Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 017

Monday, October 20 2003

• Re: Hashgocha Pratis etc.,
• Re: Hashgocha Pratis
• Question on Hosha'no
• Question on Hallel
• Korban Musaf: Uvayom vs. Bayom
• Re: male birth control
• Re: new birth control?
• male birth control
• RE: Rambam and creation
• Re: Newly Found Manuscripts
• Re: Rabbi Yosef Bechhofer & Eruvin
• Re: Hashgocha Pratis
• [none]
• Aveilus and Sukkah
• R' Yosef Bechhofer and eruvin
• Re: R' Yosef Bechhofer and eruvin

Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
> At 04:49 PM 10/4/03, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
>> In sum. Open minded discussion - in published hashkofic works of both
>> the great and not so great- of views you disagree with or are not part
>> of your mesorah - does not exist [sole exception so far is that of
>> the Lubavticher Rebbe].

> RDE has written a Letter to the Editor of Jewish Action concerning his
> criticism of my review. When I respond to the letter, I will post the
> response. I hope my position will be clarified in the process. Yes,
> I still maintain that published hashkofo works need to be as broad
> and open-minded as possible, within the boundaries of legitimate O
> parameters. More to follow.

I recently sent this to Jewish Action:

"Regarding R' Bechhofer's excellent review of Prof. Levi's "Facing
Current Challenges" - there is one major criticism of Prof Levi which
is simply wrong. He asserts that "the current perspective on hashgocha
protis is that of the Ba'al Shem Tov and that therefore Prof Levi "does
not necessarily have the right to advance" a view which differs from
the BESHT. As justification for this criticism he cites his uncle R'
Immanual Schochet - a well known spokesman for the Lubavitch perspective
- that "the greatest revolution that the Baal Shem Tov succeeded in
bringing about was in the area of Divine Providence". The essence of the
disagreement between the BESHT and the Rishonim is 1) whether hashgocha
protis is equally relevant to all people 2) whether it applies only
to man. The general position of the Rishonim is that hashgocha protis
applies to a person according to his spiritual level - otherwise he
is left to nature/accident or mazel. Furthermore the Rishonim held that
hashgocha protis only applied to man - not animals, or plants or inanimate
objects. Rabbi Bechhofer is simply presenting the Lubavitch position on
hashgocah protis - a view which in fact in not universally accepted by the
non chasidic world. [A cogent discussion of the distinctions between these
two perspectives is found in volume I of the Lubavitcher's Rebbe's "Igros
Kodesh" #94. ]. To support my contention, there is no mention of the view
of the BESHT"s view in the 5 volumes of Rav Dessler's "Michtav M'Eliyahu -
or the Sifsai Chaim of Rav Friedlander. Instead they both give a thorough
presentation of the "rejected" view of the Rishonim. . R' Aryeh Kaplan's
"Handbook of Jew Thought" does not mention the view of the BESHT in his
extensive discussion of Divine Providence - but instead presents the
view of the Rishonim. This is true also of the Shiurei Daas of Rav Yosef
Yehudah Bloch of Telz. This is an astounding omission in these widely
accepted and utilized sources for non chassidic hashkofa - assuming that
BESHT did expressed "the current perspective on hashgocha protis". The
obvious conclusion is that contemporary - non chassidic authorities -
do not reject the view of the Rishonim for that of the BESHT. Therefore
R' Bechhofers' criticism of Prof Levi for not accepting the BESHT is a
significant error in an otherwise well written, erudite review."

                         Daniel Eidensohn

R Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
> "When a person does good he is dealt with hashgocha. However when he
> isn't good then if he was dealt with hashgocha then it would be
> impossible for him to obtain any goodness. Therefore G-d leaves him
> to nature where he can possibly obtain good in a natural way. In
> fact it is possible that providence for him is totally absent. That
> is because when G-d see that person does not act properly He is
> angry and He removes His providence entirely. However now that he is
> left to nature - when he repents
> providence returns. In truth however we are not able to understand
> what is meant by nature and providence. The problem is that nature
> is also a manifestation of G-d's providence. It is impossible for a
> person to understand how two things are actually one i.e., that
> nature is in truth G-d's providence."

Notice that RAK defines "providence" as goodness. I'm not sure if he
means the totality of HP (where the goodness is the deeper "letav avad"
that underlies even the ra), or only sechar.

I think there is a basic multiplicity of definition -- even without the
issue of Yedi'ah being different than hashgachah -- that still plagues
our conversation.

> gil@aishdas.org wrote:
>>I refer back to my earlier post on the subject
>>(http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol12/v12n004.shtml#07) and the
>> citation from the Sifsei Chaim that the Gra held from what is being
>> called here the Besht's position. I do not believe that RD
>> Eidensohn refuted the Sifsei Chaim's peshat in the Gra's commentary
>> to the Zohar and the Gra certainly quoted the Yerushalmi that Rav
>> Schach allegedly rejected.

> Could you please explain why you don't except my statement that the
> Gra's position is dealing with the issue of knowledge not hashgocha
> protis....

I thought RGS did, quite succinctly. He believes the SC understood the
Gra, and is relying on his authority rather than your citation. Not
owning a SC, I must wonder if he was necessarily basing himself on the
quote of the Gra that you give. (Then there's RYEibshits and the Radal,
who the SC also attributes this position.)

>> My ignorant belief is that the Besht and the Gra both received this
>> idea from kabbalah. The Besht did not invent it, but has received
>> credit it for doing so because chasidim quote it in his name.

> I am not sure what relevance one's self professed "ignorant belief"
> has to do in this discussion....

How does one discuss if people aren't allowed to state their opinions
without having firm citations? This is not a formal debate, after all.

...
> Following your approach, since there is ultimately no difference
> between saying that G-d determines all events - some directly and
> some indirectly - why should we be concerned with these issues in
> the first place? The Ramban specifically rejects this approach in
> Shaar HaGemul.

The difference in scope of the sefarim in question doesn't say anything
about importance or unimportance.

When one is writing a mussar text, one is looking at the question
prescriptively. Therefore, if there is no lema'aseh, why would the
author discuss it. However, when one is writing about machshavah, the
philosophical differences are of import.

 -mi

 -- 
Micha Berger             When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org        you don't chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org   You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905        - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

What is the difference between hosha'no and hoshia'no?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

Why, when we say the full Hallel, does the sh"tz stop in the middle of
the perek? Since full Hallel does not break up the perek, shouldn't we
say it all at once?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

> When I was saying Musaf both yesterday and today, I caught myself as I
> was about to say "Uvayom hashmini", when I noticed my siddur give the
> text as simply "Bayom hashmini".

> I later looked in Parshas Pinchas...
> My question: Why is that vav missing by Shmini Atzeres?

> RSR Hirsch sees my question and immediately tries to answer it by
> pointing out that (unlike the other days of Sukkos) the eight day is
> separate and unconnected.

FWIW, the question was asked in our shul, and our rabbi gave the same answer.

> But I feel unsatisfied by that answer, because
> Shavuos and Rosh Chodesh and all the other Yom Tovim are also
> unconnected, yet they all have the vav except for Shmini Atzeres.

My response to that is: We already know that all the other Yomim Tovim,
etc., are unconnected, so we don't need to separate. Here, when the
very name of the chag implies "the eighth day", we need to stress that
it is separate.

-- Sholom

Kenneth G Miller <kennethgmiller@juno.com> wrote:
> R"n Toby Katz asked <<< Is a method of birth control that renders
> the MALE sterile acceptable on the grounds of medical necessity?

> This is a fascinating question. I can't help but wonder if there are any
> poskim who might consider the husband and wife as one and the same person
> in this regard. If they are two halves of a whole, then the danger to
> the wife is no different than the danger to himself, which would allow
> him to practice "defensive medicine" in this manner.

One cannot look at the Hashkafic concept of husband and wife being 2
halves of a whole in a Halchic manner. For the male, Hashchasas Zera is
an issue pertaining only to him in the sense that he may not utilize male
contraceptives, if there are other ways to prevent Sakanah to a woman.

Perhaps a more interesting question would be in the following scenario:
If a woman who would risk death by pregnancy would be forbidden to use
contraceptives because that, too would risk death, would a man then be
able to use contraceptives or would he require complete abstension? This
woud mean that there would be no Ona'ah for the wife. OTOH in order to
accomodate his wife there would be Hashchasas Zera (...if I understand the
dynamics of the male contraceptives) by use of these male contraceptives.

We know that marital relations have two componenets, 1) procreation and
2) Ona'ah. We further know that Ona'ah is enough of a reason to permit
marital relations since it is permitted during a pregnancy. The fact is
that Zera cannot be procreative in such cases yet it is not considered
"wasted" by Halacha. Would Ona'ah combined with Sakanah be enough to
permit male contrceptives in this scenario?

HM

On Monday 20 October 2003 16:16, Avodah wrote:
> R"n Toby Katz asked <<< Is a method of birth control that renders
> the MALE sterile acceptable on the grounds of medical necessity? The
> wife may have sound medical reasons for avoiding pregnancy, but does
> that either obligate the husband or permit him to make himself sterile
> (even temporarily)? Unless pregnancy is somehow harmful to the husband
> (and how could that be?) I wonder...>>>

RAM:
> This is a fascinating question. I can't help but wonder if there are any
> poskim who might consider the husband and wife as one and the same person
> in this regard. If they are two halves of a whole, then the danger to
> the wife is no different than the danger to himself, which would allow
> him to practice "defensive medicine" in this manner.

Would the man perhaps qualify as a rodef? Would that be sufficient to allow 
him/force him to use such birth control? (I am not sure, but my gut feeling 
is yes about the first question and no about the second. GUT FEELING not 
equal to extensive halakhic analysis)

[Email #2. -mi]

RHM wrote:
> This is different than bugs on lettuce which is not defined
> microscopicly. Bugs come in many sizeas and the Issur is only on those
> bugs we can see with the naked eye. But sperm comes in only one size
> which is microscopic. If we apply to Zera the requirement of visibilty
> to the naked eye, then there would be no such thing Halachicly as Zera.

Sure, it's called semen (so I am told, i.e., that I misused the word
semen in my earlier posts, when I merely wanted to say sperm).

[Email #3. -mi]

Harry Maryles wrote:
> One cannot use a microscope to check for bugs in a matter that is
> Halachicly determined by the use of the naked eye. But in an
> Halachic situation ALREADY BASED on the microscopic, i.e. the
> presence or absence of sperm, then a microscope becomes a legitmate
> tool for determination.

Note that the latest issue of Tradition has a hooloikh yailekh between
Rav Bleich and somebody who reacted to a previous article of Rav Bleich,
precisely about this point, although the issue is to be ma'hmir in case
of some well known, sought after, microscopic effects. The issue at hand
there is the destruction of in vitro fertilized embryos not implanted
in a womb.

Rav Bleich argues that not all microscopic phenomena are ignored by
halakhah, but he admits that it is his 'hiddush, and *seems* not so sure
about it.

Arie Folger
-- 
If an important person, out of humility, does not want to rely on [the Law, as 
applicable to his case], let him behave as an ascetic. However, permission 
was not granted to record this in a book, to rule this way for the future 
generations, and to be stringent of one's own accord, unless he shall bring 
clear proofs from the Talmud [to support his argument].
	paraphrase of Rabbi Asher ben Ye'hiel, as quoted by Rabbi Yoel
	Sirkis, Ba'h, Yoreh De'ah 187:9, s.v. Umah shekatav.

In a message dated 10/20/03 in Avodah V12 #16 hmaryles@yahoo.com writes:
> However, I based my statement
> on a simple reading of the term Hashchasas Zera... the destruction of
> seed. It seems to me that if there is no Zera whatsoever, then there
> can be no destruction of it and therefore no Issur of Hashcasas Zera....
>  If sterility means no sperm production whatsoever,
> how are you destroying it? There may be other Issurim involved but
> you can't say that you are being Mashchis Zera if there is no Zera to
> be Mashchis.

You can't say you are destroying something that you just destroyed?
This line of argument has an Alice in Wonderland flavor to it.

You can't say you are being mashchis zera when you do WHAT? Take a
male birth control pill? Have intercourse after taking such a pill?
Anyway the hashchasas zera involved in, say, what Er and Onan did was
spilling semen, not sperm. It seems that wasting semen would be a sin
whether or not it contained sperm. But I am totally not following what
point you are trying to make anyway, I'm sorry.

 -Toby Katz

[Micha:]
> The first ikkar is belief in the existance of a Borei. He doesn't
> merely require belief/knowledge that Hashem is a Creator; the Rambam
> defines belief in terms of there being a Creator, and then requires
> other theological points that draw the image of that Creator that we
> associate with HQBH.

I don't have the perush hamishnayot in front of me now. The siddur
version talks about bore, but need to look in the original (I suspect
that there he talks more about mamtzi kol nimtza - which is not creation)

However, in the Mishne torah, when he defines halachically required
belief, he is very careful not to use the language of boreh - either
in hilchot yesode hatora (mamtzi kol nimtza - classical Aristotelian
language,as remarked on by both Rav Twersky and the Ohr Sameach) and in
hilchot tshuva, again, the language of bria is not used (rishon refers
to logical priority - the rambam holds that even with a belief in bria,
it would be illogical to refer to hashem as temporally prior). We had
a previous go round about this (avodah vol 10 Oct -Dec 2002). The fact
that the rambam does not use the idea of briah in the mishne torah is
well known to any careful student of the rambam, although his language
can be misunderstood by those who want to read creation into it.

In the More Nevuchim, the rambam goes into great lengths about different
approaches to creation and eternity - and is quite explicit that creation
is not something that is an ikkar emuna, but, if there were good logical
proofs for eternity, one could reinterprete parshat breshit as allegorical
- and concludes that there are no proofs either way. It is downright
absurd, in both the common and philosophical senses of the word, to
suggest that a position that he espouses as consistent with proper
hashkafa and mesora in the more nevuchim would be labeled as kfira in
the yad - and it isn't.

RMB
> The Rambam's position fits the "may at times force us to delve deeper
> into Chazal" clause in RML's description of O. Liberal movements would
> not insist "dicta of theirs ... corrensponds to the truth". Liberal
> Judaism teaches r"l, that Chazal could be "incorrect or were accurate
> merely by chance:.

No, the rambam is quite explicit that chazal may have been wrong in
their description of reality (as you yourself pointed out in another
thread, citing the rabbenu Avraham the son of the rambam's definition
of nishtane hateva). However, if possible to interprete them in a way
that is correct, or we found that they were correct in a conclusion
(even if the underlying science is wrong), we don't focus on that -
we are dan lchaf zchut - a different issue (one reflecting a general
attitudinal difference, but not one that in any specific instance can
be pointed to as reflecting a fundamental difference)

Meir Shinnar

I have always been interested in how the CI understood these matters.
Could somebody please supply some sources from the CI's writings for us
to look into. It would also be appreciated if the other sources could
be cited as well - not as a challenge, just so those of us unfamiliar
with the material can see it inside.

I also just wanted to add that the question of girsah is also relevant
to whether we care about authorial intent or not. I am taking for granted
that the authors of the seforim intended for their words to be understood
as they meant to write them. If I really care what the SA says, I want
the most authoritative manuscript - the closest thing we have to what R'
Karo meant. If I care about how the SA tradition has been trasmitted
througout the generations, then what R' Karo may have initially meant
is less relevant. Just a thought to ponder.

David Shabtai

Kenneth G Miller <kennethgmiller@juno.com> wrote:
> R' Harry, I do think that I understand what you are saying, but I still
> wonder if you would consider Eruvin to be much different than Kashrus
> in this regard.

> When I read publications such as Kashrus Magazine, I am often left with
> the clear impression that many hechsherim - even many famous and highly
> regarded ones - also engage in "great kulos", the sort of which that
> many people aren't ever aware of, and would not want to rely on if they
> did know. I am left in a quandary, wondering whether to be choshesh for
> the attacks made against unnamed hechsherim.

It is exactly this type of Chumra that many Baalei Nefesh might
consider. There are some very popular Hechsherim that they do not utilize
BECAUSE of the Kulos used. I know some people that do not trust the
OU. I know some people who do not trust Empire etc. But some of these
very same people might trust an Eruv that has a Chushuva Rav as the
Rav HaMachshir. They don't think of the possible Kulos utilized. They
simply assume that Rabbi "X" who was a Lakewood Musmach in good standing
wouldn't lead them astray.

But the concepts of Reshus HaRabim D'Oraisa, the construction of Mechitzos
and Tzuros HaPesach and the utilization of pre-existing Mechitzos are
often very Kula-ized. This is because of the enormous expense of building
new Mechitzos and sometimes there are great diificulties which can only be
overcome by utilizing these Kulos. The Rav HaMachshir OTOH does not want
to cast any doubts on the Hechshir as that would undermine the entire
Kashrus of the Eruv. He is not going to come out and say "You can only
use this Eruv B'Dieved." So he does not go into detail. He simply will
consult with experts in the field and rely on any Kula that is needed to
accomplish an Halachicly accpetable Eruv. This does not mean that there
arent' Hiddurim built into any given city-wide Eruvin. They are. But so
too are many Kulos.

HM

From: "Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org>
> R Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
>> "When a person does good he is dealt with hashgocha. However when he
>> isn't good then if he was dealt with hashgocha then it would be
>> impossible for him to obtain any goodness. Therefore G-d leaves him
>> to nature where he can possibly obtain good in a natural way. In
>> fact it is possible that providence for him is totally absent...."

> Notice that RAK defines "providence" as goodness. I'm not sure if he
> means the totality of HP (where the goodness is the deeper "letav avad"
> that underlies even the ra), or only sechar.

The above quote was from Rav Nachman not R' Aryeh Kaplan

> I think there is a basic multiplicity of definition -- even without the
> issue of Yedi'ah being different than hashgachah -- that still plagues
> our conversation.

I agree - but I think that the term is used in multiple ways by the same
author - making it even more confusing.

>> Could you please explain why you don't except my statement that the
>> Gra's position is dealing with the issue of knowledge not hashgocha
>> protis....

> I thought RGS did, quite succinctly. He believes the SC understood the
> Gra, and is relying on his authority rather than your citation.

I agree that that is what RGS has done. I am curious to know why he is
relying on the SC's authority when he has the text in front of him which
doesn't support the SC's contention.

> Not
> owning a SC, I must wonder if he was necessarily basing himself on the
> quote of the Gra that you give. (Then there's RYEibshits and the Radal,
> who the SC also attributes this position.)

As I noted previously the RYEibschuetz does not say that he agree with
the "Ramban" and I quoted another statement of his that clearly is
inconsistent with the Besht's viewpoint.

>>> My ignorant belief is that the Besht and the Gra both received this
>>> idea from kabbalah. The Besht did not invent it, but has received
>>> credit it for doing so because chasidim quote it in his name.

>> I am not sure what relevance one's self professed "ignorant belief"
>> has to do in this discussion....

> How does one discuss if people aren't allowed to state their opinions
> without having firm citations? This is not a formal debate, after all.

I agree that this is not a formal debate but on the other hand I am
not sure what relevance an "ignorant belief" has in this discussion. I
can readily understand hypotheses, conjectures and questions but why
"ignorant belief". I am obviously also not preventing a presentation
of opinion. I just found it odd to characterize a conjecture as an
"ignorant belief" and was curious to know what RGS meant by the term.

> ...
>> Following your approach, since there is ultimately no difference
>> between saying that G-d determines all events - some directly and
>> some indirectly - why should we be concerned with these issues in
>> the first place? The Ramban specifically rejects this approach in
>> Shaar HaGemul.

> The difference in scope of the sefarim in question doesn't say anything
> about importance or unimportance.

> When one is writing a mussar text, one is looking at the question
> prescriptively. Therefore, if there is no lema'aseh, why would the
> author discuss it. However, when one is writing about machshavah, the
> philosophical differences are of import.

I am curious to know why you think that mussar doesn't require a clear
understanding of theoretical positions. My understanding of Mussar
is that it was not meant as a collection of slogans but rather a deep
understanding. Proper thought and understanding is lema'aseh for mussar
or chassidus. Thus it makes a big difference whether a person conceives
of the world as primarily chance rather than every occurence being
determined by G-d. I thought that the main goal of the Chovas HaLevavos
was to demonstrate that all aspects of understanding are lema'aseh for
avodas HaShem. In other words how could machshaveh ever not be lema'aseh?

                                    Daniel Eidensohn

MB writes:
> However, there are two points I can't assert.

> 1- I'm not sure if the cause of the separation is the actual point of
> separation.

2- I'm also not clear on why RML considers this an issue of dynamics
rather than principles of faith. What you consider a valid means of
finding truths is itself a principle and a philosophical point.

HM writes:
...
>> Attitude is the best dividing line. Sometimes you can't define it
>> but, like obscenity, you know it when you see it.

> I disagree. Attitude is too amourphous to be a dividing line.

>> I beleive that the Chazal would be sympathetic to locate the
>> dividing line more in the realm of attitude and soul than in
>> philosophical positions that one holds. Granted, some things are
>> basic Torah facts but the factor that separates C and O is not so
>> much the content of their positions but how they arrived at them
>> To illustrate, if  a C holds an othodox position on issue 1 and a
>> reform position on issue 2, can you call him Othodox in one area
>> and reform in another? Clearly, one is a C or O Jew, not a holder
>> of C orr O positions. What makes one C or O Jew?

> It's like being a little bit pregnant. You can't be a little bit
> pregnant. You either are or you are not. Once you step across the
> clearly drawn line of...

> If someone observes the Mitzvos but is skeptical then he may be more
> of a Jew than someone who believes in God, know that he should follow
> Halacha but refuses to do it. The observant skeptic at least
> conce=des the possiblity that his skeptisism may ultimately be
> incorrect. So he is observant.. just in case. I do not fault such an
> individual. He is simply unable to overcome his own intellectual
> doubts. 

> This is different from someone who is an atheist but clings to
> Mitzvah observance for social reasons. I believe such a person has no
> Schar for doing Mitzvos.

To explain where I am coming form, I invoke the well described difference
between Hebrew and Greek epistemiology. Greek thinkers, as other
speakers of Indo-Eurropean languages, see the world in primarily static
terms. Something is or isn;t and syllogism is the way you determine the
truth of "is". Hebrew sees becoming as identical with being; in other
words. standing is just a stage in getting up. This is why amad and kum
mean both unlike English verbs stand/stand up.

For those who want to enquire farther these are references:
Shestov Lev, Athens and Jerusalem
Borman ThorLieff, Difference between Greek and Hebrew thought,
more recent, Handlesman, Susan A. Rabbinic Thought and Modern Literary
Theory, SUNY.

If so, it is more fruitful to explore how one approaches belief than
the content of the beleif. Dynamic focus assumes that what you currently
hold true is only a station on the way of faith. The content is important
but looking at it this way opens a much more productive way of exploring
the issue.

BTW, in Hebrew one can be a little bit pregnant. The verb Harah is used
by Hagar as becoming pregnant and by Tamar as a state of being pregnant.

To a Greek, faith is rational and dispassionate; in fact this cold way
of looking at it is the malady of our world. To a Jew it is a process
full of interaction and motion and passions. G-d is not at rest, Haya
is also a verb of action, existence. In Hebrew it is a verb of action,
not a copula as in English. To a Jew, the G-d of the Philosophers makes
no sense; the concept of the Perfect unmoved Mover does not exist in
his language. Jewish philosophers while enriching us in so many ways,
muddied the waters a great deal. This Jewish way of looking at things is
a key to clear understanding of many things in Tanach and Chazal. For
example, it largely erases the boundary between drash and pshat and
rescues Rabbinic thnking out of the perception of illogic that Greek
staticism and syllogistic thought throws upon it.

M. Levin

There is a hava amina in the Gemara in Sukkah 25b that an aveil is patur
from Sukkah because he is mitzta'er. The conclusion is that he is chayav.

The question is, how can one be an aveil who would be patur from Sukkah?
For someone who is R"L in aveilus before Yom Tov, the onset of Yom Tov
ends of aveilus. For someone who R"L buries a relative on Yom Tov (or
chol ha-moed), not sitting in the Sukkah would be public aveilus which
is not allowed.

Is the Gemara speaking of the metzi'us of aveilus rather than the din
of aveilus? If so, someone months or even years after a relative's death
might still have the metzi'us of aveilus.

Any thoughts?

Gil Student

From: "Jonathan Baker" <jjbaker@panix.com>
<<Most of the major cities in Europe, and probably the smaller towns as
well, had eruvs, since they were necessary for the *men* to enjoy shabbos,
what with communal cooking facilities, outhouses, etc. that necessitated
carrying outdoors>>

I'm not sure how you conclude that cooking facilities and outhouses are
for the exclusive enjoyment of the men. Seems like those would have been
the ultimate points of equality of the sexes.

I also look forward to the specific citation that eruvin are "described
in the gemara explicitly as something we do in order to maximize women's
enjoyment of Shabbos and participation in visiting, walking, and going
to shul". I am not aware of this Gemara.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

[RnTk also asked "Can you give the citation for this Gemara, please?" -mi]

From jjbaker@panix.com  Mon Oct 20 16:21:46 2003
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Subject: Re: R' Yosef Bechhofer and eruvin
To: areivim@aishdas.org
Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2003 16:21:45 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Jonathan Baker" <jjbaker@panix.com>
Cc: jjbaker@panix.com (Jonathan Baker)
In-Reply-To: <20031020.122258.11279.331692@webmail02.lax.untd.com> from "Gershon Dubin" at Oct 20, 2003 07:22:20 PM
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RGD (and, similarly, RnTK):
> <<Most of the major cities in Europe, and probably the smaller towns
> as well, had eruvs, since they were necessary for the *men* to enjoy
> shabbos, what with communal cooking facilities, outhouses, etc. that
> necessitated carrying outdoors>>
 
> I'm not sure how you conclude that cooking facilities and outhouses
> are for the exclusive enjoyment of the men.  Seems like those would
> have been the ultimate points of equality of the sexes.

That's just it. They apply to everyone equally. Remove them, and all
you're left with is the "feminist" idea that women with small children
deserve to get out of the house and visit on Shabbat.

> I also look forward to the specific citation that eruvin are "described
> in the gemara explicitly as something we do in order to maximize women's
> enjoyment of Shabbos and participation in visiting, walking, and going
> to shul".  I am not aware of this Gemara.

OK, it was something I heard. The closest I can find is Y. Eruvin 3:2
and 7:9, with a nice story about two women on a chatzer or mavoi making
peace with each other because they could send their kids out with food
for the other.

Still, that's the avowed reason for eruv: to allow women to socialize
with one another, even through their kids. Particularly filtered through
the Netziv on Vayikra 19:3 - that it's so people can socialize, which
implies women who would otherwise be tied down with their non-mobile
infant children.

*********************


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