Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 023

Thursday, October 23 2003

• Re: Basics for Philisophical discussions
• Re: Hilonim and wine
• Re: Rambam and creation
• Re: Rambam and creation
• Re: Rambam and creation
• Re: Rambam and creation
• Re: Rambam and creation
• Re: Rambam and creation
• Re: Rambam and creation
• RE; Rambam and creation
• RE: Rambam and creation
• Creation as an Ikkar/ Rambam and creation
• Re: Hashgocha Pratis - finale
• Re: Hashgocah Protis - Sifsei Chaim's view of Gra
• hasgachah pratit
• HP
• Fwd: On G-d and Good
• RE: Basis for Philisophical discussions
• Re: Basics for Philisophical discussions

At 12:36 PM 10/22/2003, you wrote:
>Now, one can make endless arguments to define what is too sensitive for
>allegorization, but I believe that one can readily see what the difference
>is between allegorization of the Mabul and the two abovementioned
>events. No halakhot will be influenced by allegorization of the Mabul,
>except if you ShA has a prohibition on allegorization of the Mabul. Same
>for allegorization of creation to the point of making it compatible with
>evolution. As long as G'd is in the driver seat and remains Creator,
>no big change has been introduced. Not so for the two seminal events
>where many mitzvot use their existence (especially YM) to justify their
>being. (search for 'al ken Anochi metzavkha et hadavar hazeh).

The argument is specious, perhaps Leibovitzian, but incorrect. Basically, 
what you are saying is that one can allegorize anything that will not alter 
halacha but not what does affect halacha. Huh? Then in essence you are only 
restraining yourself at that point arbitrarily. Is this even intellectually 
honest?

YGB 

I just want to weigh in on the issue of a mechalal Shabbos and negia
of yayin and the subject of tinok shenishba with a few more sources not
listed so far.

Mahari Asad, y.d. siman 50; Zacher Yehosef, o.c. siman 21; Melamed
Lehoeil, 1:29 (see what he brings down from the Shoel U'Maishiv pertaining
to gitin and kedushin and American Jews); Mharsham, 1:121; Piskei Tsuvah
(Pietrokov), vol 1 p73; Chazon Ish, y.d. siman 1; Igros Mosha, o.c. 5
siman 37 ois 8.

The following seforim are talking about American Jews, in particular
Oznai Yehoshua, 1:4; Kisvi ha'Griah Henkin, p103.
 
Shmuel Pultman

RYGB:
>> From <http://www.aishdas.org/webmail/src/webmail.php>:
>>> Panentheism holds that the universe is a part of God or Goddess, but
>>> that it is not the whole of God's being. Nature is thus an aspect of
>>> divinity. Unlike pantheism, however, it does not say that the universe
>>> is identical to God; it maintains that there is more to God than just
>>> the universe. In panentheism God maintains a transcendent character,
>>> and is viewed as creator and the source of morality.

> Just as wrong. There is no source for such a doctrine in Chassidus, and, 
> indeed, it would be hagshama - the antithesis of the tzimtzum as defined by 
> the Tanya.

No?  Then how do you understand the reconciliation of sovev and mimalei
col almin? and bitul hayeish?  Everyone else who writes about Chabad 
understands it as panentheism, that the world is an illusion, but we
can't perceive that it's an illusion: Naftali Lowenthal, Rachel Elior,
etc.  That's the 3rd and 4th chapters of Shaar Hayichud Veha'emunah in
Tanya.

   - jon baker    jjbaker@panix.com     <http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker> -

At 05:35 PM 10/22/2003, Jonathan Baker wrote:
>> Just as wrong. There is no source for such a doctrine in Chassidus, and,
>> indeed, it would be hagshama - the antithesis of the tzimtzum as defined by
>> the Tanya.

>No?  Then how do you understand the reconciliation of sovev and mimalei
>col almin? and bitul hayeish?  Everyone else who writes about Chabad
>understands it as panentheism, that the world is an illusion, but we
>can't perceive that it's an illusion: Naftali Lowenthal, Rachel Elior,
>etc.  That's the 3rd and 4th chapters of Shaar Hayichud Veha'emunah in
>Tanya.

That is the problem with those who stop abruptly at the mashal of the
Kabbalistic model and forget that there is a nimshal behind it.

BTW, never heard of Lowenthal and Elior. Perhaps you might cite a bona
fide scholar from *within* Chassidus - say my Uncle Immanuel in his
"Mystical Concepts in Chassidus" to substantiate the claim. I suspect
you will find it unsubstantiated...

YGB 

RYGB: 
> At 05:35 PM 10/22/2003, Jonathan Baker wrote:

>>> Just as wrong. There is no source for such a doctrine in Chassidus, and,
>>> indeed, it would be hagshama - the antithesis of the tzimtzum as defined by
>>> the Tanya.

>>No?  Then how do you understand the reconciliation of sovev and mimalei
>>col almin? and bitul hayeish?  Everyone else who writes about Chabad
>>understands it as panentheism, that the world is an illusion, but we
>>can't perceive that it's an illusion: Naftali Lowenthal, Rachel Elior,
>>etc.  That's the 3rd and 4th chapters of Shaar Hayichud Veha'emunah in
>>Tanya.

> That is the problem with those who stop abruptly at the mashal of the 
> Kabbalistic model and forget that there is a nimshal behind it.

So what's the nimshal?  This idea is repeated over and over throughout
the work of several rebbes.  We can't trust the word of the Alter Rebbe,
and the Mittler Rebbe, and the last Rebbe in his commentary, etc.?

> BTW, never heard of Lowenthal and Elior. Perhaps you might cite a bona fide 
> scholar from *within* Chassidus - say my Uncle Immanuel in his "Mystical 
> Concepts in Chassidus" to substantiate the claim. I suspect you will find 
> it unsubstantiated...

Loewenthal is a Chabad historian in London.  Elior wrote "The Paradoxical
Ascent to God - the Kabbalistic Theosophy of Chabad Chassidism", and
"Cheirut al haLuchot" on Chasidut in general.

At 05:52 PM 10/22/2003, Jonathan Baker wrote:
>So what's the nimshal?  This idea is repeated over and over throughout
>the work of several rebbes.  We can't trust the word of the Alter Rebbe,
>and the Mittler Rebbe, and the last Rebbe in his commentary, etc.?

The nimshal is that there is no reality to tzimtzum, the kav, memaleh and 
sovev. All these are conceptualizations of the framework which is 
completely abstract and exists in no dimension or realm that is physical or 
at all associated with the physical.

>Loewenthal is a Chabad historian in London.  Elior wrote "The Paradoxical
>Ascent to God - the Kabbalistic Theosophy of Chabad Chassidism", and
>"Cheirut al haLuchot" on Chasidut in general.

Thanks for the information. My "challenge" still stands...

YGB 

> At 05:52 PM 10/22/2003, Jonathan Baker wrote:
>>So what's the nimshal?  This idea is repeated over and over throughout
>>the work of several rebbes.  We can't trust the word of the Alter Rebbe,
>>and the Mittler Rebbe, and the last Rebbe in his commentary, etc.?

> The nimshal is that there is no reality to tzimtzum, the kav, memaleh and 
> sovev. All these are conceptualizations of the framework which is 
> completely abstract and exists in no dimension or realm that is physical or 
> at all associated with the physical.

Exactly what I said.  Except even more so, that since the tzimtzum is as
much a created entity as that which we perceive as the physical universe,
*neither* has physical existence.  In fact, it's exactly the opposite
of the hagshama you accused me of - not that God is made of world-stuff,
but that the world is made of God-stuff, which is eternal and unchanging,
therefore it is only illusion that the universe has real existence and
change over time.

As I wrote before, and you seem to have taken backwards:

: But what about panentheism,
: such as is held by Chabad and others under the Lurianic ethos? That allows
: for non-ex-nihilo creation, since the Universe is made of God-stuff,
: but is not co-equal with God. Under the Chabad system, the physical
: universe has no real existence anyway, but is an illusion created by
: God so that we can (paradoxically) perceive ourselves as separate from
: God and exercise choice over our following Him and His Torah/will.

>>Loewenthal is a Chabad historian in London.  Elior wrote "The Paradoxical
>>Ascent to God - the Kabbalistic Theosophy of Chabad Chassidism", and
>>"Cheirut al haLuchot" on Chasidut in general.

> Thanks for the information. My "challenge" still stands...

As long as you base your "challenge" on claims that I said the opposite
of what I really did...

At 06:50 PM 10/22/2003, Jonathan Baker wrote:
>> The nimshal is that there is no reality to tzimtzum, the kav, memaleh and
>> sovev. All these are conceptualizations of the framework which is
>> completely abstract and exists in no dimension or realm that is physical or
>> at all associated with the physical.

>Exactly what I said.  Except even more so, that since the tzimtzum is as
>much a created entity as that which we perceive as the physical universe,

Tzimtzum is not a creation. The term creation is used vis a vis tzimtzum 
only as a mashal for understanding the absence of light.

>*neither* has physical existence.  In fact, it's exactly the opposite

Neither *what* has physical existence?

>of the hagshama you accused me of - not that God is made of world-stuff,
>but that the world is made of God-stuff, which is eternal and unchanging,
>therefore it is only illusion that the universe has real existence and
>change over time.

What is "G-d stuff" if not hagshama?!

YGB 

I must thank R' Jon Baker for the first post (that I've seen) which
actually explains a shitah, rather than simply throwing names around. He
wrote:

<<< But what about panentheism, such as is held by Chabad and others
under the Lurianic ethos? That allows for non-ex-nihilo creation, since
the Universe is made of God-stuff, but is not co-equal with God. Under
the Chabad system, the physical universe has no real existence anyway,
but is an illusion created by God so that we can (paradoxically) perceive
ourselves as separate from God and exercise choice over our following
Him and His Torah/will. ... that the matter of which the Universe is
composed is eternal, because it is identical with God, but that it was
not given the form of a physical universe until the moment of Bereshit.>>>

Makes a lot of sense to me. I would prefer to categorize <<< non-ex-nihilo
creation>>> as an oxymoron, but as long as one is careful to explain
himself (as RJB did) then all is well.

I would also hope that the advocates of this view would distinguish
between saying that <<< the matter of which the Universe is composed is
eternal>>>, and would *not* say that the Universe *itself* is eternal,
which it is not, because it had a starting point, when it was <<< made
of God-stuff>>>.

Akiva Miller

RGS: <<Even in the Moreh Nevuchim the Rambam writes that belief in an
eternally existing universe uproots the entire Torah. The only issue
is whether one must believe that Hashem created the world from nothing
or from pre-existing matter but one must definitely believe that Hashem
created the universe. Gil Student>>

I beleive this is incorrect and ignores the notion that a belief in
the eternity of "stuff" can not include a belief that the "stuff" was
ever created. so the universe was not created by God but rather "shaped"
by God. as for "must beleive" it seems clear that some didn't, e.g. (the
unbowdlerized) ibn ezra peirush toi the first posuq. however, not wishing
to engage since i believe that too much philosophizing is likely to lead
one to a catatonic inspection of one's navel, i merely want to remind
those interested in the topic of creation and maimonidean esoterica that
a particularly trenchant and incisive (did i mention it was produced
by my daughter nomi for one of her undergraduate courses, a class with
either shatz or halivni, i forget, but that's naturally irrelevant as
i'm sure i would have been equally effusive if such insights had stemmed
from george bush) essay on the general topic has been posted for some
time on the aishdas website. i found herbert davidson's arguments for an
platonic rambam, as reprised in one part of the essay, fairly persuasive.

Mechy Frankel				W: (703) 845-2357
Michael.frankel@osd.mil			H: (301) 593-3949
mfrankel@empc.org
michaeljfrankel@hotmail.com

R' Yosef Qafah, Hilchos Teshuvah ch. 3 n. 35:

"It is clear that our master's intent is against Plato's view, as he
summarized in Moreh Nevuchim part 2 ch. 13, that the "hylic" matter was
always in existence and its presence is logically necessary from the
existence of God. From it He formed and made all of existence. Therefore,
our master was careful to write "tzur", as our master defined as "the
foundation of everything and its source" in Moreh Nevuchim part 1 ch. 16.
In Plato's view, God is not (chalilah) a "creator" but a "former" meaning
one who formed something from something, an outliner and establisher of
form, as our master defined in Moreh Nevuchim part 2 ch. 30. Even more
so are our master's words against Aristotle's view..."

Marvin Fox, Interpreting Maimonides p. 252:

"So strong was Maimonides' conviction on this point, **at least in the
period of his maturity**, that he regularly reaffirmed his view that
belief in creation out of nothing is a fundamental article of faith, and
he treated it as a valid criterion for determining whether an individual
should be considered a member of the religious community of Israel or not.
He made a special point of restating this doctrine explicitly, and with
great force, in a number of works that appeared after the Guide of the
Perplexed. He may well have been concerned that his discussion in the
Guide was so intricate that its true point might be missed by all but
the most sophisticated readers. To make certain that there would be no
error or confusion about his actual teaching, he stressed repeatedly in
his later writings that creation is a fundamental article of faith."

Rambam, Peirush HaMishnayos (ed. Qafah) Sanhedrin ch. 10 introduction
(fourth principle)

"Ve-da ki ha-yesod ha-gadol shel Toras Moshe Rabbeinu hu heyos ha-olam
mechudash, yetzaro H' u-vera'o achar he-he'ader ha-muchlat. Ve-zeh
she-tireh she-ani sovev saviv inyan kadmus ha-olam le-fi da'as
ha-philosophim hu kedei she-yehei ha-mofes ha-muchlat al metzi'uso
yisaleh kemo she-bi'arti u-virarti be-moreh."

Gil Student

The Ralbag in Milchamos Hashem defends this theory philosophically(Wars
of the Lord, transl. by JPS, available on their site). Also Ibn Ezra
on Breishis 1. The Rambam apparently wrote that creation is an Ikkar in
the margins of his copy of the Comm. to the Mishna found in Oxford and
quoted in many secondary sources on the Ikkarim, f.e. Fendel's book on
13 principles. There ws a discussion of all this and more here about a
year ago.

Hope it helps,
M. Levin

R' Bechhofer wrote:
>I am still at an utter loss to understand RDE. If I interpret him
>correctly, he says that an author has the right to ignore the Chassidic
>viewpoint.

You are 100% correct that I am asserting that it is legitimate for a
Litvak to ignore the chassidic viewpoint.. I am just surprised that you
didn't realize that from my first posting. There are people in the world
whose hashkofa is not based upon the chassidic viewpoint nor do they feel
a need to apologize or be defensive about it. I think if you investigate
you will find people in the best yeshivos who do not read Sfas Emes or
Tanya. There are genuine talmidei chachomim who do not study Rav Tzadok
or Reb Nachman. They do not feel defensive that the Gra opposed the Baal
HaTanya. By the same token you will find many profound chassidim who
don't read Michtav M'Eliyahu, Ramchal, Maharal or even Rav Tzadok, Reb
Nachman. Its a shame that you didn't write reviews of Michtav M'Eliyahu
and Sifsei Chaim.

>Any author can do as he or she pleases, and may play the
>ostrich to his or her heart's content, but that is not a benchmark which
>this reviewer accepts.

Sigh. I have attempted to explain that not basing one's Yiddishkeit on
chassidic seforim - or hashkofa - is not a sign of being an ostrich or
intellectual and spiritual failure.

>If RDE puts out a book espousing the non-Chassidic
>perspective and I am zocheh to review it, I will criticize his work in
>the identical manner.

Hopefully your criticism will generate enough publicity that I might
sell a few more copies. I still can't figure out why you insist you have
a monopoly on knowing how a Jew should think. I have repeatedly asked
you to explain your point of view. You have never answered my assertion
that your point of view has no basis in the way hashkofa has been and
is being taught. I assume you are saving that for Jewish Action. Guess
I'll have to wait a couple months to find out.

>Moreover, to attribute the Chassidic viewpoint on HP to Chabad is
>glib, and erroneous.

Why? Your telegraphic sentences are not useful in educational dialogue.
I am willing to be educated and be shown the error of my ways - but I
do have a problem with criticisms that simply keep repeating "your wrong
and I am right".

>A casual DBS search on HP yields august thinkers -
>including the Ramchal,

Are you saying that the Ramchal had the view of the Besht?! His statements
in Derech HaShem do not support that.

>the Pri Ha'Aretz (if there is some contradiction
>in his approach, well that too merits analysis), the Maor Va'Shemesh,
>the Todos, the Beer Mayim Chaim, the Arugas Ha'Bosem,Reb Nachman (see
>above re the PhA) and the Shem Me'Shmuel.

There is no developed discussion of the Beshtian concept in the above
seforim nor is there a statement acknowledging that the Besht changed the
view of HP that had existed previously. In fact the above seforim seem
to assume that their view always existed. The statements of HP found in
these seforim could readily be explained to be consistent with the Kuzari
or the Ikkarim or even the Rambam as explained by the Lubavitcher Rebbe.

>Those who ignore such sarfei kodesh do so at their own intellectual peril.

An ominous statement but one which totally ignores the comments I
have made in my many postings on the subject.

In sum. There are legitimate points that intelligent people can discuss,
disagree or reformulate - as R' Micha has demonstrated with his many
cogent comments. In fact most of the postings in this forum presuppose
the value of honestly engaging in active and respectful debate. But
oracular pronouncements do not promote understanding and are not much
use in developing a deeper understanding. It would be appreciated if
you would explain your objections in a manner that illuminates the dark
corners of my ignorance rather just saying I am wrong.

Daniel Eidensohn

R' Eidensohn, you stopped translating the Sifsei Chaim at the most
important part! It is the second quote from the Gra that contains the
real proof and the justification for the SC's earlier leap from knowledge
to providence.

Gil Student

RYGB writes
<<I am still at an utter loss to understand RDE. If I interpret him
correctly, he says that an author has the right to ignore the Chassidic
viewpoint. Any author can do as he or she pleases, and may play the
ostrich to his or her heart's content, but that is not a benchmark which
this reviewer accepts. If RDE puts out a book espousing the non-Chassidic
perspective and I am zocheh to review it, I will criticize his work in
the identical manner.>>

I am still at a lost why every author needs to quote all possible
positions. As a good friend of mine said every position on HP has
major problems and at the end we throw up our hands and say we really
don't know.

However, if R. Levi is writing/talking to students he has to to tell
them things he believes in. I have gone to shirium from Ohr Sameach and
they present only the "chassidic" view as the Jewish view any ignore the
"rishonim" view.

In defense of R. Levi as a scientist I have tremendous difficulties
accepting the "chassidic view". Science is based on the assumption (yes
it is an assumption) that there are universal laws that govern all events
in the past (at least within a few nanoseconds of creation) and in the
future. All scientific predictions are predicated on the assumption that
these laws will hold in the forseable future. Given the law of gravity
I find it absurd that G-d would decree that each leaf fall. Seems like a
"waste" of G-d's time (of course meant metaphorically).

In other areas each author gadol or katan expresses some viewpoint.
An example is the purpose of davening. The artscroll siddurim take it for
the granted the kabbalistic viewpoint that prayer has a mystical side
that makes changes in the heavenly order of things. Chassidei Ashkenaz
went much further and explaned everything in terms of the number of
words and letters in prayers and even phrases.

On the other hand RYBS in his explanation of Tefillah assumes the
rationalistic rishonim and many achronim viewpoint that tefillah is
un-necessary as G-d already knows what is best. On the other hand it is
basically a chupzpah on our part to request G-d to do our requests. As
a consequence prayer is more for the person then for G-d. While many
commentaries see shevach as the ultimate prayer because we can't "bother"
G-d with our requests RYBS goes the step further and sees bakashah as
the ultimate prayer.

Does RYGB hold that artscroll is required to present all opinions of
prayer in their introduction to the siddur. Is RYBS (or for that matter
R. Hutner or any other "philosophic" acharon) required to merely summarize
early opinions without having one of their own?

Similarly when RAL discusses secular studies he brings many sources that
support his viewpoint. He certainly does not bring all opinions expressed
in the past that some may violently disagree with his approach. In fact
RAL does admit that there are other approaches but some have gone further
that secular studies are not just allowed or even advised but are indeed
almost mandatory.

The point is not to get into these other areas but to demonstrate that
rabbis on all levels from gedolim, to Roshei yeshivot to heads of schools
to rabbis of classes and shuls are entitled and in fact mandated to
present their viewpoint of yiddishkeit to their students and the world
and not just act as collectors of every possible opinion on any subject.

Hence, if RDE prsents a survey article on HP (which in fact I would
greatly appreciate) then he should bring all valid approaches. However,
if he presents his own view based on sources I fail to see why it has
to be turned into a survey article.

-- 
Prof. Eli Turkel,  turkel@post.tau.ac.il on 10/23/2003
Department of Mathematics, Tel Aviv University

RDE writes
"However I disagree with you that whether HP affects non-man is not
relevant for mussar. As an extention of the Chinuch(241) or the Tanya
how a person views and reacts to a tree falling on his house would depend
upon his understanding of HP as would the significance of his wrestling
with a lion."

That is not how I understand the argument. If one assumes that HP applies
to sechar ve-onesh in this world then that includes a tree falling on
one's house and animals dying etc. since that affects the owner of the
animal and house. This applies even though G-d , in general, does not
concern himself with individual animals or leaves.

I understood the Besht as claiming that every leaf that falls in a forest
without any effect on any human still falls only because G-d decrees it.

-- 
Prof. Eli Turkel,  turkel@post.tau.ac.il on 10/23/2003
Department of Mathematics, Tel Aviv University

I thought this could spawn interesting discussion.

 -mi

Daf Hashvua
Editor: Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis
Produced by the Rabbinical Council of the United Synagogue, London - (O)
Forwarded message from Rafael Salasnik
BriJNet.org

...

JEWISH VALUES
ON G-D AND GOOD
Chief Rabbi Dr Jonathan Sacks

How we live and what we become depends on what or who we worship. Other
civilizations in the ancient world built monuments of stone. Israel --
our ancestors -- were summoned to a quite different task: to build a
society out of holy lives and generous deeds. Ethics, along with kedushah,
sanctity, stands at the very core of Jewish values. To worship G-d is,
for us, not an escape from the world and its challenges but an engagement
with the world and its challenges. To honour G-d is to honour His image,
mankind.

It is often said that you don't have to be religious to be good. That is
true. There were people who, without any particular faith, rescued Jews
during the holocaust, fought for justice in South Africa, or dedicated
their lives to curing disease, relieving poverty, and giving shelter to
the homeless. Implanted within us (part of what makes us G-d's image)
are strong instincts of justice and compassion. Without them, homo
sapiens would not have survived.

But in the long run, without a nonnegotiable code whose authority
transcends all earthly powers, societies have a tendency to lose their
way. The moral sense becomes confused. People begin to think less of
society than of self, less of duty than desire, more of rights than
responsibilities.

Tolstoy gave a powerful analogy: "The instructions of a secular morality
that is not based on religious doctrines are exactly what a person
ignorant of music might do if he were made a conductor and started
to wave his hands in front of musicians well rehearsed in what they
are performing. By virtue of its own momentum, and from what previous
conductors had taught the musicians, the music might continue for a
while, but obviously the gesticulations made with a stick by a person
who knows nothing about music would be useless and eventually confuse
the musicians and throw the orchestra off course."

That is why, seven times in its first chapter, the Torah repeatedly uses
the word "good." Virtually every other account of creation, mythological
or scientific, emphasises power and process, the "how" but not the
"why." The Torah is remarkably uninterested in the "how." Its entire
account of the emergence of the universe takes a mere 34 verses. Its
interest is in the "why." Goodness, for Judaism, is the purpose of
creation. Morality is not something we invent. It is written into the
structure of life itself.

Rabbi Zvi Hirsch Mecklenburg offered a fascinating interpretation of
the phrase, ki tov. Normally we translate this as " [And G-d saw] that
it was good." He translated it as "because He is good." Creation was a
moral act on the part of G-d. He made the universe because He is good,
in order to bestow blessing on His creations. And whenever we bestow
blessings on others, we become "G-d's partners in the work of creation."

>: Thus, allegorization of these two seminal events is conflicting with
>: faithfulness to halakhah, more so than that of any other aspect of
>: the Torah.

> Mima nafshach:

> Either the methodology is flawed, and there are no grounds to question
> the mabul.

> Or you believe the method is valid, and there are grounds to doubt
> yetzi'as Mitzrayim. That you have religious objections to that doubt
> has little to do with whether it's correct.

> What you are offering me is a motivation for that choice, not support
> for it being reasonable. You would need to give a criterion which
> distinguishes the *effectiveness* of the attempt to disprove one vs that
> to disprove the other.

No, I think that you misunderstand the issue.

Part of the mesora itself, as understood by the rambam and others, was
that it was in agreement with reason (not provable, but not irrational).
Part of the methodology that was acceptable for making the two agree was
allegorization - and (in distinction to some viewpoints expressed in the
past here) - there did not need to be a specific mesora that something
was potentially allegorical rather than real. (as was previously cited,
RA Lichtenstein, while not endorsing the allegorical interpretation of
the mabul, agreed that it was clearly within the bounds of Orthodoxy -
and was allegorization was a legitimate tool for resolving conflicts)

The conflicts between reason and literal understanding of the mesora
change as our understandings change - and we use all the intellectual
powers in our hand to reconcile the two.

If, at a certain level, it becomes clear that the changed understanding
due to reinterpretation that we have is so fundamentally different
from the original, then we have to question which part of the mesora we
need to abandon - do we accept the revised new version, with all of its
differences, or do we abandon the claim that we can reconcile the two.
In either case, we are left with a mesora that is fundamentally different
than what we started. It is this statement - that the belief that we
can reconcile tora with reason is itself fundamental - that is (IMHO)
at the heart of the dispute.

Part of our emuna is that this will not happen - that reason and the
core parts of our emuna are consistent. It isn't that the methodology
is flawed and can't be applied - we believe that it isn't (and won't be)
necessary to apply it to core parts parts of our mesora.

Therefore, with regard to the exodus - it isn't that inherently it is not
subject to rational analysis and attempts to reconcile with all the facts
with all methods - but attempts to allegorize it fundamentally change the
nature of the mesora. Therefore, if there is perceived to be a conflict
between reason and the exodus that truly can not be reconciled without
allegorization - that the data is of such high quality that the literal
understanding can not be rationally maintained -then the choice has to
be made about which altered mesora to choose - and I emphasize that both
choices change our mesora - the one with the altered exodus, or the one
that accepts irrationality, and we would choose the latter. However,
this is a drastic step that should not be taken lightly, and we need
to be sure both that the issue discussed is truly a core part, and that
the claims of reason are strong.

I would add that the limitation of inquiry and of allegorization, IMHO,
actually reflects a lack of emuna that the tora is ultimately consistent
with reason. One might reject the actual application in many cases such
as the mabul because one is not convinced of the necessity, but to limit
the theoretical possibility is highly problematic.

Meir Shinnar

From: Harry Maryles <hmaryles@yahoo.com>
> Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
>> I believe the divergence between C and O starts with a difference in
>> epistomology. The liberal Jew bought into the technological man's
>> focus on pragmaticism, empiricism, functionalism and the experimental
>> method. Things that can be subject to experimental proof (*) are
>> treated as more real than those whose proof is internal and can't be
>> shared.

> This is an area that I think is somewhat grey. Even though IMOI2 "buy"
> into technological man's pragmaticism, empiricism, functionalism and
> the experimental method. The differernce between O and C is not whether
> science is to be a trusted resource, but to what extent it is to be
> trusted in matters of belief.

To summarize this issue. There is science and there is "scientism".
Just as there was a person named Darwin and Darwinism. Darwin pointed
out problems with his theory and stated that if these problems remained
unresolved -- his theory would not be proven correct. Followers of
Darwinism are blind to this part of the issue and don't realize the
importance of Darwin's own claims.

Science can examine anything you can humanly examine. By definition,
anything you can't place under observation, mainly in a lab -- is not
something science can say anything about. Prophecy and other modes
of communication with Hashem cannot be examined in the lab. If you
add to this that miracles are defined as natural actions that occur
in the correct time, place and manner -- then miracles also can't be
examined by scientific tools, and therefore science can neither prove
nor disprove them.

Unfortunately, this has given raise to scientism where people ignore
the FACT that prophecy etc. and related issues cannot be examined using
scientific tools, and instead of stating that science has nothing to
say about them -- they take this as proof positive that if science can't
examine it -- it doesn't exist.

This is a misrepresenation of science. It is also probably the reason you
will find more religious jews among physicists and chemists (scientists)
than in the social sciences. Social sciences have made great strides over
the last century in creating scientific tools, ignoring the fact that
these tools are actually subjective and cannot be repeated independantly,
which is one of the true requirements of science. Again, this impacts
on how one examines the Torah: Friedman(?) and others raise the same
questions that Chazal raise concerning the Torah. But as he by definition
does not accept human communication with the Devine, any answer of Chazal
that uses this as a response, is immediately unacceptable to him and
those who follow this idea.

It's why people say that belief starts where logic stops. Not b/c there
is no logic in religion, but b/c it does not truly lend itself to modern
scientific examination processes.

To summarize: Not everything can be examined in a lab. This does NOT
mean that it doesn't exist.

Shoshana L. Boublil

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