Avodah Mailing List

Volume 11 : Number 056

Monday, August 25 2003

• R. Kalir
• Re: Women and kadish
• Subject: Women and kadish
• Mixed Seating at Weddings
• To: Avodah - High Level Torah Discussion Group
• Re: Taking out the Torah
• Taking out the Torah
• Re: Avodah V11 #55
• Blackout and Kabbolas Shabbos
• RE: Jews Among the Nations
• Permissability of "The Rhythm Method"
• Re: Permissability of "The Rhythm Method"
• RE: Women and kadish
• Re: Women and kadish
• Re: She'asani Kirtzono
• re: She'asani Kirtzono
• Re: She'asani Kirtzono
• Re: Jews Among the Nations
• jews and the nations
• Was: Jews Among the Nations, Now: Pshat in Ben Azzai
• re: The Great Blackout and Kabbolas Shabbos
• RE: Women and kadish
• Freedom of choice vis-a-vis other people
• Re: Freedom of choice vis-a-vis other people
• Adv: Elul Shabbos Program, more info

[RRW:]
> FWIW, Kallir deserves his own thread and let me state that we have some
> evidence that he lived 580 CE based upon his kinna citing a thousand years
> have passed since the churban. Presuming a Seder Olam dating, then 420 BCE
> is the Churban bayyis rishon and that would put this kina at circa 580
> CE. Furthermore, it seems likely that Kalir was in the pre-Moslem era,
> {circa 622-632} so 580 fits in nicely. Those who put him in the Saadya
> Gaon era need to explain the lack of references to the rise of Islam etc.

Comment: This year on Tisah B'Av I saw the note in Artscroll kinnos that
this particular kinna is found in manuscripts to say " a few hundred
years" and that it was updated by the printers to say one thousand years.

M. Levin

I found the following list of mareh mekomos online, from a
not-entirely-reliable source that will remain nameless. I looked up
the citation from R' Moshe and found it to be in error. Regardless,
I thought this list would be of value to the chevra.

The first group supposedly prohibit a woman from saying kaddish entirely.
The second group offer certain cases in which it would be permitted,
such as in a private minyan at home. The third group permit a woman to
say kaddish in shul.

Those who prohibit:

R' Yair Chaim Bachrach, Chavos Yair, no. 222
R' Chaim Binyamin Goldberg, Pnei Baruch, pp. 360-361
R' Yekusiel Greenwald, Kol Bo al Aveilus, p. 375 n. 33
R' Herbert Dobrinsky, A Treasury of Sephardic Laws and Customs, p. 94
R' Yitzchak Ya'akov Weiss, Minchas Yitzchak, 4:30
R' Shlomo Wahrman, She'eiris Yosef, vol. 2 no. 60
R' Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer, 14:7
R' Avraham Binyamin Zilberberg, Mishnas Binyamin, no. 34
R' Yitzchak Yosef (and presumably his father, R' Ovadia Yosef), Yalkut
Yosef, vol. 7 pp. 221-222
R' Yisrael Meir Lau, Yachel Yisrael, no. 90
R' Chaim Pinchas Luria, Meishiv Halachah, 1:469
R' Maurice Lamm, The Jewish Way in Death and Mourning, pp. 166-167
R' Yosef Chaim from Baghdad, Torah Lishmah, no. 27
R' Chaim Chizkiyah Medini, Sdei Chemed, assifas dinim, ma'areches
aveilus no. 160, vol. 4 p. 1417
R' Ephraim Zalman Margoliyos, Mateh Ephraim, dinei kaddish yasom 4:8
pp. 297-298
R' Benzion Meir Hai Uziel, Mishpetei Uziel, mahadurah 2 Orach Chayim
1:13
R' Ya'akov Emden, Siddur Beis Ya'akov, dinei kaddish yasom after
shacharis, no. 46
R' Yitzchak Ya'akov Fuchs, Halichos Bas Yisrael, pp. 157-158
R' Reuven Fink, Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society 31 (Spring
1996)
R' Aharon Felder, Yesodei Smachos, pp. 50, 119
R' Shimon Frankfurter, Sefer HaChaim Amsterdam, no. 50
R' Yechezkel Katzenelenbogen, Kenesses Yechezkel, 53a
R' Cahim Rabinowicz, A Guide to Life, pp. 87-88
R' Meshulam Rathe, Kol Mevaser, 2:44
R' Shalom Yechezkel Shraga Rubin-Halberstam, HaPardes 38:1 pp. 14-16

Those who are lenient:

R' Avraham Yitzchak Glick, Yad Yitzchak, vol. 3 Yoreh Deah no. 340
R' Chaim David HaLevy, Aseh Lecha Rav, 5:33
R' Yechiel Michel Tukaczinsky, Gesher HaChaim, vol. 1 ch. 30 no. 7
R' Elazar Fleckeles, Teshuvah MeAhavah, vol. 2 Orach Chaim 229:10
R' Ya'akov Reicher, Shevus Ya'akov, vol. 2 Yoreh Deah no. 93

Those who permit:

R' Chaim HaLevy Donin, To Pray as a Jew, p. 226
R' Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, Teshuvos Ivra, p. 6
R' Yehuda Herzl Henkin, Bnei Banim, 2 :7
R' Joel B. Wolowelsky, Tradition 22:1 (Spring 1986), pp. 69-72
R' Ahron Soloveichik, Od Yisrael Yosef Bni Chai, no. 32
R' Moshe Feinstein, Iggeros Moshe, vol. 8 Orach Chaim 5:12 [This is
incorrect.  I looked it up and RMF says that halachah le-ma'aseh
requires iyun.]

Gil Student

From: "Shinnar, Meir" <Meir.Shinnar@rwjuh.edu>
> With regard to the issue of mimeticism and which war [before which it
> was common for women to say qaddish -mi] Rav Moshe mentions that it was
> a common practice in Lita for some women to say kaddish (this is also
> mentioned by RYE Henkin - that he saw it in Lita, and people have cited
> in the name of RYBS that in Vilna he saw women saying kaddish....

Rav Hershel Schachter pointed out at this year's RCA convention (available
on tape #1549 from R Milton Nordlicht) that one can only say qaddish
with a minyan and that if there is a permanent mechitza there is no
quorum present in the women's section. He cites several examples from
Vilna that women came into the men's section for the express purpose of
saying qaddish.

sk

This morning I went through R' Yehuda Herzl Henkin's teshuvah on mixed
seating at weddings (Bnei Banim 1:35) and was quite surprised. He says
that his grandfather and all the gedolim of that generation made weddings
with *separate* seating, men-only tables and women-only tables, albeit
without a mechitzah. He says that this is the ideal and then investigates
why it is not the minhag (he is referring to totally mixed seating,
which is quite common in certain frum circles). He concludes that there
is room to allow couples to sit together but it is preferable that single
men and women be seated at separate tables.

A summary of his rulings can be found online at
http://www.aishdas.org/articles/PiskeiBneiBanim.pdf

Gil Student

RHM:
> Another thing. The Kallah wore a Deck Tichal under the Chupah. This
> means that the Eidei Kiddushin did not see the Kalla's face. Are they not
> required to do so as Edim?...

> Is this not at least questionable Eidus?

The Avnei Miluim 42:9 is lenient that the eidim need not see the kallah.

Shlomo Goldstein

On 20 Aug 2003 at 8:59, Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
>> Aderaba. Passing it around shows more chavivus. See, for example,
>> the description in Yoma of how the Torah got to the Kohain Gadol in
>> the Beis HaMikdash on Yom Kippur. IIRC Rashi says there explicitly
>> that the reason for the Torah being passed from (IIRC) the Nasi to
>> the Sgan to the Kohain Gadol is to show chavivus. 

> The reason there is because of monotonically increasing chashivut of
> each individual in the chain, I don't think that applies each Shabbat.

Actually, you're right but for a different reason. The Gemara there says
that it's because of the chashivus of the Kohain Gadol - not because of
the chashivus of the sefer Torah. Not necessarily a paradigm that would
apply on ANY Shabbos.

-- Carl

Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
>>Someone asked me where the minhag of having a separate individual take
>>the Torah out of the aron and give it to the Shatz stems from - wouldn't
>>it be more proper and kavodic for the shatz to take it himself (both from
>>the shatz showing chavivut and not having the torah "passed around"). I
>>guessed that a source might be the kohen gadol on yom kippur receiving
>>the sefer from the sgan etc. although there it seems it's kvodo of the
>>kohein gadol that makes it allowable. Any thoughts?

The Shaarei Ephaim (chp.10 seif 2 in the footnote) brings a makor a
shita mekubetztes.

He then discusses the mishna in Yoma as a proof ( as RCSherer) and
rejects the proof (with the reasoning of RJR)

He concludes that the difference is whether the shatz is standing next
to the aron, or the passing around is to the get the Torah to somewhere
else where the cohen gadol is standing.

Akiva B.

In a message dated 8/7/2003 5:47:07 PM EDT, turkel@math.tau.ac.il writes:
> So I would presume to say that Dr. Agus v'sayyasom were/are probably
> happy that Tosafos preserved oral and mimetic traditions but probably....

There is a fine article by Prof Haym Soloveitchik where he points out
that in Spain, the gedolim knew the people were amaratzim but in Ashkenaz
the Ba'alei haTosafot considered the masses frum and knowledgeable. As
a result they justified common practices which were against halacha
because people did things in a certain way. They sanctified practices
(including martyrdom under conditions where the halacha demanded one
save his/her life) and so created minhagim which had no mekoros or even
were against halacha-- how could our finer yidden do things if they didnt
know it was mutar. In bezah rashi correctly notes its asur to play ball
on shabbos.-- fregt toysfes a kasha-- look -- we do it, so how can it
be asur! And so on and on and on-- and on and on and on...... When I
got married in Israel the shamash of the rabbanut told me he wouldn't
put up the hupa until I tipped him. I told him the sign in the rabbanut
office said not to tip the shamash.-- So the shamash said-- nachon--
kach hu hahalacha-- aval ha minhag eyno ken-- vehutz mizeh im ata rotzeh
lehit-haten ten li esrim lirot (about 6 dollars US then-- a lot of money
in those pre-'67days) kfi minhagenu kan. A sfardi likely would not have
used the same argument. Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook ZAL was mesader kiddushin--
and if he heard the conversation he kept far out of it.

Zvi Basser

I seems to me that R. Sherer is correct. At the time of the Mechaber
there was no kabbolas shabbos and mizmor shir was the first shabbos
realted tefillah. Other components of today's Kabbolas Shabbos service
started with the aRI; iN many palces, such as in Prague, the main shul
kept the old minhag for many years. However, that accepting shabbos
starts with mizmor shir is now well known and universal and may have
become the accepted point of when shabbos starts.

M. Levin

RAB wrote
> I don't hate goyim....
> I am responsible for fellow Jews. Kol Yisroel Areivim zeh bozeh means
> just that. Jews and nobody else.
> And I have yet to see a posuk that says otherwise.

ze sefer toldot adam...(Yerushalmi nedarim 9:4 cited by ben azai as a
greater klal than ve'ahavta lere'acha camocha cited by rav akiva)

I am curious. Are there any reputedly major poskim today who would
seriously argue RAB's position?

We have had arguments about whether the Meiri's position is accepted (even
though it is accepted by RYE Henkin, and the Seride Esh (who in one of his
letters complains that there are some rabbanim who privately tell their
talmidim otherwise, viewing it as proof of their moral degeneration).
However, those discussions have focused primarily on the status of
current goyim - whether we view some of them as ovde avoda zara or as
morally deficient (regarding the matzav in aretz and support of terror),
which pgam may remove our obligation.

RAB would go further - that even for someone who is shomer sheva mitzvot
bne noach or is even one of haside umot haolam, we have absolutely no
responsibility - not a different responsibility, deriving from other
sources, or even a lower responsibility, and that outside of the issue of
eyva (and ?related darche shalom), we have absolutely no responsibility.

Does anyone seriously argue this? Besides textual issues ( the rambam
(hilkhot melachim 10:12) argues that we do have a responsibility to a
ger toshav, as it says lager asher bishearecha titena ve'achala., and
eventually tov hashem lacol verachamav al kol ma'asav and deracheha
darche noam vechol netivoteha shalom), are others besides me morally
outraged, repulsed, and indignant that anyone who claims to be shomer
mitzvot could possibly espouse this position?

Meir Shinnar

From: "Micha Berger" <micha@aishdas.org>
To: <areivim@aishdas.org>
>The rhythm method means abstaining well beyond the shiv'ah neqi'im. I wonder
>about the grounds lehatir.

It's news to me that a heter is needed for abstinence by mutual agreement
(without delaying going to mikvah) after fulfilling pirya v'rivya and a
good portion of la'erev (e.g. 4-5 kids). At least I wasn't told such in
chasan class. Sources, please? (of course, written psakim in the area
are typically few...)

On Wed, Aug 20, 2003 at 02:03:59PM -0700, Anonymous wrote:
: >The rhythm method means abstaining well beyond the shiv'ah neqi'im. I wonder
: >about the grounds lehatir.

: It's news to me that a heter is needed for abstinence by mutual agreement
: (without delaying going to mikvah) after fulfilling pirya v'rivya and a
: good portion of la'erev (e.g. 4-5 kids). At least I wasn't told such in
: chasan class. Sources, please? (of course, written psakim in the area
: are typically few...)

To explain (as I later did on Areivim). There are two relevent assumptions in
my post:

1- Chemical contraception is no more problematic than abstinence, and
has no ona'ah problems.

2- Dropping one's claim on ona'ah because of not having enough information
is not very meaningful. Or, to put it another way: Can the husband not
take every step to inform his wife? Or, is relying on a friend's advice about
rhythm rather than asking the she'eilah itself a violation of the marriage
covenant?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org            you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org       happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                            - Dale Carnegie

> I found the following list of mareh mekomos online, from a 
> not-entirely-reliable source that will remain nameless... 
> The first group supposedly prohibit a woman from saying 
> kaddish entirely. The second group offer certain cases in 
> which it would be permitted, such as in a private minyan at 
> Those who permit:

> R' Chaim HaLevy Donin, To Pray as a Jew, p. 226
> R' Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, Teshuvos Ivra, p. 6
> R' Yehuda Herzl Henkin, Bnei Banim, 2 :7
> R' Joel B. Wolowelsky, Tradition 22:1 (Spring 1986), pp. 
> 69-72 R' Ahron Soloveichik, Od Yisrael Yosef Bni Chai, no. 
> 32 R' Moshe Feinstein, Iggeros Moshe, vol. 8 Orach Chaim 
> 5:12 [This is incorrect.  I looked it up and RMF says that 
> halachah le-ma'aseh requires iyun.]

Were you able to look up all of those the lister said were lenient or
permitted or was R' Moshe's tshuva the only one that you had time to
look up yourself?

---Rena 

As a follow-up, I looked up the reference to R'
Yosef Eliyahu Henkin, which is to an article that also
appeared in HaPardes March, 1963 pp. 5-6 (available online at
<http://www.hebrewbooks.org/getsefer.asp?jrnlnum=221>). Here are his
words:

"If a woman wants to pray in the women's section and will make her acts
proper with the holiness of Shabbos, kashrus, purity and modesty, for
all of these are fundamental, and she also wants to say kaddish before
the women at the same time that men are reciting kaddish in the men's
synagogue, it is possible that there is no concern."

Gil Student

From: kennethgmiller@juno.com
> I have heard that while "Shelo Asani Ishah" is originally recorded in the
> Gemara, the bracha of "She'asani Kirtzono" is of much later origin.. ..

The Emden and Avodas Yisroel siddurim simply have it as 'nohagu hanoshim'
to say it - without shem umalchus - "Boruch She'osani Kirtzono'.

SBA

I wrote <<< I have heard that while "Shelo Asani Ishah" is originally
recorded in the Gemara, the bracha of "She'asani Kirtzono" is of much
later origin.. .. >>>

R' SBA pointed out <<< The Emden and Avodas Yisroel siddurim simply
have it as 'nohagu hanoshim' to say it - without shem umalchus -
"Boruch She'osani Kirtzono'. >>>

Tur 46 also says "nohagu hanashim". Which makes it pretty old. Certainly
a lot older than the women's rights movements of the last century or two.

Still, if "nohagu hanoshim", then the idea did not originate with the
men. Rather, it was originated by the women. And if so, what was the
contemporary rabbinic reaction?

Perhaps I've answered the question myself. Since it pre-dates "women's
rights" by so much, I guess the rabbis of the time had no reason to
suspect any non- L'Shem Shamayim motives. (In contrast to today, where
unfortunately, there are perhaps at least grounds for such suspicions
in some cases.)

But surely there must be a discussion somewhere about the ability to
invent a new bracha, and why it doesn't count as a bracha l'vatala. Does
anyone know of sources which discuss this?

Akiva Miller

The weekly parsha sheet Torah Lodaas had a discussion of the bracha in
the Breishis 5763 issue.

The Rambam is irrelevant because it only applies to a Ger Toshav,
someone who has voluntarily entered Jewish society by accepting the
yoke of his commandments before a beis din. To everyone else, those
who have not entered into the Jewish community, these halachos imply a
lack of obligation to clothe, feed and care for them. (What's the din,
absent eivah, of pikuach nefesh on Shabbos for a non-Ger Toshav? For a
Ger Toshav?)

You cannot darshen an obligation from Tehillim and the simple fact is
that many if not most poskim do not accept the Meiri's position.

Those who explain "mipnei darkei shalom" as being more than just eivah,
and I am sympathetic to these explanations, are being innovative. It is
a chidush. And I do not believe that R' Aharon Lichtenstein can obligate
everyone else with his chidushim.

Derech agav, there is more than one way to understand the midrash
regarding "zeh sefer toldos ha-adam". You cannot obligate others to
accept your drush.

Gil Student

In sefer Yonah, it seems that we should be "in tune" with Hashem's concern
for all human beings. That is not a halachik but a hashkafic imperative.

M. Levin

At 06:56 PM 8/20/2003 -0400, you wrote:
>ze sefer toldot adam...(Yerushalmi nedarim 9:4 cited by ben azai as a
>greater klal than ve'ahavta lere'acha camocha cited by rav akiva)

Without getting into the issue of our attitude towards non-Jews (I have
something to say on the matter, but not now) I have always understood
Ben Azzai differently - I think that I picked up this understanding from
Reb Yerucham years ago, but, if not, it's mine:

R' Akiva stressed interpersonal accomplishment as the pinnacle of human
achievement; Ben Azzai disagreed, maintaining that it is the perfection
of Man as expressed by his life story that is at that pinnacle.

Now that I think of it, I have a more mundane pshat, but one that is
also karov el ho'emes, I think:

R' Akiva argued that Ben Azzai must get married, as only with a "rei'a
ahuv" can he fulfill the mitzvah of the "klal gadol ba'Torah." Ben
Azzai, who was "chashkah nafsho b'Torah" disagreed, and maintained that
self-perfection took precedence.

YGB 

R' Gil Student wrote <<< It seems to me that everyone accepts Shabbos
with the *beginning* of what we call Kabbolas Shabbos. My impression is
that people today consider that to be the beginning of Shabbos. If so,
one should not do melachah after starting Lechu Neraninah. But I haven't
seen or heard anyone suggest this. >>>

I haven't ever heard of such an idea. Nor does it make a shred of sense
to me.

We certainly have not yet begun Shabbos when we daven Mincha, so I can
only wonder what it is that we do or say at Lechu Neraninah that ight
constitute accepting the Shabbos.

On the contrary, the act of saying "Boee Kallah" while turning around
has always been (to me) a very clear and deliberate act of Kabbalas
Shabbos. Do we not face the Shabbos Queen as she stands in the back of
the shul, and then we *continue* to face her as she joins us, enters,
and makes her way to the front?

My LOR, listmember Rav E.M. Teitz has a different view. I once asked
him, if we do begin Shabbos at the end of Lecha Dodi (as per the MB
cited in RGS's post), then how can we say HaMakom Y'nachem afterwards,
being that Nichum Avelim is assur on Shabbos? His answer was very direct:
We obviously do not hold like that MB: Shabbos does not begin until we
begin Mizmor Shir, which is *after* HaMakom Y'nachem.

Akiva Miller

>Were you able to look up all of those the lister
>said were lenient or permitted or was R' Moshe's
>tshuva the only one that you had time to
>look up yourself?

I looked them all up except for R' Chaim Halevy Donin, who is not
really known as a posek anyway. Except for R' Moshe, they were all cited
correctly. Although, RYE Henkin seemed to be somewhat limiting in his
permission, as I already posted to the list.

Gil Student

Suppose you see a person drowning and rescue him. Now, the very fact that
you were able to rescue him and that he's still alive, indicates that
he was not destined to die (i.e. there was no Heavenly decree requiring
his death, at that particular time. For if there was, your efforts would
not have helped.)

Thus, he was destined to live, even if you had not rescued him. It
seems then, that your 'saving his life' was merely a token act...perhaps
something to give an impression of a natural flow of events (instead of
requiring a miraculous occurence to save him). Of course this situation
can be generalized to all life saving cases (medical operations, fire
rescues, even giving up your life for others' safety, etc.). Why should
anyone be able to claim any credit for saving a life, if technically
they had no choice in the matter whatsoever? If they had no choice in
the matter, they shouldn't get a reward.

And now let's reverse the situation - why should one be held liable for
killing somebody? The victim was definitely pre-destined to die anyway,
at that exact time (otherwise he would have lived longer). Why should
the murderer be punished?

In a more general form, the question is how are we allowed to have
freedom of choice in regards to matters concerning other people. It is
understandable to have complete freedom to let's say eat kosher or not,
or whether or not to keep Shabbos...or in mundane things like choosing
where to live, where to work, etc. But how can one have this complete
freedom when it comes to mitzvos of ben adom l'chaveiro? How can it be
completely my choice to let's say hit somebody (and cause bodily damage)
or to refrain from hitting, when in reality the well being of the target
has been determined from before. And if you argue that it has not been
so determined, then does it really make sense to say that you are in
control of someone's fate (whether he's deserving or not)...Should
someone's well being be decided by the random actions of man?

Eliezer

On Thu, Aug 21, 2003 at 11:15:25PM -0400, Leonid Portnoy wrote:
: In a more general form, the question is how are we allowed to have
: freedom of choice in regards to matters concerning other people...

Look in our earlier discussions of hashgachah peratis and whether or not
it is total for all people at all times. In particular, look for the Or
haChaim's peshat as to why the brothers wouldn't kill Yosef outright --
that a bore proves it's H's will, and not just their doing.

If HP is universal, which includes both the Besh"t's shitah as well as
those who hold it's universal and total but only for people (or only
for Jews), you would need to focus on two points:
1- There is a difference between choosing to do something and succeeding;
and
2- The set of choices you get to make, people you encounter, and
opportunities you face are not part of bechirah. IOW, a person can
choose to kill or not to kill, but Who made sure these two people met,
that A would anger B, that he would be in the wrong place at the wrong
time while he's feeling murderous, etc... By controlling the opportunities,
HQBH could weave the threads to acheive His ends even with bachirah.

The Alter of Slabodka has this notion that in truth, each person lives
in his own universe. We think we are all guests on a comon stage, but we
are not. Therefore, his bechirah and my hashgachah are features of two
totally different universes, and the conflict is only in the illusion
that they overlap. What this means is beyond me.

:-)BBii
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 "I hear, then I forget; I see, then I remember;
micha@aishdas.org            I do, then I understand." - Confucius
http://www.aishdas.org       "One can't compare hearing to seeing." - Mechilta
Fax: (413) 403-9905          "We will do and we will listen." - Israelites

Thanks to eveyone who expressed interest and offered suggestions.
Here is more information about the program.

-mi

Rosh haShanah is coming.
Can we honestly say
Ana avda deKudshah berich Hu?

A weekend of preparation for an audience with the King

Shabbos, 23 Elul / September 19-20
Passaic, NJ

AishDas is offering an inspirational Shabbos program in which we
will discuss and explore three fundamental topics of living bederech
haTorah. Each topic will be introduced by a speaker, and followed by a
va'ad in which the members further explore the ideas and ideals in light
of their own lives.

Friday night:
- Menuchas haNefesh and Ma'avir al Midosav: How to deal with anything
from Road Rage to uncooperative children.

Shabbos morning:
- Commitment and connection: Today's frum Jews looking depth in their
look to connect to the mitzvos, learning to want to do them. What is
the role of a sense of commitment and duty? What is the relationship
between the attitude of "ani leDodi veDodi li" and "ana avda deKBH"
and how do we develop it?

Shabbos afternoon:
- "How is this year's teshuvah going to be more permanent than
last's?" Or, "How can I make sure that I'm not going at the same place
next Elul as I am now?"


+ Parallel ve'adim for men and women.

+ Housing will be provided in homes close to minyanim and meals.

+ Meals will be catered.

+ Babysitting will be provided.

*********************


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