Avodah Mailing List

Volume 12 : Number 013

Wednesday, October 15 2003

• Re: duchenening during Ne'ila
• Re: Eruvin
• Re: O joining a C synagogue for qiruv
• Newly Found Manuscripts
• Re: Hedyotos...Eating in the Sukkah When it Rains
• eating in the succah in the rain
• Re: Hedyotos...Eating in the Sukkah When it Rains
• Re: Hashgocha Pratis
• Re: Hashgocha Pratis
• Re: Hashgacha
• Hashgocha protis vs teva
• Re: Hashgocha Pratis
• Re: Hashgocha Pratis
• The Upper Hemisphere
• Re: new birth control?
• Re: new birth control?
• Re: Basics for Philisophical discussions (was Re: [Areivim] Michlala)
• FW: Basics for Philisophical discussions (was Re: [Areivim] Michlala)
• RE:Basics for Philisophical discussions
• Defining Orthodoxy
• Fw: Basics for Philisophical discussions (was Re: [Areivim] Michlala)

In Avodah V12 #10, RSM wrote:
> ....the Maharil, by whom kohanim dukhened at ne'ila. But the Maharil,
> nebbekh, was from Germany. There, from the earliest times, they dukhened
> only on yom tov, but on all the t'fillos on yom tov -- i.e. shacharis
> as well (as was done by the Yekkes up until recent times).

Still done in recent times (unless said Yekkes, nebbekh, are davening
with communities that don't follow MaHaRYL). Speaking of YT, the minhag
in KAJ was not to duchen at all on YT shechal lihyos baShabbos, so you
might say duchening was an "all [t'filos except Minchah] or none [when
it was Shabbos]" proposition.

All the best from
 -Michael Poppers via RIM pager

On Fri, 3 Oct 2003 10:41:35 -0700 (PDT) sam pultman wrote:
> Somebody emailed this to me...
> While you are right that R. Bechhofer didn't quote from the kovetz on
> the Toronto eruv in his sefer, I think he knew about it, for he cites
> the Yesodei Yeshurun from R. Felder who does talk about R. Price's
> kuntres. R. Felder was involved with his Rebbe R. Avraham Price in making
> the eruv in Toronto.

I knew about it, and own it. Generally, I tried to stick, for various
reasons, to Litvishe poskim. Moreover, Rabbi Price relied on very
significant kullos in his eruv.

> 3) Here is a partial list of sources, some quoted and some not quoted
> by R. Bechhofer, that promote building an eruv in large cities. Tikvas
> Zecharia, the St. Louis eruv[ii]; Tikkun Shabbos and Tuv Yehoshua, Divrei
> Malkiel 3:14-18 and addendum 4:3, the Odessa eruv; Oznei Yehoshua 1:18 and
> Eruv V'Hotza'a and Tirosh Vayitzhur siman 73, the N.Y eruv; Bais Av vol
> 2, the Manchester eruv; Chavalim Ba'Neimim 3:14[iii]; And R. A. Price's
> kuntres, the Toronto eruv (there was also a booklet published about the
> current eruv); Chazon Ish siman 74:10 and 107:4-7, regarding eruvin in
> large cities; and Achiezer 4:8, regarding making a eruv in Paris[iv];
> R. M. Kasher's sefer, Divrei Menachem o.c.vol 2, on the Manhattan eruv,
> and Har Tzvi o.c. 2:24 regarding the Manhattan eruv; R. Y. D. Moskowitz's
> Tikkun Eruvin Manhattan; Toras Chemed siman 1-5 on a Willamsburg eruv;
> Mhari Shtief siman 68 on a Manhattan and Williamsburg eruv; Divrei Yatziv
> 2:172,173 regarding eruvin in large cities; V'Yaan Yoseph 1:195,202
> on a Manhattan and Queens eruv; Oim Ani Chomah on the Boro Park eruv;
> Shevet HaLevi 8:97-98 regarding the Chicago eruv; Even Yisroel siman
> 36, Kinyan Torah 4:40 regarding the eruv in Yerushlaim; Maczhe Eliyahu
> siman 39 regarding eruvin in large cities; Rechovas Ha'ir regarding the
> Antwerp eruv.

I must tell you, the inclusion of the reshus ho'rabbim issue in my work,
while essential, was not its primary motivating factor. Rather, I have
seen many times l'ma'aseh the emes of the purported statement of the
CI that he never saw a kosher eruv. I just recently saw an eruv that
was put up by someone with good credentials, was under the hashgocho
of someone with good credentials, and was passul from day 1, five years
before I first saw it.

> [ii] R. Bechhofer I believe is mistaken that this eruv wasn't implemented
> and that R. Rosenfeld was nifter shortly after making his proposal (see
> p31 in The Contemporary Eruv). I personally know the family and they say
> he was nifter in 1915, twenty years after he created this eruv. Also in
> the sefer Shoel k'Inyan, it's implied that the eruv was implemented.

In the recent, second ed., I noted my error, acknowledging Rabbi Adam
Mintz for pointing it out to me. I always appreciate he'aros, and will
IY"H include them in subsequent revisions.

YGB
Yosef G. and Shani M. Bechhofer
sbechhof@casbah.it.northwestern.edu
ygb@aishdas.org

On Tue, 14 Oct 2003 23:04:40 +0000 Micha Berger wrote:
> When I davened at the Torah Center of Hillcrest we were temporarily
> without a building as they took down the condemned home they were in to
> build an edifice. The local C synagogue offered use of their library. The
> LOR, R' Zvi Flaum, asked R' Dovid Lifshitz. RDL permitted our using the
> business but only because the TCH was going to use a different door for
> enterance and exit and hung a sign identifying ourselves in the glass
> over that door.

There is a teshuva in IgM, IIRC, saying the practice is halachically
muttar, but to be avoided nonetheless.

YGB
Yosef G. and Shani M. Bechhofer
sbechhof@casbah.it.northwestern.edu
ygb@aishdas.org

It seems that many Gedolim were against relying on newly found manuscripts
in areas of Halacha, especially to change the established practice. I
know of CI,RMF,SR,RYBS in particular as holding this view.

SBA writes "<<< IIRC the reason being that HKBH would not have allowed
Klall Yisroel to be nichshol all these years - and had it been relevant or
indeed the halocho so - it would have been in our hands centuries ago.>>>

But is it not clear that Psak Halacha has changed in many areas? In the
place of Rabbi Yosi Haglili they used to eat fowl with milk(Shabbos
130.) Presumably Sefardim and Ashkinazim before they evolved into
separate communities did not follow necessarily the same practices
they do now. Before the SA was codified, practices were much more
divergent. Rambam rules that a later Bais Din can argue in Halacha with
a previous Bais Din. So Halacha has always undergone change. If SBA's
argument was correct, none of this would make sense. So why is there
such an established consensus (or is there?) on not relying on the newly
found manuscripts?

R' Harry Maryles wrote:
> The Acharonim who discuss this issue and ask why then, is someone who
> eats or drinks that which is Patur from the Sukkah such as water...
> why is that to be praised and not considered Yuahra? Why not call such
> a person a Hedyot as well? The answer given by the Maharshak is that
> there is a difference between an individual who is in a state of Chiuv,
> eating or drinking an optional food such as water and one who is not a
> Bar Chiuva and completely Patur from everything.

This makes sense considering that the chiyuv of sukkah is really "teishvu
ke'eyn taduru." Really, we should be doing everything in the sukkah.
As a "minimum shiur" of this, the halakhah specifies two things that we
may ONLY do in the sukkah: eating (akhilas keva) and sleeping. But one
who is careful to always drink even water in the sukkah is certainly
taking this to a higher level.

Staying in the sukkah when it's raining, though, is not a kiyum of
"teishvu ke'eyn taduru" at all. If it was raining inside your house,
you probably wouldn't stay in your house.

Are you sure that "yuhara" should be defined the same way as "hedyot?"
Yuhara is often associated with one who does an act that really does
have religious value, such as a wearing tefilin or carrying around the
4 minim all day, but which it is customary not to do. One who does these
things implies that the weakness that most of us give us the reason for
not doing them does not apply to him.

A "hedyot," on the other hand, would seem to be one who simply
misunderstands the halakha because he has only learned it on a very
superficial level. He knows that one is obligated to eat in the sukkah,
and thinks that he's showing his dedication by doing so even when it's
uncomfortable. Due to his ignorance, he does not understand that the
obligation to eat in the sukkah is just a manifestation of "teishvu
ke'eyn taduru," and does not apply at all when it's raining.

Mo'adim lesimchah,
D.C.

Harry asked to account for the fact that some Hasidim will eat in the
succah in the rain despite the objection by chazal to such behavior.
I can understand their apparent dismissal of such objection by invoking
the difference between the probability of rain in Succot in Israel vs.
most places in the Golah. In Israel, rain in Succot is unusual and is,
therefore, reckoned by chazal as an indication of Divine displeasure.
If He doesn't want you in His presence, then you should not have
the temerity to push yourself there. In countries that do not have a
Mediterranean climate, rain is common in the fall months (or spring
in the southern hemisphere) and the occurence of rainfall need not
betoken Divine displeasure. Eating in the succah during rain can then
be considered a personal stringency - not a defiant act.

The above implies a reliance on a rationalization of mitzvot or
injunctions - rabbinic or biblical. However, Hasidim do not use such
rationales in other areas such as "cholov yisroel" where the literal
injunction of chazal against such milk is emphasized and R' Moshe's
equivalence argument is totally rejected. I have no answer for this
seeming inconsistency - then, again, who of us is totally consistent?

Have a good remainder of Succot,
Yitzchok Zlochower  

David E Cohen <ddcohen@verizon.net> wrote:
> Are you sure that "yuhara" should be defined the same way as
> "hedyot?" 

That's the way it is defined in the Sefer HaCharedim as quoted in Torah
L'Daas. If you look at the way the word Hedyot is used in context on
this Inyan, that seems to be the meaning.

> Yuhara is often associated with one who does an act that really does have 
> religious value, such as a wearing tefilin or carrying around the 4 minim 
> all day, but which it is customary not to do.  One who does these things 
> implies that the weakness that most of us give us the reason for not doing 
> them does not apply to him.

The best definiton of Yuahra that I can think of is "showing off"
through excess, of a Mitzvah. Such excess is passed off as hidur when
in fact Hiddur is NOT the intent but showing off one's Frumkeit is.
RAS felt that wearing one's Tzizis out is a form of Yuhahra.

The reason the Chazer Fees'l is used as the calssic example of Yuahara
is because there is no animail that is seen quite as "Treif" as a
pig. However, characteristicly the pig awlays rests by sticking out
his feet which contain one simon kashrus, the split hoove to show how
"Kosher" it is. But of course we all know the pig is a Behama Temeiah
because it is missing the other important Siman, chewing it's cud.

> A "hedyot," on the other hand, would seem to be one who simply 
> misunderstands the halakha because he has only learned it on a very
> superficial level. 

That descritpion sounds more like the Gemmarah's use of the word "Am
HaAretz". The word "Hedyot" can also mean simply "non Cohen" and that
is the way I have seen it used mostly. But in the context of "Kol Mi
SheHu Patur MiDavar VeAsahu, Nikra Hedyot", it is meant to be derogatory.

HM

I refer back to my earlier post on the subject
(http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol12/v12n004.shtml#07) and the citation
from the Sifsei Chaim that the Gra held from what is being called here
the Besht's position. I do not believe that RD Eidensohn refuted the
Sifsei Chaim's peshat in the Gra's commentary to the Zohar and the Gra
certainly quoted the Yerushalmi that Rav Schach allegedly rejected.

My ignorant belief is that the Besht and the Gra both received this idea
from kabbalah. The Besht did not invent it, but has received credit it
for doing so because chasidim quote it in his name.

However, between those who hold that all objects have HP and those who
hold that only those objects that are relevant to humans have HP there
is no practical difference so it is not surprising that mussar sefarim
have noted it.

The Malbim and the Meshech Chochmah were certainly highly influenced by
philosophy which is why they follow the more philosophical view of HP
(the Malbim explicitly follows the Moreh Nevuchim in his peirush to
Orach Chaim 1:1).

Misnagdim may or may not accept kabbalah and those that do may not accept
it completely and may try to blend it with philosophy. Chasidim do not
have that option. Not only do they accept kabbalah but they teach it
publicly. That may be why chasidim are the most vocal proponents for
the Gra's and Besht's kabbalistic view of HP.

Gil Student

>On Thu, Oct 09, 2003 at 08:48:42PM +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
>: I'd like to modify a statement I made in my postings regarding hashgocha
>: protis. I had noted that I could not find a single non chassidic source
>: which cites the BESHT's view - including the writings of R' Aryeh Kaplan
>: ...                      Today R' Beryl Gershonfeld - held of Yeshiva
>: Machon Shlomo- pointed out a footnote in R' Kaplan's notes to Derech
>: HaShem Part Two #3 page 340.

"...There were some who maintained that this was a dispute between
the Rambam and Ramban with only the latter holding that individual
providence exists for each thing: cf Yaaros Devash 2:6...According to
this, the Rambam would hold that Providence might decree that a bird
should be captured but it would not decree the identity of the particular
bird. The Ramban on the other hand, would dispute this, and maintain that
even the identity of the individual bird is also predetermined. (See,
however, Ramban on Genesis 18:19 and 36:7 which would seem to contradict
this. Also see R Bachya on Genesis 18:19). This latter view was accepted
by most Chasidic masters....See, however, Yad Yesodey HaTorah 2:9 and
Moreh Nevuchim 1:69 where the Rambam apparently does not dispute the
fact that each individual act is ultimately determined by G-d along. See
Kalach Pis'chey Chochmah 13."

Micha Berger wrote:
>FWIW, RAKaplan's is a chassidic view.

Could you explain: Are you saying that the above quote is representative
of the chassidic view or are you saying that you personally known that R'
Aryeh Kaplan personally had a chassidic view of hashgocha protis even
though it is not reflected in his writings? If it is the latter it is
irrelevant to our discussion so far - though perhaps you could make it
relevant. If the former would you please explain how it is chassidic.

                                     Daniel Eidensohn

As I recall, the Rambam sets up five opinions, including one that he
ascribes to Chazal (actually, one is for miktsas chochomim and another
one just of chochomim). When he presents his own opinion, he quotes
exclusively psukim and no mam'rei chazal (Hope that's completely correct;
had not had the chance to check). This is interesting in relation to
Rambam's freedom to reject Chazal's opinions when in conflict with
philosophical truth, although it is rare in his writings. Does anyone
know of other examples in the Moreh?

Also, I would like to point out that the opinion that total hashgocha is
independent of the individaul's level has a flip side, and a dangerous own
at that. It is not necessarily "frumer". The danger is that it sharpens
the problem of theodicy - How G-d can cause bad things to happen.

In that perspective, a person who suffers a misfortune cannot absolve G-d
of responsibility or say" it is my fault in not reaching a sufficiently
high level to not be subject to accidents of nature" . It can lead
directly to anger and rebellion. Point worth considering.

M. Levin

The Kuzari 5:20 stated that there are two paths of Divine influence
the direct one being called hashgocha protis while the indirect one is
called nature, mazel or accident - ultimately everything is from G-d.
Prof. Levi's understanding of HP which is similar to the that of the
Kuzari - was criticised for ignoring the "contempary understanding of HP"
which is that of the BESHT that everything is HP - for animals, plants,
dirt and surely all people. In my posts I have endeavored to show that
the view of the Rishonim is still alive and kicking as the view of the
Litvaks and mussar movement.

Please identify the very well known author of the following quote.
[Hopefully the Hebrew font shows up.]

[It didn't. Came in as question marks. Deleted. -mi]

"When a person does good he is dealt with hashgocha. However when he isn't
good then if he was dealt with hashgocha then it would be impossible for
him to obtain any goodness. Therefore G-d leaves him to nature where he
can possibly obtain good in a natural way. In fact it is possible that
providence for him is totally absent. That is because when G-d see that
person does not act properly He is angry and He removes His providence
entirely. However now that he is left to nature - when he repents
providence returns. In truth however we are not able to understand what
is meant by nature and providence. The problem is that nature is also
a manifestation of G-d's providence. It is impossible for a person to
understand how two things are actually one i.e., that nature is in truth
G-d's providence."

       Daniel Eidensohn

>This and my next comment are points I made more than once already, so I'm
>not sure why your post doesn't address these points.

>While one could argue that no rishon held of HP for non-people, there
>are rishonim who clearly state that it's universal for all people --
>and it does NOT vary with one's spiritual level. It's also unclear if
>the rishonim who say all people get HP mean *only* people. A ma'amar
>about what one should expect in life is inherently only discussing people
>(not expecting anyone else to read the book <grin>).

Could you please cite your sources? Which rishonim clearly state that
HP is universal for all people and is independent of spiritual level?

>: Chassidim are generally makpid to teach only the view of the BESHT while
>: Litvaks - generally ignore the view of the BESHT and present the view
>: of the rishonim. It is not the accepted practice amongst the gedolim
>: (or even non gedolim) to present both views.

>I think the underlying question is whether one is trying to write a survey
>or a polemic, a guide to the subject or supporting a particular position.
>This whole discussion started because RYGB wrote that the book was flawed
>as a guide to the subject, since chooosing only one position makes it more
>of a position paper.

I disagree with this characterization - which is where this thread
started. Prof. Levi did not write a polemic but he also did not write
an academic paper on hashgocha protis. Unless you want to label the
vast majority of classic sources on hashkofa as being mere polemics or
position papers. My objection has been that within the context of how
hashkofa is and has been taught and transmitted - the full range of
views held by observant Jews is never presented. In contrast the full
range approach is that of academic Jewish Studies.

Thus if R' Bechhofer had stated: "Prof Levi - in the tradition of Rav
Dessler, Rav Tzadok, Sfas Emes, R' S. R. Hirsch, Ramchal, Ramban, Rambam
etc has presented a limited sample from the population of legitimate
Jewish positions. I think it is time to cease writing in this style.
 From now on Chassidim need to fully explicate the views of Misnagdim,
misnagdim need to explain chassidus etc. There should no longer be a
parochial presentation of Jewish theology but rather an open one. Even
though there is not a single gadol who has ever advocated such an
approach ... It is time that we all expand our hashkofic horizons and
be more open minded. It is time that we each create a personal synthesis
from the supermarket of legitimate sources as we find in the Artscroll
publications." I would reply - that is a great idea. Now that you have
run it up the flag pole of "Jewish Action" - how many people stood
up and saluted? How many gedolim rosh yeshivas proclaimed that this
is needed for our generation - as they did with the revolutions of
chassidus, mussar and beis Yaakov? Could be it is time to change. But
it is necessary to acknowledge that what R' Bechhofer is proposing is
a significant deviation from traditional practice.

                Daniel Eidensohn

On Wed, Oct 15, 2003 at 04:58:18PM +0200, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
:> FWIW, RAKaplan's is a chassidic view.

: Could you explain: Are you saying that the above quote is representative
: of the chassidic view or are you saying that you personally known that R'
: Aryeh Kaplan personally had a chassidic view of hashgocha protis even
: though it is not reflected in his writings? ...

I meant something even simpler. RAK was a chassid.

-mi

A Rosh Yeshivah just told me that he recalls hearing of a source
(probably an Acharon) stating that the Torah is primarily aimed at
the "kador ha-elyon" - upper hemisphere. Hence, Pesach is on the 15th
of Nissan and must also be in the spring, which is impossible in the
Southern Hemisphere. This concept also has important ramifications
regarding other areas of Torah. But the Rosh Yeshivah couldn't remember
which sefer discusses it. Has anyone seen such a thing?

Thanks,
Nosson Slifkin
www.zootorah.com

RAB wrote:
> This article: <http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns99994237>
> discusses a new male contraceptive that works by suppressing sperm
> production. Would this be a preferably kosher birth control method being
> that there isn't any hotza'as zera l'vatala? (If I'm understanding the
> dynamics of the contraceptive properly.)

I doubt that halakhah cares whether or not the ejaculated fluid contains 
sperm. Thus, this method would not make a tremendous difference.

What Avi referred to is a high dose of testosterone which has a negative
feedback on sperm production. The Rav who runs PUAH in Jerusalem is against
the new technique; Rav Dr. Halperin mentioned in a newspaper interview last
week that in some circumstances it may be permissible.

One has to understand pshat in Even Ha'Ezer 5:11 "assur l'hafsid evrei
ha'zera..." and in EH 5:12 "ha'mashkeh kos shel ikkarin l'adam o l'she'ar
baalei chayim KEDAI L'SARSO..." [caps mine]. The Nishmat Adam here brings the
machloket from the lashon KEDAI l'SARSO between the Rambam and the TUR. It
seems from the Rambam that if it's NOT "kedai l'sarso" but for medical
treatment, it's muttar. The TUR rules otherwise. The other question is if
the issur is m'doraita or m'drabbanan.

Josh

On 15 Oct 2003 at 9:43, Shoshana L. Boublil wrote:
> In a previous post I gave 3 basic axioms:
> a) There is a Creator;
> b) The Creator created the Torah and the world
> c) The Creator passed the Torah to Moshe and Israel in 2 parts:
>     written and oral.

While I agree with your three axioms, I don't think they're 
exclusive. I think that all of O agrees on SOME form of schar 
v'onesh. While there's place to argue whether it's in this world or 
the next one, I don't see how anyone can call themselves 'fruhm' 
without believing in some form of schar v'onesh. It's something we 
accept upon ourselves every day in the second parsha of Shma. 

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son, 
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much. 

{bounce)

> They are no more meaningless than any other word in any language.  The
> definition of written Torah is absolute -- what Hashem gave Moshe
> and Yisrael
> and has been passed on through the ages.

Does that include Navi? Ketuvim? To what degree are they "God-given" vs
"God-inspired"?

(Because C, R, JR, etc DO acknowledge Torah as "God-inspired")

And regarding the Written Torah -- How much of Bereshit is
allegorical? One chapter? Two? More?

> Oral Torah is also defined as the Oral
> part including shechita, rules of halachic psika and interpretation, the
> calendar and other related topics that are agreed upon as being Torah
> MiShamayim.

But that's the problem -- just what IS "agreed upon"? Not every O would
agree on the calendar being on this list, for example.

Compare:
> The details are subject to a different discussion, as there is no
> question about
> the idea of Torah MeShamayim -- just on the details of what
> exactly is covered by Oral Torah (as discussed in G'mara..).

and:
> Therefore, they are NOT meaningless, they are full of meaning
> that is clearly understood by everyone.

they contradict each other. ALL that is clearly understood and agreed
upon by all is that a concept of "Torah meShamayim" exists. The details
are where everything breaks down.

Akiva

RSB
> In a previous post I gave 3 basic axioms:
> a) There is a Creator;
> b) The Creator created the Torah and the world
> c) The Creator passed the Torah to Moshe and Israel in 2 parts:
>     written and oral.

Just to complicate life, the rambam did not make hashem being a creator
(as commonly understood) part of the 13 ikkarim, and his actual position
on this issue is a matter of dispute (as RM Frankel has posted in the
past) - making it problematic to make this one of the basic axioms -
showing how difficult it is to reach consensus.

Meir Shinnar

From: "Carl and Adina Sherer" <sherer@actcom.co.il>
> On 15 Oct 2003 at 9:43, Shoshana L. Boublil wrote:

>> In a previous post I gave 3 basic axioms:
>> a) There is a Creator;
>> b) The Creator created the Torah and the world
>> c) The Creator passed the Torah to Moshe and Israel in 2 parts:
>>     written and oral.

> While I agree with your three axioms, I don't think they're 
> exclusive. I think that all of O agrees on SOME form of schar 
> v'onesh. While there's place to argue whether it's in this world or 
> the next one, I don't see how anyone can call themselves 'fruhm' 
> without believing in some form of schar v'onesh. It's something we 
> accept upon ourselves every day in the second parsha of Shma. 

But s'char v'onesh can be derived from the axioms and from the Torah.
Shoshana is not positing a *maximal* set of common beliefs among all O,
but a minimal set. All O's believe in the binding nature of the mitzvot
as well, but that's not necessarily axiomatic.

Part of the problem is that we're discussing several different issues:

1) what differentiates O from C/R?
   a) how does this affect the psak process?

2) what allows us to say with reasonable certitude that a certain
     belief is within O?
   a) what allows us to say with reasonable certitude that a certain
       school of belief/psak is within O?

3) what allows us to define the holder of a certain belief as 
     inside or outside of O 
   a) is there some set of incorrect beliefs that can add up to
        knock a person out of the set of O Jews?
   b) is it OK to call oneself O if one holds one (or n) incorrect
        beliefs?
   [effects on practice:]
   c) at what point do we say X Person no longer counts for a minyan?
   d) does tinok shenishba play a role?

All of which should boil down to minimal criteria, ideally.

For instance, I have long maintained that the dividing line between C
and O is belief in the Oral Torah, that is, the transmission of some set
of explanations and exegetical/hermeneutical rules from God to Moshe
at Sinai. If one looks at the range of Conservative belief in Elliot
Dorff's "Conservative Judaism, Our Ancestors to Our Descendents", or in
"Emet v'Emunah" (wish I could find mine, as well), some schools within
C believe in a Divine written Torah, but none believe in a Divine Oral
Torah. Such belief imparts a reverence for tradition and process that
makes them harder to change.

From: "Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org>
> RnTK:
>>> All you're saying is that "Orthodoxy is a spectrum, that fits
>>> within what I think is Orthodox."  It's all subjective.  There's
>>> no objective definition.

>> IOW whatever you think is Orthodoxy, is.  Whatever you think is
>> Judaism, is.   Whoever you think is a Jew, is.  It's "ALL"
>> subjective....

> You're both suffering from an overdose of Boole. Let me introduce some
> Zadeh:

> There is a definition of O; but it's a fuzzy set.

Of course. But even in a fuzzy set, surely there are things that
necessarily exist in that set, no? Once you get beyond that, people
draw their lines in different places.

From: "Shoshana L. Boublil" <toramada@bezeqint.net>
> RAA:
>> RnSB: 
>>> to prove them.  I am stating that these basic assumptions cannot
>>> be questioned in the present context of Orthodoxy vs. others.

>> But one first has to define "Torah", both "written" and "oral", and define
>> their limitations.

>> The terms by themselves are meaningless.

> The details are subject to a different discussion, as there is no question 
> about the idea of Torah MeShamayim -- just on the details of what exactly 
> is covered by Oral Torah (as discussed in G'mara..).

> Therefore, they are NOT meaningless, they are full of meaning that is clearly
> understood by everyone.

Not necessarily. You and I may draw the line at belief in some kind of
Oral Torah. Others may draw the line at belief in something more than
a minimal Oral Torah - which leads to questions of whether R' Eliezer
Berkovits z"l or ybl"ch R' David Hartman are inside or outside the line
(to name two Oral Torah minimalists), if they hold that God gave every
jot and tittle explicitly at Sinai.

   - jon baker    jjbaker@panix.com     <http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker> -

> On 15 Oct 2003 at 9:43, Shoshana L. Boublil wrote:
>> In a previous post I gave 3 basic axioms:
>> a) There is a Creator;
>> b) The Creator created the Torah and the world
>> c) The Creator passed the Torah to Moshe and Israel in 2 parts:
>>     written and oral.

> While I agree with your three axioms, I don't think they're
> exclusive.

These are the basics. There is no disagreement of any sort between
Orthodox with regard to these 3.

As for the schar v'onesh you yourself state:
> I think that all of O agrees on SOME form of schar
> v'onesh. While there's place to argue whether it's in this world or
> the next one, I don't see how anyone can call themselves 'fruhm'
> without believing in some form of schar v'onesh. It's something we
> accept upon ourselves every day in the second parsha of Shma.

Indeed, but there is disagreement on the details. So -- the axioms
(which of course can be discussed and analyzed separately) are these 3
and sachar v'onesh is a topic based on these 3 (it's mentioned as you
have noted in Shma - which is in the Torah, therefore it can be derived
from axiom 3) -- which can be discussed philisophically.

Those that hold with the 3 above axioms will start with the basic idea
that there IS sachar va'onesh as it is reported in both the written and
oral Torah, while those who question any of the 3 axioms will start with
the question of whether Hashem even interacts with humans (ergo OCR wars
on the net <g>).

The idea is to have a basic set of axioms on which we all agree in full.
Then we can examine where we disagree -- and still be considered frum.

The question posed on Areivim was how to differentiate between a frum
philosophy and one that is outside the pale. These 3 axioms give us such
a tool.

Moa'adim LeSimha,
Shoshana L. Boublil

*********************


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