Avodah Mailing List

Volume 09 : Number 042

Sunday, June 2 2002

• Re: When is Tzait?
• Textual Variants in the Torah
• RE: Wearing tzitzis outside one's clothes
• sholom zachor
• Re: Is this movement halakhic
• Ani veHo Hoshiah Na"
• Rosh in mitzva 613
• Re: birth control
• law of averages
• birkhoth hashaxar
• Re: birkhoth hashaxar
• Re: Hashgacha Protis
• Re: Ikkarei Emunah on the Text of the Torah
• Re: Ikkarei Emunah on the Text of the Torah
• When is Tzait?
• Wearing Tzitzis outside

David Cohen wrote:
From what I understand, the 8.5 degrees definition that is commonly used 
>today comes from R' Yechiel Michel Tukaczinsky, who observed that 3 medium 
>stars are not visible until somewhat after 3/4 mil. Apparently, he held, 
>unlike R' Levi, that the 3 medium stars determine the actual halachic 
>definition of nightfall.

>There is certainly a "machalokes metzius" between them.

>However, I am interested in what appears to be the conceptual machalokes. 
>Since I have
>been unable to get hold of RYMT's work on the subject, I am turning to 
>those of you who may have some familiarity with it. Why does he come to the 
>conclusion that 3 medium
>stars, as opposed to 3/4 mil, is the actual definition to be followed when 
>the two events are at different times? And what does he do with R' 
>Yehudah's statement in the gemara about 3/4 mil? Does it mean anything?

I have not seen RYMT's work and am relying on a summary by R. Mordechai
Willig in his Am Mordechai. RYMT determined based on the gemara according
to the Gra that the 3 medium stars should be visible after 3/4 mil.
It is not that the 3 stars determine night, but that the gemara states
that this phenomenon corresponds to the beginning of night. Since night
begins when 3 medium stars are visible and that happens a little after 3/4
mil, the Gra's understanding of the sugya must be incorrect. RYMT then
came up with a slightly different understanding which confused me but is
based on R' Yossi (like I said, I never saw it inside) and concluded that
the maskana of the sugya is that night begins slightly after 3/4 mil,
at a time that corresponds with when 3/4 mil are observable.

R. Yehudah (Leo) Levi observed (or quoted R. Chaim Druck who
observed?) that 3 medium stars are visible in Jerusalem after 3/4 mil,
but only to a trained observer. This led him to reject RYMT's conclusions
and stick with the Gra.

IOW the conceptual differences are great because RYL follows the Gra's
shitah while RYMT follows his own shitah.

Gil Student

For those interested in the L. Rebbe's response to textual variants in the 
Torah please point your browser to: 
http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/heichalMenachem.pdf

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

> (I will also note that the talmidim of the Vilner Gaon noted that he wore
> a talis godol made of cotton underneath his clothes.....)

(I am behind in my reading, so I apologize if I am being repetitive....)

I recently heard an excellent tape from R' Y. Reisman entitled "The Fringe
Benefits of Tzizis."  He mentioned that the Vilna Gaon didn't wear a wool
talis koton, and offered two reasons why:  1)  the Vilna Gaon wore linen
shirts (and was machmir not to wear wool and linen next to each other; or 2)
Since some shitos hold that cotton is only chayiv in tzizis m'drabanan, the
Vilna Gaon wanted to be yotzei the mitzva both m'd'oraisa (when he wore a
wool talis gadol) and m'drabanan (when he wore a cotton talis koton).

KT
Aryeh

... baby was still in ths hospital the first Friday night, bris is delayed
a week, so that there will be another shabbos before the bris.

Can we (not me, someone in my community) have a sholom zochor on this
second Fri night?

Mareh mekomos appreciated if possible.

-- Sholom

Micha Berger (9:242) wrote:
>: GS, because of its arbitrary nature is obviously held to be in a 
>:>: special class according to the author of the beraita you are citing.  That
>:>: has nothing to do with the other hermeneutic rules that are based on
>:>: logic and sevara...

>:> Actually, the only two middos that are argued to be logical are the
>:> first (qal vachomer) and the last (ad sheyavo hakasuv hashelishi).

>: Where did you get that from?  In any event, I did not mean Aristotlean
>: logic or set theory, I meant a formal system of reasoning that allows
>: one to draw inferences from texts. 

> In that case, your sentence is circular. You say that only these two are
> not rules but are only applied when we have a mesorah to because these
> two aren't rules in a formal system.

All I said was that GS and heqesh are based on word association, not the
application of some formal reasoning. I therefore think that it is easy
to distinguish between them and other hermeneutic rules. But if you
insist on arguing (contrary to what appears obvious to me and contrary
to the obvious interpretation of the baraita in Heleq that singles out
GS rather than derashot in general) that what is true of GS is true of
all derashot, you are free to do so.
 
>:> No, it's an ad absurdum. If your argument works for derashos, it works
>:> for every de'Oraisa about which there is a machlokes. I assume you do
>:> not say that kindling a fire is deRabbanan because Beis Shammai hold
>:> that it includes leavning the fire burning. So I'll use that as
>:> my absurdum.

>: I'm sorry, you've lost me here.  The rabbis had arguments about how 
>: properly to understand Scriptural texts...

> You said that derashos can't come from G-d, we debate their identity.

I said they can't? When did I say they can't? I said that they need
not and, it appears obvious to me that many derashot were originated by
the Sages. They were not created out of thin air, but from analysis of
the Scriptural text. What does "debate their identity" mean and what
does it refer to? I am still not following you.

> Then you say that dinim that come from peshat in the pasuq do, even
> though we debate their identity?

Look, we can all read the Scripture and figure out, more or less, what
it means. Sometimes the meaning is really obvious. Other times, it is
not obvious. Sometimes, Hazal interpret the text in a way that conflicts
with the obvious or most plausible interpretation, and derive halakhot
accordingly. That is clarly within their prerogative under Mamrim 2:1.
I really don't understand what you think is the matter here.

> You're left with only with a subset of those dinim that are not subject
> to machliqes, and are either halachah leMosheh Misinai or peshat in the
> pasuq. Only those /could be/ from Hashem, and even that we only proved
> the possibility.

Micha, I'm clueless.

> That is the argument you make for derashos, applied consistantly
> across the board.

If you say so.  I really can't tell.

RSB asks re mishnah Sukkah 4:5
> ana H' hoshiah na ana ve-hoshiah na" (no second mention of the Name)" and
> Is there another possible manuscript-based explanation, according to which the
> girsa "ani veHo" derives from Tanna Kamma's "[...] ana ve-ho[shiah na

1. the ms has the shem deleted (by the circle around it)
2. notice, too, the beraita of rebi eliezer omer is not there (though
it is in our printed eds)
3. See H Albeck ad loc (and at end, p. 476). re ani va-... Albeck says
that's how they would pronounce the words "ana H". I leave it to RSM
to explain.
4. See R. Elimelekh Schachter (thats RHS' father BTW), *hamishnah be-bavli
uvi-yerusahlmi" for interesting he`arot and mareh mekomot
5. See Harry (Menahem Tsevi) Fox's diss, vol 2, pp. 131-140 for
text-critical comments re this mishnah ani va-hu (yes, with "melupm-vov")
has a history

i'm sorry i must stop here. ten le-hakham ve-yehkam od
yd

According to the Rosh the mitzva of an individual writing a Sefer Torah
(mitzva 613) nowadays has been superceded with the mitzva of buying
seforim. (Shas, etc.)

A lot of Achronim have a problem with this Rosh and have reworded him
to mean that we have to _also_ buy seforim.

What puzzles me (according to either view) is that the halocho is clear
that do fulfill mitzva 613 you have to write it yourself (yourself or
by shaliach) perfectly (according to current mesora).

- Simply buying a Sefer Torah doesn't do the trick, according to most
  poskim. ("Like snatching a mitzva from the market place")
- Inheriting a Sefer Torah doesn't do the trick.
- A Sefer Torah with even 1 inaccurate letter doesn't do the trick.

Yet the Rosh says "buy seforim".
- Seforim are "printed" not written.
- The seforim are not printed for a specific individual
- Rarely do seforim come without a typo defect.

Considering the "discrepancies" mentioned, does anybody have any insights
as to the transition from Sefer Torah to seforim?

 - Danny

RCS: <<Should I assume that you hold that nebech if someone became a
teacher or a social worker, they are not allowed to have more children
than necessary for them to fulfill pirya v'rivya because they won't be
able to pay tuitions? >>

Don't know about tuitions (historically, the community paid the cost
of education) but I am unsure whether they should be having very
large families when they know that barring a nes, they will have to
receive tomchei shabbos packages and beg for hachnasas kallah, etc.
It is derech eretz not to put oneself in the situation where one must
receive tzedakah (l'olam yaaseh shabaso chol v'al yitztarech labriyos).
Should one be mekayem the derech eretz of "la'erev" (view of Ramban)
if one knows that one is likely to violate a different derech eretz?

Also, if we are not supposed to make financial calculations before we
perform a mitzvah, why shouldn't poor people buy $1000 mehudar esrogim?
Why don't we spend more than a fifth on a mitzvas aseh?

The Tiferes Yisroel (Boaz) at the end of Kiddushin says that Hashem's
plan (mazal) for a person's financial success is unlikely to be changed
by zechuyos, and that a person's job is part of this prearranged mazal.
Why shouldn't a person look at his fixed salary job in chinuch as an
indication that this probably reflective of his financial situation
in life? Put it another way: in reality, most of the EY people in
chinuch with very large families and no wealthy mishpacha do have to
rely on some form of tzedakah.

<< The Ramban says "ain kofin v'lo korin avaryana l'mi she'lo rotzeh
la'asok ba." It's still at least a mitzva kiyumis l'shitas ha'Ramban. We
aren't kofeh on going on aliya or on tzitzis either. >>

My point is that in the case of Aliyah, many are willing to countenance
the possibility that finances play an role, so if Aliyah is no less
important than l'erev, the same should be true of l'erev.

I failed to make trouble with my previous post (about Gan Eden), so I
figured I'd make one last try before I leave for vacation. Here goes:

My guess is that the Tannaitic preference for case law reflects a halachic
principle. That is, we all know that Tannaim generally prefer to say
hashochet rov echad baof kasher rather than rubo k'kulo. The principle
is that votes in Sanhedrin follow case law, that is, everyone in the
Sanhedrin who believes that rov echad baof kasher would vote yes, even
if some of them reject rubo k'kulo and accept the law about fowl for
a different reason. So that they codified case law, since that's what
they would have voted on in the good old days.

Now consider a Rabbi who rejects rubo k'kulo and consequently believes
that rov echad baof passul. The Sanhedrin votes against him (citing
multiple reasons), and he has to change his mind. What does he do? I
can think of several possibilities:

1. He changes his psaq in that one case, and leaves all his other
opinions intact.

2. He adopts one of the opinions that implies rov echad baof kasher,
and changes all his opinions dependent on that one principle.

3. He adopts some or all of the principles which imply rov echad baof
kasher.

Now all of these have problems. Number 1 contradicts everything we
know about amoraic methodology: they assume that tannaim held consistent
opinions and never say kan kodem hachraath beth din, kan l'achar hachraath
beth din.

Numbers 2 and 3 lead to problems, not immediately, but when the Sanhedrin
votes on other cases. Loosely speaking I think I'm asking a variant
on Arrow's theorem: is there any reason to believe that voting on case
law will lead to consistent law? My intuition is that it won't, but the
gemara clearly assumes that it does.

David Riceman

The first berakha is "ahser nathan lasekhvee bina ...". We HEAR the cock
when it crows in the morning.

On Fri, May 31, 2002 at 09:08:37AM -0700, Saul Davis wrote:
: The first berakha is "ahser nathan lasekhvee bina ...". We HEAR the cock
: when it crows in the morning.

But use it as a reminder to thank HQBH for giving binah.

Perhaps this is because those who coined birchos hashachar never pictured
someone who could hear but was still educable. The dinim of cheireish
are related to the uneducability of the deaf.

Perhaps this is why the haqaras hatov upon hearing the rooster is for
the binah we learned to apply.

-mi

On Wed, May 08, 2002 at 10:42:27AM -0400, Yzkd@aol.com wrote:
: Those who are interested in seeing the L. Rebbe's response(s)
: on the issue of Hashgacha Protis can point their browser to:
: <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/faxes/protis.pdf>.

A summary:

The Besh"t's shitah is that everything is subject to hashgachah peratis,
even domeim, tzomei'ach and chai (DTC).
    1- Their very existance is through active Ratzon haBorei -- existance
       itself is HP.
    2- Everything fits Kavanah ha'Elyonah be'inyan beri'ah.

On this, RMMS makes three he'aros (two in section aleph, one in dalet):
    a- The Besh"t's primary goal is to be soseir deism.
    b- "Ein hashem el verei'av -- bebeis einayim" is saying that yereiav
       get a differentkind of HP, not a more personal HP.
    c- Even though DTC are subject to HP and therefore suffer (*) by
       Kavanah ha'Elyonah, since they lack bechirah they lack sechar
       va'onesh.

(* The sar of a domeim suffers when it's prematurely destroyed, e.g.
via bal tashchis.)

The Moreh 3:17 excludes DTC from HP, and in 3:18 the Rambam also
excudes sichlim and mamarim -- who are as ba'alei chai WRT HP.
Later RMMS elaborates that this removal of HP is not onesh or
seguli, but tiv'i -- a natural consequence of his actions.

[I'm still unclear how that's different than onesh.]

Shomer Emunim starts by saying that nothing is without kavanah
and hashgachah, as it says, "vehalachti imchem beqeri". But then
he writes that DTC are subject to sarim who are appointed
over themin as a whole. A sar has no perati authority. With one
exception, if the fate of a human is impacted by the fact of an
object than his HP would determine what happens to that object.

The Ramak in sefer Alimah starts presents the same dilemma as the SE.

RMMS resolves this by saying that even alleged miqreh is from HKBH. This
fits the pasuq cited by the SE. This shitah doesn't limit omniscience or
omnipotence, but holds that Hashem chooses not to bestow HP on non-humans.

Tzarich inyan if the rasha's shift from HP to [Divinely caused] miqreh
is seguli or tiv'i. The Ramaq has hester panim listed as the 10th
form of HP.

You might ask if everything exists for the sake of man, why doesn't
man's HP affect everything? However, man need amin, not necessarily
an individual. His fortune may be tied to the health of his own cow,
but not to the health of some fish at the bottom of the sea.

The Ramban (Ber 18:19) says that the role of hashgachah in the
olam hashafeil is lishmor hakelalim. Regular people can be left
to miqreh until their eis pequdah, whereas chasidim get HP.

Derech haChaim takes issue with the Rambam. "Einecha pequchos al kol
darchei benei adam." Even if a person is filled with a ru'ach shetus
like a beheimah, he still gets HP -- albeit in the form of din.

QHY (Qehillas Ya'aqov?) breaks down the Ramban's shitah into two parts:
    1- Hashgachah bema'asav -- which applies even to ovdei AZ;
    2- Protection from miqreh -- only for tzaddiqim.

QHY asks on this shitah from Yer' Shevi'is 9:1, where RSBY says
that a bird isn't hunted down without Shamayim saying so. And
from this bird he makes a qal vachomer to the fate of man. First,
RMMS explains RSBY's statement, given the hunter has HP. He holds
the gemara's chiddush is because the bird is in a maqom sakanah,
and the QV is to people even in such a maqom.
Also:
    1- The hunter could have gotten a similar bird instead of this
       individual;
    2- If the he'arah were about HP for parnasah rather than the bird,
       the QV would have been phrased accordingly.
So, the QHY concludes, the gemara implies HP for a ba'al chai -- the
hunted bird.

The Chinuch (169) assumes that the concept of HP even on non-human events
is "rachoq harbeih min haseichel". The Morah (3:17) calls this a position
of some latter ge'onim, but they got the notion from the Metaqallamun --
it's not found in Chazal.

HOwever, RMMS points out that this isn't necessarily shitas haBesh"t.
This shitah is about gemul to a ba'al chai. The Besh"t rules out sechar
va'onesh for them. Is gemul the same thing -- or only reimbursment for
suffering. And if the latter, why chai and not tzomei'ach nor domeim?

RMMS concludes from the general silence that most held there was no
question worth discussion.


The Besh"t's premise that lead to the HP-is-universal maskanah, is also
subject to machloqes. Those who take tzimtzum literally would not say
that the persistance of objects requires constant Divine Action. (I
believe RMMS is contrasting this to the Tanya's statement that tzimtzum
is an illusion. However, I hadn't realized the Besh"t said it first.)

That doesn't mean that the others who argure with the Besh"t's maskanah
necessarily disagree with the premise. RMMS brings 4 ra'ayos that they
need not, but simply didn't clarify a shitah. The fourth is particularly
important as it shows what RMMS holds HP means.

1- They obviously don't limit omniscience. So, saying that Hashem doesn't
bestow HP on all DTC doesn't imply a total detachment from them.

2- The Besh"t chidush with "devarcha nitzav" is that his-havus is renewed
every moment. These rishonim don't argue with the original creation,
the his-havus at the first moment. But that would mean that there is
hashgachah in the birth of a chai, and the Rambam explicitly says there
isn't.

3- People have bechirah in face of "devarcha nitzav" because that itself
is the davar that Hashem wants for people. There is no greater question in
saying Hashem wants the existance of DTCs that are subject to sar umazal.

4- RMMS makes clear something I tried to keep clear from the begining:
that his-havus and HP are different things. The Besh"t is saying that
one implies the other, NOT that the two are identical. HP is about
sechar va'onesh, not mere existance.

Ad kan RMMS.

Some of my own thoughts:

1- If HP is about sechar va'onesh, then how did RMMS ask about whether
gemul is part of SvO. Once he said it's part of HP, wouldn't it have
to be?

2- What about the Rambam? Isn't making HP a consequence of da'as Hasem
make is a form of sechar, vechein lehefech? Does the Rambam beleive in
a separate onesh seguli that is HP in addition to the consequence of
losing HP?

3- Note that this implies two very different approaches to min:

The Rambam has the min called "ben adam" as something you can be more or
less a member of. He argues this from a general concept on the definition
of min.

Those who speak of a DTC being subject to the sar who does the hashgachah
minis for that min see min as a more absolute thing.

This is a machlokes you find in philosophy as well. Unsurprisingly, the
Rambam is saying like Aristotle: The individual is primary, the min is
a group of individuals that have something in common.

The other side is Platonic Idealism. The min exists in a higher level
than the actual members of the min (which are shadows on a cave wall,
in the famous metaphor).

I refered to this debate last week when we discussed shinui sheim.
Shinui sheim implies a third approach to min -- that it's "merely"
a word, with no real existance: Nominalsim.

I tried to rule out this implication by saying that halachah doesn't
concern itself with the thing-in-itself, but with how we relate to the
object. (Since that's how the object will impact our quest for deveiqus
and sheleimus.) There's no big chiddush to include the name we have for
the object in our relationship to it.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                    Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org                   The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                    - R' Binyamin Hecht

[I don't know why this repeatedly ends up on Areivim. -mi]

Micha Berger wrote (9:256):
> David Glasner wrote:
>: All I said was that GS and heqesh are based on word association, not the
>: application of some formal reasoning. I therefore think that it is easy
>: to distinguish between them and other hermeneutic rules...

> But the only grounds you give me to make that distinction is the argument
> that only GS and heqesh are not formal reasoning.

I'm sorry, I thought that the difference between GS and heqesh on the one
hand and the other 11 midot was obvious. It's been obvious to me ever
since I was in R. Simcha Wasserman's shiur in the ninth grade and asked
him whether it wasn't possible using a GS to prove just about anything.
And he agreed that it would be except that unlike the other midot one
needed a tradition for a GS and one couldn't invent new GS on one's
own. In the context of the conversation, it was obvious to me that
GS are unique and that R. Simcha was telling me that they were unique.
From that time (almost 40 years ago) till now, I have never heard anyone
suggest that one requires a tradition in order to invent a new derashah.
The shakla v'tarya of sugyot in shas would be incomprehensible if the
opposing sides were simply parroting traditions they had received from
their rebbeim.

> The only rules the west considers logical, as opposed to textual
> hermeneutics are qal vachomer (related to the a fortiori argument)
> and ad sheyavo hakasuv hashelishi. The others? Kelal uperat ukelal
> is sevarah, and we'd have gotten this principle even without a mesorah
> that that's the way the Torah was written?

The method of k'lal u'prat u'klal is a mesorah, the specific application 
for a specific derashah can be invented, just as moavi v'lo mo'aviah
was invented.  (I know you will say that derashah was not invented,
but I have never seen any non-dogmatic basis for saying that it 
wasn't invented.)

>: insist on arguing (contrary to what appears obvious to me and contrary
>: to the obvious interpretation of the baraita in Heleq that singles out
>: GS rather than derashot in general) that what is true of GS is true of
>: all derashot, you are free to do so.

> I don't agree with your parenthetic. The lashon is that it's the smallest
> deviation from belief in mesorah to qualify. Not that it's bedavka GS.

That's right that's what the beraita says.  But it is you not the beraita
that are inventing a dogma that all derashot and not just GS were 
transmitted to Moshe and thenceforward.  Those derashot are not 
part of mesorah under discussion in the beraita.  According to you, 
why couldn't Moshe Raabbeinu understand R. Akiva's shiur?
 
>:>:> No, it's an ad absurdum. If your argument works for derashos, it works
>:>:> for every de'Oraisa about which there is a machlokes. I assume you do
>:>:> not say that kindling a fire is deRabbanan because Beis Shammai hold
>:>:> that it includes leavning the fire burning. So I'll use that as
>:>:> my absurdum.

>:>: I'm sorry, you've lost me here.  The rabbis had arguments about how 
>:>: properly to understand Scriptural texts...

>:> You said that derashos can't come from G-d, we debate their identity.

>: I said they can't? When did I say they can't? I said that they need
>: not and, it appears obvious to me that many derashot were originated by
>: the Sages...

> I must have misunderstood. You said that the presence of machloqesin
> about which derashos exist proves that not all of them are not from G-d.
> I took this to mean that those that are under dispute aren't, and wondered
> about why you wouldn't use this argument elsewhere. Like any machloqes
> on any din de'Oraisa.

> However, as you now explain it, if the existance of machloqesin means
> that some but not all that are under debate are not from G-d, why?
> If some can be from G-d, why not all?

Read the Rambam's introduction to Zeraim, where he flat out rejects the
possibility that there could have been any conflict concerning a Sinaitic
tradition.  He makes the absence of mahloqet the criterion for the inference
of such a tradition.  His position is problematic for any number of reasons
also, which we need not go into here.  But you have no basis for asserting
that every opinion on every question is based on some tradition that
originated at Sinai.  I'm amazed that you would even suggest such an idea.
You have to explain why some issues are controversial and others not.  If
the RshO created multiple traditions about some halakhot, why not about 
all halakhot?  

>: Look, we can all read the Scripture and figure out, more or less, what
>: it means. Sometimes the meaning is really obvious. Other times, it is
>: not obvious. Sometimes, Hazal interpret the text in a way that conflicts
>: with the obvious or most plausible interpretation, and derive halakhot
>: accordingly....

> You've phrased this as though the interpretation is newer than the
> text. What we have within Hil Mamrim is the permission to pick on
> pre-existant interpretation over another. Which is why the mishnah in
> Ediyos tells us the until-then rejected approach is recorded in the
> mishnah. So that a later Sanhedrin can use it.

Why reinvent the wheel? Again you are just asserting beliefs that
you are free to espouse if you care to, but I hope that you are not
suggesting that these beliefs are iqarei emunah. And in the context of
your criticism of Halivni, it certainly seemed as if you were, or were
headed in that direction.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

Two clarifications:

1- I am not identifying "from G-d" with "being known since Sinai". In
the past, I pointed out that Rus Rabba says Mo'avi velo Mo'avis wasn't
known until Bo'az's day.

However, there is a difference between discovering a hidden gift from
G-d and inventing from materials that He gave us.

What RDR learnt in HS was not the Ramban's position. He holds that
the list of words about which we can make a GS was known since Sinai.
The use of those words were left to later discovery.

(I see it as saying that the list of words meant as jargon was given
with the text. Drawing actual conclusions from the conotations of that
jargon was left to be found.)

In any case, the derashah and the conclusion reached by the derashah
are different things.

2- I am not making all derashos part of the ikkar. However, denying the
origin of certain details of the text denies the origin of derashos.
So, if any one derashah must be from G-d, then textual detail it relies
upon must also.

Whether or not you agree with my "from G-d but later discovered" vs
"man-made" distinction, GS alone is enough to place someone who questions
the Sinaitic origin of those words (and their context) that the GSos
are from.

The nature of the derashos vs sevarah in an interesting topic, but
for a later post.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                    Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org                   The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                    - R' Binyamin Hecht

David E Cohen writes:
From what I understand, the 8.5 degrees definition that is commonly
>used today comes from R' Yechiel Michel Tukaczinsky, who observed that 3
>medium stars are not visible until somewhat after 3/4 mil. Apparently,
>he held, unlike R' Levi, that the 3 medium stars determine the actual
>halachic definition of nightfall.

Actually, the 8.5 degrees definition from R' Yechiel Michel Tukaczinsky is
when he observed 3 *small* stars

As far as the Gemara I (actually it's the Kesef Mishnah) would like to point
out to 3 statements from Rav Yehudah Omar Shmuel (starting from Shabbos
34:2) #1 The Machlokes between Rabbah and Rav Yosef as to what Rav Yehudah
Omar Shmuel said concerning Hichsif Hoelyon etc. #2 The Machlokes between
Rabbah and Rav Yosef as to what Rav Yehudah Omar Shmuel said concerning the
Shiur of Bein Hashmosois whether its 1/2 or 3/4 of a Mil. #3 (Shabbos 35:2)
Rav Yehudah Omar Shmuel said Kochav Echod Yoim etc.

So we see that since the original statements were said by the very same
person (Rav Yehudah Omar Shmuel) the 3 Shiurim are synonymous.

kol tuv
yosef stern

Further to Reb SM's piece on Tzitzis - and being Inyoneh Deyomeh (this
weeks sidrah has Parshas Tzitzis) - 2 comments.

The Ibn Ezra says on "Ur'isem Osoy" - 'Mitzva lihyos nireh'.

The CS z'l in his Droshos (Parshas Zochor p.187) writes - that most
mitzvos are not being fulfilled properly because we live amongst the
goyim. ...We cannot have the Tzitzis hanging openly -
>UMAMESH SH'EYNOM YOTZIM YEDEI CHOVOSOM ZULAS ZEH<(!!)
Similarly Tefilin "...mitzvoson lehanichon kol hayom",
vechein issur Chodosh nisbatel mikol vekol...
veharbeh ke'eylu shegorem lonu hapizur vehapirud..."

Nu, Reb Carl...?
A real reason to make aliyah...

SBA

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