Avodah Mailing List

Volume 10 : Number 042

Monday, October 28 2002

• Re: Yehei shlama rabba
• Re: atzas gdolim
• the son of the Shunamis (was: Fw: A question from my father r.e. this week's Haftarah)
• Re: AI-D - Psak of the Satmar Rebbe z'l
• Re: AI-D - Psak of the Satmar Rebbe z'l
• Re: AI-D - Psak of the Satmar Rebbe z'l
• Re: AI-D - Psak of the Satmar Rebbe z'l
• Re: am'ru vs. amaru, RC,
• Takannat Hakahal - RG
• learning rishonim
• atzat gedolim
• Re: the son of the Shunamis (was: Fw: A question from my father r.e. this wee...
• Dor Revi'i on the moral obligation to be intelligent
• Defining death. Formerly: A question from my father r.e. this week's Haftarah
• Nice diyuk of Chasam Sofer

On Sat, Oct 26, 2002 at 08:18:13PM -0400, Jonathan Baker wrote:
: So after shul, we had an argument over phrasing. The old president says
: Yhei shlama rabba min shmaia vechaim, aleinu v'al col ysrael v'imru amein

It would mean that "min shemaya" applies to "shelama rabba" and "chaim"
(or that the shalom comes "shemaya" and "chayim"?). There are other
instances in tefillah of interrupting a list with a comment that refers to
the items both before it and after. For example, the opening of qaddish:
"Yisgadeil veyiskadeish shemei raba" and "veyamlich malchusei" is likely
one such sequence.

However, I wouldn't assume this odder structure unless I had to.

: My reasoning being a) that shlama rabba should be for all humanity, not
: just for col ysrael, and b) the language changes there...

The berakhah is already particularist, as the "chaim" must be aleinu
ve'al kol Yisrael -- with no mention of asking for it for everyone else.
So, if the latter part is particularist, why couldn't the tefillah for
shalom be as well?

So, I would go with "may there be (1) great peace from heaven and (2)
life on us and all of Israel". The "min shemaya" is only said about
peace because of the next line: "Oseh shalom bimromav..."

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 It isn't what you have, or who you are, or where
micha@aishdas.org            you are,  or what you are doing,  that makes you
http://www.aishdas.org       happy or unhappy. It's what you think about.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                            - Dale Carnegie

I am very tempted to be verbose, but since it seems no one is listening to 
us debate other than ourselves, I will try to be brief.

I thank RMS fro clarifying what is so objectionable in the approach I 
believe he takes (is this similar to Yeshaya Leibowitz?) in reducing 
Judaism to a religion of halacha, shorn of theology (aka Agada?), for which 
one's own common sense (aka the imperative not to be a shoteh?) 
substitutes. If not Leibowitzian, at least Mendelosohnian.

(Don't go off the handle, again, RMS, shouting that I am branding you a 
kofer. Nuh-uh. Just wrong.)

K'drkecha ba'kodesh, you set up "strawmen," claim that they represent my 
positions, and attack me on that basis.

I will try to limit myself to pointing out where you do so in the following 
missive.


At 08:56 PM 10/27/02 -0500, shinname@UMDNJ.EDU wrote:
>My debates with RYGB truly amaze me at the lengths some will go to defend
>what I am sure is a deeply felt position.
>
>I will summarize my position as follows:
>
>It is impossible for any objective person learning the Rambam moreh
>nevuchim and other philosophical articles not to realize that his approach
>to hilchot deot is not based on a pshat understanding of maamre hazal,
>even those maamre hazal that seem to reflect a deliberate statement
>on hilchot deot rather than merely ma'asim. This is zil kare be rav.
>(I wonder how one could, for example, learn the rambam on what it means
>that hashem is menasse bne adam without such an understanding_

Did someone here disagree? Not I!

>This, of course, made the rambam very controversial. Even those who
>didn't ban him try to minimize the impact of his statements. This is
>clearly RYGB's approach, who tries to minimize every statement only to the
>very minimal and precise context that it occurs in, regardless of the fact
>that the rambam is quite clear that he is making a very general statement.

Still waiting for that general statement... It does not appear in the next 
paragraph. So sorry.

>The statement in the letter on gzerat hacochavim is related to
>astrology,as RYGB points out. However, the rambam doesn't frame his
>objections in that way. He doesn't say," you know, astrology is a
>controversial subject, often rejected by hazal themselves, as in these
>maamarim", as RYGB would. He uses the example of astrology to explicitly
>explain a methodology. This is plain in the language and meaning.
>To cite again,
>
>This should not cause you any difficulty, that it is not appropriate that
>a man should leave halacha lemaa'se and go after different questions and
>answers, and similarly it is not appropriate for a man to leave the
>words of reason that were already proven by proofs, and shake his hands
>from them, and rely on a statement of one of the chachamim, that it is
>possible that he forgot something, or that there is in those words a
>hint (remez), or he said that according to the hour and an event that
>was before him.

"Proven by proofs" means those found in the Nevi'im and Chazal! (Who, the 
Rambam held, were, of course, of keen philosophical capactiy and wisdom.) 
See the letter to Marseilles p. 21 (LE ed.), Hil. akum perek 1 and perek 11.

>These words are crystal clear. The reason is not because other statements
>of hazal can be cited in opposition, nor that it is that these statements
>are clearly allegorical, but the fact that something has been proven
>by reason means that a statement by hazal apparently to the contrary
>needs to be reinterpreted, because clearly that statement of hazal
>can not mean what you think it means. This is why the rambam expands
>this and says that this principle was used by hazal themselves, which
>is why onkelos translated several psukim against their pshat meaning.
>No other reading of the paragraph makes any sense, in spite of your
>attempts to limit it to astrology.

Wrong. See citations above.

Bottom line: I am waiting with bated breath for the Rambam you allege 
exists where he says Tom, Dick, Harry and Meir are free to reject Chzal 
based on their putative "common sense."

>Lastly, the conclusion of the rambam is precisely my fourteenth ikkar
>(I am surprised by the issue of bal tosif of the 13 ikkarim, but in
>polemics, everything is acceptable)

It seems so, doesn't it? ;-)

>A man should never leave his reason behind, that the eyes are in front
>and not in back.
>
>With your citation of the mishna:
>
>Yes, I am familiar with that mishna, but I think (WADR) that you
>completely misunderstand the mishna. (it is perhaps paradigmatic that
>in your attempts to defend the "truth" against the modern "kofer" that
>you view me to be that you clearly misstate pshat in a simple mishna,
>something I am sure you would never otherwise do)
>
>It doesn't say muttav li lihyot shotteh, rather muttav li lehikkare
>shotteh. Clearly, my avodat hashem should not be dependent on external
>opinion, and I should rather be called a shotte by others than to be
>considered a rasha before hashem - I think simple pshat in the mishna
>(I believe, though haven't checked recently, that that is the Rambam'
>pshat as well). However, I don't think that there is a choice between
>being a shotte or being a rasha - and I doubt that the rambam would have
>considered that as a choice, although, as I stated in my ikkar, "and the
>other 13 ikkarim should be understood, as much as possible, so as not to
>contradict the 14th." - the 14th is not an absolute, given limitations
>of human reason. However, remember what the rambam says (and means)
>
>A man should never leave his reason behind, that the eyes are in front
>and not in back.

You keep coming back to that line, as if the Rambam meant that where you 
and Chazal differ, and your reason tells you X while Chazal tell you Y, 
follow X! But this is not what the Rambam means! He means you reject emunos 
tefeilos - red bands around wrists and the like - not divrei Chazal.

Your chiluk between being called a shtoeh and being one is obvious, but you 
misunderstand me. I mean that you will never know, being of limited 
intellectual capacity, whether your self-confident assumption that you are 
not being a shoteh is really your unwillingness to be called a shoteh...

>To paraphrase you, RMS has brought a good proof, and you can only say
>that he doesn't mean it, it is only about astrology, and misinterpret
>a mishna.

Cute!

>With regard to the other statements in my post and your response, I think
>again, that you are deliberately minimizing the clear meaning of the
>rambam only to the specific issue that he is discussing. The hakdama to
>the perush hamishnayot seems clear that it takes the approach to aggadot
>hazal of reinterpreting the pshat. The issue is not merely that there
>isn't a concrete daled amot, but that the plain meaning of that midrash,
>which is also the way it is commonly understood) is also reinterpreted.

Nope. The Rambam holds in some Agada (not all!), the idea *is* the pshat.

>Similarly with the eyn makshin - the issue isn't allegory, and the gmara
>in question isn't allegory. The rambam defines the categories of maamre
>hazal shemakshin bahem - that is, that have normative meaning so their
>meaning has to be specifically understood and reconciled with the rest
>of the torah shebealpe. Things that are
>
>  lo divre kabbala, velo asor velo muttar, velo din min hadinin,
>
>do not fall in the normative category - simple pshat, consistent with
>everything else in the rambam.

Nope. He defines those as the categories in which one does not *pasken,* 
not the ones in which *makshin* or not.

>lastly, the fact that you find some of the 13 ikkarim irrational,
>so therefore I should reject them (note that I am not talking about
>arational - no rational proof is required), so would think that I should
>question them - suggests that ultimately, you do view the criteria of
>reason to be threatening, and that is our difference. However, the
>fact that you view the ikkarim to be irrational says more about you than
>either me or the ikkarim.
>
>Meir Shinnar

Irrational?! I hold Agada is rational! You're the one who takes Agada as a 
priori bereft of stature and authority, and thereforw would be expected to 
reject at leat some of the 13!


Kol Tuv,
YGB

ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

The father of a student of R' Daniel Eidensohn asked:
<<< when scripture says the boy is "dead," are we supposed to take it
plainly and at absolute face value and assume that by definition the
boy is really in fact dead even by the standards of our modern medicine,
even if there are situations in which we would know the boy to be alive
(and in a coma) which the ancients would have read as death?>>>

My response needs some introduction:

Throughout history, people have seen others die, but only in the sense
that they saw a person while he was alive, and then (without interruption)
they saw him dead. But I say that this is not the same thing as witnessing
the act of dying. To the best of my knowledge, no human being has ever
seen - with his eyes - a soul depart from a body.

Medical science, over the centuries, has accumulated a number of symptoms
which are indicative of death, but that's not the same thing as watching
someone die. This is similar to how diagnosing an allergy is not the
same as watching someone sneeze.

This list of symptoms has not remained unchanged over time. It seems to
me that whenever a person was thought to be dead but then improved to
any minor degree whatsoever, the old "definition of death" was seen as
deficient, and was modified after more research into that incident and
similar ones.

The most any doctor can do is to say that the symptoms shown by the
patient are consistent with a diagnosis of death. Regardless of the
symptoms of death to which this doctor subscribes, or the century in which
the doctor lived (or will live), when he pronounces someone to be dead,
he is stating a professional opinion, *not* an obective fact.

I believe the above to be true when a doctor declares someone to be dead,
and certainly when a layman expresses such an opinion. But I believe
that Rav Moshe Feinstein zt"l held this to be NOT necessarily true when
a *rabbi* says that someone has died.

The following is my translation of Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:174, page
288, bottom of first column:

<<< Therefore, if someone is decapitated, even though his head and body
are jumping around, his status is entirely that of a dead person. Even
if we would say that there is a way to connect his head and body so
that he would live, there is no obligation to do so even on a weekday,
because there is no obligation to revive the dead, and so on Shabbos it
would be forbidden. Note that in Bava Basra 74, R' Yehuda says that a
certain jewel exists which has the power to revive the dead, even those
who are decapitated, but that HaShem hid it from humanity. It is plain
that even if HaShem would make it available to some person, he would
not be obligated to revive the dead, because the Torah required only
healing the sick, even to violate Shabbos, but not to revive the dead.>>>

In other words, Rav Moshe says that a decapitated person *IS* halachically
dead, and that this would be true even if medicine advanced to the point
where the doctors were capable of restoring this person's health. Further,
Rav Moshe says that because of this truth, such a restoration would not
constitute Pikuach Nefesh, and would therefore be forbidden on Shabbos,
and not mandatory during the week.

So my answer to the posted question is:

Doctors work at a definition of death via trial and error, but Rav Moshe
seems to be saying that the rabbis are privy to an objective definition
which is *not* subject to revision, and that decapitation is one such
symptom. There may or may not be other such symptoms as well.

Therefore, if the author of the haftara says that the boy was dead
(and he does, in verses 20 and 32) then it is entirely possible that
this was an objective truth, based on symptoms which the characters of
the story knew to be among the objective symtoms which were revealed to
the Rabbis along with decapitation.

On the other hand... (I write the following with great trepidation and
fear, for it smells to me like kefira, and I write it mainly in the
hopes that someone will point out my misunderstanding. I'll continue...)

On the other hand, the more I learn, the blurrier the line gets, between
what was revealed to the rabbis, and what they accepted from the educated
people of the world.

An average solar year is exactly 365.25 days long. An average lunar
month is 29 days 12 hours 44 minutes and one chelek long. Eating fish
with meat is unhealthy. A pregnant woman may miscarry if she steps on
cut fingernails under certain conditions.

These are things, and others, are ones which I can't imagine being
based on empirical science, and so I've always presumed that they
must have entered our traditions via a Revelation of some kind. But
conversations here and elsewhere have suggested that Chazal did *not*
get their knoweledge of astronomy from On High, but from the Greeks,
and that their other scientific information was similarly picked up from
local and contemporary sources.

And despite this, we find that "The halacha for generations is
such-and-such" rather than "Our doctors and scholars say this, and so we
should act like that, until our doctors and scholars say otherwise." And
if so, what do I make of Rav Moshe's assertion that a decapitated person
may not be healed on Shabbos even if we had the technology to do it?

Bottom line: I'd *like* to say that the author of the haftara had special
information that the boy really was dead. But I don't know that for sure.
It could well be that he was still alive, while exhibiting symptoms
which appeared like death to the doctors of the time.

But even so, if that boy was beyond hope of current medical abilities,
and Elisha successfully healed him, is that not a miracle?

Postscript:

R' Micha Berger asked <<< Why not be literal? Is there a reason to
be minimalist in our claims here, or is it just a modern westerner's
instinct to find rationalizations for whatever he can?>>>

I'm not sure what is meant by "rationalizations" here. Isn't it a normal
part of learning the stories of Tanach, to try to understand the details
of the stories, and the motivations of the characters? If someone asks,
"How did they know the boy was dead", is that not a legitimate question?

Akiva Miller

On 27 Oct 2002 at 16:17, SBA wrote:
> And where the donor is positively a goy - and the child is halachically
> kosher, the SR calls it an act of "maaseh zimoh v'toyevoh bli sofek"
> and the women is a 'zoneh bevadai' RL.

I don't have the tshuva handy. Does he asser her on a non-Kohain husband?

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

From: "Carl and Adina Sherer" <sherer@actcom.co.il>
> SBA wrote:
>> And where the donor is positively a goy - and the child is halachically
>> kosher, the SR calls it an act of "maaseh zimoh v'toyevoh bli sofek"
>> and the women is a 'zoneh bevadai' RL.

> I don't have the tshuva handy. Does he asser her on a non-Kohain 
> husband? 

I don't think he mentions it. But leshitoso shouldn't she be ossur on
ANY husband?

On 28 Oct 2002 at 18:57, SBA wrote:
> From: "Carl and Adina Sherer" <sherer@actcom.co.il>
>> SBA wrote:
>>> And where the donor is positively a goy - and the child is
>>> halachically kosher, the SR calls it an act of "maaseh zimoh
>>> v'toyevoh bli sofek" and the women is a 'zoneh bevadai' RL.

>> I don't have the tshuva handy. Does he asser her on a non-Kohain
>> husband? 

> I don't think he mentions it. But leshitoso shouldn't she be
> ossur on ANY husband?

That's why I said "non-Kohain." Does he consider it mei'ratzon or
not? It's clear to me that l'shitaso, he should certainly asser her on
her husband if her husband is a Kohain.

-- Carl

From: "Carl M. Sherer" <cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il>
>>> I don't have the tshuva handy. Does he asser her on a non-Kohain
>>> husband? 

>> I don't think he mentions it. But leshitoso shouldn't she be
>> ossur on ANY husband?

> That's why I said "non-Kohain." Does he consider it mei'ratzon or 
> not? It's clear to me that l'shitaso, he should certainly asser her 
> on her husband if her husband is a Kohain.

Sorry, I read it as Kokain..

[Email #2. -mi]

From: Elazar M Teitz <remt@juno.com>
> Re the Israeli kohein and his wife who opted for a girl because "A
> daughter, they explained, would never go up to read from the Torah; the
> community would not know that she was not their biological child; and
> they wouldn't have to tell her either," will they make sure that she
> marries only a kohein or a leivi?  Otherwise, her first child, if male,
> would need a pidyon haben and would not be nifdeh because of the mistaken
> assumption that the mother is a bas kohein

Further to the Tshuva I quoted from the SR on this subject - I notice
that in his sefer he has a second tshuva on a similar situation -
written pre-war.

There, surprisingly, he did not bring up the problem with mamzerus but
other points including yerusha - which al pi Torah this child is not
entitled to - and yichud.

SBA

From: "Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
> Yes, it was I who queried after noting that the Stoliner Chasidim with
> which I davened this summer would say "amaru."...

> Now my question is why and how, would you surmise, Stoliners adopted
> RZ"H as their guiding light in this respect? Historically, who followed
> him and why?

I make no claim to knowledge about dikduk matters - but just wish to
add 2 points which may or may not makes a difference.

1) There is a nussach "...Zeh keili onu, yachad kulom hodu vehimlichu
ve'omOru..". which is said in TA - and I think by by Sfardim.

2) The nussach Ashkenaz for YT - Maariv when we say Maarovis is '...Zeh
tzur yisheinu potzi feh ve'omOru..."

SBA

On Wed, Oct 23, 2002 at 11:31:18AM +0000, Eli Turkel wrote:
: In fact takkanot rabbenu Gershom are takkanat hakahal which certainly
: exist even today...

[Micha Berger:]
> .. and just to close the loop, and therefore RMF would have the 
> power to make takkanos for the US of his generation.

My point was exactly the opposite - takkanat hakahal are takkanot taken by
the community (or more exactly by the officially recognized leadership)
and not by individual rabbis. Hence, RMF could NOT issue takkanot unless
it was also passed by the various rabbinic organizations. Any organization
that did agree would only bind its own membership.

In the early middle ages there were several organizational meetings of
the heads of the various German and French kehillot. These groups issued
takkanot of which the most famous were under the leadership of Rabbenu
Tam and later Takkanot Shum (1220).

The earlier takkanot of Rabbenu Gershom are very controversial among
historians whether he personally (or rather his bet din) ever issued
any takkanot, or some of the takanot with which he is associated. In
many later teshuvot these are also listed as takkanat hakahal. It is
also debated whether the later community meetings occurred before 1096
and so his original takkanah affected all of Ashkenazi Jewry or whther
it was a local takkanah in Mayence which spread over the years to other
communities. The language of Agus is "They (the takkanot) were the product
of the culture, the learning and the traditions of the whole people"
It is universally agreed that a takkanah issued only by Rabbenu Gershon
would not affect other communties.
(see Chachmei Ashkenaz haRishonim by Grossman for more details)

Rosh explicitly states that a takkanah by a Gadol that is not accepted
is not binding. In fact it is for this reason that takkanat Rabbenu
Gershon and the later takkanot Shum are not binding on Sephardic or
other non-ashenazi communities.

Hence, any takkanah issued by RMF, RYE, ROY, the Satmar Rav, the RCA,
etc are only binding on those that voluntarily accept them or those that
are part of their community not on other Jews.

[Email #2. -mi]

I forgot to give the reference. The Rosh talks about the status of Rabbenu
Gershon and other takkanot of gedolim in teshuvot HaRosh kelal 43 siman 8

--
 Eli Turkel, turkel@math.tau.ac.il on 28/10/2002

<Counter-argument (made with great force by R. Shmuel Nacham of
Shaalvim): R Lichtenstein's method causes one to approach the rishonim
with preconceived notions, and possibly misread them. R. Nacham (my
rebbe in 85-86) prefers to first read all the rishonim in all parallel
sugyos very carefully, and only then start thinking conceptually.>

The story is told that the Chafetz Chaim would cover Rashi the first
time he started a new sugya.

The idea is exactly the opposite of R. Nacham. If one reads Rashi right
away then his pshat looks like the obvious and simplistic one. By first
learning without Rashi and only later looking in Rashi one realizes the
chiddushim in Rashi.

In the debate over asking gedolim their advice evryone seems to agree
that as gedolim they have great insight. However, some gedolim also
seem to be unconnected to the world living a sheltered life in the bet
hamedrash. There are known stories of gedolim who barely knew there way
home at night. As such I have some practical questions rather than the
theoretical questions until now.

I again stress that we all agree that it is a good idea to ask the
gadol his advice, The question is to what degree it is compulsory and
his opinion is binding. All this on condition that there are no formal
halachic questions involved. Halacha defined as something in the Shulchan
Arukh or later piskei halacha.

1. Marriage counseling - I know of some rabbis who would be the last
person I would recommend as a marriage counselor. In particular the
advice of some gedolim differs drastically from the advice of religious
marriage counslors and psychologists

2. Advice on getting married - I know of families that would not have
their children married without the consent of Maran HaRav Schach even
though he did not know the sides very closely. There is even more
prevelant in chassidic circles were some won't get engaged without
permission of the rebbe even from the grave. On the other hand RYBS
refused on principle to answer such questions.

3. Similar to #2 with regard to business decisions

4. Questions of political questions - eg demonstrations when there is a
strong disagreement between the psak of many gedolim and the consensus
of political people involved in the issue.

5. Medical questions - like the experience of RCS many gedolim will give
an opinion based on what the doctors will say. Others will say not to
operate (for example) even when the overwhelming consnsus of doctors is
to operate.

--
 Eli Turkel, turkel@math.tau.ac.il on 28/10/2002

In a message dated 10/28/2002 11:06:58 AM EST, kennethgmiller@juno.com writes:
> R' Micha Berger asked <<< Why not be literal? Is there a reason to
> be minimalist in our claims here, or is it just a modern westerner's
> instinct to find rationalizations for whatever he can?>>>
 
> I'm not sure what is meant by "rationalizations" here. Isn't it a normal
> part of learning the stories of Tanach, to try to understand the details
> of the stories, and the motivations of the characters? If someone asks,
> "How did they know the boy was dead", is that not a legitimate question?
 
I guess the question here is Lmai Nafka Mina? Either understanding can
be supported but what halachik conclusions , if any, would one draw ?(eg
if the boy had been married, would his wife be an almanah?)

KT
Joel Rich

 From Shut Dor Revi'i v. 2, siman 110

Nevertheless, I disagree with your approach to learning (darkei limudo)
and with that of most of the scholars of your country (Poland) who push
aside a clear and straightforward reasoning (s'vara b'rurah viysharah)
owing to some contradiction that they have found. And this is not
an approach that entlightens, for the Ramban, of blessed memory, has
written in his novellae about the response that we find in the Talmud
"if you like I will cite a Scripture and if you like I will expoud a
rational argument" (iy ba'it eima qra v'iy ba'it eima s'vara). This is
difficult because how can one compare his reasoning to a Scripture
by asking "which would you like a Scripture or a rational argument?"
And he, of blessed memory, wrote that they really are comparable
(b'emet shavin hein) for straightforward reasoning (seikhel ha-yashar),
which is the gift of G-d, a portion of G-d on high (matat Eloqim heileq
Eloqa mi-ma'al), is as reliable as Scripture (v'yeish lismokh alav
kmo qra ha-m'phurash), for they are alike (ki shavin hein). And see
the midrash qohelet on the verse (6:9) "tov mareih einayim mei-halokh
naphesh" that it is better to question deeply and to understand in an
enlightened way than to go and repeat one's lesson without reflection
(tov l'ha'amiq u-l'havin b'ein sikhli mi-la-halokh v'lahzor al mishnato
b'li havanat ha-leiv). So therefore if some gemara stands opposed to
our straightforward reasoning, we must dedicate our souls to reconcile
the difficult passage to the conclusion of our reasoning (l'yasheiv
ha-ma'amar ha-muksheh kdai l'hashvoto l'ha-muskam min ha-seikhel).
And whoever does this will find wonders in his study (yimtza nora'ot
b'torato) and will make himself into a great tree (v'ilana raba yitavad).

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

The question of the definition of halakhic death was been discussed many
times on the list.

As I wrote then, R' Halperin's opinion is that death is, by definition,
irreversible (excluding the case of a miracle of divine intervention).
In the past, stoppage of heart and breathing were irreversible.
Therefore they were halakhic death. If they have now become reversible,
they are no longer death.

Today, brain stem death is irreversible. Today, it is death. Tomorrow?
Who knows.

Rabbi Halperin's comment on those who insist that only heart and breath
define death is that, according to them, anyone revived by CPR cannot
go home to his wife because they are not married. She is halakhically
a widow. He cannot take any money from his bank account, because, his
estate belongs, by halakha, to the yor'shim. Just as this sounds absurd,
so too is that old definition of death.

BTW, is it permissible for a widow to live with a dead man - walking
and talking dead, of course.

k"t,
David

I thought you can explain why Avraham at first did not want to listen
to Sarah to drive out Yishmael till he was told "shma b'kola" based
on the machlokes Rambam and Tos. (Sanhedrin 89) whether the mitzva to
listen to a navi extends even to matters the navi says as "good advice"
or only if the navi has an explicit tzivuy (see Minchas Chinuch 516).
Sarah was giving advice, but had no explicit tzivuy, so Avraham did not
think at first that he would be *mechuyav* to listen. (Though you could
be mechalaik and say davka Avraham had that right as he also had a din
navi, but a regular person would not).

Even if you don't like my idea, the Chasam Sofer has a fantastic diyuk
in that sugya in Sanhedrin 89 (Shu"t O.C. 208). The gemara asks how
Yitzchak could listen to Avraham to sacrifice his life for akeidah
against the Torah, and the gemara answers that Avraham was muchzak as a
navi (so he is believed to suspend divrei torah as a hora'as sha'ah).
The gemara's kashe is only concerned with Yitzchak; there is never a
kashe on Avraham (or any navi) being mechuyav to listen to direct nevuah
even if it entails violating divrei Torah!

Chasam Sofer expands this to explain our focus on akeidas *Yitzchak*
davka. Each of the avos intuited kol hatorah kula, and each would have
realized that human sacrifice is antithetical to the whole essence of
Torah. Faced with a nevuah that contradicted everything he believed,
Avraham might have been led to doubt he was correct in other areas.
Kal V'chomer the challenge was greater for Yitzchak, who did not
receive the tzivuy b'nevuah, but had to rely on the mesorah and samchut
of Avraham. L'doros this is the more significant limud, which Chasam
Sofer expands to include our reliance on Chazal even where it defies our
understanding of what is correct (and no, I have no desire to connect
this to the "atzas gedolim" thread going on - I'll leave that to others).

-Chaim B.

*********************


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