Avodah Mailing List

Volume 09 : Number 043

Monday, June 3 2002

• Rosh meguleh and women
• women's aliyot
• Re: Rosh meguleh and women
• Re: Naso
• Re: the Torah its light
• Re: Wearing Tzitzis outside
• RE: Hashgacha Protis
• Re: Hashgacha Protis
• RE: Wearing Tzitzis outside
• Re: Ikkarei Emunah on the Text of the Torah
• Re: Ikkarei Emunah on the Text of the Torah
• first principles
• Re: first principles
• RE: first principles
• RE: first principles
• Re: first principles
• hasgachah
• FW: DEVELOP -27: Bittachon [Part 3 of 3]

> I recently wrote:
> In the same siman SA [282:2] the Remoh says that 'ossur likros' broysh
> megulah.
> The Oruch Hashulchon explains [s 10] that this means either a hat or the
> tallis over the head.

Just wondering...
(and also wondering why it took me so long to wonder ...)

How come women - or at least unmarried women - don't have a problem with
rosh meguleh.

If the whole idea is - as we are generally told - to do with Yiras and
Kvod Hashem, have they any less chiyuv in this?

SBA

Ri Emden brings a much more likely scenario in his glosses to Megillah 21a
in the back of the standard Vilna edition, that if there are not enough
men who are able to read the Torah themselves, then kevod hatzibur is of
necessity suspended so that the reading can proceed. In light of this,
it is unclear why he wrote in Migdal Oz that the far-fetched case he
mentions there must be what the beraita is alluding to, v'im lo achshav
eimatai. Probably his glosses were written later.

Ri Emden's apparent distinction between a tzibur in the synagogue and
a private minyan in a home is anticipated by an opinion cited in Sefer
haBatim on the Rambam.

On the views of Maharam Rottenberg, Ri Emden, and Hasdei David on women
reading the Torah in special circumstances, see Resp. Bnei Banim, vol.
1, no. 4. On the meaning of kevod hatzibur with regards to women's
aliyot, ibid. On the view brought by Sefer haBatim, see Bnei Banim vol.
2, no. 10. On whether or not a tzibbur can waive kevod hatzibur, see
vol. 2, no. 11. In practice, it is an opening towards Conservativism and
Reform and cannot be approved. In a rebuttal to someone's long article
in vol. 2 of the Edah virtual journal (edah.org), I discussed the novel
proposition of women's aliyot once-a-year within the framework of the
additional aliyot outside the main shul on Simchat Torah. I am not
connected with Edah.

Prof. R. Aryeh Frimer has put together source sheets with excerpts from
dozens of sources on the various aspects of the issue of Torah reading
by women.

With Torah blessings.

On Sun, Jun 02, 2002 at 09:30:35PM +1000, SBA wrote:
: How come women - or at least unmarried women - don't have a problem with
: rosh meguleh.

R' Ovadia holds they do!

-mi

More on the same theme.

The message of "beha'alosecha es haneiros" is often taken to be that a
rebbe is charged to get the talmud to "light on his own". Much like
what I said the nesi'im are to do.

All of which culminates with "Vayhi binso'ah", and then we're presented
with the contrast.

The mis'onim crying for the need to obey dinei arayos in order to get the
mann. They prefered being slaves and poorly cared for if it guaranteed
their cucumbers and onions. Because it meant being cared for, being
nisa'im is easier than being nos'im.

Then we have the first use of three items: the menorah, the keruvim
(and the amud ha'anan), and the chatzatzros. All three are "miqshah".
Compare to the complaint of the mis'onim, if we understand it as
being a complaint of "qasheh".

And the meraglim, who saw the transition from midbar to conquring
a land, and panicked. Again, unready to assume the full burden of
being nos'im.

And that's why we needed 40 years in the midbar in response to
the meraglim. 40 years to stop seeing it as an eved and his rav
providing for him, but that of working to be an active participant
in you own fate.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                    Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org                   The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                    - R' Binyamin Hecht

Back in v4n79 - 81 we discussed the relationship described in Mishlei
6:2 "ki neir mitzvah..." and what the mashal is trying to teach. In
particular, the signature line I used for this post and how loyal is
it to the pasuq's intent.

A partial baruch shekivanti! See Sfas Emes, Beha'alosecha 5631. He sees
neir as a causative binyan. The SE says that mitzvos are the neiros that
bring the light of Torah into ma'aseh and olam ha'asiyah. (I saw them
as the neiros that bring the light of Torah into the heart of the oseh.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

On 2 Jun 2002 at 14:26, SBA wrote:

> The CS z'l in his Droshos (Parshas Zochor p.187) writes - that most
> mitzvos are not being fulfilled properly because we live amongst the
> goyim. ...We cannot have the Tzitzis hanging openly -
> >UMAMESH SH'EYNOM YOTZIM YEDEI CHOVOSOM ZULAS ZEH<(!!)
> Similarly Tefilin "...mitzvoson lehanichon kol hayom",
> vechein issur Chodosh nisbatel mikol vekol...
> veharbeh ke'eylu shegorem lonu hapizur vehapirud..."
> 
> Nu, Reb Carl...?
> A real reason to make aliyah...

:-) Actually, with respect to tefillin, most people here do not wear 
them all day, mainly because of the problem of not thinking of divrei 
chol while wearing the tefillin. AIUI, thinking divrei chol during 
davening is not good (because it means you're distracted from 
davening) but is more tolerated than thinking divrei chol while 
wearing tefillin after davening. 

-- Carl

Carl M. Sherer, Adv. Silber, Schottenfels, Gerber & Sherer
Telephone 972-2-625-7751 Fax 972-2-625-0461 eFax (US) 1-253-423-1459

mailto:cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

"Whoever forgets the past is condemned to repeat it." 
                                --George Santayana. 

"I have become totally tired of history, because I feel history is a 
long misunderstanding." 
                                  --Shimon Peres 

> The Moreh 3:17 excludes DTC from HP, and in 3:18 the Rambam also
> excudes sichlim and mamarim -- who are as ba'alei chai WRT HP. Later
> RMMS elaborates that this removal of HP is not onesh or seguli, but
> tiv'i -- a natural consequence of his actions.

> [I'm still unclear how that's different than onesh.]

I see it this way: 

If your two-year old puts his hand near a flame and you grab him before
he reaches it and give him a solid potch in tuchus, that's an onesh
meant to prevent him from doing it again.

If your two-year old puts his hand near a flame and you can't catch
him in time and he gets burned, that's tiv'i - a natural consequence of
his actions.

Hashem created the world with "laws of nature" such that we can predict
what will happen if we do certain things [if you jump off of a cliff,
you're going to head downwards and not upwards].

---Rena

On Sun, Jun 02, 2002 at 06:43:21PM +0200, Mishpachat Freedenberg wrote:
: If your two-year old puts his hand near a flame and you grab him before
: he reaches it and give him a solid potch in tuchus, that's an onesh
: meant to prevent him from doing it again.

: If your two-year old puts his hand near a flame and you can't catch
: him in time and he gets burned, that's tiv'i - a natural consequence of
: his actions.

Does hashem actually given petchelach? I was under the impression
that onesh is a consequence of cheit. See RGS's fine survey at
<http://www.aishdas.org/articles/punish.html> and our previous discussion.

In psych, you are taught that natural consequences (such as your latter
example) are far better educational experiences than ones perceived as
being artificially imposed.

See also Rashi on Eichah 3:38, "From the 'Mouth' of the One Above, come
neither the evil nor the good." He explains that this is because they
actually come from the person himself. "Uvacharta bachayim." "Chai gever
al chata'av." "The wicked deepen gehennom for themselves." (Eiruvin 19a)
The Ikkarim 4:33 identifies the fires of gehenom with bushah. Etc...

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                    Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org                   The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                    - R' Binyamin Hecht

R. SBA wrote: <Further to Reb SM's piece on Tzitzis -- and being Inyoneh
Deyomeh (this weeks sidrah has Parshas Tzitzis) -- 2 comments.
The Ibn Ezra says on "Ur'isem Osoy" -- 'Mitzva lihyos nireh'.
The CS z'l in his Droshos (Parshas Zochor p.187) writes -- that most
mitzvos are not being fulfilled properly because we live amongst the
goyim...We cannot have the Tzitzis hanging openly -- UMAMESH SH'EYNOM
YOTZIM YEDEI CHOVOSOM ZULAS ZEH(!!)>

I wish to emphasize something: My piece was not on the mitzvah of tzitzis
in general, but the talles koton. What I established was that
1) according to the Rishonim, wearing the talles koton is only a minhog,
2) the minhog apparently developed in Ashkenaz,
3) many rishonim questioned whether the talles koton really fulfilled
the mitzvah from the Torah, and
4) the minhog of wearing a talles koton was always done with the tzitzis
inside the clothing, as shown by pictures going back to the medieval
period, by photographs from the last 150 years, and by information
transmitted by Jews who lived in Europe.

My whole point was to distinguish the wearing of the talles koton from
the mitzvah d'orayso of tzitzis, which Jews throughout history (again,
from testimony from pictures going back hundreds of years and information
from European Jews, but very few photographs) did by wearing a talles
godol during davening in the morning. This point is true of S'faradim and
Teimanim as well as Ashk'nazim. Indeed, in my original post, I showed that
the source the M'habber brought for his idea that a talles koton should be
worn over other clothes, the Nimmuqei Yosef, was specifically only talking
about Jews who did not possess a talles godol.
The CS, as shown by his reference to wearing t'fillin all day, is talking
about the mitzvah d'orayso, and thus wearing talles godol and t'fillin
all day.

In the course of the discussion, I showed that the problem rishonim
had with the talles koton was the way it was worn, not whether the
tzitzis were visible, and that is because the Torah sheb'al Peh holds
that "ur'item oto" refers to the time element, yom vs. laylo, not to
visibility. Indeed, were it to be taken literally, it would not mean
"they should be visible" but rather "thou shalt see them/it," which would
mean that one would be obligated to look at tzitzis (all the time? 100
times a day? 10 times a day?) which no rishon holds to be part of the
mitzvah whatsoever (despite various minhogim -- only minhogim -- to
hold the tzitzis at various points and in various ways during q'rias
Sh'ma'. However, it should not be surprising that rishonim looking for
p'shat vs. what the TSBP holds would interpret it having to do with seeing
-- but that does not mean that they held that that was lahalokho, just
a p'shat in the posuq. The Ibn 'Ezra fits in that category; in addition,
he is presumably talking about a talles godol, as all the rishonim take
the parsha as referring to; I doubt that the Ibn 'Ezra or the Rambam even
knew what a talles koton was, since it was not worn by Spanish Jews in
that early period.

Seth

R' Micha Berger wrote <<< I am not identifying "from G-d" with "being
known since Sinai". In the past, I pointed out that Rus Rabba says Mo'avi
velo Mo'avis wasn't known until Bo'az's day. >>>

Is that Rus Rabba clear or ambiguous on whether it wasn't known *at all*,
or whether it wasn't known to the *general public*?

If it wasn't known *at all*, does it suggest by what means it *became*
known?

I wonder... Is it possible that once upon a time, "v'limadtem es bneichem"
(Dvarim 11) was understood to mean "teach your children", and was only
later darshened to mean "sons and not daughters", or has it meant "sons
and not daughters" all along?

Akiva Miller

R' Micha Berger wrote <<< I am not identifying "from G-d" with "being
known since Sinai". In the past, I pointed out that Rus Rabba says Mo'avi
velo Mo'avis wasn't known until Bo'az's day. >>>

Is that Rus Rabba clear or ambiguous on whether it wasn't known *at all*,
or whether it wasn't known to the *general public*?

If it wasn't known *at all*, does it suggest by what means it *became*
known?

I wonder... Is it possible that once upon a time, "v'limadtem es bneichem"
(Dvarim 11) was understood to mean "teach your children", and was only
later darshened to mean "sons and not daughters", or has it meant "sons
and not daughters" all along?

Akiva Miller

> Or, to put it another way, since when doies having postulates make one
> a non-rationalist? What system of thought doesn't have first principles?

I used the term "rationalist" to describe someone who has first
principles, believes that those first principles are "incorrigible," and
then believes that the most significant truths can be derived from them.

Most contemporary philosophers reject the above. Some accept the idea
of "foundations" but allow fairly significant truths to function as
foundations. (E.g. one may not need a proof for the existence of G-d
because the existence of G-d is a "basic truth.") Thus, one of the
most sophisticated Orthodox thinkers of the past generations, R. Walter
Wurzburger zt"l, wrote a book with the title, "G-d is Proof Enough.")

Others, following Wittgenstein, reject the very idea of "foundations."

Many religious philosophers today advocate "reliabilism." In simple terms,
this means that knowledge is not attained by finding secure foundations
and inferring propositions from them, but rather in coming to understand
how a "reliable" intellectual apparatus functions, in the manner that
we would speak of a reliable process of perception= one that reliably
yields correct reports about the universe.

These developments have been among the most exciting in the technical
philosophy of the past 20-30 years, though they were discerned by writers
like R. Soloveitchik and, with less sophisticated formulations, R. Kook
and R. Nahman (!!!), as well as their Christian counterparts. It is a
commentary on the parochialism of our community that so few of us are
prepared to take advantage of developments that have made it much easier
for traditional religious belief to be self-respecting.

Shalom Carmy <carmy@ymail.yu.edu> wrote:
> Some (contemporary philosophers ) accept the idea of
> "foundations" but allow fairly significant truths to function as
> foundations. (E.g. one may not need a proof for the existence of G-d
> because the existence of G-d is a "basic truth.") Thus, one of the most
> sophisticated Orthodox thinkers of the past generations, R. Walter
> Wurzburger zt"l, wrote a book with the title, "G-d is Proof Enough.")

I have difficulty with this concept, in part because it is not well
enought defined. To me G-d's existence is a logical deduction. If one
belives in material existence then there has to be a prime cause. Perhaps
that is what is meant by, "one may not need a proof for the existence
of G-d because the existence of G-d is a "basic truth."

The problem lies in the various belief systems ABOUT G-d. In the case of
Judaism, we are left mostly with either Masoretic text or generationally
transmitted Mesorah. There is no inductive or deductive reasoning
that can be used without resorting to a "first principle". There is no
archeological evidence which would prove the Torah narrative and the
use of logical deductions require axioms that are not derived at through
logic but only through Mesorah. I.e. they are "givens".

> Others, following Wittgenstein, reject the very idea of "foundations."

> Many religious philosophers today advocate "reliabilism." In simple terms,
> this means that knowledge is not attained by finding secure foundations
> and inferring propositions from them, but rather in coming to understand
> how a "reliable" intellectual apparatus functions, in the manner that we
> would speak of a reliable process of perception= one that reliably yields
> correct reports about the universe.

How does one determine what is or isn't "reliable"? Intellectual thought,
no matter how honest, is often used by opposing philosophies to prove
diametrically opposite paradigms. IOW the "given" first principle is the
basis for any logic that follows. But by what logic, does anyone derive
the the truth of a "first principle"? In fact it is not derived but
ASSUMED. Yet these "first principles" are the basis for most religious
doctrines, no matter what the religion... aren't they?

Isn't it true that the bias of any individual's arguments is always going
to skew the argument in favor of that bias, no matter how rational the
argument is? In the case of Judaism, all of the greatest philosophic
thinkers of the millenia who have tried to prove the Truth of Judaism,
no matter how skilled the argument... are influenced by their Mesorah
which in essence can be defined as their "first principles". Have they
not? Does this not undermine their logical basis?

HM

> logical deduction. If one belives in material existence
> then there has to be a prime cause.

Not according to some cosmologists -- Sir Fred Hoyle comes to mind, but there
are current theorist who postulate an infinitly-old universe.

Akiva

Akiva Atwood <atwood@netvision.net.il> wrote:
>> logical deduction. If one belives in material existence
>> then there has to be a prime cause.

> Not according to some cosmologists -- Sir Fred Hoyle comes to mind, but there
> are current theorist who postulate an infinitly-old universe.

This is not a new postulate. I remember hearing it in my introductory
philosophy course with Dr. Berkovitz in 1967. The problem with an
infinitely old universe is that it defies reason. Infinity is a concept
that equates to G-d Himself (Ahiyeh Asher Ahiyeh). Isn't it more rational
to say that there is a "prime cause" beyond material existence which in
fact created material existence?

HM

On Mon, Jun 03, 2002 at 06:00:20AM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
:> Not according to some cosmologists -- Sir Fred Hoyle comes to mind, but there
:> are current theorist who postulate an infinitly-old universe.

: This is not a new postulate. I remember hearing it in my introductory
: philosophy course with Dr. Berkovitz in 1967. The problem with an
: infinitely old universe is that it defies reason. Infinity is a concept
: that equates to G-d Himself (Ahiyeh Asher Ahiyeh). Isn't it more rational
: to say that there is a "prime cause" beyond material existence which in
: fact created material existence?

This postulate is VERY far from new. The big bang theory and the concept
of a first moment overthrew the pevailing theory since Aristotle.

The Rambam addresses Aristotle's opinion that the universe is infinitely
old by denying the meaning of an infinite regress. In Aristotle's and
the Rambam's thought, the idea of a "completed infinity" had too many
paradoxes. Instead they dealt with the potentially infinite. Rather than
saying X is infinitely large they would say that X is larger than any
finite quantity you may happen to choose.

The Rambam seems to avoid the question of how HQBH could then be infinite
because of his adherance to the concept of negative attributes. If there
are no attributes than what is it we're calling infinite?

In the Moreh ch' 1, we are told that "omnipotence" (for example) isn't
meant has an attribute of Hashem, that He has an infinite quantity
of power/ability. Rather it is a negative statement, that there is no
challenge you can pose that He can't do.

Note the similarity between this and the concept of the potential
infinity. I would want more than this, though, before making the radical
statement that this was certainly the Rambam's intent. But it seems
suggestive.


It's possible to believe in an infinitely old universe that has a
first cause. I think this is the Rambam's point in Moreh ch' 2, when
he suggests that had the theory been compelling, he could have explained
the chumash on ma'aseh bereishis in a manner consistant with Aristotle.

One possibility (that isn't the Rambam's) is that if you believe the
beri'ah is an emanation of the Borei, and the Borei is infinitely old,
then why wouldn't the beri'ah be? The chain of "why?" leads you to a final
answer and yet the existance of a First Cause doesn't mean a first moment.

To get back on topic, and therefore sticking to understanding philosophies
consistant with yahadus, I do not know how the more kabbalistic approaches
that stress atzilus answer this question. Why would atzilus have a start?


As for RHM's argument, I get a similar kick out of some attempts being
made by the scientific community to explain the Anthropic Principle.

The AP notes that the universe is pretty well tuned to yeild man. Within
AP, there are two versions:

The strong AP is that the universe needs an observer in order to exist.
(For odd quantum mechanical reasons this is a scientific position, not
only a philosophical one.) Therefore, it could only have constants that
would produce such an observer. Most cosmologists reject this position
as part of their bias against religion and that it's purpose-driven,
not cause driven.

The weak version simply states that since man is the result who is asking
the question, of course the universe he looks out at is one that would
produce him. So, the earth is perfect for supporting intelligent life
because otherwise we'd be somewhere else noting how well suited it was
for supporting intelligent life. No matter who wins the lottery, after
the fact that person will be amazed it was him and not someone else. But
it was not surpising that /someone/ amongst all the players did.

Now that works for the earth, but what about the universe as a whole?
Why do all of the constants work to support space, time, matter and energy
altogether -- without which intelligence wouldn't emerge in any form?

With the newer theories in physics, they propose a meta-universe of
10 or 26 dimensions, and/or that our universe is conntected to others.
This allows them to suggest that even the constants of physics are the
product of this lottery effect: with an infinite number of universes,
at least one should have the right conditions, and in that one we wonder
about how amazing it is.

However, and this is what I find amusing, it boils down to rejecting the
notion of an Absolute Infinite Creator in favor of another infinity that
can't be directly observed. They end up trading one religious stance
for another.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905             - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Even so, that's more comforting than the Rambam's notion that most people
are subject to nature. According CI, there's no reason to be anxious
whether you're going to be in the next terror attack--you either will
or won't but it's not up to you (unless you purposely enter a place of
sakanah--statistically, even Sbarro's isn't a makom sakanah).

I recently went to a shiur of R. Leff on hasgacha in which he basically
took a REED type position. Someone in the audience asked about a recent
attack on a yeshiva in Gush Katif where several teenagers were killed
while learning in the bet medrash.
His answer was that hasgacha pratit does not apply in a time of danger or
war. He did not specify but I got the feeling that he did not mean because
it was in Gush Katid. He meant that went a suicide bomber comes and kills
people sometimes one is killed or hurt because of the situation and not
because of his individual sins.

He also mentioned in the shiur that everything is for the good including
all pinishments from Hashem. I asked what about karet? His answer was that
there are shitot that even karet is not final and the soul can get closer
to Hashem even after karet?
Is this really a common shitah?

Eli Turkel

                   YESHIVAT HAR ETZION
      ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)
             DEVELOPING A TORAH PERSONALITY
                            
     Based on addresses by Harav Aharon Lichtenstein
              Adapted by Rav Ronnie Ziegler
                            
          LECTURE #27: Bittachon - Trust in God
                       Part 3 of 3

H. BITTACHON TODAY

While we should generally try to maintain a balance between the optimistic
trust of faith and the steadfast trust of love, there are historical
periods when it seems that the latter type of bittachon is about to
dissipate completely, and therefore needs special reinforcement. Although
it may sound paradoxical, I think that our own period, which has witnessed
the rebirth of the State of Israel, is one of those times. All of the
religious and national hopes and aspirations that arose with the dawn
of the State tended to direct our attention completely towards "faithful
trust," while the second approach of "loving trust" was pushed aside.

Perhaps this is due to the fact that under favorable conditions, it is
harder to demand religious self- sacrifice. As the Catholic historian
Christopher Dawson pointed out, it is much easier to dismiss this world
and to adopt an otherworldly stance when there is not much to lose in this
life. In contrast, for a person burdened with many possessions, disdain
for materiality is much more difficult. It is also possible that our
almost exclusive embrace of the first aspect of trust is engendered by our
continuous accomplishments, which raise expectations even further. Perhaps
the popularity of the teachings of Rav Kook, suffused as they are with
national and cosmic optimism, is also partially responsible.

Whatever the cause, the phenomenon is clear: the equilibrium between the
two aspects of trust has been lost by the National-Religious community
in Israel. This fact was and is reflected in our educational system. We
inculcated the ideas of faithful trust, redemption, hope and expectation
very well, but neglected to teach the values of loving trust, of cleaving
to God without hesitation under all circumstances. We did not strengthen
our children or ourselves concerning the possibility of crises, conveying
that the song to God must be sung even on the rivers of Babylon. We
did not allow ourselves to struggle spiritually with the possibility of
national setbacks.

We taught our students about the "human comedy" but never about the
"human tragedy," on either the individual or the collective plane. We did
succeed in nurturing the younger generation to be ready and willing to
offer personal sacrifice for the sake of the nation and the land. All of
this was accomplished, however, while riding a wave of optimism, that
all would work out because the process of redemption was unfolding. The
engine of this process was faithful trust, and it found expression on
the individual as well as on the national level.

I fear, however, that today we are beginning to pay the price for
this skewing of values, and now is the time to rectify the error.
Our obligation is to redirect our focus to embrace loving trust, to
acknowledge that we are ready to hold tight to God because He is our
steadfast Rock, and let the chips fall where they may. We must deal with
the tragic dimension of trust, to renew the spirit of "Though He may slay
me, still I will trust in Him." This expresses the essence of Jewish trust
in the face of tragic situations, and it is this which we must inculcate.

I hope that my words are not misconstrued to mean that we must abandon
faithful trust. Personally, I am brimming with the belief that God will
not abandon His people and that our national existence in this Holy
Land is secure. I do my utmost to pass on this belief to my children and
students. At the same time, I feel that I must simultaneously instill in
them loving trust, not as a spiritual insurance policy in case of crisis,
but rather because sacrifice and connectedness to God are essential in
their own right, even under the most favorable of circumstances. The
ability to trust during suffering is important for a person, even when
he thinks that difficulties do not lie on the horizon.

I also hope that my words are not taken to imply a depreciation of
suffering or a negation of the pain of tribulation. In his essay,
"Beyond Tragedy," Reinhold Niebuhr writes, "Christianity is a religion
above and beyond tragedy. Tears as well as death are swallowed in up
triumph." This is because, for Christianity, suffering is transformed
by becoming the foundation for personal redemption. Let it be stated
explicitly that Judaism is not "beyond tragedy," nor does it "swallow up"
suffering. Jewish tradition educates the person to accept suffering,
but also to bemoan it. Grieving, not philosophical detachment, stoic
fortitude, or open-armed joy, is the response which Halakha mandates
when a person is faced by a loved one's death. As the Ramban writes in
the introduction to his work on the laws of mourning, Torat Ha-adam,
"Strength of heart in this matter is of the path of rebelliousness, and
softness of heart is of the path of confession and repentance." Jewish
tradition teaches the person to respond to suffering and to be educated
through his or her experience of it, but certainly not to downplay or
negate it. Let us recognize the magnitude of pain and suffering, but
let us also continue to trust in and cleave to God.

The attribute of trust is thus antinomic, i.e., it contains opposing
aspects. On the one hand, trust demands that a person be convinced that
God will assist him; on the other hand, it demands that a person be
prepared for a time when, God forbid, help will not be forthcoming. That
it is antinomic makes it more difficult to teach, but the model
nonetheless exists.

Let us recall that our tradition preserves the account of a towering and
heroic figure - Rabbi Akiva. He was full of faithful trust and optimism,
convinced that the Jewish people would be restored to sovereignty and
spiritual greatness in their land. In the sound of Bar Kochva's advancing
footsteps, he heard the approaching herald of messianic redemption. On the
other hand, his life was a paradigm for loving trust, for he literally
fulfilled the verse in Iyov, "Though He may slay me, still I will trust
in Him."

Rabbi Akiva hoped, he anticipated the best and believed that it would
transpire. Yet when this did not come to pass, when faced with a cruel
and painful death - in this last most bitter hour, he smiled. As he
explained to Turnus Rufus, the wicked Roman governor, his smile was not
an indication of "belittling of suffering," but rather a sign of great
bittachon (Yerushalmi Berakhot 9:5).

Do we succeed in following Rabbi Akiva's example? I suspect that the
movement that bears his name, a movement I admire, tends to emphasize the
first aspect of Rabbi Akiva's faith more so than the second. This, in
turn, is a reflection of our spiritual and educational state in general.

I. THE EDUCATIONAL IMPERATIVE

Practically speaking, I think that we - as educators - must concentrate
on one point: Trust is not an independent topic, but rather is associated
with both faith and love. The ability to nurture the quality of trust
depends upon a student's internalization of a general fear of Heaven,
which is connected to the quest for closeness to God as well to the
centrality of religious values in a person's life. The attribute of trust,
especially with respect to its second aspect of love, is not independent
of other qualities, and it certainly cannot simply be activated, like a
proverbial faucet, during an hour of need. Rather, bittachon is a function
of a person's general relationship to God, and depends upon his service
of the heart, practical mitzva observance, devotion to study of Torah,
and sensitivity to God's constant overarching presence, in the sense of
the verse (Tehillim 16:8), "I have placed God before me always."

This approach is, of course, long and arduous. It offers no shortcuts
and eschews facile slogans. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it is,
in the final analysis, a "long path which is short;" and I am not aware
of any ot This approach is not presumptuous enough to suppose that it
can answer all of our questions, but it does remove some of the "sting"
from the questions. As educators, it is not the question of suffering
per se that should trouble us. Our illustrious forebears have already
posed the question of why the righteous suffer: David asked, Chabakuk
inquired, and Moshe himself asked of God, "Inform me of Your ways." The
issue is rather the background and tone of the question. When a student
asks why people suffer, does he preface his question as does Yirmiyahu
(12:1): "God, You are righteous, and therefore I will contend with You
and question Your justice?" Or does he simply hurl rebellious and angry
accusations at God?

It is natural that our students have difficulties with these issues, as do
we. Let us encourage them to ask questions. Our responsibility as teachers
is to transmit a life of Torah that will ensure that these legitimate
questions do not become serious doubts. Cardinal Newman assiduously
distinguished between "difficulties" and "doubts." From all of religion's
tenets, he related, nothing presented him with as many difficulties as
the idea of God's existence - yet of nothing was he more certain.

If we are interested in coping with students' questions concerning
bittachon, then we must address the general state of their Torah life.
Let us deepen their faith, increase their love, and in so doing, we will
provide them with the necessary trust. This is a trust that will allow
them to hope for the best possible outcome, but will also strengthen
them for life's most difficult moments. As "believers and children of
believers," we trust that God will do His part.

SOME RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS RAISED AFTER THE LECTURE

1) Plato already addressed the ancient question as to whether it is
possible to teach values. It seems to me that we champion an approach
that maintains that it IS possible to educate towards the development of
values. To my mind, the most effective means of achieving this goal is to
combine values-based instruction with the teaching of other subjects. This
must be in a manner that takes advantage of ongoing opportunities to
raise, in the course of instruction, philosophical-existential issues,
including those of faith and trust. This type of approach can be
effective to the degree that it is part of a broader effort, rather than
being pursued as a self- contained lecture on faith and trust.

2) Yes, I did mention differences of opinion and opposing views with
respect to several matters. On many levels, I advocate a somewhat
pluralistic approach that is based on the Talmudic dictum, "These and
these are the words of the living God" (Eruvin 13b). In my opinion,
this represents a central foundation of Jewish tradition, and we must
reject any attempt to impose a narrow interpretation in areas of Jewish
philosophy or hashkafa, as if there were only one view on these issues.

This can be compared to the domain of Halakha, where we encounter a range
of opinions and disagreements among the Tannaim, the Amoraim, the Rishonim
and down through the Acharonim. I do not see why we must think that in
the realm of philosophical thought there has been absolute consensus
throughout the generations. Moreover, in the realm of thought, matters
frequently remain unresolved, since there exists no mechanism similar
to the one of pesika (rendering a decision) that guides practical Halakha.

In studying Tanakh, for example, we find possibilities of interpreting
in different directions, with the various options all falling within
the parameters of reverence and tradition. For example, is Eliezer the
servant of Avraham a positive figure or a negative one? In another vein,
was Avraham three years old when he came to recognize God, as the Midrash
posits, or was he forty or forty-eight, as the Rambam maintains? Obviously
the path of Avraham's spiritual development is very different depending on
which of these views is adopted. There is no "pesak" (conclusive decision)
to settle the matter.

We ourselves must develop, and inculcate in our students as well,
different approaches within the framework of tradition. Whether or
not we decide between them, we must realize that there is more than
one view. Sometimes, we can allow the students to themselves decide.
A student should be presented with the primary sources against the
backdrop of different interpretations, even if no single, conclusive
view emerges at the end. Such a student will be richer, wiser and more
sensitive.

3) Educating towards love of God and faith must be anchored in the
intellectual realm. At the same time, other significant domains must
be included, such as the experiential, the existential - the purity of
feeling, if you will - and practical application. It is not realistic
to concentrate on one area in the hopes that it can achieve everything.

4) Although it is difficult to educate one to love, it is nevertheless
essential, and we must make valiant efforts in this direction. We,
as well as our students, must struggle with the fact that the Torah
addresses us with demands rather than entitlements. The Torah commands,
"Love the Lord your God," discouraging the fulfillment of mitzvot for
ulterior motives, such as achieving a place in the World-to-Come. Loving
God is a central mitzva, which we dare not neglect.

5) With respect to "chastisements of love" (yissurin shel ahava),
the fundamental question is whether it is possible to have suffering
without transgression. Our Sages as well as the Rishonim disagree on this
matter. The Maharal, for example, indicates that "yissurin shel ahava"
are indeed a form of punishment. I tend to understand "chastisements
of love" as forms of suffering that come to purify a person. We begin
with the assumption that there exist individuals who are purified by
suffering, just as there exist those who are broken by suffering. One
does not know how he or she will perform until the suffering actually
takes place. Nevertheless, the experience of suffering is one which can
contain an aspect of human refinement.

We cannot regard the Akeda (binding of Yitzchak) as an exercise that
reveals any facts to God, since He knows all at the outset. Rather, the
Akeda is a creative act that stands by itself. Avraham after the Akeda
is not the same Avraham as before the Akeda, because the experience of
suffering purified him.

Judaism does not demand that its adherents revel in suffering.
But when suffering occurs, it is essential to turn it into a force
for self-rehabilitation and growth. Then it can be transformed into
"chastisements of love," which can creatively build the person's soul
and enhance his or her spiritual development.

6) I completely reject the exclusive use of the approach that stresses
hope and a positive outcome - the common attitude that "It will be OK." We
can certainly stress the positive aspects of a given difficult situation,
but only on two conditions: a) we are being honest with ourselves, and b)
we do not consequently ignore the second aspect of loving trust. Even
if a person finds himself in Paradise, he must be prepared to cleave to
God even (God forbid) under hellish circumstances.

It seems to me that it does not suffice to explain to our students
that the righteous may suffer in this world, but that in the next world
they enjoy goodness. This is just one response to the problem of human
suffering, but certainly not the only one.

7) Indeed, it is difficult to nurture values of faith and trust in an
environment dominated by secularism. Faith and trust are not the most
marketable merchandise. We must redouble our efforts in the educational
realm, and must provide examples through our personal conduct. I am
convinced that our students can easily distinguish between a teacher who
is truly devoted to his or her calling, whose soul is bound up with that
which he or she teaches, and one who only goes through the motions and
regards teaching merely as a livelihood. There are many ways of being
dishonest in our instruction. We must build ourselves and then try to
develop tspiritual potential of our students. I believe that a person
who is open and sensitive will in the end come to encounter God.

8) Concerning faith during the Holocaust: The most firmly rooted tree
cannot withstand great storm winds. There were many whose spiritual roots
were deep and strong. Nevertheless, they were broken by the experience
of the Holocaust. It is not possible for us to judge the religious
state of particular individuals, or of a particular generation, by
inquiring as to whether they withstood the test of the Holocaust. Of
course, if someone emerged from the Holocaust with his faith intact,
we have no greater evidence of devotion than this. By the same token,
one who was broken by the experience did not necessarily possess less
faith and trust in God at the outset. The test was overwhelming, and
it is not possible to derive meaningful proof from it.

Teaching values of faith and trust is a slow and incremental process.
It presents us, as well as our students, with lofty goals, with the
constant challenge of achieving love of God and accepting suffering
predicated on a conviction that "Though He may slay me, still I will
trust in Him."

[Translated by Michael Hattin.
This lecture was originally delivered in Hebrew to a conference
of senior educators of the National Religious school system in Israel.
This adaptation is based on a transcript of that lecture published in
Elul 5735 (1974) by the Israeli Ministry of Education. It has not
been reviewed by Harav Lichtenstein.]

*********************************************************
Copyright (c) 2002 Yeshivat Har Etzion
All Rights Reserved.

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