Avodah Mailing List

Volume 09 : Number 058

Friday, July 5 2002

• Fried chicken on the seder night(s)
• Ervah in the Workplace
• Re: Halacha as Experiential Reality
• Re: Halacha as Experiential Reality
• Re: Tur organization
• Re: Instinct for Moral Behavior
• Re: Parallel massorot
• Re: The/A mesorah
• Re: Derashah and Sevarah
• Re: The MB and psaq
• Re: Disputation at Barcelone
• Re:RYBS and Aggadata
• RE: Ervah in the Workplace
• Re: Sefiras Haomer and Safek
• Omer question
• Re: Tur organization
• Re: Forward article about ritually observant boxer
• Amazing Piaczsesner, Visualizations, Continued
• Re: Omer question
• Re: Omer question

On Areivim, the issue of frying chicken arose. This reminded me of a
R' Reisman tape I heard a while ago about tigun. Basically, we pasken
tigun k'bishul. If so, then we should be allowed to eat fried chicken
on the seder night(s), since only roasted chicken is not eaten.

R' Reisman asked R' Pam, z'l, about this, and R' Pam was hesitant to
allow it, since the minhag of k'lal yisroel for years has been to only
eat boiled chicken [or baked chicken cooked with an abundance of water
in the pan], and we don't want to tamper with a minhag carelessly.

I realize that, with the upcoming leap year, there is plenty of time
until Pesach, however, I'd like to know if anyone else has minhag of
eating fried chicken on the seder night(s), and if anyone is aware of
any shu"t discussing this topic. Allowing fried chicken would go a long
way to having my kids enjoy the seder even more then they already do.

KT
Aryeh

I have a college aged talmid who raised with me the following question
(slightly edited):

>I work for a graduate student named [name of female]. She and I have a very
> good
> working relationship. I'm learning a lot of great stuff from her and
> getting a lot done. As with almost everyone in the Hospital, she is not
> frum. This becomes a problem every so often (about half the time), when
> she wears clothing that is not tzanuah.

> Obviously there is not much that can be done. To be honest, my real
> problem is that this will be an issue on a much larger scale for the rest
> of my professional life. It is 100% inevitable that I will end up working
> in a lab with someone who might be attractive and even less modest. Here,
> even though I can walk walk around the university and jerusalem
> with my head down, you can't really do that when you're working with
> people. So my questions are 1) seeing as I have to look at what is
> considered halachically ervah to do my job, what do I do? 2) even if I
> find a solution to this problem, it's bound to happen about 50 more times
> working in labs for the rest of my life on a much worse scale. How can one
> knowingly put themselves in this position? 

The questions that I seek input on specifically are as follows:

Is there any heter (sources please) for seeing ervah that generates
hirhurim in situations that are almost impossible, if not impossible
to avoid (such as the above described workplace)? Do we just rely
on ones rachmana patrei? Does a future ones justify putting oneself
in the position in the first place (I am aware of the machlokes ba'al
hamaor and ramban in the sugya of mila of a choleh sheyesh bo sakana in
eiruvin)? Is there a halachic basis (other than ones rachmana patrei)
that justifies working in such situations (or must we simply relocate
to more wintry climes).

Thoughts?
KT, Shimon Isaacson
	
Andre D. Isaacson
Kostelanetz & Fink
530 Fifth Avenue, 22nd Floor
New York, NY  10036
(212) 808-8100

On Mon, Jul 01, 2002 at 12:16:11PM -0400, DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
: Your distinction certainly would simplify things. One can experience
: fire, but not minute electrical currents running through microscopic
: circuits embedded on silicon chips. So, cell phones and computer games
: for everyone on Shabbos, right?

Electricity isn't fire. Electricity is assur either because of the boneh /
makeh bepatish of completing a circuit or because of the impermissability
of its effects, the lights, sounds and sparks that it makes.

Far from being an exception, this is a case in point!

On Mon, Jul 01, 2002 at 04:33:35PM -0400, Arie Folger wrote:
: RYSE would indeed require that the woman remain an 'agunah, and one reason
: I had for posting this is because I have too little information on the
: WTC 'agunot to figure out whether they ultimately relied on DNA. More
: info welcome.

This notion of not using DNA fits the "if it can't be experienced, don't
consider it" shitah.

To my mind, the question is therefore whether we apply this rule only to
the metzi'us or also to forms of birur. If you say the latter, than how
can one use DNA as halachic birur, even if its birur of a human-scale
reality?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

RDF wrote:
> Your distinction certainly would simplify things. One can experience
> fire, but not minute electrical currents running through microscopic
> circuits embedded on silicon chips. So, cell phones and computer games
> for everyone on Shabbos, right?

Nu, who says that these are biblically prohibited? Delve more into the
original debate (around the beginning of the 19th century) and you'll
see the matter seems far from clear. The clearest prohibition (and that
is far from a clear matter) is uvda de'hol. Go and define that.

> Also, the difference between glatt vs. standard kosher sort of disproves
> your point. Under the laws of kashruth, one can manipulate the internal
> organs of a flawed but properly slaughtered animal and conclude, perhaps
> erroneously, that the animal is free from disease. Glatt says no, as a
> scientific matter these manipulations aren't scientific enough to be truly
> predictive of disease....

Who says treifah is about illness? A certain Katznelson wrote HaTalmud
ve'hokhmat harefuah in the late 19th century. His claim (which he supports
well), is that the prohibition on treifah is about a particular class of
health issues: pathological anatomy. Acc. to him the Talmud's categories
of treifah adequately cover all the cases of PA, and nothing else. I will
also cite another piece of evidence: an animal that injected poison and
will soon die is NOT a treifah.

Glatt is indeed an experiential scientific component of figuring out
whether the tissue of the lungs has any perceptible pathology which,
since we consider ourselves non bekiim, should cause us to abstain from
eating that animal's flesh.

Arie Folger

On Tue, Jul 02, 2002 at 12:42:02AM +0300, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
: > dinei mamunos, but rather a din of "achicha".

: AIUI you're classifying Ribis as a bein adam l'chaveiro...

I was simply quoting the pasuq, which is also the maqor for permitting
ribis WRT nachri'im. If it were dinei mamunos, it would be discouraged
if not assur, similar to gezel.

I didn't think about the question you raise.

:                            I would understand it as a din in issur 
: v'heter, which would explain its placement in YD. The money of Ribis 
: is assur just like tarfus or basar b'chalav or nida. 

Makes sense to me.

However, there is a fundamental Jewish unity component to the purpose
of the issur. The pasuq outright tells you it's assur because brothers
lend eachother money without interest.

(BTW, another proof it's not mamunus. We are makpid about words as ribis,
even though there is no shoveh perutah.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

On Mon, Jul 01, 2002 at 07:13:07PM +0300, Akiva Atwood wrote:
:> This argues against a literal definition of yeitzer hatov.
:> I have no problem with that, but I want to point it out.

: Well, IIRC Chazal say that children don't get a "yetzer haTov" until
: Bar/Bas Mitzvah. I might be wrong about the age -- but there is a definite
: idea that we aren't born with a YhT.

According to the Gra, Peirush al Kama Agados (which can be found as an
appendix in The Juggler and the King), this refers to the late onset of
the neshamah. The nefesh one gets at birth, but the neshamah develops
and isn't complete until bar mitzvah.

That is /certainly/ not a literal peshat in "yeitzer hatov". It
makes it about man's quest for HQBH vs his animal nature, not good vs
evil. (Although one could certainly see the overlap.)


On Tue, Jul 02, 2002 at 09:58:58AM -0400, David Riceman wrote:
:> It's clear that man has no *inate* instinct for moral behavior -- therefore
:> it must be taught.

...
: The analogy is quite good. The Kuzari (echoing Plato) points out that
: even a band of thieves has a form of morality. It is the particular
: implementation of morality that must be taught.

On Tue, Jul 02, 2002 at 09:44:30PM +0300, Akiva Atwood wrote:
: I was refering to an absolute morality -- the kuzari (IMO) is referring
: to a relative morality.

This is particularly interesting if you associate the Gra's nara"n with
RSRH's symbols of 6, 7, and 8. Dr. Isaac Levy includes this explanation
in his English translation of Hirsch's commentary to Bamidbar 16:41:

     The origin of this meaning is to be found in the work of the
     Creation. The visible material world created in six days received
     with the seventh day a day of remembrance of, and bond with its
     invisible L-rd and Creator, and thereby its completed consummation.
     Similarly the symbolism of the number seven in the Menora, in the
     Temple, in the Mussaf offerings, in the sprinklings of the blood
     on Yom Kippur, in the Festivals of Pessach and Succoth, in Sabbath,
     Schmita, Tumma etc. etc. The symbolism of the number eight: starting
     afresh on a higher level, an octave higher. The eighth day for Mila,
     Schmini Atzereth and Israel as the eighth of G-d's Creations. With
     the creation of Israel G-d laid the groundwork for a fresh, higher
     mankind and a fresh higher world, for that shamayim chadashim and
     the `eretz chadashah for which Israel and its mission is to be the
     beginning and instrument (Is. LXV,17).

     So that there are three elements in us. (a) our material sensuous
     bodies, like the rest of the created visible world = 6; (b) the
     breath of free will, invisible, coming from the Invisible One = 7;
     (c) the calling of Jew, coming from the historical choice of Israel
     = 8.

Strong similarity to the Gra's naran: nefesh is the dog yelling hav hav,
ru'ach is the deciding mind, neshamah as above.

If the two do hold the same shitah, then the Gra is saying the yeitzer
hatov is the drive to "start afresh at a higher level". This drive to
be beyond what one is, to constantly improve, leads one to want to be
moral -- whatever the person happens to think "moral" means.

That's very different than the naive taitch of YhT, a desire to be good
that identifies good as innately as epicurean desires are tied to an
awareness of what the person finds delicious.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

RMB:
> Technically, Judaism is the religion and culture of the
> survivors of Judaea. But I think your reponse is overly focussed in
> this direction.

> The real question is whether such a kehillah is observing the beris Sinai,
> and if so, if their observance can/ought have any impact on ours.

ZGG. This explains why even among those rishnonim who believed Eldad
haDani (who are they, BTW?), I cannot recall any discussion of parallel
masorot. Following your statement I would say that the question is
moot, as all they were interested was whether Eldad's reports had any
value to enhance our observance. Thus, instead of dismissing him as a
fraud or considering his massorah to be vastly superior (he does start
his halakhot with a statement in the order of "Thus says Eldad of Dan,
in the name of the neviim, in the name of the elders, in the name of
Yehoshu'ah bin Nun, in the name of Mosheh"), the Mordekhai and others
consider whether his halakhot fit into our mold.

Arie

On Mon, Jul 01, 2002 at 06:52:37PM -0400, RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
:>: Think about this: Let's say a community followed some combination of
:>: Tanach and Josephus, how would you view them?

:> But we're talking about one that didn't break from TSBP. Rather, one whose
:> TSBP evolves differently than ours. And yet evolved entirely within the
:> rules of pesaq.

: This pre-supposes Josephus broke with TSBP.

No, it presupposes Josephus wasn't a ba'al mesorah. Following Josephus
is therefore following historical evidence, not the flow of the halachic
process.

: I once meta Mormon at a social gathering and he told me I am from the
: tribe of Joseph and you are from the tribe of Judah. Now while YOU might
: no agree to his pedigree as one of the 10 lost ribes, it is likely you
: would not recognize the Judaism of any bona fide descendants of the 10
: lost tribes either.

Not our hypothetical. The question (after refinement of language) was
whether a hypothetical real descendent is within the Sanaitic covenent in
following his mesorah, or if he'd be bound by the evolution of halachah
by Sanhedrin and the majority once he learned of us.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

On Mon, Jul 01, 2002 at 08:00:13PM -0400, RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
: 1) Halachah miSinai with a later "guess" as to the source
: 2) Halachah miSinai or Miderabbana with a pasuk as merely an asmachta
: {mnemonic devise perhaps}

But even your #2 in the case of derabbanan requires, according to
some rishonim, that there was a mesorah for the derashah back to Sinai.

: 3) Torah implies but the mining of the Halachah came out LATER the Sinai
: albeit it might have been implciti at Sinai...

Li nir'eh this is the overwhelming majority. Every time there is a
machlokes tana'im about the lema'seh, along with a machlokes over
the derashos, this is the probable cause.

: 4) Drasha is known but implication is unknown {I believe Rashi on Gzeria
: Shava syas something on this. Location of Source is unkown to me....

How does this differ from #3 in any pragmatic sense?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

RDSu wrote:
> Reb Simon wrote:
>> -- furthermore, in the S"A he paskens in a way differently than any of the
>> options he presented in the BY

> That's not unusual. In the BY he's explaining the Tur. In SA he's
> paskening. So I recall from my Kollel days, when we learnt Tur, BY and SA
> in the afternoons.

Not sure. The impression I get (from decent ongoing experience) is that
the only places where BY doesn't pasqen or paskens differently in SA than
the non psaq of BY is when (type 1) there is no overwhelmingly convincing
shittah, or (type 2) where he decides, against his habit, to follow
Ramo's methodology and consult a bunch of Ashkenazy poskim and state
their minhag (rather rare, but a bunch of those are in hilkhot meli'hah).

I think that whenever RYQ wrote that (both the 1st and 2nd type) way he
was trying to show the inconclusive nature of his investigation, and thus
make sure we understand his psaq in this context. (as in, its already a
'humrah, no need to heap even more 'ghumrot on top of that one)

Arie Folger

In a message dated 7/3/02 2:37:00 PM, Micha Berger writes:
> Woah Nelly!

The last time I heard "Whoa, Nelly!," was when sportscaster Keith Jackson
described some neanderthal Ohio State lineman separating a University of
Illinois running back's knee from his thigh. I hardly think my comments
on the Ramban's Disputation at Barcelona are comparable to that, at least
from the running back's point of view. But I won't insist on an apology.

> First, RRW and I were discussing derashah, hemeneutics, not aggadic
> stories.

> Second, the connection between stories and metaphors and halachah is
> minimal. The mashal is an aggadic tool, not a halachic one. Although
> there are times where Chazal presume that the aggadic story wouldn't
> have a hero violate halachah, so tangentially a halachic conclusion can
> be conveyed by the story. (Thus my "minimal" rather than "none".)

Nowadays it's easy to draw distinctions between hermaneutic darasha and
narrative aggadata. We all have lots of books and formalistic means of
preserving such distinctions when we talk about the history of Jewish
ideas. In the Ramban's time, however, there's much evidence that the
largely oral history of Judaism was conveyed down the generations by a
midrashic mish-mosh that mixed up these categories except, of course,
in the minds of the educated elite who had access to mishnaic texts and
commentaries. That's the background to the Disputation at Barcelona.

> If you recieved a different impression from the Ramban's viku'ach,
> perhaps we should be discussing what gave you that impression rather
> than accept this idea as a given.

All I was saying is that Ramban employed fairly rigorous rhetorical
techniques (techniques that are still used today in academic argument)
to use psak to trump derasha, including derasha that included non-aggaditc
elements (again, it was a mish-mosh). I didn't mean to suggest that pure
aggadata needs to be deconstructed using the methods one might apply to
halachic questions.

David Finch

In a message dated 7/3/02 2:37:00 PM, Micha Berger writes:
<< I would say it is quite Brisk to say halachah is determined only by
the halachic process, regardless of other explorations of truth. Our
discussions here of R' Chaim's position on Radziner techeiles as a case
in point. . .

<<the bas qol tells us that divrei E-lokim chaim is a broader concept
than halachic pesaq. Pisqei Beis Shammai are emes without being halachah.
Would we then not be able to derive aggadic points from them? >>

I imagine that RYBS wasn't much interested in exploring "aggadic points"
as a means of reconciling questions of halachic ontology. If there are
two images that one cannot simultaneously hold in one's mind without
smiling, it's RYBS's existential Briskerism and the notion of independent
aggadic truth.

David Finch

From: Shimon Isaacson [mailto:Temp-2@kflaw.com]
>  This becomes a problem every so often (about half the 
> time), when she wears clothing that is not tzanuah.
<snip>
> Is there any heter (sources please) for seeing ervah that generates
> hirhurim in situations that are almost impossible, if not impossible
> to avoid (such as the above described workplace)? 

See my post at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol08/v08n110.shtml#14.

Also, the original questioner asked about seeing a woman not dressed
tziusdikly, not necessarily that it caused hirhurim. My guess is that
most people who walk the streets of NYC are habituated to seeing this
kind of dress and that it doesn't cause hirhurim. See Rabbi YH Henkin's
article quoted in the above post.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

Here are some mareh mkomos on this inyan

1) HaMoadim BaHalacha- R Zevin extensively discusses this issue. The
Dvar Avraham holds that if one counted a day in uncertainty as to the
proper day, one cannot count furtheer with a bracha because the essence
of any mitzva that requires a count requires certainty, as opposed to a
doubt. I would also suggest looking at the Minchas Chinuch with regards
to this mitzva and Pesach Sheni for other discussions on this topic.

2) Look at R Daniel Feldman's Binah Bseforim . he has an extensive
discussion of sefirah.

Steve Brizel
Zeliglaw@aol.com

From: MIKE38CT@aol.com
> A guy counting sefira forgets to count on a Thursday night. He doesn't
> realize he has forgotten, and in his community they bring in Shabbos
> early at 7PM. He says Kabalas Shabbos, and suddenly realizes he forgot
> to count the night before. Can he count without a bracha for that day,...

I would assume it would depend on the opinions in 489:3, it appears that
meikur hadin after plag is not yet the time of the next nights sfira
(see MB, SA Horav (Par. 12) there). I don't see why kabolas Shabbos
should make a difference.

I just looked in the Sefer "Sfiras Haomer" (Cohen) who also holds this
way, and brings many poskim including Igros Moshe OH v4 #99:3.

Chaim G. Steinmetz
cgsteinmetz@juno.com

On 3 Jul 2002 at 18:56, Micha Berger wrote:
>:                            I would understand it as a din in issur 
>: v'heter, which would explain its placement in YD. The money of Ribis 
>: is assur just like tarfus or basar b'chalav or nida. 

> Makes sense to me.

In an off-list discussion with someone I thought of another 
justification for Ribis being in YD. Gezel, gneiva etc. are Mishpat - 
they're things that are intuitive to the proper functioning of 
society. Ribis feels more like a chok - it's not intutive. Especially 
once you get beyond simple monetary interest. 

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

The Rambam (Hilchot Chovel u'Mazzik 5:1) qualifies the issur of hitting
someone else "derech bizayon". The Minchat Chinuch 48 # gimmel qualifies
the issur "....b'makeh aviv i'imo o chavero, haynu DAVKA BELO RESHUT,
aval im ....chaveiro OMRIM LO SHE'YAKEM ... EINO OVER b'LAV ZEH v'eino
chayav malkot velo mita ....". See also: Ralbach in Kuntrus ha'Semicha
101 "harei amar l'chaveiro hakeini u'pzaani....patur aliba d'kuli alma,
v'NIREH SHE'HU MUTAR".

So it seems to me that a boxer who knows that he'll be hit goes in
willingly.

Josh

Really good he'aros from five separate correspondents, check out
especially the similar points in the last two (as you will note, the
last one is pretty deep - the "Ich" concept is a really good one, see R'
Shimon's Hakdomo to Sha''arei Yosher, the greatest masterpiece of Jewish
thought written in the last couple of hundred years or so).

YGB

>I recently davened at a mincha minyan which had a "live" shot of the kotel 
>on the screen.  OK nobody was moving

>Its not so much that Rav Zalesnik would argue with the Rebbe, but he would 
>more likely quote from the Pissukim in Parshas BiShalach in the Shira to 
>arrive at the same point.

>My understanding:  HKBH's world is the real one - and His hand is real; our
>world, and therefore our "hands", are NOT real, they're just the
>representation/facsimile of reality made available to us. Lesaber es haozen
>is true of our entire sense of this world being the real one, and means
>we're given a tool to comprehend something about Him, although of course
>there's nothing physical/finite about Him it's just that in His wisdom he
>made us physical/finite so our tool to comprehend Him is a physical
>approximation of His reality. As such, there should be objection to
>visualizing a physical representation, distinct from forging a physical
>representation of that visualization.

>what he misses is that very often we make g-d into our anthromorphization -
>i.e. we limit g-d by how we anthropomorhize him. such that most ltvishe
>divrie torahs' questions and answers make g-d into the great rebbe/rosh 
>yeshiva in the sky

>re: visualizing the infinite and the danger of avoda zara.
>
>I think the issue is central to the machloket regarding the tzimztum as to 
>whether we take it kipshuto or keiyuno.
>
>I mean by this that among the talmidim of the Ari there are differences 
>which are well articulated in the famous letter of the Lubavitcher Rebbe 
>no. 11 (easy to access on chabad cyberspace!). he outlined the 4 
>possiblilities.
>
>In my humble opinion all of life is imaginative and the question is to 
>which imaginative palimspet do we ascribe. We live in  post freudian world 
>and i might add post Zadokian (as in Reb Zadok) who is so careful 
>(especially in his machshavot harutz) to articulate the pitfalls of 
>dimyonot...how do we translate this ?illusions or perhaps fantasy in the 
>psychological meaning of the term (not Hollywood!). This he pits dimyon 
>with the true vision of the world as "ein od milvado" which as an 
>alternative worldview is equally fantastic (if we take a scentific object 
>verification standpoint).
>
>According to James Hillman we live in our fantasies we think through them 
>and we project them onto the world.
>
>Thus applying this to your discussions of icons in prayer Reb Aaron Halevi 
>of Starosselye (Avodat Halevi and Kuntres haavodah) also battles with the 
>dissolution of all dimyon all the while maintaining that the world is 
>nothing and efes, (a dimyon itself perhaps although he denies it) and 
>forms the basis of his argument with the Mittle Rebbe regarding "false" 
>hispailus in prayer i.e. fales dimyonos of ecstasy.
>
>It seems that the battle between the philosophers and the mythicists 
>hinges around the notion of a memutze an intermediary however all insist 
>this is spiritual.
>
>All is spiritual in a sense... the world can only be viewed through the 
>eyes of perception which is neuropsychologically predetermined by all 
>sorts of lens.
>
>I would like to suggest that we can perceive the world though a number of 
>different lens or i prefer to call them concentric rings. the innermost is 
>the ich...the i that perceives and must survive at all cost, then the 
>family unit those i would die for, then my local ethnic upbringing that 
>makes me sense the world at times of crisis, the sort of thing that makes 
>a non frum yid insist on a frum burial, the tribal instinct, then the next 
>outer ring is the intellectual that i picked up along the way, those 
>thoughts and ideas that grabbed me, as a jew, then as a human being, then 
>the ability to see both sides of the coin in a larger unitary whole 
>persepctive, the planet as a whole from the outside...
>
>in this manner i avoid arguments between ideas from different circles, 
>each one belongs to another circle and has different frames of reference.
>
>This iconic versus non-iconic prayer...each in its own circle can be 
>understood
>
>i fear i have shed more darkness than light on the matter.

RMFeldstein wrote:
> A guy counting sefira forgets to count on a Thursday night. He doesn't
> realize he has forgotten, and in his community they bring in Shabbos
> early at 7PM. He says Kabalas Shabbos, and suddenly realizes he forgot
> to count the night before. Can he count without a bracha for that day,
> and then proceed to count later that evening with a bracha, or does the
> fact that he has already has brought in Shabbos negate the possibility
> of him counting without a bracha for the previous night he missed?
> Finally, if he also davened maariv, and then remembered he didn't count,
> and it still is before shkia, would that change the answer?

Happened to me, and my then RY, rav Yehudah Aryeh Treger, SIL of RSZA,
told me I can still count. Don't remember the source (was 13-15 years
ago). The logic is that even though one accepts Shabbat, he has not
moved the boundary between day and night, merely drawn the holiness
of Shabbat into the weekday. In fact, I am sure that somebody who was
meqabel Shabbat early and then transgressed it intentionally would not
be liable for sqilah.

Arie Folger

R' Michael Feldstein asked a few questions about one who davened an early
Maariv and then realized that he forgot the previous day's Sefira count.
I believe the following quote from Kaf HaChayim 489:82 will help to
answer those questions:

"One who forgot to count on the night of Erev Shabbos Kodesh [I believe
that means Thursday night - Akiva] and they davened Maariv of Shabbos
Kodesh while it was still daytime, and then he remembered that he did
not count at night, even though they davened Maariv of Shabbos Kodesh,
since it is still day, he should count without a bracha, and all the
other days he will count with a bracha."

Akiva Miller

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