Avodah Mailing List

Volume 09 : Number 044

Wednesday, June 5 2002

• When is tzait?
• Slav
• nightfall
• Re: hasgachah
• Shalom Zakhor
• Re: nightfall
• Re: Rosh meguleh and women
• RE: hasgachah
• Donations
• first principles
• Re: first principles
• Re: Donations
• Re: Shalom Zakhor
• women's aliyot
• Re: Rosh meguleh and women
• Mahol ha-mavet
• Re: Rosh meguleh and women
• RE: Hashgacha Protis
• Re: first principles
• Re: law of averages
• Derashah and Sevarah

Recent postings on this issue, it seems to me, have muddled the issue.

Any understanding of the controversy surrounding the definition of
the start of night requires a basic knowledge of the primary source
in talmud, i.e. T.B. Shabbat 34b - 35b. I don't intend to cover the
entire issue of bain ha'shemoshot in this post (that issue has been
discussed previously in Avodah) - just the issue of what definines
the start of night. According to the above source in Shabbat 34b,
there is a dispute between the Tanna'im, R' Yehudah and R' Yosi on
this matter. R' Yehudah holds that night is defined by a uniformly
dark sky. According to Rabba in the name of the Amora, Rav Yehuda in
the name of Shmuel, this condition occurs (presumably at the equinoxes
in the lattitudes of Eretz Yisrael and Bavel) 3/4 mil after sunset.
According to the conventional understanding of T.B. Pesachim 94a walking
a mil distance (at the pace of a daylong trek) takes 18 minutes (22.5
minutes according to the apparent understanding of the Vilna Gaon and
24 minutes according to the Rambam). Then 3/4 mil is either 13.5, 18.9
(approx.), or 24 minutes, respectively. Now, Rav Yosef in the name of
Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel defines R' Yehudah's uniformly dark
sky as occuring 2/3 mil after the start of bain ha'shemoshot (12, 15,
and 16 minutes, respectively). However, Rav Yosef's understanding of R'
Yehuda's bain ha'shemoshot leaves sunset and the time when the eastern
(western according to Rava) sky is still reddened by the sun after
setting, as part of day. Hence, there need be no difference between them
as to the condition of a uniformly dark sky which defines night according
to R' Yehudah. That occurs 3/4 mil after sunset. They only differ in
when bain ha'shemoshot starts. According to Rabba, it starts at sunset;
according to Rav Yosef, it starts 1/12 mil after sunset. [It should be
appreciated that these talmudic times are only approximate since they
are based on an estimate of an average daylight walking distance and the
fact that there were no accurate timepieces then to measure the duration
of the various phases of the sky's transformation with the setting sun.
  They also depend on time of year, lattitude, and viewing conditions.]

The above represents the various Amora'itic understandings of the view of
the Tanna, R' Yehudah. However, the Tanna, R' Yosi disagrees as to the
duration of bain ha'shemoshot. He considers it to be a very short period
prior to nightfall.. According to the Amorah, Rav Yehuda in the name of
Shmuel, R' Yossi's bain ha'shemoshot starts after the conclusion of R'
Yehudah's. That is, for a very short period when it is night according
to R' Yehudah, it is still bain ha'shemoshot according to R' Yossi..
The same Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel also holds that the visibility
of 2 stars defines the start of R' Yosi's bain ha'shemoshot and 3 stars
defines the end of it and the start of night. The Gemara also brings the
opinion (it is elaborated near the beginning of T. Y. Berachot) that only
"medium" stars that do not appear right after sunset nor only .later at
night are to be used for night determination. This still leaves some
uncertainty as to the definition of "medium" stars. Clearly, planets
and the brightest stars are excluded, but we are not informed as to what
stars are included. Indeed, according to the RI in Tosfot Shabbat 35a
(Trei tilse mil) the dispute between R' Yehuda and R' Yossi as to the
start of night hinges on the question of which stars are to be used for
the 3 stars that define or signify night (he considers that everyone
agrees that 3 stars signify night)..

In the light of the above, it is not difficult to appreciate how the
different measures of star appearance have arisen. It would have been
helpful had the various protagonists identified the stars that they used
to determine night. There is a bias among the post-talmudic authorities
for the use of "small" stars. There is certainly room for additional
scientific observation of the times of star appearance at the equinoxes
and throughout the year. Such observations should no longer be made
in J'lem (or any city) because of the masking effects of city lights.
The best observations can be made on a mountain or in a desert with a
clear view of the western horizon.

Yitzchok

Initially, I saw in the Jewish Press an excerpt from "Windows to the Soul"
by Rabbi Michael Bernstein M.D. that quoted the Baal Haturim on Bamidbar
11,20 that slav/quail has the taste of everything but the Levioson
[i.e. the same sort of multiple taste in manna]. This is also cited in
the Rokeach (see Midrash Says) and I saw it there (though footnoted as
in the Baal Haturim in order of publication but not lives/history ;)
). Has anyone seen a midrash/zohar/gemara etc. that says this?

Chaim

From what I understand, the 8.5 degrees definition that is commonly used
>today comes from R' Yechiel Michel Tukaczinsky, who observed that 3 medium
>stars are not visible until somewhat after 3/4 mil. Apparently, he held,
>unlike R' Levi, that the 3 medium stars determine the actual halachic
>definition of nightfall.

In the Torah uMada conference before Pesach in Machon Lev there was a
lecture on astronomy and the lecturer (sorry forget his name) claimes that
there are many mistakes in R. Tukashinsky's work. In particular he assumed
that the times in the morning and evening were symmetric which no one
before RMYT assumed and has no basis. In particular the lecturer claimed
that he had convinced the rabbanut to use other calculations in their
future calendars and to fix other mistakes in the rabbanut's calendars.

Eli Turkel

Eli Turkel wrote:
>I recently went to a shiur of R. Leff on hasgacha in which he basically 
>took a REED type position. Someone in the audience asked about a recent 
>attack on a yeshiva in Gush Katif where several teenagers were killed while 
>learning in the bet medrash. His answer was that hasgacha pratit does not 
>apply in a time of danger or war.

He was probably referring to 1 Shmuel 26:10.  See the Avodah thread "Kuzari 
and Hashgachah".

Gil Student

Sholom Simon asked about shalom zakhor + mareh meqomoth.

The Xokhmath Adam says at kelal 149 seif 24 that the custom is to make
a light seuda on Friday night (leyl Shabbat) on the Shabbath BEFORE the
brith mila. That is, not the Friday night AFTER the birth.

Saul Davis

On 3 Jun 2002 at 9:34, Eli Turkel wrote:
> In the Torah uMada conference before Pesach in Machon Lev there was a
> lecture on astronomy and the lecturer (sorry forget his name) claimes that
> there are many mistakes in R. Tukashinsky's work. In particular he assumed
> that the times in the morning and evening were symmetric which no one
> before RMYT assumed and has no basis. In particular the lecturer claimed
> that he had convinced the rabbanut to use other calculations in their
> future calendars and to fix other mistakes in the rabbanut's calendars.

Possibly Rav Menat? 

There are at least three calendars of Hanetz and Shkiya floating
around Yerushalayim, and I know that our minyan uses Rav Menat's (at
Rav Elyashiv's instruction). At the Kotel, however, AFAIK, all minyanim
use RYMT's Hanetz with the exception of Rav Scheinberg's minyan (which
AFAIK only happens when Rav Scheinberg is there).

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

R' Shlomo Abeles asked <<< How come women - or at least unmarried women
- don't have a problem with rosh meguleh. If the whole idea is - as we
are generally told - to do with Yiras and Kvod Hashem, have they any
less chiyuv in this? >>>

My guess has always been that it is because of the historical development
of two very different inyanim.

 From the time that we received Parshas Sotah, and possibly before that,
all married women had been covering their hair for tznius. At this point
in history, if I understand correctly, no men had their heads covered
except for kohanim during their avodah.

If other exceptional individuals also covered their heads for yirah and
kavod, that will not make much difference to my idea, which is that it
took a few millenia for this minhag to trickle down to the point where
it has become standard for ordinary balabatim to keep their heads covered
at all times. (It has been suggested to me that in some communities this
happened only in the past century, if at all.)

It is not clear to me at which point in history it became standard
for men to have their heads covered when learning and davening, but it
doesn't really matter. Consider these factors:

1) The reason for covering (tznius vs. yirah/kavod)
2) The area being covered (hair vs. head)
3) The very slow development of this minhag among the men

These factors in mind, it is very easy for me to understand how this
minhag was seen as a "men's thing" which was never adopted by women
who are (for whatever reason) exempt from covering their hair (e.g.,
single girls, married women at home alone, perhaps others as well).

Akiva Miller

From: Eli Turkel [mailto:turkel@math.tau.ac.il]
> I recently went to a shiur of R. Leff on hasgacha ...
> His answer was that hasgacha pratit does not apply in a time of danger or
> war. He did not specify but I got the feeling that he did not mean because
> it was in Gush Katid. He meant that went a suicide bomber comes and kills
> people sometimes one is killed or hurt because of the situation and not
> because of his individual sins.

RGS referred us to the Avodah thread "Kuzari and Hashgachah." In that
thread, Reb Micha wrote <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol06/v06n142.shtml#10>.
In particular he wrote about the Kuzari:
<< So that implies that from the victim's point of view, another's
bechirah isn't bechirah.
....
I get the idea that his model is similar to REEDs. I can't say I'm fully
convinced without resolving that "mikreh" issue. But it seems like the
Rihal holds that even though mikreh and bechirah are possibilities,
HKBH controls which choices someone faces, and which further evolve to
impact you. Therefore everything you recieve is fully from HKBH. >>

Am I right in assuming that R Leff disagrees with R Micha (not that R
Leff is specifically interpreting the Kuzari)?

Also I note that on 1 Shmuel 26:10, Radak and Ralbag differ on whether
"b'milchama yeireid" refers to Hashem's decision to cut a person's life
short because of the person's sins (Radak) vs. a person's dying early
because he makes the bechira to enter a dangerous situation (Ralbag).
Ralbag there ties this into the mitzvah of making a ma'akeh for one's
roof.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

SBA wrote on Areivim:
>PS And a question to the poskim here.. If one donates money to help the YU 
>law or business school - is it considered tzedoko? (And bichlall, is there 
>a mitzva of tzedoko to ANY institution that has almost a BILLION in the 
>bank?) Can one give such donations from Maaser? If yes, would it, however, 
>be preferable to give the money to a struggling yeshiva, hachnosas kallah 
>or a hungry family?

I'm not sure why giving money to any Yeshiva is tzedakah. Hachzakas
haTorah, of course. But if it isn't going to aniyim, even indirectly
(except perhaps a percentage that funds scholarships for the needy),
then it isn't the mitzvah of tzedakah.

Is giving money to YU law school hachzakas haTorah? *IF* all the schools
have set budgets and a donation to the law school frees up funds that
will then be directed to the yeshiva, then it is hachzakas haTorah.
However, since I don't see pigs flying I have to assume that money still
flows in the other direction and a donation to the law school is not
hachzakas haTorah. Perhaps a better question is whether a donation to
YU's yeshiva is hachzakas haTorah or will an offsetting amount of funds
from the budget be then directed elsewhere.

Can one give money from ma'aser kesafim to a law school? We first have
to go back to a fundamental machlokes over whether ma'aser kesafim money
bizman hazeh must go to davka tzedakah (i.e. aniyim) or can go to any
mitzvah. If the latter, which includes hachzakas haTorah (i.e. yeshivos),
then the answer to this question hinges on whether supporting YU law
school is a mitzvah. I doubt it.

Gil Student

> This is not a new postulate. I remember hearing it in my introductory
> philosophy course with Dr. Berkovitz in 1967. The problem with an
> infinitely old universe is that it defies reason. Infinity is a concept
> that equates to G-d Himself (Ahiyeh Asher Ahiyeh). Isn't it more rational
> to say that there is a "prime cause" beyond material existence which in
> fact created material existence?

What is more rational is in the eye of the beholder.

As another example one of the philosophic principles that face science
today is the "anthropic principal" that probability seems to show that
our world is very unlikely.

One of the answers to this is to assume that there are an infinite number
of parallel universes which are all independent and so cannot be detected.

To me it is more rational to say there is a creator rather than unprovable
parallel universes. However, top scientists and philosophers do hold of
these alternatives. It is easy for us to say they are biased against G-d
but of course they will answer they we are biased for G-d.

Eli Turkel

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> With the newer theories in physics, they propose a meta-universe of
> 10 or 26 dimensions, and/or that our universe is conntected to others.
> This allows them to suggest that even the constants of physics are the
> product of this lottery effect: with an infinite number of universes,
> at least one should have the right conditions, and in that one we wonder
> about how amazing it is.

> However, and this is what I find amusing, it boils down to rejecting the
> notion of an Absolute Infinite Creator in favor of another infinity that
> can't be directly observed. They end up trading one religious stance
> for another.

What I find amusing is the idea that multiple universes is an answer to
anything. No matter how many universes there are there still has to be
a First cause. The choice still boils down to two options. 1) that the
universe (or universes) are infinite or 2) that tyhere is a first cause
and my argument is that it is more logical to say that the universe has a
first cause than it is to say that the universe has just always existed
and is therefore by definition infinite itself. This is true whether
you believe that the universe is an expanding one or contacting one. The
prevalent theory is that the universde will eventually contract to the
point of the proverbial "pinhead" and re-explode in another big bang. It
will then follow the same pattern as the present universe. It will expand
to a point only to begin to retract to a pinhead and exxplode once again
in another big bang. This cosmic activity will go on forever. But there
had to be a creator of that "pinhead" of all matter that began the present
universe and all subsequent universes. Logic dictates that. To say
that it has always existed sounds to me like a refusal to accept the
reasonable explanation of existence and a copout in an agenda of Atheism.

HM.

On 3 Jun 2002 at 13:48, Gil Student wrote:
> SBA wrote on Areivim:
>> PS And a question to the poskim here.. If one donates money to help the YU 
>> law or business school - is it considered tzedoko? (And bichlall, is there 
>> a mitzva of tzedoko to ANY institution that has almost a BILLION in the 
>> bank?) Can one give such donations from Maaser? If yes, would it, however, 
>> be preferable to give the money to a struggling yeshiva, hachnosas kallah 
>> or a hungry family?

> I'm not sure why giving money to any Yeshiva is tzedakah. Hachzakas
> haTorah, of course. But if it isn't going to aniyim, even indirectly
> (except perhaps a percentage that funds scholarships for the needy),
> then it isn't the mitzvah of tzedakah.

I don't think that's correct. R. Blau in Tzedaka u'Mishpat (3:26)
paskens that Hachzokas Talmud Torah comes before aniyim who are not
your relatives, unless the aniyim are b'sakana and he does not seem to
distinguish (based on a quick look and not limud b'iyun) between Talmud
Torah for aniyim and for non-aniyim. See also Maharik Shoresh 128 (he
brings it in the footnotes - I don't have one in the house so I can't
look it up).

> Perhaps a better question is whether a donation to
> YU's yeshiva is hachzakas haTorah or will an offsetting amount of funds
> from the budget be then directed elsewhere.

I'm afraid only someone in the know at YU could tell you that. While
RMF points out that RIETS is a separate corporate entity and therefore
donations to RIETS are unlikely to be directed elsewhere, AIUI university
endowments are generally shared by all colleges within the university and
therefore it is possible that donating money to RIETS will offset money
that they would otherwise have gotten from a university-wide endowment
(one notable exception to the university-wide rule was in my days when
NYU Law owned Mueller's Egg Noodles and did not share profits with other
schools - it was in the grantor's will).

-- Carl

On 3 Jun 2002 at 9:33, Saul Davis wrote:
> The Xokhmath Adam says at kelal 149 seif 24 that the custom is to make
> a light seuda on Friday night (leyl Shabbat) on the Shabbath BEFORE the
> brith mila. That is, not the Friday night AFTER the birth.

This seems to contradict the Gemara which is the makor for Shalom 
Zachor (Bava Kama 80a - and Tosfos there in the name of Rabbeinu 
Chananel who says that when the Gemara refers to a Seudas Yeshuas 
HaBen, it's "al she'nosha v'nimlat mi'mei imo"). See also Trumas 
HaDeshen 1:269 ("b'leil Shabbos ha'Samuch l'leida d'hi seudas 
mitzva"), Rema YD 265:12, Taz YD 265:13 and the Drisha there. 

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

From: "Rabbi Y. H. Henkin" <henkin@012.net.il>
> Ri Emden brings a much more likely scenario in his glosses to Megillah 21a
> in the back of the standard Vilna edition, that if there are not enough
> men who are able to read the Torah themselves, then kevod hatzibur is of
> necessity suspended so that the reading can proceed.

I mentioned this second explanation of RYE last week:
> Thanks to RA Folger I have now seen a second pshat from RY Emden on this
> Chazal (in his peirush on Mes. Megilla).He writes in a case where the woman
> is the only person who can lein...she may.

And I added:
> I wonder if he is saying that where there is a tzibbur of men who all
> cannot lein - there is no longer a  'kvod hatzibbur'...?

Someone suggested that indeed this may be seen in a way similar to the
Mishna in Sukka [3:10] cursing (Tovoy lo m'eiro') a man who has to rely
on his wife or child for saying Hallel.

> In light of this, it is unclear why he wrote in Migdal Oz that the
> far-fetched case he mentions there must be what the beraita is alluding
> to,

Maybe because in Migdal Oz he is discussing the halachos and minhogim
re naming girls in various scenarios including one where the father is not
around.

> Probably his glosses were written later.

It seems clearly so from the language in MO.

SBA

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
> SBA wrote:
>: How come women - or at least unmarried women - don't have a problem with
>: rosh meguleh.

> R' Ovadia holds they do

I understand that some Sfardim have this shittoh.
Someone told me that in the sefer Ish Matzliach (by Rav Matzliach Mazuz
HYD) of Tunisia there is a tshuva on this subject.

I have also been told that Rav Yisroel Veltz z'l in his Tshuvos mentions
a CS [in Nedorim} that explains our minhag.

I am awaiting an exact MM.

SBA

SY Agnon in his short story "Ba-Derekh" mentions several interesting
minhagim from medieval Ashkenaz. Among them is one called the "ma.hol
ha-mavet", which is that on Shavuot a bahur would lie down and act dead
bec of the pasuk "nafshi yatsah be-dabro" and the rest of the kehilah
would then dance around him as he "awoke." Apparently, says Agnon,
R. Yisrael Isserlein did not like this minhag. I couldn't find mention
of it in Terumat ha-Deshen (but Agnon is very reliable as to having
seen it somewhere. Elsewhere in the story he does quote directly from
the TH). This minhag is similar, I think, to what is sometimes done,
so I've heard, at Hasidic weddings (the toiten tantz? It's found also
in non-Jewish sources as an act against the Black Death, as a trick
to cheat death. Anyone with info re the Hasid minhag at weddings,
elaboration would be appreciated) but I think this is not related to it.

What I am trying to find out is any source (not limited to R Isserlein)
on such a minhag.

Thanks in advance,

YD

On 4 Jun 2002 at 21:24, SBA wrote:
> I understand that some Sfardim have this shittoh.
> Someone told me that in the sefer Ish Matzliach (by Rav Matzliach Mazuz
> HYD) of Tunisia there is a tshuva on this subject.

See Tshuvos Be'er Sheva 18.

-- Carl

>: If your two-year old puts his hand near a flame and you grab him before
>: he reaches it and give him a solid potch in tuchus, that's an onesh
>: meant to prevent him from doing it again.

>: If your two-year old puts his hand near a flame and you can't catch
>: him in time and he gets burned, that's tiv'i - a natural consequence of
>: his actions.

> Does hashem actually given petchelach? I was under the impression that
> onesh is a consequence of cheit. See RGS's
> fine survey at <http://www.aishdas.org/articles/punish.html> and our
> previous discussion.

I don't see the contradiction. The potch was a consequence of the child
trying to put his hand in the fire. Otherwise, the abba or eema never
would have thought to potch him. The child caused his own potch. 

The difference between the two is that one is a direct intervention
meant to teach [the potch] and one is just what we could call hester
panim of a sort, allowing the consequences to impose themselves by
natural consequences [the burn].

---Rena

Eli Turkel <turkel@math.tau.ac.il> wrote:
>> This is not a new postulate. I remember hearing it in my introductory
>> philosophy course with Dr. Berkovitz in 1967. The problem with an
>> infinitely old universe is that it defies reason. Infinity is a concept
>> that equates to G-d Himself (Ahiyeh Asher Ahiyeh). Isn't it more rational
>> to say that there is a "prime cause" beyond material existence which in
>> fact created material existence?

> What is more rational is in the eye of the beholder.

> As another example one of the philosophic principles that face science
> today is the "anthropic principal" that probability seems to show that
> our world is very unlikely.

RMB refferenced the anthropic principle in his post on the issue as well.
AIUI this is the principle that states that the high improbability the
entire universe evolved from an original "Big Bang" and ultimately
through it... that the human species evolved randomly from a single
celled bacteria does not preclude the possiblity that it can happen. In
fact it can happen and indeed DID happen. V'Haw Rayah... here we are! The
anthropic principle is used to demonstrate the lack of necessity to rely
on a Creator guided evolution.

Well perhaps it can be used to demonstrate this. But it CANNOT be used
to explain existence without a Creator. Even that famous Agnostic Carl
Sagan who believed totally in "random selection" as the underlying force
of evolution conceeded this point.

> One of the answers to this is to assume that there are an infinite number
> of parallel universes which are all independent and so cannot be detected.

> To me it is more rational to say there is a creator rather than unprovable
> parallel universes. However, top scientists and philosophers do hold of
> these alternatives. It is easy for us to say they are biased against G-d
> but of course they will answer they we are biased for G-d.

IMHO, one can question organized religion but one cannot question the
logic of a "Prime Cause". Unless one is willing to give up traditional
notions of material existence. If so, then the universe can be explained
as entirely spiritual. We can then use the model of Bishop George
Berkley's Idealism. Briefly Idealism can be explained as follows:

Our knowledge of corporeality is that which we perceive with our five
senses. If we were to lose all of our five senses would we know of
the exitence of a material world? If a one were born without sight,
hearing, sense of smell, taste, and touch would he be able to percieve of
corporeality? The fact is that the only way we know of material existence
is indirectly, through at least one of those five senses. We have only
indirect knowledge of materialism. Since corporeality can't be proven
we do not really know if it exists or not as only our senses tell us
so. The only thing we can be sure of is existence itself. An organism
sans any of the five senses would still know it exists. So all we can
prove is a spiritual existence... Des Carte's "Cogito Ergo Sum".

Once we eliminate the requirement of a physical universe, anything is
possible and we can make up anything we want about the origin of the
species as long as it doesn't contradict the laws of nature which still
exist in Berkley's Spritual world.

BUT, intuititively I think all of us would agree that there does exist
a material universe and that Berkley's "Idealism" is but an interesting
mental excersize.

Berkeley did, however, succeed in demonstrating that one can use logic
to eliminate the obvious. By the same token intuition plays a big part
in how we understand the universe. We intuitively, not rationally, know
that we live in a physical universe, although, as Berkely suggests there
is an alternate explantion of the universe (where all the laws of nature
are observed) that is just as logical.

So in the end, intuition is perhaps a more important component of belief
than logic. But intuition is amorphous and hard to define. Somtimes
we know something for a ceratinty through intuition and other times
we have intuition about something and don't really know for sure.
With mathematical logic, conclusions are more definite. Applied to
Judaism, how much of belief is intuitive and how much is logically
deduced? And what type of intuition is it? Is it like intuiting material
existence? Or is it like intuiting that your grandchildren love you?

Just thinking out loud.

HM

RDR wrote:
> Now all of these have problems. Number 1 contradicts everything we
> know about amoraic methodology: they assume that tannaim held consistent
> opinions and never say kan kodem hachraath beth din, kan l'achar hachraath
> beth din.

See 'Hullin 32a&b re mishnah beginning of 3rd chapter ibid. I don't remember 
the exact wording, but it boils down to kaan lifnei 'hazarah, kaan a'harei 
'hazarah. Sounds quite similar to me, and seems a manifestation of a change 
of mind re the underlying principle. It is also the way RYBS portrayed 
Snahedrin's functioning in his 1974 pre RCA convention shi'ur&speech.

Arie Folger
-- 
It is absurd to seek to give an account of the matter to a man 
who cannot himself give an account of anything; for insofar as
he is already like this, such a man is no better than a vegetable.
           -- Book IV of Aristotle's Metaphysics

On Wed, May 29, 2002 at 03:04:56PM -0400, David Glasner wrote:
: All I said was that GS and heqesh are based on word association, not the
: application of some formal reasoning. I therefore think that it is easy
: to distinguish between them and other hermeneutic rules...

What about ribui umi'ut?

Does "es" including one's older sibling in kibud av va'eim a formal
reasoning step? Or the derashah of "ach es Shabsosai tishmoru" to exclude
piku'ach nefesh? Or the repetition of "lo sevasheil gedi"? Klal uperat
ukelal may include ke'ein haperat, but there is no formal system for
defining the limits of that ke'ein.

There are only two derashos that could be applied by two communities that
weren't in contact and produce the same results: qal vachomer, and ad
sheyavo hakasuv hashelishi.

In fact, for these two, the question is why they are midos of derashah,
and not forms of sevarah.

As far as I can tell, it's because these are quantitative: which is
more chamur, which has the preponderance of meqoros. Sevarah might only
include qualitative logic reasoning.

But in any case, it's hard to see why RDG considers any of the other
midos are less dependent on tradition or any more deterministic than GS
and heqesh. Which would explain the machloqes (quoted in the haggadah)
about the derashah of "kol yemei chayecha".

Note that this is a vast departure of my position in v6n57.

See also <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol07/v07n081.shtml#11>.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]