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Volume 09 : Number 072

Wednesday, August 7 2002

• Re: Can Halacha Dictate reality
• Re: Ikkarim
• Re: 100 Berachos
• Re: The MB and psaq
• Re: tfillin)
• Re: Basar SheNisalem Min HaAyin
• Re: Basar SheNisalem Min HaAyin
• Re: Basar SheNisalem Min HaAyin
• Re: Ramchal, Musar and Chasidus
• 100 Berachos
• Re: The MB and psaq
• RE: The MB and psaq
• Re: The MB and psaq
• Re: rings- beged isha. ?
• Re: beged ish
• Re: Can Halacha Dictate reality

At 10:23 AM 8/2/02 -0400, Shimon Isaacson wrote:
>I recently came across a story (it is recounted in the early pages of a
>book named Worldmask, by R Akiva Tatz) ...
>                      Afterwards, in describing why he would give such
>unusual advice, the CI is purported to have explained that in hearing
>the description of the ailment he was reminded of a siman in SA dealing
>with treifos. The SA paskened that a beheima with this kind of ailment
>is not a treifa and the Rema disagreed holding that the animal was osur
>as a treifa. Based on this, the CI is alleged to have opined that since
>the "moreh deasrah" of Europe is the Rema, there this individual would
>be b'geder treifa and not have long to live. In EY, where the SA had
>jurisdiction, the individual was not in the category of treifa and would
>be fine. ...


								    BS"D
Mezuzos, Machlokos and Eilu va'Eilu Divrei Elokim Chayim
Rabbi Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer

The Halachic Problem

Do you have a door that leads out to your balcony or backyard? If you
do, you probably have faced (or will face) the following question: Do
you fix the mezuza on the right side of the door as you come in from
the balcony or backyard into the house, or do you fix it on the right
side of the door as you go into that balcony or backyard?

You are not alone. Gedolei HaPoskim for generations have dealt with
this common question. The purpose of this essay is not to provide you
with a practical Halachic psak for this issue. You should approach your
local Rov for that. I am using this case as a springboard to explore
the complex issues that lurk behind this seemingly innocuous question:
How do we figure out or understand what Hashem would like us to do in
this situation? How does He and how do we regard others who follow other
approaches than our own when it comes to a machlokes in practical Halacha?

The Halachic Dispute

The Halachic problem is that if you fix a mezuza on the wrong side of
your doorway, you do not fulfill the mitzva (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah
289:2). You cannot put up two mezuzos, on both sides of the doorway,
just to be sure, because many Poskim (see Igros Moshe Yoreh De'ah 1:176)
prohibit such practice. There is no way to "just be machmir!" You must
pick one side or the other. Which side of the doorway to your balcony
or backyard you should fix the mezuza upon is a longstanding Machlokes
HaPoskim (see She'arim Metzuyanim Ba'Halacha 11:3). HaGaon HaRav Moshe
Feinsteinzt"l (Igros Moshe ibid., 181) held that in completely enclosed
balconies and yards the mezuza should be fixed on the right side of the
doorway as you exit to your yard. The Chazon Ish zt"l (Yoreh De'ah 168:7)
held the opposite _ the mezuza should be fixed on the right side of the
doorway as you enter your house.

The Machashava Issue

As I said, refer to your Rov for practical guidelines in Halacha
L'Ma'aseh. Let us instead tackle the Machashavaissues that underlie this
Halachic problem: Is one approach here right and the other wrong? If we
follow the approach that is, by some objective standards (that Eliyahu
HaNavi may reveal _ see Chiddushei HaGriz al HaTorah 122), wrong, have
we fallen short in our kiyum hamitzvos? Have we then not fulfilled the
Ratzon Hashem in this or any other similar area of Halachic contention?

The Machashava of Halacha

Of course, in all such thorny issues we look to Rabboseinu HaRishonim and
Gedolei Ha'Acharonim for guidance. We begin our pursuit of understanding,
however, at the source, the Gemara:

Eruvin 13b:

    Rabbi Abba said in the name of Shmuel: Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel
    argued for three years, each side claiming the Halacha was as
    they maintained. A bas kol then came forth and stated: Eilu va'eilu
    divrei Elokim chaim (These and those are the living words of Hashem),
    but the Halacha is according to Beis Hillel . . .

The Ritva there explains:

    The French Rabbonim asked how it is possible that these and those are
    the living words of Hashem when these forbid and those allow. They
    answered: When Moshe went up to receive the Torah, he was shown in
    every issue forty_nine manners in which to forbid and forty_nine
    ways in which to allow. Moshe asked Hashem about this. Hashem told
    him that the Chachmei Yisroel in every generation, were to decide
    which manners to follow in their specific times and places . . .

(See also Chagiga 3b; Avos 5:17, and the Maharal in the Derech Chaim
there). The Ritva goes on to say that although this approach is correct,
there is also a yet deeper perspective. He does not tell us what that
deeper perspective might be. Perhaps we can find it in later sources.

Torah Shapes the World

HaGaon HaRav Tzadok HaKohen of Lublin zt"l writes (Tzidkas HaTzaddik 90.
See also Bnei Yissaschar, Chodesh Nissan 4): "The Torah is the map of the
world . . . and so is Yisroel (since they and the Torah are one. This is
because we know that the illumination of Jewish souls is the illumination
of the Torah, as it is said that Yisroel is an acrostic: Yesh Shishim
RibohOsios LaTorah [there are six hundred thousand letters to the Torah]).
The Jews in each generation, therfore, comprise the current map of the
world. New phenomena in the Jewish nation in any generation will create
corresponding new phenomena in the structure of the world."

This idea is not solely a Chassidic one. HaGaon HaRav Eliyahu Meir
Bloch zt"l (Shiurei Da'as, "Darka shel Torah",chap. 5) writes: "When
the Torah was given to Yisroel, the characteristics of its nature were
imparted to the Torah Sages. They, through their thought, determine the
characteristics of nature, which follows the logic and secrets of their
Torah. They decide the reality of Torah, and the reality of the Creation
linked to the Torah."

What is the cause, and what is the effect? The cause is not reality, which
demands the effect of figuring out relevantHalachos. On the contrary,
the cause is Halacha, and the effect is the reality of the world.

Let us note Reb Elya Meir's caveat: "If it is in line with the logic
and secrets of the Torah . . ." Reb Tzadok elsewhere (ibid., 115) makes
a similar remark: "When one is mechadesh a matter in Torah, one must not
do so with any negi'a [vested personal interest] in his heart, i.e., that
he wants the matter turn out so, for the sake of his pride, or to argue
on another, etc. One's chiddush must stem solely from one's yearning to
know the truth. If a person follows these guidelines, then even if he
makes a mistake his words are words of Torah and divrei Elokim chaim."

Not every person under every circumstance can claim to generate divrei
Elokim chaim. Only people whose thoughts and conclusions meet these
criteria are qualified to create divrei Elokim chaim. If these criteria
are met, however, even a mistake(in Talmudic terms, a hava amina) can
be considered divrei Elokim chaim!

Why?

We here, however, are not dealing with theoretical mistakes. We are
discussing practical Halachic opinions _ that happen to conflict. How do
we understand why Hashem allows two (actually, 49+49=98!) contradictory
practical approaches to coexist. Why is the legitimacy of machlokes in
Halacha L'Ma'aseh so inherent in Yahadus?

Again, let us turn to Reb Tzadok (Sichas Malachei HaShareis 5a. HaGaon
HaRav Yisroel Salanter zt"l expresses a similar idea in Or Yisroel 28. See
also Michtav Me'Eliyahu vol. 3 p. 353). In every Halachic matter there may
be conflicting approaches of equal validity. This phenomenon is rooted in
the fact that there are distinctions between souls and personalities. Reb
Tzadok bases this idea on the Gemara's explanation of the bracha made upon
seeing an assembly of 600,000 Jews: Baruch Chacham HaRazim (Berachos 58a),
and the description of distinctions between individuals in Sanhedrin 37a
and 38a. Hashem's Master Plan specifically required a world of diversity.
Am Yisroel is a nation of many different and diverse people. Each member
of our nation is created for his or her specific and unique purpose.

That is why most of the Torah is Be'al Peh (Gittin 60b). Torah She'biktav
corresponds to the entirety of Am Yisroel _ and it is therefore static
and uniform, as is the eternal kedusha of the Klal of Am Yisroel. Torah
She'Be'al Peh, however, corresponds to the particular individuals
within the nation. Therefore, just as there are many variations among
the individual members of Am Yisroel, there are many variations in Torah
She'Be'al Peh.

Reb Tzadok draws an analogy to medicines. Different patients suffering
dissimilar illnesses at distinct times require different _ often opposite
_ Refu'as HaGuf medications. Similarly, different members of Am Yisroel
in dissimilar places at distinct times in history require different _
often opposite _ Refu'as HaNefesh medications.

Hashem created a world full of variety and differences. "Different
strokes for different folks." The variations in Halacha correspond to
the variations among human beings. (A Kabbalistic explanation of these
variations along the lines of chesed andgevurah is cited in the Hakdama
to Tanya).

The inhabitants of the town of Rabbi Eliezer who cut down trees on Shabbos
to make coals to forge knives to perform a Bris Mila that day (according
to his opinion in Shabbos 130a that machshirei mila are docheh Shabbos)
were therefore fulfilling a mitzva and Ratzon Hashem. Their Mara D'Asra,
whom Hashem had provided them as a Rofeh HaNefesh, had made such a
determination. Inhabitants of any other locality who would engage in
the same activity, however, would be liable to capitol punishment!

Two questions arise:

1) We understand that different centers of Torah learning throughout
the generations produced various darkei Avodaand Limud, and, therefore,
different psak halacha. The Hungarian derech differs from the Polish
derech, which in turn differ from Lithuanian and Sefardic derachim (see
Michtav Me'Eliyahu vol. 4 p. 129). There are wide variations in derech
amongPoskim of our generation as well. Most of us are not qualified
to analyze these derachim and render judgments as to their comparative
validity. How then, do we find out who is qualified to state an opinion
that may be considered divrei Elokim chayim?

2) If Rabbi Eliezer's opinion (or any other similar opinion) was valid,
why can one no longer choose to follow such apsak? Who?

Obviously, prowess in Lomdus and Halachic methodology is a precondition
for acceptance as a Posek. Sometimessemicha recognizes that prowess. More
often, haskamos or verbal recognition of universally accepted Gedolei
Hora'a validate the positions of aspiring Poskim.

Reb Tzadok (ibid.), however, addresses an additional qualification. Once
upon a time Shevet Yissachar (who were"yod'ei bina l'ittim" (Divrei
Hayamim 1:12), i.e., they understood what Halachic behavior was suitable
for each generation) and Shevet Levi decided what Halachic approach
was suitable for whom when (Yuma 26a). Rabbi Yochanan in Chagiga 15b
identified their qualification. He explains the pasuk in Malachi: "For
the lips of a Kohen guard wisdom and they will seek Torah from his mouth,
because he is a malach of Hashem Tzevakos." Said Rabbi Yochanan: "Only
if a Rov is like a malach ofHashem Tzevakos may one seek Torah from his
mouth." A malach is an agent (a shaliach) of Hashem. An individual who
views himself only as an agent of Hashem and focusses on the fulfillment
of that agency, is qualified to generate divrei Elokim chayim. The Gemara
(Yuma ibid.) explains the description of Dovid HaMelech as "Hashem imo,"
to mean that Halacha always followed his opinion. Reb Tzadok understands
that this is not just a statement of fact. "Hashem imo" was the reason
that Halacha was always like Dovid. He fulfilled "Shivisi Hashem l'negdi
tamid", and therefore met the criterion of agency that allowed him to
be a malach Hashem Tzevakos.

Only devoted Talmidei Chachomim who are without negi'os and focussed on
detecting Ratzon Hashem, can generatedivrei Elokim chaim. As we will see,
this approach is one understanding of learning lishma.

It is imperative that we note a caveat. I was once asked in a Kiruv class
why the opinion of the Conservative "Rabbinate" that permitted driving
to Shul on Shabbos is not considered divrei Elokim chaim. There are,
of course, many answers to this question, including the simple fact
that their Halachic Decisors do not meet the above criteria. I believe,
however, that we often make the mistake of engaging in a polemic that
disputes the methodology they employed in reaching their conclusions. This
approach ignores the true "Great Divide" between us and them. Even
where their methodology is erroneous, the fact that they do not fulfill
Halacha is not what makes them Non_Orthodox (i.e., Apikorsim, even if,
Tinokos She'nishbu). That would only make them Avaryanim, i.e. less or
non_observant. It is their denial of Torah min HaShamayim, and several
other of the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim that separates them from true Judaism. A
"Movement" that denies the principles of Judaism is unacceptable in
a way that transcends Halachic methodologies or specific questions of
expertise or observance.

Once a Posek is recognized to have attained the above criteria, a
layman is not obliged to ascertain the validity of thatPosek's Halachic
methodology. Hashem helps Poskim to reach legitimate conclusions that are
divrei Elokim chaim, and suitable for the Avodas Hashem of the relevant
people, places and times.

The greatest Poskim became one with the Torah itself, and their capacity
to pasken transcended even the Halachic process itself. Once the Chasam
Sofer zt"l's son, the Ksav Sofer zt"l, felt that his father's proofs in
a certain teshuva were questionable. He asked his father, therefore,
about the validity of the resultant psak. The Chasam Sofer responded
that in hispiskei halacha, the primary determining factor was his sense
of what the psak should be. Specific proofs were secondary in importance
(Nefesh HaRav p. 42. See Eitz Chaim p. 430 for a similar statement by
HaGaon HaRav Chaim of Volozhin zt"l). Psak Halacha

We now turn now to the second question: Why may we no longer follow
opinions that, like Rabbi Eliezer's, have been rejected?

The answer lies in the idea we explored previously, that Torah determines
the reality of Creation. When Am Yisroel, via its Poskim and its Minhagim,
determines specific issues according to the guidelines that decide psak
halacha (i.e., yachid v'rabbim halacha k'rabbim, etc.), that psak shapes
the reality of Creation. When subsequent generations approach their
responsibility in this world, they face a different set of circumstances
than faced by the generation in which the originalmachlokes occurred.

Reb Elya Meir (ibid., chap. 7) explains that this is what Chazal
meant when they said (Shabbos 10a): "Every Dayanthat judges truly and
truthfully is considered by Scripture as a partner with Hashem in the
act of creation." The Poskim decide not only Halachic reality, but also
the structural reality of the world.

As long as the psak is not conclusively decided by Am Yisroel, conflicting
opinions may each represent legitimate avenues of practical Avodas
Hashem. Once, however, the psak has been decided, the rejected opinion is
still Torah, and theoretical divrei Elokim chayim, but it is no longer a
legitimate avenue of practical Avodas Hashem. Under the new circumstances
of reality, following the rejected opinion might be an aveira.

It is easier to make out how various darkei Avoda and Limud correspond
on macro_levels. For example, many sources point out that Beis Shammai's
trend to chumra corresponded to middas hadin while Beis Hillel's trend
to kulla corresponded to middas harachamim. It is more difficult, if not
impossible, at least for us, to identify such parallels on micro_levels
such as our example, mezuza. In terms of Halachic conduct in this area,
however, we have, hopefully, achieved some degree of clarification. No
final decision has been rendered in the machlokes over where to place
the mezuza. We may, therefore, rest assured that whatever our Rabbonim
pasken for us is a legitimate avenue of kiyum mitzvos and Avodas Hashem
(although you might like to keep this essay handy to explain why!).

A Broader Perspective

Implicit in the discussion of eilu va'eilu is, obviously, a plug for
Ahavas Yisroel. When HaGaon HaRav Isser Zalman Meltzer zt"l first became
Rov in Slutzk, an argument broke out in shul whether to say Av HaRachamim
on Shabbos Mevarchim Av. The arguing parties asked Reb Isser Zalman to
clarify the proper minhag. He said: "This is the minhag: some say Av
HaRachamim, some do not, and both sides quarrel about it!"

On a more serious plane, eilu va'eilu teaches us to tolerate others'
minhagim and derachim, and to realize that those derachim may also be
legitimate avenues of Avodas Hashem. In areas that are the subject of
legitimate Halachic debate, there is no one emes, and no justification
for personal machlokes, much less, chas ve'shalom, sinas chinam.

There is, however, another, more important mussar haskel for us to take
away from this discussion.

Reb Tzadok (Yisroel Kedoshim 66b) notes that every member of Am Yisroel
is rooted in Torah She'Be'al Peh and possesses the unique qualities that
it imparts. Although we don't always realize it, each of us contributes a
unique quality to the ongoing weave of the rich tapestry of Am Yisroel.
Therefore, in a broader sense, each of us is involved in the ongoing
creation of Torah She'Be'al Peh. Although most of us are not great
scholars and will not produce great works of Torah, with our Torah and
mitzvos we all manipulate and shape the Creation (Reb Chaim Volozhiner
explains this process in the first section of theNefesh HaChaim).

This quality that Hashem granted us is not just a gift. It is also
a tremendous responsibility. As participants in the creation of
Torah She'Be'al Peh, we must ensure that are lives are divrei Elokim
chayim. That means that we must lead our lives lishma _ focussed on
discovering and fulfilling Ratzon Hashem.

The Kotzker Rebbe zt"l (Emes v'Emuna p. 26) notes that lishma begins in
the way we learn. Torah lishma, said the Kotzker, is the same as Torah
kishma. We learn Torah to fulfill the meaning of its name. Torah means
"Teaching," and our Torah is Toras Chaim, the Teaching of Life. If we
learn Torah with the intent that it elevate and refine our lives, our
Torah islishma, and divrei Elokim chayim.

Then, of course, our ma'aseh, our lives themselves must be divrei Elokim
chayim. I recently met a Reform "Rabbi" who had previously been a police
officer in Yerushalayim. He claimed the catalyst for his subsequent
career choice was his perception that the Charedim in Yerushalayim
were no better in their middos and personal lifestyles than their
Chilonicounterparts. He concluded that kiyum mitzvos did not refine the
Charedim in any significant way. If so, he reasoned, why bother?

I don't think it is relevant whether his assertion is true or not. We
cannot allow situations that provide opportunities to even say such
things about us to occur! We must lead lives that are such a Kiddush
Hashem that no one would dream that we might ever engage in unrefined,
much less base, behavior. We may apply this yardstick to the recent
spate of negative articles in the American press concerning behavior of
certain segments of our society. Whether the allegations are true or not
is irrelevant. If our lives were divrei Elokim chayim and "v'ra'u kol
Amei Ha'Aretz ki shem Hashem nikra alecha" no one could ever have made
such allegations. It is said that HaGaon HaRav Naftali Amsterdam zt"l set
a goal to become such a pure tzaddikthat everyone he met would want to
be a religious Jew (Reb Yaakov p. 29). If we measure our lives by this
standard they will truly be divrei Elokim chayim _ living words of Hashem.

NOTES
"""""
1. Chazal note that the Sanhedrin determines the reality of the world
when they declare a leap year, see Yerushalmi Kesuvos1:2, and Encyclopedia
Talmudis vol. 1 pp. 201_202.

2. It is debatable whether the classic concept of Mara d'Asra still
exists. Once, however, local psak determined local reality.HaGaon HaRav
Yechiel Michel Gordon zt"l of Lomza related that an indivdual in Volozhin
suffered from a certain form of lung disease. The person intended to leave
the city and move to a place with better air. The individual's father
appeared to him in a dream and told him that his specific form of lung
disease was the subject of a machlokes between the Rema and the Sha'agas
Aryeh. The Rema held that if this particular form of lung disease occurs
in a cow, then the animal is treif, as it is incapable of living for
another year. The Sha'agas Aryeh, however, had paskened that an animal
with this disease was nonetheless kosher. (The fascinating history of the
psak of umma haserucha ladofen im makka badofen is well documented. See,
for instance, Makor Baruch chap. 17 section 2.) The father therefore
warned his son to remain in Volozhin. His rationale was that in Volozhin,
the Sha'agas Aryeh's town, the psak _ and therefore the Ratzon Hashem _
followed the ruling of the Sha'agas Aryeh. The disease would not threaten
this person's life as long as he remained there. Were he, however, to
leave Volozhin, he would fall under the ruling of the Rema and would be
at mortal risk. (I am indebted to Rabbi Avraham Kivelevitz for finding
the source of this ma'aseh in Rabbi Menachem M. Yashar zt"l's essay in
the She'eilos U'Teshuvos Sha'agas Aryeh Mahaduras Machon Chasam Sofer
note 2.)

3. Reb Tzadok notes that the use of name Tzevakos _ "Lord of Hosts"
_ in this context connotes a variety of individuals. The quality of
malach Hashem allows the Rov to understand the proper Refu'as HaNefesh
for each different individual. (In Divrei HaYamim2:36 and Shabbos 119b,
Talmidei Chachomim are called "Malachei Elokim." Reb Tzadok understands
that description in light of the term Elohim in Parashas Mishpatim that
means judges.)

On the lines of the old debate under this title, I put together some of my
thoughts.  Micha was kind enough to post them in the articles section of the
AishDas website.  I'd appreciate comments and criticisms on what I wrote,
particularly from those who disagree.  [I already received comments from one
person to the extent of "I disagree because I don't like the idea."  That's
not particularly helpful.]

http://www.aishdas.org/articles/crossroads.htm

Gil Student

YZ: In addition to the Brochos: Sheloi Osani Isha, </BLOCKQUOTE>

RCS: She'asani kirtzono?

YZ: 24 Brochos including Yiru Eininu.

RCS: Only in chu"l.

My point was to highlight the different Brochos that have issues WRT
women, in both of the above there are Chilukei Minhogim.

Kol Tuv,
Yitzchok Zirkind

On Fri, Jul 26, 2002 at 12:57:44PM -0400, Feldman, Mark wrote:
: According to RSMandel, the MB was meant to summarize the writings of
: the various achronim, not to decide among them or render psak. If you
: think about it, the MB was not intending to reflect the minhag (e.g.,
: to use eiruvin, as he himself did), just the written texts....

On Fri, Jul 26, 2002 at 05:32:37PM +0000, Seth Mandel wrote:
: I will add to R. Moshe's argument (with which I concur): those who say that 
: the CC meant it to be a sefer psak still have to explain (and have not yet) 
: why it is that even the talmidim in Radin did not wear the tzitzis of their 
: talis kotons outside...

Okay, I'm TOTALLY confused. Why are we arguing, and bringing proofs to
"RSMandel's position"? He gave us a direct citation from the haqdamah
of the book. Why bring an argument that indicates one side over the
other when the thing has a ra'ayah berurah, muchrach, written black on
white by the author?

-mi

In a message dated 5/26/02 7:03:44pm EDT, Joelirich@aol.com writes:
> I remember learning that the tfillin of a niftar must be checked before 
> their 
> used again but I can't find a  source.Does this sound familiar to anyone?

In the Leket Hakemach Hachadash Simon 36 s"k 28 he says:

that the custom was spread, and so brings the Misgeres Zahav on the KSA,
to check the Tfilin from a Niftar that was sold or is Choviv to his
heirs or students, see there the reason, and in Lkutei MRYC see (s"k 36)
from the Yerushalmi. (from the yerushalmi there is proof to the contrary).

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

In a message dated 8/5/02 12:22:14pm EDT, gil_student@hotmail.com writes:
> However, benidon didan where a reliable caterer brings cholent to a shul
> and then it is served the next morning to the daveners, is not cholent in
> itself a siman that the meat is kosher? How often is non-kosher cholent
> made? ...

So if one finds a pot of Cholant in the street (on Shabbos) he may eat it?

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

On Fri, Aug 02, 2002 at 09:48:14AM -0400, Gil Student wrote:
: However, benidon didan where a reliable caterer brings cholent to a shul
: and then it is served the next morning to the daveners, is not cholent in
: itself a siman that the meat is kosher? How often is non-kosher cholent
: made? ...

I originally thought of this as a joke, but I realize it applies to
RGS's suggestion literally. Are you offering a klal: rov metzuyim eitzel
chulent mumchim heim?

I'm not sure the rov is large enough to be relied upon. C Jews make
chulent, as do frum people who aren't mumchim. You're effectively
reducing the level of kashrus inspection to that of the least observant
chulent-maker in town. Do you eat in her/his home?

More significantly, I'm not sure we can make our own chazaqos.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 "And you shall love H' your G-d with your whole
micha@aishdas.org            heart, with your entire soul, with all you own."
http://www.aishdas.org       Love is not two who look at each other,
Fax: (413) 403-9905          It is two who look in the same direction.

R' Yitzchok Zirkind wrote:
>So if one finds a pot of Cholant in the street (on Shabbos) he may eat it?

I don't know that one would any more than one would eat meat found on the
ground in front of a kosher butcher.  But lichora it should be mutar like
the case of teisha chanuyos.

Micha wrote:
>C Jews make chulent, as do frum people who aren't mumchim. You're
>effectively reducing the level of kashrus inspection to that of the least
>observant chulent-maker in town.

Lav davka that C Jews make cholent.  I've know quite a few C Jews in my
life, none of whom make cholent on any regular basis.  Besides, how easy it
is to treif up cholent?  Assuming that these people are buying kosher meat,
which is a safe assumption for even C Jews (who observe Shabbos enough to
make cholent), there isn't much else that can treif it up.

>More significantly, I'm not sure we can make our own chazaqos.

This isn't a new chazakah.  If you estimate that there is a rov then the
food is mutar.

Gil Student

Fascinating Post on Ramchal. Dr Leiman discussed Ramchal and these issues
in one of his shiurim. It is fascinating that Ramchal is considered
one of the mainstays and founding influences in both Tnuas HaMussar and
Chassidus, notwithstanding these issues. Any explanations out there?

Steve Brizel
Zeliglaw@aol.com

From: Yzkd@aol.com
:In addition to the Brochos: Sheloi Osani Isha, Tzitzis, Tfilin, Birchos
:Krias Shma, Birchas Hamozozn (sofeik).
:24 Brochos including Yiru Eininu.

Why would you include Yiru einenu (that they don't say) and not she'asani
kirtzono (that they do)?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

In a message dated 08/06/2002 3:19:10pm EDT, 
micha@aishdas.org writes:
> Okay, I'm TOTALLY confused. Why are we arguing, and bringing proofs to
> "RSMandel's position"? He gave us a direct citation from the haqdamah
> of the book....

There's a theory that once the posek has written, the writing takes on a 
reality of its own notwithstanding the author's intent.

KT
Joel Rich

From: Micha Berger [mailto:micha@aishdas.org]
> Okay, I'm TOTALLY confused. Why are we arguing...

Because some people (both on and off-list) refuse to be convinced.
This attitude may derive from the fact that today most people consider
the MB to be a sefer psak. Presumably, the naysayers would argue that
the CC was overly modest in his hakdamah.

BTW, if anyone has the hakdamah to the Aruch HaShulchan (the part
dealing with his purpose in writing the work) and could fax it to me,
I would appreciate it. I've looked at a number of printings, and they
all skip the hakdamah.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

In a message dated 08/06/2002 4:02:04pm EDT, MFeldman@CM-P.COM writes:
> BTW, if anyone has the hakdamah to the Aruch HaShulchan (the part
> dealing with his purpose in writing the work) and could fax it to me,
> I would appreciate it. I've looked at a number of printings, and they
> all skip the hakdamah.

The Hakdama is in Choshen Mishpat, NOT Orach Chayim.

SBA wrote:
>But I was asking, has anyone noticed women (and indeed men)
>remove rings before netilas lulav?

See the Rama in OC 651:7 that midina there is no need to remove rings but
the minhag is to do so. The Mishnah Berurah 36 quotes some acharonim who say
that even midina one needs to remove rings. No, I've never seen anyone do
it.

Gil Student

>> RCS wrote:
>>> But I think in EY the presumption is that surrounding society is solely
>>> Jewish. I was asking whether we determine standards of Begged Ish/Isha
>>> based on standards of non-Jewish society.<snip>

> On 2 Aug 2002 at 10:22, Arie Folger wrote:
>> Solely Jewish, but not solely religious.

On Monday 05 August 2002 13:13, Carl M. Sherer wrote:
> Source? You'd include mumarim and tinokos she'nishbu?

This was an observation. You wrote that "in EY the presumption is that
surrounding society is solely Jewish", and I remarked that this is
factually incorrect.

No halakhik argument (yet). I am trying to see where you take your
argument, first.

Arie Folger

R' Shimon Isaacson asked <<< are there any clear sources, kabbalistic
or otherwise, that indicate that halacha and/or psak can influence
physical reality?>>>

The example I remember (from 10th perek Kesubos IIRC) was of a girl born
in the beginning of Adar Sheni. (I might say "plain Adar", but that will
introduce unneeded problems.) About three years later someone has sexual
relations with her, towards the end of Adar. We'll say that at the time
of said act, it was not yet clear whether or not Beis Din would declare
an Adar Sheni for that year.

If Beis Din *does* declare an Adar Sheni, then the act was in Adar
Rishon, and she was not get three years old, and so her besulim will
grow back. But if Beis Din does *not* declare an Adar Sheni, then she
was already three years old the the time of the act, and so her besulim
will *not* grow back. Or that's how I remember it, at least.

If I do remember that case correctly, it would seem to fit the requested
parameters: It is a biological event which will occur - or not occur -
depending totally on the actions of Beis Din.

(The hairs of a potential Bar Mitzvah might fit the example too. But the
way it was explained to me, it is possible for a pre-Bar Mitzvah boy to
have such hairs, only that their status is different from post-Bar Mitzvah
hairs. No biological event is occurring (or not occurring) there, only
that the same hairs would have a different halachic impact dependent on
the actions of Beis Din. The case of the 3-year-old girl in different,
as I was taught that it is not merely a different halachic status of
the same biology, but that the biological growth would take a different
actual course.)

Akiva Miller

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