non-literal readings of the Mabul.  I don't think Meiri allows for
> complete allegorization out of literalness, but he does allow for under-
> standing certain aspects as hyperbole (guzma).

If the Meiri draws lines then we can draw the same lines and allegorize
without fear of being an Apikores. To expand those lines, however,
starts us down that slippery slope. The Conservative Movement can then
legtimately claim that they follow Halacha as they interpret it and
that the only thing they do is look to scientific evidence to repudiate
the narrative of the Torah and make it all allegorical. If you buy into
this argument, why not go all the way to Refrom? They carry the "ethics"
argument to exactly it's ultimate point, vis a vis Halacha, saying that
Halacha informs us what is ethical and we are therefore not required to
perform the ritual upon which an ethical precept is based. Once you start
changing things on your own, using the limitations of the human mind,
you can end up anywhere and Judaism then becomes Humanism.

HM

RHM:
> JJB:
>> Read the Meiri on Avot 3:15 (R' Elazar Hamoda'i). He classifies things
>> into that which can be allegorized and that which can't.  And by
>> "allegorization" I include all non-literal interpretation.  As

> If the Meiri draws lines then we can draw the same lines and
> allegorize without fear of being an Apikores. To expand those lines,
> however, starts us down that slippery slope. The Conservative

And to constrict those lines, however, starts us down the slippery
slope to becoming irrelevant to most of today's non-observant Jews.
Do we present Torah as totally counter-factual? Or do we present it as
something which a modern reasoning person can accept and incorporate into
their psyche and behavior? Credo quia absurdum est is *not* a Jewish
sentiment. In fact, it's the opposite of the gnoses of either Rambam
or of the kabbalists/chasidim, neither of whom are overly attached to
literal readings of the Torah's narratives and metaphors.

> Movement can then legtimately claim that they follow Halacha as they
> interpret it and that the only thing they do is look to scientific
> evidence to repudiate the narrative of the Torah and make it all
> allegorical. If you buy into this argument, why not go all the way to
> Refrom? They carry the "ethics" argument to exactly it's ultimate
> point, vis a vis Halacha, saying that Halacha informs us what is
> ethical and we are therefore not required to perform the ritual upon
> which an ethical precept is based. Once you start changing things on
> your own, using the limitations of the human mind, you can end up
> anywhere and Judaism then becomes Humanism.

Sounds to me like you're just rejecting the Meiri - you don't yourself
draw lines between non-literal interpretation that is OK, and total
allegorization that leads to "ot al yadecha" being allegorized.

The Meiri and Rashi don't give catalogues of things which can be and
can't be allegorized, but they do give examples. Beyond that, it *is*
upt to our human choice, informed by Torah as a whole, to decide what is
and what is not within the pale. But the whole enterprise of non-literal
interpretation of narrative does not lie outside the pale, nor did,
apparently, our Rishonim regard it as the top of a slippery slope to
Scientism. Or to Xianity, which was more of a Torah-rejecting threat in
their time.

   - jon baker    jjbaker@panix.com     <http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker> -

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