Avodah Mailing List

Volume 10 : Number 138

Friday, April 4 2003

• Bimkom haolah
• R. Yosi B. Kisma
• Sheitels
• Re: Sheitlach
• Re: Sheitlach
• RE: Mixed seating
• RE: Mixed seating
• RE: Mixed seating
• Re: Shema Yakdim Kana l'Veshet
• Re: Makdim Kana L'Veshet
• Gilgul
• Re: P' shmimi - onen and talmud torah
• RE: P' shmini - onen and talmud torah
• Re: P' shmimi - onen and talmud torah
• Re: P' shmimi - onen and talmud torah
• Re: P' shmini - onen and talmud torah
• RE: Oral and written traditions
• RE: Mixed seating
• Re: Brisk
• [Areivim] The Steipler re gilgulim, dybbuk and yeled peleh
• Re chamira sakant am'issura
• Re: Mixed seating
• Think, Ask, Internalize!

>> Along these lines, I'd like to suggest our original pesuqim not only
>> mean "in the place of the olah" but also bimqom as instead. The olah was
>> directly for the tzafun, the hidden problem, but the asham and chatas
>> are brought after it came out min hako'ach el hapo'al. Instead of the
>> olah that could have been brought when one only had hirhurei aveirah,
>> the Torah is saying, now bring a chatas or an asham.

> You were mechaven to the Satmar Rov, IIRC.

The Noam Elimelech also plays on the word of "bimkom". When bringing an
olah, instead of (bimkom) considering your innocence in having sinned
merely with hirhurei aveirah, tishacheit hachatais, consider yourself
as culpable as if you actually did an issur and are liable for a chatas.

> Wonder if there is a link between R' Yossi B. Kisma's hachno'oh to the
> Roman decrees in yesterday's daf and his statement that "Eini dar elah
> b'makom Torah" at the end of Avos...

How about this suggestion - both are based by an attitude and tendency
to be a follower, not a leader?

M> Levin

Posted by: hmaryles@yahoo.com
> There is a tremendous illogic to the mitzvah of covering the hair of
> married women and not single women...

> Another piece is that no matter how attractive an adult unmarried woman's
> hair is, there is absolutely no Issur for that hair to be uncovered
> and fashionable (according to most Poskim). Yet, for that same woman,
> once she is married that same hair is considered Ervah.

But isn't being attracted to a married woman much more objectionable
than to a single woman who is theoretically avaialble for marriage?

M. Levin

On 2 Apr 2003 at 20:57, Moshe Shulman wrote:

> At 09:37 AM 4/2/03 +0300, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
>> On 1 Apr 2003 at 20:26, Moshe Shulman wrote:
>>> Erva is technically any place which is 'customarily' or required
>>> to be covered.  (I recall seeing in the Rav's Shulchan Aruch that
>>> this is one of the reasons for men going with a yarmulke.)
>> A MAN'S head is erva? On what basis?

> Because it is a place that is customarily covered.

But a man's hair isn't covered because of erva in the first place. 
It's covered because of kavod Shamayim. If the issue was erva, Rav 
Moshe never would have been matir going to work without a yarmulka. 

-- Carl

At 11:09 AM 4/3/03 +0300, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
>> Because it is a place that is customarily covered.
> But a man's hair isn't covered because of erva in the first place.
> It's covered because of kavod Shamayim. If the issue was erva, Rav
> Moshe never would have been matir going to work without a yarmulka.

I guess you missed what I wrote. Since now it is customary to cover it,
it (according to the Rav in his Shulchan Aruch) is considered a 'place
that is customarily covered'. Rav Moshe may not have agreed with the
Rav's Shulchan Aruch. There is nothing wrong with that.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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On 2 Apr 2003 at 20:59, Moshe Shulman wrote:
> At 09:37 AM 4/2/03 +0300, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
...
>> Nope. I'm arguing that something that looks like real hair is only
>> slightly better than real hair because it can still cause hirhurim

> I am not aware that 'hirhur' the reason for the issur. I have never
> seen that cited.

What is "ervah" if not a reference to hirhur? The entire issur of looking
at ervah is because of hirhur. How else can you understand it?

>> wig). With a tichel, most of the hair is covered even if some small
>> amount is showing. Don't get me wrong - I'm not arguing that wearing
>> a sheitel is assur (although there are poskim who argue just that).

> What I am saying is that for those women who do not shave or cut their
> hair, then a sheitel, where no hair is showing, is better then
> something where hair does show.

1. "No hair showing" is a big assumption on your part.

2. A sheitel can look real enough to defeat the purpose of covering 
the hair.

3. Where is it written that EVERY hair has to be covered? For those 
who cut short or shave, I understood that the issue was chatzitza in 
the mikva and not gliuy sei'ar.

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

At 11:09 AM 4/3/03 +0300, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
>> I am not aware that 'hirhur' the reason for the issur. I have never
>> seen that cited.

> What is "ervah" if not a reference to hirhur? The entire issur of
> looking at ervah is because of hirhur. How else can you understand
> it?

It is forbidden as a violation of modesty. (Tznius) Nothing to do
with hirhur.

>>> wig). With a tichel, most of the hair is covered even if some small
>>> amount is showing. Don't get me wrong - I'm not arguing that wearing
>>> a sheitel is assur (although there are poskim who argue just that).
>> What I am saying is that for those women who do not shave or cut their
>> hair, then a sheitel, where no hair is showing, is better then
>> something where hair does show.
> 1. "No hair showing" is a big assumption on your part.

Certainly there is less hair showing.

> 2. A sheitel can look real enough to defeat the purpose of covering
> the hair.

But the bottom line is that it is not hair.

> 3. Where is it written that EVERY hair has to be covered? For those
> who cut short or shave, I understood that the issue was chatzitza in
> the mikva and not gliuy sei'ar.

Shaving has nothing to do with chatzitzah.

Moshe Shulman   outreach@messiahtruth.com 718-436-7705

On 3 Apr 2003 at 13:28, Moshe Shulman wrote:
> It is forbidden as a violation of modesty. (Tznius) Nothing to do with
> hirhur.

And "kol b'isha erva" is also only a matter of "tznius?" So if I have
the woman stand behind a screen I can listen to her sing?

Tznius is about much MORE than erva. Hatznea leches im Elokecha is about a
lot more than what we wear. On the other hand, violations of tznius have
a lower threshold. If having hair showing was a violation of tznius and
not out and out erva, then we would have been told s'ar b'isha pritzus
or something like that. Not every violation of tznius is erva. But every
erva is something that brings us to hirhur. It has a sexual connotation.

>>>> wig). With a tichel, most of the hair is covered even if some
>>>> small amount is showing. Don't get me wrong - I'm not arguing
>>>> that wearing a sheitel is assur (although there are poskim who
>>>> argue just that).
>>> What I am saying is that for those women who do not shave or cut
>>> their hair, then a sheitel, where no hair is showing, is better
>>> then something where hair does show.
>> 1. "No hair showing" is a big assumption on your part.

> Certainly there is less hair showing.

Not necessarily. I have seen many women in close, tight tichels that
show no hair at all (in fact, one walked by with her husband as I was
parking my car a few minutes ago).

>> 2. A sheitel can look real enough to defeat the purpose of covering
>> the hair.

> But the bottom line is that it is not hair.

But it can bring to hirhur the same way that hair does. 

-- Carl

[R' Dr JB tried submitting a more medically technical post on the subject,
which we decided would instead be made available by request to those
who would like the greater detail and further references. -mi]

Chazal were 101% correct not only on the danger (of the right lateral
decubitus position) but also on the very essence of hasiva to the left
being equivalent to "cherut" It has to do with the 'skin pressure
vegetative reflex" (a dozen journal references upon request) affecting
autonomic tone. BTW way back in 1987, I and Dr. Sy Wynchank a visiting
professor of nuclear medicine who was at Hadassah University Hospital,
replicated a study done in the 1930's on rabbits volunteering ourselves
and using the equipment at the Dept of Nuclear Medicine. There was a
differential effect of HASIVA (left vs. right) on lung perfusion scans
and diffusion capacity. See also my paper "Stimulation of epipharyngeal
receptors can produce significant bronchoconstriction or bronchodilation:
Dependence upon unilateral forced nostril breathing?".

As far as HASIVA to the left being equivalent to "cherut": we ran a recent
study on our technique (left vs right lateral decubitus position, as well
as foced unilateral nostril breathing) using dual transcranial Doppler
on blood flow to the brain, affecting brain hemisphericity (activating left
hemisphere vs. right).

Left vs. right HASIVA affects an humungous amount of physiological
parameters ranging from gastric emptying [apropos, see Rambam Hilchot
Deot 4:5], to intraocular pressure to asthma (see: Backon J, Kullok S.
"Why asthmatic patients should not sleep in right lateral decubitus
position" Br J Clin Practice 1990;44:448-449) to cardiac conduction
disturbance, to the "dawn phenomenon"in pre-breakfast hyperglycemia, etc.

PEYRUSH RASHI :-)  1) HASIVA to the right is probably dangerous and may
allow food to enter trachea; 2) HASIVA to the left via skin pressure
vegetative reflex (a picture map of the body areas that induce this is
at the Journal of Otolaryngology 1986;15: Suppl. 16, on page 20)
activates ipsilateral left brain hemisphere with a net result of the
person behaving in a more arrogant, extroverted manner (a.k.a. "cherut").

Josh

I once asked this to R' Moshe D. Tendler but I don't remember his
answer and I'm not sure I even understood it at the time. But he
seemed confident that it made sense. Maybe someone who sees him can
ask him again.

Gil Student

Shmuel's repeated insistence that reincarnation (gilgul neshamot) is
a concept whose acceptance is incumbent on all of us is unconvincing..
He blithely disregards the strong opposition to that concept by Rabbenu
Saadya Gaon and the Rosh in favor of the kabbalistic viewpoint. He can
not point to any explicit statement about gilgul in the Ramban - only an
intimation of a great secret about Hevel. I doubt that he can find an
explicti statement by the Rashba, either. The statement that R' Chasdai
Crescas was forced to accept gilgul despite his philosophic objections is
unfounded. The statement, " im kabala hi, nekabel" is not an admission -
just a way of saying that if you can prove the antiquity of the idea in
Jewish sources, then he would accept it. R' Saadya explicitly denies its
antiquity in authentic Jewish sources. So, it is a question of choosing
between contrary views - the antagonistic view of a few major authorities
vs. the kabbalistic tradition going back at least to the Zohar. The idea
of reincarnation into a lower form of life is, apparently, even younger
in Jewish sources. Of course the idea is quite ancient among some
Gentile peoples, going back to 900 BCE in India. That antiquity, or
its acceptance by such philosophers as Plato really does not give it any
additional credence. The problem of jsutifying the suffering of the
innocent and the good has always plagued thoughtful people. I fail to
see, however, that reincarnation is a proper answer to such questions.
Are we really to believe that people suffer for sins committed by a
previous incarnation? The later incarnations have no knowledge of such
past sins, and, therefore, no way of taking corrective action to fend
off or ameliorate their suffering - particularly if they are children.
Surely, one would not wish to consider their lives as mere means to an
end - the end being the adequate punishment of the original sinners.
Moreover, the sages have often referred to Gehinnom as a place of
punishment of the sinful dead.

If they believed in reincarnation, then that alternate punishment should
have at least been hinted at.

Yitzchok Zlochower

Micha:
> Pardon the morbidity, but was there anything left of Nadav va'Avihu
> to bury?

Me (actually perek yud, pasuk heh): "Vayisa'um b'chutanosam."

Meyer

> Question: Ahron was an onen, albeit a kh"g, but what is the heter to engage
> in a theoretical discussion of talmud torah?

According to the Pnei Baruch only eating things that are kodesh is
forbidden min HaTorah for an onen.
It is difficult to know when the isur midRabbanan was instituted
forbidding an onen or aveil to learn Torah, but maybe it was not a
problem because it was not yet asur.

Kol Tov
Ezriel

On 2 Apr 2003 at 15:29, Micha Berger wrote:

> Pardon the morbidity, but was there anything left of Nadav va'Avihu to
> bury?

That would certainly seem to be pshat in the psukim. 

> Your question is valid according to the Ramban (Toras haAdam) that
> aninus de'Oraisa is the entire first day. Rashi holds that aninus
> de'Oraisa even on the day of misah is only while there is a chiyuv
> qevurah.

You don't have to reach the question of whether there were remains to 
be buried in order to reach the conclusion that aninus has ended: 
someone else was dealing with the kvura. It would be no different 
than someone who starts sitting shiva in America while the meis is 
being taken to Eretz Yisrael; because the American's role in the 
kvura process has ended, aninus has ended and aveilus has begun. 

> As for aninus deRabban, yeish ko'ach beyad BD, but until the BD
> actually is oqeir davar, Aharon would have to follow the chiyuv.

Why? Can someone who is patur from aveilus be an onen? The entire din 
of aninus is predicated on a relationship that requires aveilus. 
You're not an onein R"L for a meis mitzva or for anyone other than 
the shiva krovim. But Aharon himself had no chiyuv in aveilus - 
aderaba he was commanded not to be misabeil, and therefore I would 
argue that he had no chiyuv in aninus either. 

-- Carl

> Pardon the morbidity, but was there anything left of Nadav va'Avihu
> to bury?

The Gemara in Shabbat 113b says that only their neshamot were burned
but their "gufim" were still "kayyam" - these terms could probably be
understood in a number of ways, but most would agree that there were
still remains to bury - so there would still be a hiyyuv qevurah.

David Shabtai

"Brown, Charles.F" wrote:
> Question: Ahron was an onen, albeit a kh"g, but what is the heter to
> engage in a theoretical discussion of talmud torah?

Wasn't this a theoretical discussion of hilchos aveilus?

David Riceman

At 12:28 PM 4/2/03 -0500, Shinnar, Meir wrote:
> Here is where I find RYGB's position confusing, at best. The heter to
> write down torah shebealpe is so that it is not forgotten. Furthermore,
> one can argue that written justifications allow for greater detail and
> understanding of the rationale. However, there is no inherent requirement
> for a written psak - writing it down may make it more accessible to the
> general public, easier to document, etc - but the lack of such writing
> does not invalidate it...
> Thus, while the public writings of an individual may sometimes be
> preferred for accuracy, the notion that oral traditions may be safely
> ignored and are of inherently less value than wrtten traditions is a
> highly radical one, without any basis, and yes, stands the entire notion
> of the torah shebealpe on its head.

Missing a fundamental point, perhaps due to its subtlety:

When Rebbe began compiling mishnayos and Ravina and Rav Ashi redacted
Shas, the legislative period in Klal Yisroel terminated (until the
Sanhedrin is reinstitued). The corpus was there, and was carefully
edited, to present positions and arguments sufficient to serve as a
springboard for subsequent rigorous and scholarly analysis, subject to
peer and future review. This new phase is extrapolative and requires and
interpretive. IT must be based on coherent and cogent argument which is
then subject to dispute. Thus, the entire vista of responsa literature.

Oral traditions can play only secondary, perhaps only tertiary, roles
in this process. The erosion of the halachic method in our day and age
is in inverse proportion to the spread of oral psak.

Kol Tuv,  CKVS,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org  or  ygb@yerushalmionline.org
essays, tapes and seforim at: www.aishdas.org;
on-line Yerushalmi shiurim at www.yerushalmionline.org

At 01:02 AM 4/4/03 +0300, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
>On 3 Apr 2003 at 13:28, Moshe Shulman wrote:
>> It is forbidden as a violation of modesty. (Tznius) Nothing to do with
>> hirhur.

>And "kol b'isha erva" is also only a matter of "tznius?" So if I have
>the woman stand behind a screen I can listen to her sing?

As a matter of fact, yes, if you do not know what she looks like.

>Tznius is about much MORE than erva. Hatznea leches im Elokecha is about a
>lot more than what we wear. On the other hand, violations of tznius have
>a lower threshold. If having hair showing was a violation of tznius and
>not out and out erva, then we would have been told s'ar b'isha pritzus...

But the Aruch ha'Shulchan on the uncovered hair issue makes the precise
point that this is NOT the case!

>>> 2. A sheitel can look real enough to defeat the purpose of covering
>>> the hair.

>> But the bottom line is that it is not hair.

>But it can bring to hirhur the same way that hair does.

And so can a woman wearing tight fitting clothing that is "technically"
tzanu'ah in its covering of the extremities. A sheitel ios yet another
article of clothing. If it is meant to exude allure is yet another article
of technically tzanu'ah clothing that provokes hirhur and overrides the
technical fulfillment. If it does not provoke hirhur (see AhS as noted),
it is in the category of proper attire as befits Benos Melachim.

Kol Tuv,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org  or  ygb@yerushalmionline.org
essays, tapes and seforim at: www.aishdas.org;
on-line Yerushalmi shiurim at www.yerushalmionline.org

On Tue, Apr 01, 2003 at 10:40:07AM -0500, Mlevinmd@aol.com wrote:
: I did post some of my thoughts on avoda. Briefly, I think that R. Krumbein
: takes a little slice of the Brisker world...

While this may be true to some extent, I think you are asking for too
wide of a slice.

:                        He does not take into account the mpi hashmua
: collections, the Telz versions, Birchas Sh'muel, R. Shimon Shkop etc...

Are these the Brisker derekh, or are they derakhim in their own right?

The derekh limud used by R' Dovid Lifshitz, which I presume is RSS's,
is not enough like Brisk for me to think them the same.

:-)BB!!
-mi

The sefer Chayei Olom by the Steipler discusses gilgulim and dybbukim -
[including the dybbuk which was removed by the CC (in presence of RE
Wasserman)].

Bein hadvorim he writes re belief in gilgul.
"...af al pi sh'ketzas mehaRishonim hirchikuhu, rubom ishruhu vekaymuhu,
kmsh"k biTshuvas Maharal ben Chaviv, v'chein Hagro [Even Shlomo 3:5].

He cites the Shem Hagdolim ret Maharyo Mimodina who was an 'unbeliever'
until he witnessed a 6 months old child who was constantly sick and then
when gosses saying Shma Yisroel. After this - he believed.

"..Upoi beArtzeinu Hakedosho, bishnas 5715, beyeled ben 4 shonim shehoyo
maggid al peh beShas verishonim - devorim shelo shomaso oznoy begilgul
zeh klall..."

SBA

From: "shmuel"
<[he] mentions that some rishonim require a revi'hus water for mayim
achronim. Could he please find them for me?>

The one I remember off hand is the Rambam, no one to sneeze at.
In Chapter 6 of Hil. Brakhot, he says if you eat bread, you need n'tilat
yadayim t'hilla vasof (whereas davar shetibbulo bamashqeh only needs
t'hilla), and n'tilat yadayim bein tavshil l'tavshil is only a r'shut.
He then proceeds to give all the dinim of n'tilat yadayim (as above, at
the beginning of the pereq he applies the term to both mayim rishonim,
mayim aharonim, and bein tavshil l'tavshil). Towards the end of the
pereq, after defining all the things necessary for n'tilat yadayim,
he defines 3 other requirements, but says that they differ with mayim
rishonim from mayim acharonim. The shiur and the keli are not among
them. There are other rishonim as well, but that is what I remember now.
The Raavad has a completely different shittot in n'tilat yadayim from the
Rambam; the Rambam only requires water once on each hand for hulin; the
Raavad requires twice. You don't see the differences from the hasogos
of the Raavad as much as you do from his t'shuvos.

<I've heard that the Gro required a revi'ith, but he was not a rishon.>

Correct, he is not. But there is not a single thing in the Maaseh Rav
that the G'ro did that was not based on evidence from rishonim.

<Likewise the 'heter' of Tosefos re snakes was accepted all over Europe
and in Jerusalem by the Sefaradim and Ashkenazim (see pri Hodosh, based
on the mishnah that no snake ever killed a person in Jerusalem). It is
not a weak heter as your correspondent writes, but the result of what
we would call daas Torah - being able to distinguish and analyse.>

I never said that people who rely on Tosfos don't have what to rely on.
What you call their "daas Torah" is indeed enough for people to rely
on, but I would mention that first they bring the minhog and then find
the hetter. And their "daas Torah" was not the same as the Rambam's.
The Rambam's approach is what the Vilner Gaon says explicitly: that
Hazal didn't make a taqqono based only on one reason, and so the Rambam
mentions when he assers food left under the bed not ruah ra'a but vermin.
There are poisonous vermin besides snakes around, and insects that carry
disease. The SA itself mentions that there is a reason for mayim aharonim
besides melah s'domit.

But this is really irrelevant to my argument. I _never_ argued that one
should be mahmir like the Rambam in mayim acharonim or g'luyim. What I
did say, and I repeat, is that if you want to be mahmir on issues in the
g'moro that were not paskened by a single rishon, not in Ashk'naz, not
in S'farad, not in Teiman, nor by the SA nor by the R'mo, then it would
behoove you not to be hypocritical and be mahmir first like the issues
that are paskened by some rishonim. About the issue of mixed seating, I
do not think that the Elya Rabbo or any of the others were paskening the
g'moro, since they all omit the issue of palm trees and dogs. Rather,
they were bringing the g'moro as a smakh for their communal custom of
separate seating (or the custom that they wished to establish in their
own community). The CI was mahmir on everything, and no one can possibly
have complaints about that, but he did not try to claim that his minhogim
were binding on all the members of his community. His followers adopted
them, and they adopted all of them.

<At the bottom of the pail was discovered a snake - drowned.>

Nu, isn't this a maaseh listor to what you say before that there are no
snakes in Yerushalayim? And if you say that there are no snakes in Y-m,
but there are in Bnei Braq, a) I can testify that with my own eyes I saw
a snake in Y-m 25 years ago, and b) neither Hazal nor any rishon anywhere
that I have seen said that there is a difference in g'luyim between Y-m
and other places. (Adrabbo, g'luyim are osur for the mizbeah, where they
are not drunk, and is only in Y-m.) Again, I have no complaints about
those who follow Tosfos and the SA; that was the custom in Europe for
hundreds of years, and I would never be m'vazzeh the g'dolim who followed
it. But by the same token, if an Ashk'nazi came to a Teimani and tried
to tell him he should not do full n'tilas yodayim for mayim aharonim,
he would be m'vazzeh all the Teimani posqim that said it is required. Let
people not try to impose on others their own humrot not based on rishonim
or the SA or the R'mo; let them keep them themselves, and if it increases
their yir'as shomayim and avodas haBore, tavo 'aleihem b'rakha. I don't
complain if you don't eat gebrokts (not you, R. SBA, about that I would
complain about changing minhag ovos); you should not complain if I do.

Seth Mandel

On Fri, Apr 04, 2003 at 10:17:54AM -0500, RYGB M. Bechhofer wrote:
:>                .... If having hair showing was a violation of tznius and
:> not out and out erva, then we would have been told s'ar b'isha pritzus...

: But the Aruch ha'Shulchan on the uncovered hair issue makes the precise
: point that this is NOT the case!

...
:> But it can bring to hirhur the same way that hair does.

: And so can a woman wearing tight fitting clothing that is "technically"
: tzanu'ah in its covering of the extremities. A sheitel ios yet another
: article of clothing. If it is meant to exude allure is yet another article
: of technically tzanu'ah clothing that provokes hirhur and overrides the
: technical fulfillment. If it does not provoke hirhur (see AhS as noted),
: it is in the category of proper attire as befits Benos Melachim.

I think this is the core of the machloqes between those who assur use of
shetlach (eg ROY) and those who permit. What's the line between trying
to look nice and trying to exude improper allure?

And for those for whom ROY offers pesaq, the line is probably nowhere
near where it is for us American Ashkenazim.

:-)BB!!
-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

[The following is an article that appears in the April/Nissan issue of
the JO. The next post will be an earlier version that didn't make it
in. I prefer the earlier one, myself. -mi]

                       Think, Ask, Internalize!
                    Rabbi Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer

I once heard a distinguished Rav delivering Mussar to his congregation. He
urged them toward the obviously laudable goal of ridding their houses
of televisions. The congregants, of course, have heard this particular
message before, they will hear it again, and they almost certainly
recognize the truth that underlies the Rav's plaint. Yet we all know
what both the Rav and the congregants know: That this is a never-ending,
ongoing, ritual. The congregants who have televisions will not get rid
of them (after all, they just installed satellite dishes!). The Rav
knows that the congregants who have televisions will not throw them
out because of the deroshos. The congregants know that the Rav knows
this. Olam k'minhago noheig.[1] What is going on here?

An apparently unrelated anecdote: My daughter once told me that a
speaker that day had discussed how women merit the World to Come via
their facilitation of their husbands' and childrens' Torah study.[2]
One of the girls present asked a question: What about women who never
marry and/or never have children, or have husbands that cannot or do not
learn? The speaker responded: "I get this question every year, but I do
not answer it, because we do not encourage that kind of lifestyle."

While these two vignettes may appear very different, the issue that
underlies both these scenarios is the same; the latter case builds on the
former: We frequently leave our Avodas Hashem to others, because that is
more comfortable; if and when, finally, we do think about Avodas Hashem
and how it is to be accomplished, we are may find ourselves admonished
not to ask challenging questions about its direction!

Thus, we never develop a yetzer ha'tov.

Let us analyze that assertion, first vignette first: The congregants with
the televisions have externalized their "consciences."[3] In this case,
who is the external conscience? The Rav! Why is this a problem? Because
then, the battle between their consciences and their drives takes place
outside themselves.

Delving a bit deeper, we Torah-true Jews have a common perception of
what is "good" and "holy." We all know, for example: television = bad.
We possess, however, great desires, drives and temptations.

Chazal tell us that we are born with our yetzer ho'ra; but we acquire our
yetzer ha'tov only at the age of bar or bas mitzvah.[4] Our conscience -
our yetzer ha'tov - begins work late and comes from outside of us. In
the meantime, we can identify internally with our drives and our own
agendas - our yetzer ho'ra.[5]

At that point - and often beyond - we are, in essence, stuck in the
mode that some of us experienced in our school days: There is a system
that we recognize, in some abstract way, as "good." Often, however, we
test the system, bend the rules, and exploit its weaknesses (a la the
"naval b'reshus haTorah"[6]. All too often we adhere to the system as
minimally as possible so as to not be expelled, suspended or otherwise
punished, scraping by and passing to get "through." I am what I want
and what fulfills my desires; the school - or principal - is my external
yetzer ha'tov.

As we progress through life, many phenomena may become parts of our
externalized conscience. In the case of the Rav and the congregation,
the Rav remains his congregation's external conscience. We feel good
being associated with the stratum of Yahadus that detests televisions -
while we ourselves hide them deep in our houses, because we do feel guilty
or ashamed. Rituals and forms of attire - that are not internalized -
are often also part of this external conscience.[7] The Mekkubalim call
this an Or Makkif - an enveloping light that does little to affect the
internal state of the soul. The yetzer ha'tov does not become an Or
Pnimi - an internal illumination.[8]

With a conscience that is outside and distinct, we can maintain a
superficial identification with a good and holy system, yet simultaneously
do as we please - as long as the system doesn't "catch up" with us and
castigate us. We are much like a fellow who will speed as long as he
sees no policeman. True, we may feel somewhat guilty over our pleasures,
but as Chazal note, guilt does not help very much in restraining us from
negative activities.[9] (We might even end up at non-gebrokts Pesach
vacation in a Las Vegas hotel-casino!)

Internalizing the conscience is the process of becoming a fully developed
Oved Hashem.

While it would be great to emerge victorious over our yetzer ho'ra,
the reality is that most of us must battle our yetzer. If my yetzer
ha'tov is still extrinsic to myself - embodied in my menahel, my rav,
etc. - the battle is between my yetzer ha'tov and me. What if, however,
my yetzer ha'tov is no longer outside of me, but inside me? If I have
internalized my conscience, it is part of me, and it is ever present in
my consideration.

For most of us, the internal balance between yetzer ho'ra and yetzer
ha'tov is an ongoing struggle, the battle of bechirah.[10] The first
foothold of the yetzer ha'tov, however, is equated with the onset of
maturity.[11] I am beginning to go beyond my subjective agenda, the
one which caused me to seek the the weaknesses I could exploit in the
system. I have a component within myself that weighs matters objectively -
and I need to make decisions. This of course, restricts my "fun." A 19 or
20-year-old may express his resistance to this maturity thus: "Eventually,
when I am 21 or 22 and get married, I will lead a full Torah life - now
I'm young, I want to enjoy myself. Let me have my TV [or worse...]." The
danger in this perspective is fairly obvious. An external conscience
is a terrible nuisance. Since it impinges on my lifestyle, I seek to
drown it out - at first, perhaps, with behavior that distracts me from
its inconvenient reproaches (like watching lots of television). Matters
then may deteriorate. "Ha'omer echtoh v'ashuv ein mapikin b'yado la'asos
teshuva" - "One who says I will sin and then repent, they do not grant
him the opportunity to do teshuva."[12] Maturity, in the spiritual sense,
will then tarry - perhaps never to arrive...

But now, what is the conscience, the yetzer ha'tov, that we seek to
internalize?

This leads us to the second vignette.

Rabbi Yisroel Salanter says that yetzer ha'tov is often a synonym for the
intellect ("seichel") while yetzer ho'ra is frequently identified with
emotion ("kochos ha'nefesh").[13] Not, says Reb Yisroel, that intellect
is always used for the good, nor that emotion is always for the bad. The
converse can, and does, occur. Nevertheless, following intellectual
conclusions will usually lead one to good; following emotional drives
will generally lead elsewhere.

When a person internalizes emes, awareness and contemplation grant the
objectivity necessary for a true Cheshbon ha'Nefesh. The Rambam tells
us that the first test of Odom Ho'Rishon was not that of good vs. evil,
but rather that of emes vs. sheker. If emes is external, then the kochos
ha'nefesh - and sheker - hold internal sway, and then evil follows -
extending gradually, imperceptibly, at first, then sprouting and growing
beyond control.[14] External awareness cannot do the trick.[15]

But, indeed, how do we educate ourselves (and others) to achieve Emes?

We must think, we must ask, we must seek answers, we must demand of our
Rav or teacher or seforim that they give us answers, which we must then
contemplate and internalize.[16]

(Here, of course, there is a difference between the case of the
televisions and the case of the women and Olam HaBo. In the former case,
the congregants know the answers - they try, mostly with success, to avoid
thinking about them. In the latter case, someone actually asked a question
- but was told not to ask. In both cases, the intellectual faculty is
suspended - in the former, internally; in the latter, externally.)

So how do we go about doing this?

Let me answer on the basis of an experience. I once gave a Hashkofo Shiur,
in which I presented all sides of the issue, even those that I was going
to ultimately reject. Someone asked me: Why present positions that are
against Mesorah even as an intellectual Hava Amina (premise)? Suffice
it to say that the Gedolim oppose position X!

At first glance, this approach is tantalizingly appealing. It certainly
saves significant mental exertion, which may then be devoted to mego, rov
and chazoko [classic Talmudic concepts]. Furthermore, there is a strong
emotional appeal in the simple citation of "Ru'ach Yisroel Sabbah." Much
literature in our circles is based on this approach. This apparent short
cut, however, is not without potential pitfalls:

Declarative statements remain extrinsic. It is only by inculcating the
quest for truth and meaning; by acquiring and imparting both the truth
and its basis; by training ourselves and others to rigorously assess,
analyze and critique, by thinking, that we internalize the yetzer
ha'tov of emes, and we "mohn" (demand) of ourselves. It is only when we
ourselves make demands of ourselves that they are truly inescapable. We
(the congregation) will only change when we ourselves demand it of
ourselves, not when the Rav demands it from us.[17]

This is not to say that that there is no room for rote education. As
Rabbi Dessler notes (Michtav Me'Eliyahu vol. 3, pp. 131-133), there is
much that one can learn "by osmosis" - by absorbing values from the
right environment and contact with the right people. Indeed, in the
right environment, one can reach levels of outstanding piety.[18] But,
says Rabbi Dessler, one's true level is what he has accomplished on the
basis of habituation, but what he has accomplished in his personal battle
with the unique yetzer ho'ra that Hashem has imparted to him.[19]

The Maharal, Be'er Ha'Golah, end of Be'er 7 says it best. It is only when
we fully explore and comprehend the truth that we will be able to best
our enemy (he was talking about an external one, but in our discussion
we are dealing with our internal adversary):

When an individual does not intend to scoff - rather only to state his
belief - even if these positions stand against your belief and system,
don't say to him: "Don't talk, seal your mouth!" For then the system
will not be clarified. On the contrary, in such matters we should say:
"Speak as much as you want, all that you want to say, so that you will
not be able to say that were you granted permission to expand you would
have spoken further [and convinced me with your beliefs]." If you do close
his mouth and prevent him from speaking, that points toward a weakness in
the system. This [approach] is the converse of the general impression,
which is that it is not permitted to discuss the system, and that thus
the system is strengthened. On the contrary! That approach undermines
the system!... Thus [through the former approach] a person comes to the
inner truth of matters... For, any competes with another to demonstrate
his might wants very much that his opponent muster as much strength as
possible - then, if the hero overcomes his opponent, he proves that he
is the mightier hero. What might, however, does the hero display if his
opponent is not permitted to stand strong and wage war against him?...[20]

It is worthwhile to recall here Reb Chaim Volozhiner's[21] explanation
of "Hevei mis'avek b'afar ragleihem" (literally translated as: "Sit in
the dust at the feet [of the Sages]"). He explains misavek, based on
Yaakov Avinu's encounter with Eisav's malach, as connoting wrestling:
You must wrestle (intellectually) with your Rebbe (with respect,
of course - "at his feet") - ask questions, demand answers - not to
test the Rebbe, Rav,, or teacher, but to get your own mind in gear so
you can make your own cheshbon ha'nefesh (reckoning) and be your own
conscience:"She'yisbarer v'yisames etzel ho'Odom mah chovoso b'olamo" -
"That is should be clarified and become true to a person what his task
is in his world." (Hakdomo to the Mesillas Yesharim).

In taking our thesis to its conclusion, we might understand an interesting
perspective of the Zohar HaKodosh. The Zohar calls the 613 mitzvos
"Taryag Ittin" (613 suggestions).[22] To be sure, although there are
other interpretations, the simple derivation of mitzvah is from the verb
tzaveh, i.e., command. Why does the Zohar depart from the simple meaning?

Perhaps the Zohar is pointing at the difference between the external
yetzer ha'tov and the internalized yetzer ha'tov. At the earlier stage,
the mitzvos resemble the rules and regulations that an external system
must impose on its constituents. This is the level of Avdus - the
impositions of a Master on His servant.[23] For the immature individual -
be he seventeen or seventy - a structure of rules is necessary - a system
to confine him to the straight and narrow.

But it is not for that end that HaKadosh Baruch Hu created us: "Bannim
attem la'Hashem Elokeichem" (Devarim 14:1). The more we internalize
"Hashem Elokeichem Emes" the more we achieve that true Tzelem Elokim which
is our innermost essence. Our conscience is then not imposed command
but inner truth - no longer the directive of a Master to a servant but
the loving advice of a Father to his beloved - and loving child.

I know it's hard to think. My learning rebbe in camp a quarter century
ago, Rabbi Hillel David shlita, challenged us: "You have no idea how many
problems you can solve if you just think about the same thing for five
minutes straight!" Many years later, I still find it next to impossible
to focus on a thought for more than a few seconds at a time.

But just think... if we would just think...

FOOTNOTES:

1. Avodah Zarah 54b.

2. See Berachos 17a.

3. I am using the English word "conscience," with its connotation of
conscious recognition and awareness, as a synonym for yetzer ha'tov.

4. See Avos d'Rabbi Nassan 16:2 and Koheles Rabba 4:9. I am indebted to
Rabbi Avrohom Chaim Feuer shlita for a precious reference, Piskei Tosafos
to Nedarim no. 62 (free translation): "The yetzer ha'tov is given in the
mother's womb when the person knows the entire Torah. At the moment of
birth the yetzer ho'ra enters the person and banishes the yetzer ha'tov
until a person becomes intelligent and the yetzer ha'tov enters him."

5. It is concerning a person at this stage of life that the Michtav
Me'Eliyahu (vol. 1 p. 255) insightfully notes that when he speaks to
himself about his drives and desires he says things like: "I want this";
yet when he speaks to himself about proper behavior he admonishes himself
in the format of: "You shouldn't do that." The ideal is to accomplish
the converse:. I know of an Oved Hashem who has named his yetzer ho'ra
"Rembrandt" (after the great artist, not the toothpaste) reflecting the
yetzer ho'ra's capacity to paint beautiful - yet deceptive - portraits. He
thus attempts to isolate and externalize his yetzer ho'ra.

6. See the Ramban at the beginning of Parashas Kedoshim.

7. Perhaps Chazal had this problem in mind when they advised one who feels
compelled to sin to don different garments and wrap himself differently
and go to a place where no one knows him before committing the sin (see
Moed Kattan 17a): A person must know that sinning is not compatible with
being a part of Torah society. All too often we "walk the walk and talk
the talk," and gloss over our shortcomings with our extrinsic affiliation.

8. It is interesting, in this context, to note that Reb Itzele from
Volozhin, in his he'oroh at the beginning of his father's Nefesh HaChaim,
cites Mekkubalim who locate the yetzer ho'ra between the penimi'im and the
makkifim. (A very beautiful and understandable explanation of Or Penimi
and Or Makkif is in Rabbi Shlomo Yosef Zevin's La'Torah v'la'Mo'adim in
the section on Simchas Torah Hakkofos.)

9. "Reshaim meleim charoto" - Shevet HaMussar chap. 25, on the basis of
Nedarim 9b; see the discussion of this concept in the Hakdomas Talmid
HaMechaber to the Avnei Miluim.

10. Of course, the classic description of that battle is to be found
in one of the many "must see" sources upon which this essay is built,
the Kunteres HaBechirah in Michtav Me'Eliyahu vol. 1, p. 111ff. (Most of
this essay is captured by the Michtav Mei'Eliyahu in his analysis of "Ein
lecha Ben Chorin elah me she'oseik ba'Torah."(Avos 6:2) there, p. 117ff.)

11. This is in line with the Chazal that we cited in note 4, that we are
born with a yetzer ho'ra, while we acquire a yetzer ha'tov at bar (or bas)
mitzvah. The expansion of that yetzer ha'tov is then a life-long process.

12. Yuma 85b. The Nefesh HaChaim (1:12) notes that sinners live in the
midst of their accumulated Gehennom - the constant distracting stimuli
of this world prevent them from experiencing it on an ongoing basis. Upon
leaving this world, divested of its commotion, they finally confront and
experience the shame and degradation of their activities. That accumulated
tumah is destructive, and makes teshuvah all the more difficult as well.

13. Ohr Yisroel Iggeres 30, Vilna 5660 edition and reprints p. 84.
Everything we have discussed (and more) is essentially found in the Or
Yisroel there and in the first lines of the Iggeres ha'Mussar.

14. See Sukkah 52b.

15. "Yod'im Resho'im she'darchom l'miso, v'yesh lohem chilev al kislom"
- Shabbos 31b.

16. I would like to note to the many readers who are familiar with the
19^th century children's story of "Pinocchio" that the tale serves as
a very powerful metaphor for this essay.

17. The Shem MeShmuel on Dayeinu in the Haggadah says that the reason
Am Yisroel in the Midbar fell so many times from very high levels to
great depths is because the madreigos that they acquired were not their
own internal accomplishments, but extrinsic ones conveyed to them by
Moshe Rabbeinu.

18. Editor's note: Along the lines of the positive impact of the right
environment, it is interesting to note the comment reported by NRP
MK-elect Mrs. Gila Finkelstein in the name of her father ("The New Face
of the National Religious Party," The Jerusalem Report, Dec. 30, '02:

A year later she [Mrs. Finkelstein] got her own wig, It wasn't a
simple decision. For many modern Orthodox women, covering one's hair
remains one of the most complicated mitzvot to accept, a symbol of
servitude. Finkelstein felt that way, "My own mother, who was very
Orthodox and a desendant of the Vilna Gaon, didn't cover her head. And
my father never insisted.

But he came to regret that. "Before he died, he once told me, 'The
stupidest mistake of my life was that I didn't ask your mother to cover
her hair.' He came to believe that the head covering set a religious
tone in the house, that had my mother done so, perhaps my [oldest]
brother wouldn't have turned secular." - NW.

19. Rabbi Dessler explains further: There are people who give much
money to tzedakah, and are even meticulous to do so in secret, but are
nevertheless dishonest in their business practices. How can a person
can be so inconsistent? He explains: This person became habituated to
the trait of tzedakah from his environment, but never became habituated
to the trait of honesty.

20. See also the Alter from Kelm, Chochmo U'Mussar vol. 2 p. 50 and
p. 76 - Mesorah and Thought must go hand in hand.

21. Ruach Chaim to Avos 1:4.

22. Reb Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin expands on this Zohar (vol. 2, 82b)
in numerous places. See, for example, Tzidkas HaTzaddik simanim 68,
156 and 219.

23. I know I am on shaky grounds here. After all, the Chofetz Chaim
did not recite "Berich Shmei" because he found it presumptuous to
state about himself "Ana avda d'Kudsha Berich Hu" (see Shorshei Minhag
Ashkenaz vol. 1, the discussion on the German minhag not to recite
Berich Shmei). The Torah reserves the praise of Eved Hashem for Moshe
Rabbeinu. But there are different connotations to Avdus, and I am using
the term here in its more negative implication.

**********************


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