Avodah Mailing List

Volume 11 : Number 058

Wednesday, August 27 2003

• Re: Freedom of choice vis-a-vis other people
• Re: Re: Freedom of choice vis-a-vis other people
• Re: Ahavas Chinam?
• Re: TIDE
• Freedom of choice vis-a-vis other people
• Re: minhag ashkenaz
• Psak
• Re: Re: Freedom of choice vis-a-vis other people
• Re: Psak
• Mussar, haskalah, philosophy, kabbalah, and the standard curriculum
• Re: Psak
• Re: Psak
• Psak vs. Mussar
• Re: HaKalir's era
• RE: Women and kadish
• Women and Kaddish
• Re: Freedom of choice vis-a-vis other people
• Re: Freedom of choice vis-a-vis other people
• Re: Freedom of choice vis-a-vis other people
• Re: Freedom of choice vis-a-vis other people
• Ilan/Etz
• RE: Freedom of choice vis-a-vis other people
• RE: minyan in women's section
• Re: Ilan/Etz

In a message dated 8/25/03 6:36:18 PM EDT, vze2vt56@verizon.net writes:
>>The question still remains - if Ploni was supposed to be killed at
time t, and everything was set up for this [including the main 'tool',
the 'volunteer'] and at time t-2 min the murderer changes his mind,
something drastic has to happen in order for Ploni to still be killed at
precisely time t. Anything that drastic would be perceived as pure divine
intervention by observers. And that isn't supposed to happen. Therefore,
we must conclude that there is something wrong with this analysis. Perhaps
a person's life is not decreed to end at a precise time, but rather
within an interval, with the precise moment determined by man?< <

I am having difficulty understanding your question. Hashem plans out
everything, what can I say? If He knows that the guy is not, after all,
going to pull the trigger, and Ploni is destined to die--He will put
Ploni in front of someone who WILL pull the trigger.

The conflict between bechira and hashgacha pratis is no harder to
reconcile in your scenario than in any other scenario where something is
decreed to happen to X, the fulfillment of which depends on Y's exercising
his bechira. These scenarios happen every day, in a million permutations,
many involving a lot more than just two players.

Toby Katz 

> There is such a concept in Chazal as "too late to do teshuva."  After you 
> pull the trigger but before the bullet hits its mark is too late.

Yes, though my case was different - he did not do any irreversible
actions yet. But ok, let's say it isn't one second before he strikes,
but a minute or two. The murderer changes his mind. The question still
remains - if ploni was supposed to be killed at time t, and everything
was set up for this [including the main 'tool', the 'volunteer'] and at
time t-2min the murderer changes his mind, something drastic has to happen
in order for ploni to still be killed at precisely time t. Anything that
drastic would be perceived as pure divine intervention by observers. And
that isn't supposed to happen. Therefore, we must conclude that there
is something wrong with this analysis. Perhaps a person's life is not
decreed to end at a precise time, but rather within an interval, with
the precise moment determined by man?

Eliezer

On Tue, Aug 12, 2003 at 07:44:57AM -0400, RYGB wrote:
: Retaining love is certainly the product of hard work, but its development 
: in the first place is often based on "chen." Perhaps, indeed, we might link 
: "chen" to "chinam" and find agreement...

I think it's pashut that chein = chinam. Which is why we speak of "limtzo
chein". Chein is found, not made or earned.

Chein is the expression of ahavas chinam.

-mi

On Sun, Aug 17, 2003 at 12:49:54AM -0400, RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
: Then the very Waspy blue-blooded, Mayflower-descended Mayor of West
: Hartford g ot up and said the opposite. He pointed out that we are all
: DIFFERENT. And that is why we must stand up for each other DESPITE these
: differences... etc.

Nein. We must stand up for each other BECAUSE of these differences.

In his case the world, but in ours, the olam haTorah, is a much stronger
place because it harbors variety. Chassidus needs the existance of Yekkes,
Litvaks need Sepharadim.

-mi

>There is a discussion of this very point in the Netsiv, Herchev Davar to
>Breishis 37, 2. He shows form the fact that Reuven was willing to throw
>Yosef into the Bor full of snakes to save him from the brothers and from
>the fact that Nevuchadnezzar sealed the entrance of the fiery kiln into
>which he threw Daniel ( so that no hand shall have power against Daniel),
>that average hashgocho that is enough to prevent natural disaster is
>not sufficient to protect against human action. For that you requie a
>greater zchus.

And according to this view, can one's life be terminated prematurely
simply because of someone else's actions? Yet what does 'prematurely' mean
in this context - it would be absurd to think that one can do anything
against Hashem's will... With our 20/20 hindsight, it is obvious that
Yosef was destined to live and go to mitzrayim, etc. etc. Thus, even if
the brothers wanted it, they could not have killed him against Hashem's
will. Why was Reuven concerned then? Since anything that would happen
to Yosef would be governed by hashgocho anyway, why was there a need to
throw him to the snakes rather than leave him with the brothers.

[Email #2. -mi]

>The Alter of Slabodka has this notion that in truth, each person lives
>in his own universe. We think we are all guests on a comon stage, but we
>are not. Therefore, his bechirah and my hashgachah are features of two
>totally different universes, and the conflict is only in the illusion
>that they overlap. What this means is beyond me.

Maybe Everett's many-worlds interpretation of QM? :) Though that
introduces more problems with the concept of free will than it
solves. [Since essentially there is no free will in a multi-verse... Every
possible choice is executed, every possible path taken.]

Eliezer

On Sun, Aug 17, 2003 at 12:12:25AM -0400, RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
: I'm not sure what Prof. Agus himself thought. There is NO question
: that Tosafos was extremely strong when it came to defending the Minhag.
: {Rabbi Kanarfogel once used the term TAKIF}

In the few cases across all of shas that they discuss halachah
lema'aseh. Again, my complaint is turning this into a major motivating
factor. Very few Tosefosim refer to minhag -- whether or not it agrees
with shas. Most resolve problems between suguyos without any need to
reinterpret to fit extant pesaq.

:> Which is why they don't try to deny the obvious that most of Tosafos is
:> their attempts to be meyasheiv the gemara before us with other gemaros.

: This is certainly true up to a point.
: You still must ask the obvious question - why didn't Tosafos ever dismiss
: Minhag X as a Taus?

Because they didn't write a book about minhag X. They wrote a book about
how to understand a sugya given other sugyos.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

From: Joelirich@aol.com
> A number of years back I heard about someone developing an "expert system"
> for Psak that would use a database to select sources and weight them to
> come to a conclusion. Does anyone know if this has been pursued?

I have heard it said about ROY's psokim.
But as I have rarely studied them - I'll leave opinion-making to our
experts.

SBA

A consequence of RnTK's approach to this problem (my #2, belief that
G-d can weave the strands even though each is independent) is that it
shifts the question to one already posed.

Given that hakol tzafui vehareshus nesunah, G-d's knowing our actions
doesn't affect bechirah. If He knows them, then He can include them as
givens in His plans.

R Leonid Portnoy wrote:
>>There is a discussion of this very point in the Netsiv, Herchev Davar to
>> Breishis 37, 2. He shows form the fact that Reuven was willing to throw
>> Yosef into the Bor full of snakes to save him from the brothers...
>> that average hashgocho that is enough to prevent natural disaster is not
>> sufficient to protect against human action. For that you requie a greater
>> zchus.

> And according to this view, can one's life be terminated prematurely simply
> because of someone else's actions?

It can be terminated (we'll leave aside the word prematurely) simply
because of someone else's actions. This is also the position of the Or
haChaim (as I mentioned) on why they put Yosef in the bor. We sometimes
forget that this notion that hashgachah applies to every one of a person's
experiences is not universally held.

> Yet what does 'prematurely' mean in this
> context - it would be absurd to think that one can do anything against
> Hashem's will... With our 20/20 hindsight, it is obvious that Yosef was
> destined to live and go to mitzrayim, etc. etc. Thus, even if the brothers
> wanted it, they could not have killed him against Hashem's will. Why was
> Reuven concerned then? Since anything that would happen to Yosef would be
> governed by hashgocho anyway, why was there a need to throw him to the
> snakes rather than leave him with the brothers.

Who said it was governed by hashgachah? Perhaps we would have gone to
Mitzrayim in some other way? Hashem has an infinite number of means to
get us to Mitzrayim at His disposal.

Second, sin hakol tzfui, didn't He know the proper "date of maturity"
given the choice that would end up being made?

...
>>The Alter of Slabodka has this notion that in truth, each person lives in
>> his own universe. We think we are all guests on a comon stage, but we are
>> not. Therefore, his bechirah and my hashgachah are features of two totally
>> different universes, and the conflict is only in the illusion that they
>> overlap. What this means is beyond me.

> Maybe Everett's many-worlds interpretation of QM? :) Though that
> introduces more problems with the concept of free will than it
> solves. [Since essentially there is no free will in a multi-verse... Every
> possible choice is executed, every possible path taken.]

No, since Everett does not assume one world per person, but one world per
choice. A neighbor (and dayan), R' Jack Love, found a source for Everett's
interpretation in the medrash on Shemos. Moshe looks "im yeish ish", which we
are told refers to looking at the Mitzri's descendents to see if there is
someone who would come out of him that the world could use. However, what
would Moshe Rabbeinu have seen? Noone! After all, the man is about to die
without having any more children! This would imply that somehow both versions
of this Mitzri exists, the man who lived to have children, and the one Moshe
killed.

What does RJL do with bechirah? The person, as he is here and now, is the
product of a particular set of choices. The fact that there is another version
who made different choices only effects that version. Each version gets the
sechar va'onesh of the choices that produced that version. Thus, there is din.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 You will never "find" time for anything.
micha@aishdas.org            If you want time, you must make it.
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Charles Buxton
Fax: (413) 403-9905

SBA wrote:
> From: Joelirich@aol.com
>> A number of years back I heard about someone developing an "expert system"
>> for Psak that would use a database to select sources and weight them to
>> come to a conclusion. Does anyone know if this has been pursued?
>
> I have heard it said about ROY's psokim.
> But as I have rarely studied them - I'll leave opinion-making to our
> experts.

ROY is a person. An "expert system" would be a bit of software.

The SA claimed to set out to pasqen algorythmically. Yet we know the
mechaber made many exceptions to his rule.

R' Moshe Koppel, in his book MetaHalakhah, argues that both halakhah
and bechirah chafshi share this property. Neither is random, however,
neither came be captured by a finite algorythm. Any rule you can generate
to explain some subset of the data, be it halkhah or a person's activities
will need embellishing as more data comes in. And since this too is an
algorythm, you'll reach the point where it too needs embellishing. (Sounds
like a fractal, no?)

Even if ROY tends to follow some rule, the fact is that he is capable of
knowing when the rule falls short. A program could not.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 You will never "find" time for anything.
micha@aishdas.org            If you want time, you must make it.
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Charles Buxton
Fax: (413) 403-9905

I'm reading RM bar Ilan's book Mivolozhin L'Yerushalayim. He makes
all sorts of provocative comments about all sorts of things. One that
interested me was his comparison of the yeshivos of Slabodka and Odessa.
Odessa (for those who, like me, had never heard of it before) was
a haskalah yeshiva. RMBI comments that, even though one might think
they were opposites, in one sense they were similar to each other and
different from the "old style" yeshivos (read Volozhin: his dad was
the Rosh Yeshiva and he grew up there). In old style yeshivos Torah was
viewed as sufficient, whereas in these modern yeshivos it was felt that
Torah needed to be supplemented by something else.

<slight digression> The Gaon's brother, in his peirush on Avos, deduces
that mussar is not Torah from the verb "Tz'u" in Avos 2:13. <end
digression>

I was reminded of something Rabbi (Professor) Twersky Z"L once observed,
that what philosophy and kabbalah had in common was that their adherents
viewed the Talmud as insufficient.

Here's my quandary: RMBI also mentions that the only member of his family
who ever studied kabbalah was his grandpa (R. YM HaLevi Epstein, author
of the Arukh HaShulhan). Yet certainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries kabbalah (and philosophy) were parts of the standard curriculum.
When did they drop out? In other words, how old was the "old style"
yeshiva really, and how long did it last?

David Riceman

In a message dated 8/26/2003 10:43:18 AM EDT, micha@aishdas.org writes:
> R' Moshe Koppel, in his book MetaHalakhah, argues that both halakhah
> and bechirah chafshi share this property. Neither is random, however,
> neither came be captured by a finite algorythm. Any rule you can generate
> to explain some subset of the data, be it halkhah or a person's activities
> will need embellishing as more data comes in. And since this too is an
> algorythm, you'll reach the point where it too needs embellishing. (Sounds
> like a fractal, no?)

> Even if ROY tends to follow some rule, the fact is that he is capable of
> knowing when the rule falls short. A program could not.

Interesting assertion, Halacha is a set of rules yet it can't be captured
by a finite algorithm. This is much different from saying we have a lot
of data points and believe there is an underlying algorithm which we
try to better approximate each time. How different would our answer be
for medicine?

If we can separate out the theological implications for a minute and
eliminate areas of disagreement as to whether psak is involved(eg should
I become a lawyer or an accountant), what percentage of shailot could
be answered by such a system with 99% accuracy (assuming 1 "gadol's"
school were used as a basis-ie he was the final arbiter of all shailot
that came to him and all disciples and this was used as a data base)?
My guess is it would be pretty high for most laymen and more accurate
than consulting the many "guide to the halachot of..." type anthologies
in print today.We would miss the Rebbi/Talmid relationship .

KT
Joel

RJR:
>> R' Moshe Koppel, in his book MetaHalakhah, argues that both halakhah and
>> bechirah chafshi share this property. Neither is random, however, neither
>> came be captured by a finite algorythm. Any rule you can generate to
>> explain some subset of the data, be it halkhah or a person's activities
>> will need embellishing as more data comes in. And since this too is an
>> algorythm, you'll reach the point where it too needs embellishing. (Sounds
>> like a fractal, no?)
...

> Interesting assertion, Halacha is a set of rules yet it can't be captured by
> a finite algorithm. This is much different from saying we have a lot of data
> points and believe there is an underlying algorithm which we try to better
> approximate each time. How different would our answer be for medicine?

It needn't be. The implication could be taken that there is an underlying
algorithm, but because it's of infinite complexity we'll never get beyond
successive approximations of it.

RMK likens it to grammar. A native speaker doesn't need to learn rules of
grammar, he knows what sounds right. The grammarian reverse-engineers rules
from actual usage. The immigrant then learns these rules, complete with the
necessary jargon, in order to be able to speak the language. However, things
like "poetic license" shows that there are things the native speaker knows
"sounds right" that the rules don't capture.

The dor dei'ah were halachah's native speakers. With each generation that
slowly leaks away. Less of a feel for the Torah's right-and-wrong, and a
greater dependence on formal rules. RMK suggests this as a model for
understanding the shift to textualism after a cultural rupture. It's a shift
to a greater dependency on rules after we lost a lot of what it takes to have
the proper feel.

Pesaq establishes a rule. Before the pesaq, poetic license would be possible;
ways of implementing the mitzvah that no longer fit the din.

> If we can separate out the theological implications for a minute and
> eliminate areas of disagreement as to whether psak is involved(eg should I
> become a lawyer or an accountant), what percentage of shailot could be
> answered by such a system with 99% accuracy...

Probably a lot. Otherwise, those halachic guides would be prohibited. As would
the Kitzur and the Moreh Nevuchim. (Most other famous codes do not explicitly
claim to be guides for laypeople to turn to when bothering the LOR is
impractical.)

> We would miss the Rebbi/Talmid relationship .

"Shelo shimshu es rabosam" was the cause of a major stage in yeridas hadoros,
the explosion of machloqesei batei Hillel veShammai. It's the talmud's shimush
of the rebbe which allows him to pick up what's left of the native speaker's
ear. Which is why Yehoshua meshareis Moshe was chosen.

One last tidbit about his theory:

According to RMK, "shachechum vechazar veyasdum" refers to this process.
"Yasdum" is establishing the halachah on rules. They forgot the instinctive
feel of the mitzvah, and therefore established rules to replace them.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 You will never "find" time for anything.
micha@aishdas.org            If you want time, you must make it.
http://www.aishdas.org                         - Charles Buxton
Fax: (413) 403-9905

I would like to add a valuable reference to this important discussion:
S. Spero, Morality , Halakha and the Jewish Tradition, Ktav, Ch. 6
-Morality and Halakha. He sets up and dsicusses the various hierarchies
of obligations - a well written, comprehensive discussion.

M. Levin

In Avodah V11#55, RRW wrote:
> FWIW, Kallir deserves his own thread and let me state that we have some
> evidence that he lived 580 CE based upon his kinna citing a thousand
> years have passed since the churban. Presuming a Seder Olam dating,
> then 420 BCE is the Churban bayyis rishon and that would put this kina
> at circa 580 CE. Furthermore, it seems likely that Kalir was in the
> pre-Moslem era, {circa 622-632} so 580 fits in nicely.

Were the Amidah b'rochos of "v'liYrushalayim" and "es tzemach" one
b'rocho at that time (6th c. CE)? I ask because I seem to recall that
the K'rovetz (K'rovos, for those who say k'rovos at other times, too
;-)) l'Purim was authored by HaKalir, and it (as I'm sure we all know)
only includes a stanza for the one (former) b'rocho. Thanks.

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

You should have a look in a periodic paper called tzohar. There are a
number of articals about kaddish for woman. In the artical all agree
that there is not halachik issur. The whole debate is whether is should
be allowed based on other reasons (reform ext).

Chaim Turkel.

See Sefer Taarich Yosroel by Rabbi Yisroel Taplin in siman 19, note 34
and add Rav Pinchas Sheinberg (shlita) to the list of those who allow
women to recite kaddish from the esras nashim, and Rav Chaim Kenievski
(shlita) who is does so matir.

[A few posts on the subject bounced over from Areivim. History and
current events references ellided to avoid tangents. -mi]

[Quoted post deleted.]

But even if [...] was innocent, Hashem DID decide that he would be
killed. Every murder is "sanctioned" by Hashem [that's not the right
word, but the right one isn't coming to me]; if Hashem had not handed
down the decree that this person would die they would still be alive.

We don't know exactly why any specific thing happens, but we do know
that Hashem is Just and He is the one who hands down the verdicts.

 --Rena 

> killed. Every murder is "sanctioned" by Hashem [that's not the right
> word, but the right one isn't coming to me]; if Hashem had not handed
> down the decree that this person would die they would still be alive.

Maybe.

There are times when this is not correct (times of Hester Panim, for
example).

Akiva

> There are times when this is not correct (times of Hester 
> Panim, for example).

I think that the times of Hester Panim that you are speaking of are by
definition times when tragedy is visiting klal Yisrael as a whole and
not just one person, no? I don't think that applies to single deaths in
prison. 

 --Rena 

R"n Rena Freedenberg wrote <<< Every murder is "sanctioned" by Hashem
[that's not the right word, but the right one isn't coming to me]; if
Hashem had not handed down the decree that this person would die they
would still be alive. >>>

R' Akiva Atwood objected: <<< Maybe. There are times when this is not
correct (times of Hester Panim, for example). >>>

R"n Rena Freedenberg responded <<< I think that the times of Hester
Panim that you are speaking of are by definition times when tragedy is
visiting klal Yisrael as a whole and not just one person, no? I don't
think that applies to single deaths in prison. >>>

My understanding is similar to that of RAA.

If someone had decided to murder a person who was *not* on Hashem's
"death list", RRF would have Hashem intervene to save that person. And
maybe that does happen often or even most of the time.

But I suspect that if He would intervene *all* of the time, we might
notice a pattern, and that would interfere with out bechira. It is
therefore my suspicion that (at least occasionally) HaShem refrains from
such intervention, so as to preserve the illusion that the world runs
on its own.

(Hmmm... According to my view, is He "preserving the illusion that the
world runs on its own", or is He creating a *reality* that the world
runs on its own, by refraining from intervention? Not sure. I think it's
still an illusion, since He would decide when to intervene or not...)

Akiva Miller

Other than lashon mikra/leshon chachamim, can anyone point me towards
differences between Ilan and Etz?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

[R' Akiva Miller:]
> R"n Rena Freedenberg wrote
>> Every murder is "sanctioned" If someone had decided to murder a person
>> who was *not* on Hashem's "death list", RRF would have Hashem intervene
>> to save that person. And maybe that does happen often or even most of
>> the time.

> But I suspect that if He would intervene *all* of the time, we might
> notice a pattern, and that would interfere with out bechira. It is
> therefore my suspicion that (at least occasionally) HaShem refrains from
> such intervention, so as to preserve the illusion that the world runs
> on its own.

I am more than a bit confused here. Why would anyone notice any pattern
here? You have no idea who is meant to die and who isn't. Therefore,
you have no idea when they've been "saved" because you had no way to
know they were ever in danger in the first place.

I remember learning somewhere [someone please help me out here] that
in the End of Days we are going to thank Hashem for all of the times
that He saved us that we never knew that we were in danger. There are
rashaim who plot against us [Klal Yisrael] every day and Hashem foils
their plans so that they never come to fruition and we won't know about
it until after the arrival of Moshiach. This seems to say that this is
already going on all the time and we never notice a "pattern" because
we don't even know what to look for.

As far as a yachid goes, everything that we do can only succeed if Hashem
decides that it will so why would it be chutz miNormali if a killer
tried to kill someone and didn't succeed? This type of thing happens
every day, both in times of war [with soldiers] and stam in everyday
life. Many times in criminal cases the testimony verifies that a robber
decided in a split second to kill or not kill his victim. What [or Who]
do you think gives the criminal the idea as to what to do in that split
second? We can certainly cite numerous cases in which a kassam rocket
was shot into populated Israeli areas and either did not do damage or
killed someone. It is all up to Hashem. However, the "rocket shooters"
certainly have free choice and have put in their hishtadlus and will
continue their efforts no matter whether Hashem causes them to succeed
or not.

 --Rena 

> This would imply that women hearing davening and layning in the women's
> section are not really hearing it with a minyan.

Sotah 22 has the story of an almanah went out of her way to daven at r'
yochanan's bais midrash, and when r' yochanan asked why she did not go
to the shul closer to her home she said she wanted more schar halicha.
The implication is that there is schar for davening b'tzibbur, or at
least in a beit knesset, even for a woman (r' yochanan's kashe was why
she went to the further away shule, not why she bothered to come at all).
I would presume she was sitting in the ezras nashim.

> It also implies that if men are in the women's section (when there are no
> women present) they are not part of the minyan.

The mechaber (O.C. 55) writes that if one is standing 'achorei beit
haknesset' and can see the tzibbur through a window one would be
mitztaref, mashma that seeing the tzibbur from the ezras nashim would also
be sufficient (m"b). However: 1) not everyone (e.g. GR"A) agrees with the
psak of the mechaber that seeing=tziruf (m"b and biur halacha discuss);
2)even if you accept the mechaber's opinion, the aruch hashulchan is
mechadesh that ezras nashim is still excluded - 'achorei beit hakenesset'
means a courtyard or open area which is not an independent reshus, but
the ezras nashim is an independent room/reshus defined by mechitzos so
there is no tziruf to the main room.

 -Chaim

R Gershon Dubin wrote:
> Other than lashon mikra/leshon chachamim, can anyone point me towards
> differences between Ilan and Etz?

When Avraham avinu offers the mal'achim shade (Ber 18:4), the pasuq reads
"tachas ha'eitz", to which Rashi writes "tachas ha'ilan".

Answering your question would answer what Rashi is trying to add. "Eitz"
means both tree or wood. Perhaps Rashi was clarifying that they were
under a tree, and not in some small hut.

In BK 91b, the gemara contrasts the "eitz ma'achal" (Dev 20:20, context:
bal tashchis) to the "elan seraq". I'm not sure how much to make of it;
perhaps "ilan" was the more natural mishnaic term, but "eitz ma'achal"
is the term in the pasuq. For example, we can't make this diyuq WRT
"harkavas ha'ilan" in Qiddushin 39a.

In Berakhos 6:1, we're told that the berakhah on peiros ha'ilan is
"borei peri ha'eitz" -- possibly giving credance to the Ashkenazi norm
of using biblical Hebrew in tefillah rather than mishnaic???

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
micha@aishdas.org            heart, with your entire soul, with all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org       Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (413) 403-9905          It is two who look in the same direction.

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