Avodah Mailing List

Volume 11 : Number 067

Thursday, September 11 2003

• Re: Women and Kaddish
• re:ze sefer toldot adam
• re:ze sefer toldot adam
• IVF/community acceptance
• Misas tzadikim...
• Re: web sites on shabbos
• Re: help with questions
• Re: Misas tzadikim...
• Women and Kaddish (Reasons for saying Kaddish)
• Re: community approval
• Re: Women and kaddish
• mchilla
• Re: Women and kaddish

> Women not being allowed to say kaddish attacks the social, emotional
> and halachic depth of traditional Orthodoxy and IMO can do much harm
> if allowed to shrink beyond its present boundaries.

1) Initially, "Rav and Ravina sof Horaah" is a statement that has
boundaries for all of us in how we approach Limud HaTorah. It is
more than a boundary for Maimondeans. RHS explained that prior to
the Chasimas HaShas, an Amorah could argue with a Tana and that later
gernations could reverse the accepted psak of earlier generations ,
even on matters that involved a Torah law. However, as R Chaim Brisker
explained to R Elchanan Wasserman in explaining " Rav Tana Upalig", even
though an Amora could dissagree with a Tana , they rarely did so. There
is a Ramban in a Milchamas in the end of BK that sets forth a long list
of instances where the Gemara accepts the arguments of an Amora against a
Tana. We also frequently see Mishna Rishonah vs Mishna Acharonah, etc as
an explanation. See also the intro to Igros Moshe in which RMF explains
the dynamism of Psak halacha and the shiurim of RYBS with respect to
our acceptance of chidushim from within and our rejection of shinuim
from without. After the Chasimas HaShas, this dynamism exists within
psak and chidushim reached after Chasimas HaShas, but not beforehand .

2) The statement that preventing women from saying Kaddish will cause O
to shrink requires proof. Please set forth affirmative proof justifying
the premise.

Steve Brizel
Zeliglaw@aol.com

In response to my post on his pshat on ben azzai's statement, RYGB cites
R Kornfeld and the parsha sheet, who has a similar pshat.

I am still puzzled. The understanding gives a nice mussar teaching,
and yes there are many, rishonim and achronim, who hold by that mussar
teaching, but the question isn't the mussar - but what ben azzai actually
meant, and how he has been classically understood. The parsha sheet
gives proof that at least one other contemporary rav learns it that way,
and RGS suggested that he too learned it that way. The mussar is also
quite consonant with rav yerucham's shitta, but the question is still the
pshat. Are there any earlier (say rishonim, achronim pre this century)
who have a similar pshat in ben azzai's actual statement? and can this
pshat be reconciled with the discussion in breshit rabba??

Meir Shinnar

At 04:47 PM 9/10/2003 -0400, you wrote:
>In response to my post on his pshat on ben azzai's statement, RYGB cites
>R Kornfeld and the parsha sheet, who has a similar pshat.

>I am still puzzled. The understanding gives a nice mussar teaching,
>and yes there are many, rishonim and achronim, who hold by that mussar
>teaching, but the question isn't the mussar - but what ben azzai actually
>meant, and how he has been classically understood....
>       Are there any earlier (say rishonim, achronim pre this century)
>who have a similar pshat in ben azzai's actual statement? and can this
>pshat be reconciled with the discussion in breshit rabba??

There are no Rishonim on Yerushalmi and I fail to see why the
interpretation of any other Acharon is more valid than mine. Because odf
the nature of the text and the manner of interpretation, most Acharonim
who write on Yerushalmi are of the opinion that they are entitled to
present pshat, and to this principle I am no exception.

YGB 

From: Eli  Turkel <turkel@nianet.org>
> I am completely at loss as to the violent objections as to the possible
> psak of R. Elyashiv given that Josh has brought several poskim that
> indeed do prohibit it. Hence, should R. Elyashiv indeed prohibit it

Because people don't undertake IVF casually. It's a long, painful process,
both physically and emotionally, resorted to by people desperate to
fulfill pru urvu. To have a posek, widely regarded as the premier living
posek, ban it, is felt like a slap in the face. And R' Zilberstein's story
only reinforces that feeling: you guys who can't have children *should*
feel lesser than other people, because odds are your kids will turn out
to be resha'im.

It's an issue that affects a lot more than just the presence or absence
of children, esp. since so much of Jewish sexual behavior is related
to reproduction, and since there is a lot of communal pressure among
observant Jews to have lots of kids.

> it is not his personal chumra but is in concurrence with other poskim.

Of course, but it's not clear that it's really RYSE who prohibits,
or if it's some peculiar thing that R' Zilberstein is saying.

> Of course as Josh brings down other poskim do allow it under varying
> circumstances. This is not particular unusual for poskim to disagree.

Sure. But the majority cited by Josh permit. And he just lists citations,
no actual rationales to permit or forbid. Further, his qualification
for some of the poskim (that the couple has waited 10 years, or has
been told by doctors that they won't otherwise have children) pretty
much applies to *anyone* who undertakes it.

> On a slightly different issue Lubavitch opposes adoption on the grounds
> that it invloves too many problems of yichud. Does that mean that
> other communities should avoid adoption because it might impact on L.
> Alternatively before a posek allows an adoption need he consult a L
> posek to get his approval or as a minimum account for such a custom.

No, because L. is considered fringie by most. RYSE is not considered so
fringie. If one is worrying about other kehillot, one also has to think
about the likelihood that it will really be a problem.

> Similar problems apply to accepting gerim where some kehillot refuse to
> accept converts on principle. Do other communties need to account for
> these communities?
> Micha still seems to be arguing that the Charedi ciommunity should have
> some veto power over the MO community because it might affect them in
> the future.

Maybe wearing the uniform has affected his thinking? After all, the
clothes make the man. <g> Of course, for those of us who wear kipa sruga,
the holes let our brains leak out... ha ha ha.

Or, more seriously, if the MO community hasn't produced [m]any gedolim,
what role do gedolim outside the community play? What makes a gadol a
gadol, and what about adherence to halacha affects a community's relation-
ship to gedolim outside itself?

   - jon baker    jjbaker@panix.com     <http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker> -

On Areivim we were discussing the greatness of R Dr David Applebaum
hy"d. I had the following thoughts.

There is a tension between
     misas tzadiqim mechapeir
and
     preida achas yeish Li lehotzi mikem

The latter quote is from Sanhedrin 108a, explaining why Mesushelakh
died before the mabul. It's the notion that HQBH spares tzadiqim from
living through oneshim.

One implies the misas tzadiqim should introduce better times, as
kapparah was acheived. The other, that it's preparation for worse
ones.

LAD, the difference is whether the misah is mis'oreir those who are
left behind.

Vedok, particularly in Elul.

Looking up the quote from Sanhedrin, I also found the aggadita about
the dor hahapelagah mourning the loss of a brick, but not the loss of
a person.

The two seem very connected. One is tochacha from HQBH that they
didn't take Mesushelakh's petirah as an occasion to think about how he
lived and what he stood for, and to take lesson from him. The other,
that they didn't consider other people's deaths altogether. The tower
builders developed the very same midah that kept the dor hamabul from
teshuvah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Rabindranath Tagore

To recap the conversation AIUI:

An unnamed but well-known poseiq was cited as prohibiting letting a
web site run on Shabbos, comparing it to leaving open a store on
Shabbos.

The problem of the web server itself was rapidly dismissed by a number
of us, as beis Hillel has no requirement of shevisas keilim. I think
this also covers RnTK's questions about telephoning her parents during
their Shabbos (but before hers), or the use of fax machines.

BTW, faxing causes a shinui sheim. A piece of paper becomes a fax.
They are therefore arguably nolad, and can't be read on Shabbos even
when faxed beheter. CYLOR, of course.

This left two possibilities remaining:

1- He was bedavka speaking about web stores, where kinyanim are involved.

2- There is a problem of mesayei'ah in providing a page for a Jew to
read on Shabbos.

If #2 is an issue, a number of us noted that it would be an issue
based on the reader's time zone, making the problem last around 2 days
as the dove of Shabbos flies around the globe.

But is it a problem? Won't the person browse the web anyway?

It was also suggested RAM that for Torah sites, Shabbos could be a
kiruv opportunity. Rather than shutting down the server, which will
just produce an error message for the person to read and click away
from anyway, you could put up a pro-Shabbos message. After all, the
person is non-observant AND interested in a Torah site; he's part of
the way there already.

(Then there's the technical issue of being able to know what time it
is on the reader's side, and setting things up accordingly. Also, of
being able to include this special coding on every page served from
your site even when you are virtually hosted and don't own the
server.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Rabindranath Tagore

Newman,Saul Z wrote:
> a friend posed some questions about the mesorah...

> Kidushin lamed discusses the issue of the Vav of Gichon being the
> numerical center of the Torah -in letters.

RMKornfeld has a nice vort on this. Refer your friend to
<http://www.shemayisrael.co.il/dafyomi2/kidushin/insites/kd-dt-30.htm>.

> A.Is it true that the Torah we now have is, as is often taught in
> schools, "letter for letter" the same as what Moshe received at
> Sinai? The
> Gemmarah seems to indicate differently--though I have heard some
> streched explanations to account for the discrepancies.

If were aren't bekiim in malei vechaseir, how can we have the same
Torah letter for letter? Word for word, yes. But was R' Yosi speaking
about the letters, knowing how to darshen the letters, or something
else?

Refer your friend to our discussion on Avodah. See suggested answers at:
    <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol03/v03n185.shtml#14>
    <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol03/v03n188.shtml#14>
    <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol03/v03n194.shtml#14>
    <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol07/v07n001.shtml#01>

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Rabindranath Tagore

Micha Berger wrote:
> There is a tension between
>      misas tzadiqim mechapeir
> and
>      preida achas yeish Li lehotzi mikem
...
> One implies the misas tzadiqim should introduce better times, as
> kapparah was acheived. The other, that it's preparation for worse
> ones.

> LAD, the difference is whether the misah is mis'oreir those who are
> left behind.

We also find the oft quoted but hard to find midrash that "gam kol choli
v'chol makah asher lo chasuv b'sefer hatorah hazos, yaaleim Hashem alecha
ad hishamdach" of this week's kriah is a reference to misas tzadikim.

A drush written in the name of R' Yitzock Elchanan explains why the pasuk
did not list misas tzadikim outright. On the one hand, Hashem takes away
the Tzadik before r'l evil befalls klal yisrael. That implies that misas
tzadikim should be listed first in the tocheicah. OTOH, misas tzadikim
should be written last, as it is one of the worst evils that can befall
klal yisrael as it deprives us of our guides, our meilitzim. Therefore
the pasuk refers to it in a veiled way towards the end of the tocheicha.

Perhaps one could use the tension R' Micha points out as an different
explanation of this same midrash, even a variation on the above drush --
the misa can go either way, depending on what we make of it.

elly

[Cut and pasted from a slightly longer post of mine from several years
ago on MailJewish but relevant to the discussion today. References to
Rabbi Fink are to his article in "The Recital of Kaddish by Women" in
the RJJ's Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society (XXXI, Spring 1996)]


1. What we called the "Mourner's Kaddish" really is the "Orphan's
Kaddish" -- i.e., "Kaddish Yasom" that was added after the Aleinu at
the end of davening.

2. Rabbi Fink explains (at page 24) its origin as follows : "Originally
Kaddish was recited seven times each day -- three recitations during
Shacharit, one after Yishtabach, one after Tachanun and after U'vah
le-zion. It was only at a later time that the kaddish after Aleinu
was added, ostensibly because of the proliferation of orphans." [All
footnotes omitted.]

See also Rabbi Nosson Scherman's Overview to the Artscroll publication
""Kaddish" at page xxii, where he notes that while the "effect of Kaddish
was well known in the time of the Talmud" [and had even much earlier
origins], nonetheless, "the custom for mourners to recite Kaddish began
in the Middle Ages . . ."

3. It would seem that Kaddish Yasom was enacted, or became an accepted
minhag, in order to bring y'somim (orphans) to shul so that they would
not be lost to Judaism (Yahadus) -- even though once there they could
not act as a sh'liach tzibbur and thus recite the *requisite* kaddishim
during the davening which were known to have a beneficial "effect"
(using Rabbi Scherman's word) on the departed.

Indeed, the seminal source for recitation of kaddish for the departed
and its effect on the departed is the story of Rabbi Akivah (some say,
R. Yochanan ben Zakkai). See, e.g., Remah, Yoreh Deah 376,4, citing
Rabbeinu Bechai and others. According to the story, which is found in
various sources [one of which is translated in the Artscroll "Kaddish"
publication at xxi-xxii], Rabbi Akivah taught an obviously irreligious
and unschooled orphan to recite the Barchu and the Kaddish and brought
him before a tzibbur in shul (or a beis medrash) to do so, which saved
the boy's father from the (further) throes of gehenom.

Moreover, Rav Yosef Henkin, z'tl, as brought down by Rabbi Fink, alludes
to the "kiruv" -- so to speak -- aspect of Kaddish as well: " . . .
coming to shul to say kaddish serves as an educational purpose whereby
the child might develop warm feelings for Judaism and thus is drawn to
Judaism . . ." [Fink, at 35]

4. Rabbi Yaacov ben Moshe haLevi Moeillin, the "Maharil" (d. Germany
1427) was asked (Shu't Maharil Chadashos, siman 28) why a katan (minor)
is allowed to recite the Kaddish Yasom -- after all, kaddish is a davar
shebikdusha, which requires a minyan of of ten adult men, and minors
are not counted in that quorum.

Rabbi Moellin replied that minors cannot assist adults in fulfilling their
obligations (i.e, can't be "motzi" the adults) in d'varim shebikdusha
[such as the Barchu and other obligatory Kaddishim enacted by the Rabbonim
to be recited by the sh'liach tzibbur].

However, the Kaddish Yasum, said the Maharil, is not obligatory and
thus minors may recite it ("aval kaddish ze lav davar sh'bechovah hu;
hilchach y'cholim ketanim l'omro"). Moreover, he explains, this kaddish
was an "addition" and is not a requisite part of the davening ("tosesfes
v'lo chovah"). In other words, the minor who recites the kaddish is
not acting as a sh'liach tzibbur and thus is not doing so to fulfill
another's obligation to hear and respond to a kaddish (that having been
accomplished via the adult sh'liach tzibbur during the davening). See
also MB 55:20 (kaddish after aleinu is only a minhag).

[As to whether a katan can also lead the Barchu at the end of davening,
see Sefer Iyunai Halachot, by Rabbi D. Y. Tzvi Rabinowitz (Bnei B'rak),
perek 12, "Din Yasum Katan b'Kaddish u'Barchu" wherein he cites some
poskim who would uphold the practice provided that the adults present
had already heard Barchu (and thus fulfilled their obligation through
the sh'liach tzibbur) earlier.]

5. With regard to women, the Tzitz Eliezer (vol. 14:7), cited by Rabbi
Fink (at page 32 of his article), prohibits women from reciting kaddish
because, in part (using Rabbi Fink's words): "this might lead to confusion
on the part of those present who might quite naturally assume that if
it is permissible for her to recite the kaddish, it must also be that
she can be included in making up the minyan required for the recitation
of kaddish."

6. On the other hand, Rabbi Aharon Soloveitchik, z'tl, according to
Rabbi Fink, "argues that in the battle for equal rights for women in
synagogue participation the demand is currently for women to be called
up to the Torah for aliyot. Therefore, if the Rabbis do not concede the
recitation of the kaddish to women, the women then might come under the
influence of non-traditional rabbis. The lesser of the two evils is to
allow women to recite the kaddish." [Fink, at 37, n. 8.]

Similarly, on the lenient side, Rav Henkin zt'l says (as described by
Rabbi Fink) that "one should not push away young girls (just as one
would not push away young boys from the opportunity to get closer to
Jewish practice." [Fink, at 35.]

7. Perhaps the arguments of the Tzitz Eliezer on the one hand, and Rav
Soloveitchik and Rav Henkin on the other, are rooted in the original
basis to allow a katan to recite the "additional/non-obligatory" kaddish
(per the Maharil, above).

8. In this regard, we know that an eishah (woman) and katan (minor) are
sometimes found in a comparable category regarding matters pertaining
to davening. See the mishnah at Brachos 20a and 20b (regarding k'riyas
shema and t'fillah), and Megila 23a (regarding "hakol olin leminyan
shiva . . .").

9. Thus,

When the takanah/minhag of adding the Kaddish Yasom first arose,
we may ask if it was enacted for the category of *all* who could not
participate as a sh'liach tzibbur -- i.e., a katan (minor) *and* an
eishah (woman), alike -- since its purpose was to draw to shul, and hence
closer to Judaism (Yahadus) *all* those in the "disadvantaged" category
of being unable to benefit the departed by reciting the *requisite*
kaddishim during the davening as a sh'liach tzibbur, and since it was
known that this kaddish, unlike others, was not the normal, *required*
davar shebikdusha that would be unsuitable for a katan and eishah to
recite to be motzi others,

or

was the takanah/minhag of reciting the *"additional/non-obligatory"*
Kaddish Yasum permitted solely to a katan *but not* an eishah, since only
the former (post-Bar Mitzvah), but not the latter, eventually would be
able to be counted in the minyan quorum and be able to participate as a
sh'liach tzibbur -- thus mitigating any possible "confusion" as to why the
katan would be allowed to recite what ostensibly is a davar shebikdusha
that under normal (requisite) situations he would not be permitted to
recite as a sh'liach tzibbur helping others fulfill their obligation.

10. Under this construct, Rav Henkin and Rav Soloveitchik hold the first
opinion, while the Tzitz Eliezer holds the latter.

R Eli  Turkel wrote:
> I am still bothered by Micha's assertion that poskim need to account
> for the impact on their kehillot. In RMF piskei halacha on various
> types of insemination I don't think he discussed the issue of
> slippery slope and similarly on other issues.
...
> Micha still seems to be arguing that the Charedi ciommunity should
> have some veto power over the MO community because it might affect
> them in the future.

I obviously didn't make my position clear, probably because it wasn't
all clear in my head either.

Say we have four shuls:
    shul R in Riverdale, the most progressive of our lot WRT women's
           issues
    shul T in Teaneck, demographically between R and Q
    shul Q in Queens, which is RW MO -- whatever RHSchachter says, goes
    shul B in Boro Park

Say the LOR in T decides that something benidon didan is allow in his
shul. Say it's a valid pesaq, after considering all the dinim
involved, etc...

Now we get to those secondary effects I was mysteriously alluding to.
What happens in those other shuls?

The feminists in R will see this as growing acceptance of their
position, and therefore ask for another innovation. In fact, R will
tend to stay around the same distance from T over time. If T has
cultural overlap with R, they'll follow one step behind, leading to
that slippery slope.

Of course B's practice won't be influenced. But what will happen in Q?

Either Q will be influenced, or there is now a divide between T and Q.
In fact, we noted this divide actually happening bemitzi'us.

If the LOR in T would defer to a rav that all of MO (including the
shuls named R, T, and Q) accept, then the split is far less likely to
occur. Also, the feedback loop pushing T & R toward more and more
innovation has a break, there is someone recognized by both saying ad
kan vesu lo.

The LOR of T's decision affects R and Q. He has authority, despite
these "secondary effects". But ought he take it?

This is not only a lack of halakhic or aggadic motivation for change,
it's a motivation away from it. Whether it's a motivation to avoid
women saying qaddish should be up to a common poseiq, not the LOR.

When I argued that it could well be sufficient, depite pesaqim of RMF
or RYBS, it's because the connections between R, T and Q are different
than they were then. The social dynamic changed, and therefore the
pesaq is facing a new metzi'us. It could well be that a poseiq dealing
with that new metzi'us would end up upholding the previous pesaqim.

But should an LOR???

Tangent:
> On a slightly different issue Lubavitch opposes adoption on the
> grounds that it invloves too many problems of yichud. Does that mean
> that
> other communities should avoid adoption because it might impact on
> L....

Funny, my wife places children for a Crown Heights based tzedaqah.

However, how does an adoptive parent's violation of yichud impact L?
Will adoption in the non-L community cause pressure on LOR rabbanim to
change L pisqa?

AID has direct impact on the entire observant kehillah, as one might
invoke questions of introducing a safeiq mamzer to the marriage pool.
Presumably those who permit feel the sechar outweighs the hefsed. But
ought an LOR decide, or one whose opinion would be respected by as
large a percentage as possible of that marriage pool?

> Similar problems apply to accepting gerim where some kehillot refuse
> to accept converts on principle. Do other communties need to account
> for these communities?

These questions are akin to your complaint about my invoking the idea
of slippery slope. I'm not banning because of the slope. I'm saying
the impact on these kehillos (via precedent or marriage pool, as
examples) needs to be considered as part of the she'eilah.

And once you do, the typical LOR would be assuming a HUGE burden to
take it on himself.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Rabindranath Tagore

RnTK writes:
> I remember one instance in which my father zt'l told a 12-year-old
> girl to  say kaddish for her mother, from behind the mechitza.  She
> was the oldest child,  there were no sons or brothers, the mother
> was a giyores (and, though this is  not directly relevant, a
> tzadekes, as I well remember).

Actually, a tzadeqes needs it less than had she been evil. Recall the
original aggadita. A deceased man who was a rasha in life pleaded in a
dream that R' Aqiva teach his son to say Borechu...

Now, on to the subject itself. I'm going to reply separately on issues
of how much authority I believe an LOR should assume, and just stick
to women and qaddish.

The issue in and of itself (without taking into account secondary
effects) is clearly mutar according to many noted poseqim, and is
not evena post-feminism innovation.

Let's not confuse halakhah considering something as being a
permissable concession vs einah metzuvah ve'osah. Is qaddish
comparable to performing semichah on a qorban or to sukkah?

Actually, the sources suggest the former. Which is why there is the
possibility that it not be heard and answered.

R Joseph Kaplan wrote:
> R' Harry makes a halachic argument (based on a "hunch")
> that women saying kaddish has no halachic significance. I'm not a
> halachist, so I won't attempt to respond to the halachic argument.
> But I will note that the gedolim who permit kaddish appear not to
> agree with R' Harry (or his hunch)....

No, what you get from them is that it's allowed. They didn't
necessarily allow it because it's significant. You assume this
"mutar" is like a mitzvah qiyumis, rather than like semichah.

RMShinnar wrote:
> There is also a halacha ... that kshem sheassur
> lehattir et ha'assur, cach assur le'essor et hamuttar. Not that
> everything that can be done should be done, but neither that
> everything that can be assured should be. There should be a reason
> for assuring something.

Actually, it's the one who is proposing change who carries the burden
of proof. In the case of qaddish, that would be the machmirim. In the
other topics raised, that would be the meiqilim.

There is also the question of "what's a reason?" -- as RMS later
agrees with RHM:
> RHM argues that being muttar isn't the only issue, and on that I
> agree.

Being a permitted change isn't identical to being a good idea.

And yet RHM reverts to this language when he writes:
> The Halachic portions about the permissiblity of women saying
> Kaddish may well be justified. But is there an Halachic purpose for
> it? Do they build up Zechuyos for the Nifter?

First, the purpose need not be halakhic. If it's mutar, and there is
an aggadic point, change could be justified. Second, your issue isn't
a halakhic one anyway.

RJK and RHM then discuss whether there is sufficient reason for qaddish
for women to be a good idea. Li nir'eh there would be, if not for
secondary effects. However, the burden of proof is on those who think
it's a bad idea. So the rest I see as all sort of theoretical.

Back to RJK:
> 3. R' Harry sets up a strawman (or woman) in his argument that women
> ay kaddish "to make [them] feel better." Who says? How does he know?
> And how does he know what their "REAL motivation" is? Has he ever
> spoken to a woman who has taken on the serious obligation of saying
> kaddish for a parent for 11 months and yartzheits? If he has, have
> ANY of them ever spoken about "feeling better."

Actually, for most aveilim, the need for catharsis is the primary
motivator. And the difficulty is part of its value.

I therefore disagree with RHM's reply as well:
>> It has to do with a sense of kibbud hamet and kibbud av
>> vaeym; it has to do with finding a Jewish way to mourn;

> Saying Kaddish is none of the above. It is a "prayer" if you will...
> for the exaltation of God's name. That it is used by Aveilim to
> build up Zechuyos is incidental to its primary purpose.

I disagree. Yes, it is incidental to its original purpose. However, as
RYBS describes it, Qaddish is an opportunity for someone in the depths
of despair to leave the state of existential doubt (perhaps a aveil -
aval connection?) and declare the basic truths.

> I submit that the "sense of kibbud hamet and kibbud av vaeym" and
> "finding a Jewish way to mourn" has more to do with one's own
> feelings rather than it does with Halacha or the intent of those who
> proscribed the Mourner's Kaddish.

RYBS describes the halakhah as being aimed at healing that angst. It's
not "more to do with", as addressing the feelings is the source of the
din.

But the purpose for any alleged change need not be found in the din
itself. Which brings me to the "secondary effects" spoken of above.
But that is the topic of another post.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger             I slept and dreamt that life was joy.
micha@aishdas.org        I awoke and found that life was duty.
http://www.aishdas.org   I worked and, behold -- duty is joy.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                        - Rabindranath Tagore

The generally accepted practice seems to be to ask mchilla during asseret
ymei tshuva.
Given that Rosh Hashana is the 1st "judgement day", why don't we ask
before?
Aren't we setting ourselves up for a fall?

KVCT
Joel Rich

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> There is also the question of "what's a reason?" -- as RMS later
> agrees with RHM:
>> RHM argues that being muttar isn't the only issue, and on that I
>> agree.

> Being a permitted change isn't identical to being a good idea.

> And yet RHM reverts to this language when he writes:
>> The Halachic portions about the permissiblity of women saying
>> Kaddish may well be justified. But is there an Halachic purpose for
>> it? Do they build up Zechuyos for the Nifter?

> First, the purpose need not be halakhic. If it's mutar, and there is
> an aggadic point, change could be justified.

What do you mean by an Aggadic point?

> Second, your issue isn't
> a halakhic one anyway.

It is more of an Hashkafic reason. Since it is probably permitted
MeIkkar Hadin, then one must look at the over all Toeles and factor
in cost/benefit. Is a permissible act that has no indication of
Halachic value, beneficial or detrimental if the sources of practice
are anathematic to Torah Judaism? I submit that if the source is the
radical social changes that some of the more extreme feminists want to
foist upon society is the genesis of the practice, then more harm than
good will result.

Please understand I am NOT casting any aspesions on those sincere women
who wish to honor their parents by saying Kaddish. I simply suggest
that circumstantial evidence would suggest that there is a subliminal
influence at play that is which is anathema to Torah. That evidence is
the fact that AIUI the vast majority if of those women who say Kaddish
are memmbers of a segment of Orthodox Judaism that is heavily bombarded
by feminist thinking.

> RJK and RHM then discuss whether there is sufficient reason for qaddish
> for women to be a good idea. Li nir'eh there would be, if not for
> secondary effects. However, the burden of proof is on those who think
> it's a bad idea. So the rest I see as all sort of theoretical.

See above.

> Actually, for most aveilim, the need for catharsis is the primary
> motivator. And the difficulty is part of its value.

> I therefore disagree with RHM's reply as well:
>>> It has to do with a sense of kibbud hamet and kibbud av
>>> vaeym; it has to do with finding a Jewish way to mourn;

>> Saying Kaddish is none of the above. It is a "prayer" if you will...
>> for the exaltation of God's name. That it is used by Aveilim to
>> build up Zechuyos is incidental to its primary purpose.

> I disagree. Yes, it is incidental to its original purpose. However, as
> RYBS describes it, Qaddish is an opportunity for someone in the depths
> of despair to leave the state of existential doubt (perhaps a aveil -
> aval connection?) and declare the basic truths.

Perhaps this is true and I certainly would not disagree with RYBS.
But Isn't RYBS really explaining a secondary benefit, albeit an
important one? Are you saying that RYBS does not hold that the
primary purpose of Kaddish is to exalt the name of God?  Is it not
this very exaltation which in the then has the effect of taking an
Avel out of the depths of despair... to leave the state of
existential doubt and declare the basic truths? And wouldn't you
think that RYBS himself would have advocated woman saying Kaddish if
this was enough of a reason to do so? I do not remember ever hearing
or reading anything resembling such a Psak from RYBS.

> RYBS describes the halakhah as being aimed at healing that angst. It's
> not "more to do with", as addressing the feelings is the source of the
> din.

> But the purpose for any alleged change need not be found in the din
> itself. 

Are you saying that RYBS held that the purpose of Halacha is healing
angst? This is not how I read him. The purpose of Halacha is to
synthesize the spiritual realm with physical universe by using our
cognative abilities. Halacha's purpose is to "bring down" the
spiritual world into the real world. It is a philosophy that sees the
physical universe as the "place" given to mankind to achieve God's
will through the medium He gave us, Halacha.

HM

*********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]