Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 116

Friday, February 22 2002

• Re: tzaddik vs. tzaddi
• RE: Segulos
• 7 Adar
• RE: Women Reading Megillah For Men
• Re: Inductive Conclusions
• Re: 7 Adar
• Re: Later additions to Shas
• hupat ha-talit
• Re: Women Reading Megillah For Men
• Women Reading Megillah For Men
• Re: Nusach Hadlukas Nairos
• conflicting reports
• calendar
• entertainment
• gezerot
• custom vs gezerah
• Re:custom vs gezerah
• Re: Halachic permissibility of viewing movies
• Re: entertainment
• structure of kedusha
• Re: Knas/nidui bizman hazeh
• competent Beis Din
• Re: Proper care avoiding AZ and shemos AZ
• Re: Tikkun Soferim
• women reading megilla
• Re: women reading megilla
• Re: women reading megilla

At 12:22 AM 2/19/02 EST, you wrote:
>What is the correct name for the eighteenth letter of the Aleph-beis? Is
>there any other letter with two (somewhat, alebit similar) different
>names?

What about "daled" vs. "dalet"? Or is this a hebrew vs aramaic issue?

mendel

> as segulos, and I strongly suspect that many of them don't work.

You would have to take into account the Placebo affect -- which HAS been
documented to work.

Akiva

I believe the minhag of the chavrei CK is to fast during the day and eat 
the se'udah at night - which explains why 7 Adar se'udos are generally 
relatively late in the evening. There are probably different minhogim as to 
whether the fast is 6 Adar or 7 Adar, but I think it's 6 with the se'udah 
or l'yom 7.

Kol Tuv,
YGB

ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

Many of these issues are discussed in the article by
Mendel Shapiro, "Qeri'at Ha-Torah by Women," found at
<http://www.edah.org/backend/JournalArticle/1_2_shapiro.pdf>. Footnote
230 deals with the Kol Isha issue.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

> Empirical realities do not presume emunah. Yes, only a ma'amin has a decent
> explanation for why they follow rules rather than being simply random. But
> the rules themselves are inductive conclusions built on observation directly
> by the senses.

I'm not sure this makes sense. Nowadays "empiricial realities" include --
take small-particle physics, for example -- computer-identified results
of complex interactions involving matter, forces, and phenomena too
small or subtle to be observed directly by any human sense. The rules
are inductive conclusions built upon generally agreed-upon premises that
can never be truly "proven" by application of the senses. The senses,
in fact, are irrelevant to empirical science. (Take string theory, for
example. Please.) As we fast-forward into the future, the senses will
become even more irrelevant.

At least emunah depends on our beings as holy creations of HaShem. Without
the idea of emunah, there'd be no reason to get up in the morning.

David Finch

>I believe the minhag of the chavrei CK is to fast during the day and eat
>the se'udah at night - which explains why 7 Adar se'udos are generally
>relatively late in the evening. There are probably different minhogim as to
>whether the fast is 6 Adar or 7 Adar, but I think it's 6 with the se'udah
>or l'yom 7.

I can't speak for other chevros but in Passaic 'we' fast on the 7th
and have a siyum or shiur or l'yom 8.

sk

Moshe Feldman wrote:
>I seem to recall that whenever I encountered such Talmudic sections in the 
>past, the speaker was always stama d'gemara. Does the Maharatz Chayus 
>mention other examples where an Amora is cited rather than stama d'gemara?

Rav Achai is generally under suspicion as being a saborai (or sabora?),
e.g. Kiddushin 13a. See Tosafos in Zevachim 102b sv parich and Kesuvos
2b who disagree.

Gil Student

I''ve been asked the [halakhic, sociological] reasoning behind the recent
custom in the (Ashkenazi) yeshivish-velt in which the hupah is made by
holding a talit, whereas in the past a plain cloth was apparently used.
True, it's a nice minhag but why has it only recently taken hold? My
inquirer is concerned that this "new-fangled" minhag might take over the
older, more respectable [his words] one (and he is aware that Sephardic
custom may have had this minhag for a longer time; that's fine for the
Sephardim, says he, but why should Ashkenazim feel compelled to take
it over?).

Yisrael Dubitsky

Just to add to the sources I cited earlier, the Magen Avraham (689:5),
Mishnah Berurah (689:7), Aruch HaShulchan (689:1,4), and Kaf HaChaim
(689:13,14) pasken that women cannot read megillah for men. I thought I
saw the article cite R' Moshe Shternbuch so I wanted to point out that in
Moadim uZemanim vol. 2 ch. 171 he argues that women cannot be motzi men
in megillah. And finally, probably most relevant to this crowd, are the
words of RYBS as quoted in Reshimos Shiurim on Sukkah 38a (pp. 184-185).

Tosafos there (sv be'emes) say that women can not be motzi men in
mikra megillah because "zilah behu milsa" and then quote the Bahag.
RYBS offers six different explanations of the Bahag:

1. What the Turei Even (Megillah 4a) says, that women are only obligated
miderabbanan while men are obligated midivrei kabbalah.

2. Women are only obligated in *hearing* the megillah while men are
obligated in *reading* it.

3. R' Moshe Soloveitchik explained that women are only obligated in
megillah as a kiyum of pirsumei nisa while men are also obligated in
the mitzvah itself.

4. RYBS' explanation is that there are two kiyumim in mikra megillah -
talmud Torah and pirsum hanes. Men are obligated for both reasons while
women are only obligated for the latter.

5. The Gra (OC 689:2) quotes the Yerushalmi that women are not obligated
in mikra megillah but their husbands are obligated to read it to the
entire family.

6. Women are only obligated in a private reading and cannot create a
cheftza of keriah letzibbur.

At the end, RYBS adds that there are other rishonim who disagree with
the Bahag.

At least from where I'm sitting, neither the Marcheshes nor R' Tzvi
Pesach Frank had the final word on the Bahag's shitah.

Gil Student

On the subject of  Women Reading Megillah For Men, Gil Student wrote:

"Professor Aryeh Frimer, on Areivim, posted an article by Rabbi Daniel
Landes arguing that women can be motzi men in the evening reading of
megillah <http://www.pardes.org.il/articles/purim1.html>.
--CUT--
This is not to say that a rabbi does not have the right to pasken
the women can be motzi men. He just should not be saying that "it is
incontestable that women may fulfill the obligation for men by reading
the Megillah on Purim night." It is, in fact, contestable."

Indeed, there was a wonderful article in the latest Torah U'madda Journal
(Volume 9) attacking R. Avi Weiss (Torah U'madda Journal Volume 8)
on this very issue.

Aryeh

--
Dr. Aryeh A. Frimer
Ethel and David Resnick Professor of Active Oxygen Chemistry
Chemistry Dept., Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 52900, ISRAEL
E-mail: FrimeA@mail.biu.ac.il
Tel: 972-3-5318610; Fax: 972-3-5351250 Tel Home: 972-8-9473819/9470834

From: "Danny Schoemann" <dannys@smtp2.atomica.com>
>>Has any one ever seen the word qodesh added to the end of the berakhah
>>for lighting Shabbat candles.
...

>Nusach Ari (Chabad) has the word "Qodesh" at the end of the Bracha.

>Then again, Nusach Ari is by far the most radical in terms of
>Candle-Lighting Brachos. On Rosh Hashana, the nusach is "L'hadlik Ner
>Shel Yom HaZiqaron"!

In Sefer Shaarei Halach Uminhag ( Chabad ) page 250 the Rebbe himself was 
asked where do we get the Minhag to add the work Kodesh.

The answer the Rebbe writes is actually ( from a letter from 1952 ) " As to 
the adding of the work Kodesh in our SIdur Nusach Tehilas Hashem (chabad) I 
have not found a Mokor for this additon as of yet ...... but I have seen my 
Mother In Law make the blessing in that Nusach and it is BiKabalah for 
generations.........."

As too Rosh Hashonah " Yom Hazikoron " Please look in Otzer Minhagei Chabad 
(Mundshein) volume Elul-Tishrei page 57 also brings a story about why Chabad 
chose to say this new Nusach which goes back many generations in Minhag 
Chabad.

Neal Fox

RDE writes 
<Conflicting reports concerning gadolim as well as everything else - do
not necessarily indicate that someone is lying. The facts can possibly
be explained by factors such as - 1) there was a change in attitude
of various family members after Reb Moshe was niftar. Thus it makes a
difference what time period is being described 2) There is not a uniform
position taken by the children and grandchildren towards the issue. 3) the
issue of bal nefesh is such that Reb Moshe notes himself that he himself
would be lenient concerning blended whisky to avoid offending someone. 4)
There is a possible distinction between milk and yogurt 5) the existence
of commercial milk products in someones house does not necessarily
mean they consume them. In sum - none of the facts cited are inherently
contradictory and can possibly be explained by appropriate context.>

I would add one more factor to the above list. In the Torah umada journal
there is a discussion of the Netziv's attitude to secular studies and
the difference between the attitudes of his sons R. Chaim Berlin and
R. Meir Bar-Ilan.
In the discussion a psychologist brings his observation that in
interviewing children he frequently gets diametrically opposite viewpoints
from children about the identical event that happened within the
family. He provides several different suggestions as to why this happens.

As such it not always true that children or other close relatives are the
best testimony as to what happened in the family. It frequently happens
that there own personal outlooks and family relationships color the facts
(NOTE: This is a general claim and I am not in any way connecting it to
RMF and his family!).

In particular I see this with RYBS in which various members of his
extended family claim to have exclusive rights to interpret his opinions
on the grounds that they are close relatives and so knew him better than
others. However, my personal observation is that in many cases these
claims reflect more on the author's opinions that that of RYBS. They
naturally (I do not claim a lie) interpret some ambigous deed or statement
of RYBS as being in line with their personal haskafa.

-- 
Eli Turkel, turkel@colorado.edu on 2/21/2002

 <<Which was by Hillel II -- not coincidentally the av beis din who
disbanded / presided over the self-disbanding Sanhedrin (in 358ce).
 He made the calendar because it was the end of the mosad that could
be meqadeish the chodesh.

 Though these facts are generally accepted in fact it appears no
where in the Gemara and many rishonim seem to unaware of the details.

One thing that has always bothered me. If the establishment of the calendar
was such a momentous event how come it is never mentioned in the gemara. The
gemara in beitzah is very vague and certainly does not mention Hillel II,
a Sanhedrin or any such idea....>>

Arie Folger asks
< Could you elaborate on
a) where the well known facts came from
b) what is/is not elaborated in TB/TY
c) what you base your POV that the calendar was established over
  centuries on? >

One of the best sources I know is R. Kasher's Torah Shelemah on Parshat Bo
which has a few hundred pages on the development of the Calendar. Since I
don't have access to this now I am relying on my (faulty) memory.

Various Rishonim quote the geneaology of Hillel II differently some even making
him a great-grand son of Rebbe which is much too early. Some of the earlier
sources are R. Chananel, Ramban. I believe Rambam says he was a contemporary
of Abaye and Rava. In any case the Talmud never quotes him by name and doesn't
give any indication that this is a decree of the Sanhedrin and some momentus
change happened smack in the middle of the days of the Amoraim in Bavel.

 From various gemaras it is obvious that takanot like Rosh Hashana can
not fall on certain days preceded the establishment of the calendar by
Hillel II. It is very probable that even this takanah was not done all
at once but different possibilities were ruled out in different eras.

 From the whole fight with R. Saadiah Gaon it is clear that the complete
details of the calendar were not established even by close to end of
the gaonic era some 400-500 years after R. Ashi.

kol tuv
-- 
Eli Turkel, turkel@colorado.edu on 2/21/2002

<Again, the formula is inescapable - point to the source in halacha that
(a) entertainment is a need and (b) there isn't a derech achrita from
movies as an avenue to fulfilling this need.>

The way I understand this approach it is forbidden to walk down a street
where a woman might not be dressed properly unless there is a pressing
need. Why stop at movies or bowling. It should be forbidden to walk around
Times square (or kikar zion for that matter or probably even 47th street
in manhattan) unless needed for ones parnassa or for shopping. i.e. one is
prohibited from entering a non-charedi neighborhood for any non-essential
reason. Certainly visiting a friend is not sufficient and I am not
convinced that even giving a shiur is good enough of a reason to enter
a suspect neighborhood.

-- 
Eli Turkel, turkel@colorado.edu on 2/21/2002

Rabbi Rich Wolpoe responded <<< Kitniyos / Cheirem derabbeinu Gershom /
both are post Talmudic >>>

Akiva Miller writes

Yes, they are post-Talmudic, But I thought they were in the category of
Minhag, not of Gezerah.
 My understanding is that a "minhag" is a "way of acting"; a person
(or group of people) takes it upon himself. A "gezerah", in contrast, is
imposed on the group from the outside. I don't know where anyone would
get the authority to do that, other than a Beis Din (or maybe even an
individual) of semuchim.

Certainly in the days of ashkenazi Jewry there were several councils in
which the rabbis proclaimed many gezerot including those of Rabbenu
Gershon. Another set was decreed under the leadership of Rabbenu
Tam. These gezerot cover many different areas of halacha including
privacy of mail, the rights of merchants, the rights to get up in shul and
complain about misconduct etc. These are not customs but gezerot issued
from an outside group backed up by a cherem against violaters. This is
after the period if semicha and this was not a gezerah. kitniot is a
minhag because it was decreed in any of these councils and in fact was
controversial among baale hatosaphot.

I have not checked into it but I am pretty sure that the vaad arba arazot
in Poland/Lithunia also issued gezerot.

What I have claimed in the past is that prohibition of "lo tassur"
applies only to the decrees of a Sanhedrin in the Temple or else to
a body that is accepted by all of Israel (i.e. Mishna and Gemara).
Hence, Lo tassur would not apply to gezerot of Rabbenu Gershon and
Rabbenu Tam. This does not mean that one is not obligated to follow
these gezerot as decress and not just customs.

-- 
Eli Turkel, turkel@colorado.edu on 2/21/2002

Akiva writes
< A minhag is something which originates with the people, and is ratified
by the rabbis. (If the rabbis reject it, or choose not to endorse it,
it is considered a silly minhag, or mistaken minhag, or wrong minhag, and
the followers can and should cease to follow it.) In contrast, a takanah
(which includes gezeros and perhaps other forms of d'rabanan) originates
with the rabbis, and is ratified by the people. (If the majority of the
people are unable to abide by it, it ceases to have the force of law, but
stays on the books as a strong recommendation. Pas Palter and Tevilas Ezra
are my favorite examples.)>

I am not convinced by this. I think most takanot started out as minhagim that
the rabbis wanted to strengthen by making it an official takanah, i.e. did
the idea of Pas Palter not exist until the formal declaration in the sanhedrin?

A better example is the various halachot of nidah. The gemara in a number of
cases says that the women accepted on themselves chumrot (i.e. every nidah
has the laws of zivah). Does anyone today think of this as a custom? Obviously
at some stage what started as a custom got changed into a gezerah. Similarly
many takanot in monetary matters obviously were accepted by merchants long
before they became official takanot. I can't imagine any bet din intorducing
a brand new takanah in business matters that had never been previously tried
in practice.

-- 
Eli Turkel, turkel@colorado.edu on 2/21/2002

I fully accept R' Eli Turkel's diyukim on my distinction between takanah
and minhag. It certainly sounds reasonable to me that certain individuals
started refraining from [fill in the blank], or started doing [fill in
the blank], long before the Sanhedrin legislated them.

R' Turkel writes <<< I think most takanot started out as minhagim that
the rabbis wanted to strengthen by making it an official takanah, >>>

And those minhagim which did *not* need to be strengthened were not turned
into takanos, I suppose. Perhaps those minhagim which had already been
accepted and followed by the majority, are the ones which were allowed to
remain as minhagim. There were other minhagim which were only followed
by small groups or even scattered individuals, but the Sanhedrin saw
great value in them and made them into law so that all would follow them.

Occasionally, the Sanhedrin misjudged how difficult these things would
be for the average person, and so the people failed to ratify them --
my examples of Tevilas Ezra and Pas Palter again. But most of the time,
people saw the value, and were willing to follow this newly-passed law,
which they had not heard of before, or perhaps they heard of it but did
not want to bother with which it was still optional -- I think that R'
Turkel's examples of Nidah/Zivah and various business practices can fall
in this category easily.

Akiva Miller

I wrote:
>> I don't think that that is pshat in darka achrita, but that darka achrita
>> refers to your choosing a specific road to get to your destination rather
>> than an alternative road.  The "destination" refers to a specific activity
>> you have in mind, and as RCS pointed out, it need not be a mitzvah.  The
>> "road" vs "alternative road" refers to how you travel to your destination,
>> not which destination you choose. 

R Y Willroth replied:
> The destination is entertainment, the route is via movies and television.

I reviewed a number of rishonim and achronim on BB 57b, and the only
relevant comment is from the Maharsha. He says that pshat in the
gemara is that if there is a darka achrisa, this shows that the person
is miskaven l'aveira and he is therefore labeled a rasha for having gone
on the first derech.

I believe that the Maharsha supports my understanding that the choice of
different type of entertainment (e.g., choosing bowling, which requires
taking a subway, over playing a card game at home) is not the darka
achrisa that the gemara is talking about. If he chose the bowling,
it's difficult to say that he was miskaven l'aveira. Rather, he likes
bowling better.

Instead, the Marasha is taliking of taking road A rather than road B
to the same destination. If you chose road A, that shows that you were
miskaven l'aveirah.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

>> Again, the formula is inescapable - point to the source in halacha that
>> (a) entertainment is a need and (b) there isn't a derech achrita from
>> movies as an avenue to fulfilling this need.

> The way I understand this approach it is forbidden to walk down a street
> where a woman might not be dressed properly unless there is a pressing
> need. Why stop at movies or bowling. ...

Who's stoping at movies or bowling (though I wish people would go even
_that_ far, that there would be what to talk about not stopping there)?
What _is_ the heter for Times Square? Visiting a friend -- who has
friends in such places?! Giving a shiur? I'm geussing that the end there
is giving the shiur _to those people_ and therefore there is no derech
achrita and it would be permissable. What's the need? Limud Torah,
Kiruv, etc. - much easier to justify than a "walk" through the scenes
of Terminator 2 to get to the (questionable) destination of entertainment.

It occurred to me that there is a parallel between the kedusha of Shabbos
Musaf and the yotzer of every day. Namely, we say kaddosh, baruch,
shema, then Hashem yimloch le'olam va'ed/yimloch Hashem le'olam.

Comments?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

On Mon, Feb 18, 2002 at 08:24:36AM +0200, Shlomo Argamon wrote:
: A minor point here I'd like to understand: My understanding was that
: the case itself could actually be held *inside* of EY, however, the
: BD is one of non-semukhin. I've understood the phrase "einam semukhin
: beErets Yisrael" to mean "don't have *real* semikha", but it doesn't
: matter where the case takes place. Nisht azoi?

 From what we've seen so far, it sounds to like both the ordination and
the case must be within EY.

You joined us just a shade late for a discussion of this point. See
our discussion starting in v8n76 about Rav Ashi's semichah (or go to
the R page in the subject index and scroll down) and continuing into
a discussion of whether "Rav" is simply "Rabbi" with a Bavli accent or
actually denotes a different status.

I have been following the opening part of C"M with an eye toward seeing
what's implied. Also interesting to explore, and related to the question,
is whether the dayanim of today actually have power qua dayanim or as
people approached for pesharah. I noticed that bedi'eved, pasul dayanim
(e.g. a karov, someone who knows the to'ein is evil, one dayan alone)
are followed since both sides went to them.

BTW, most of the Limud Yomi discussion is going on on the Forum, not here.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

One of my friends has a comment which, in theory, should be addressed to
a local, competent Beis Din (cf. CM 28:1). I quoted the Aruch HaShulhan
to him, who says that a competent BD has three basic responsibilities:
i. resolving financial disputes ii. punishing ovrei aveirah (and
preventing people from being oveir aveiroth) and iii. preventing people
from having treasonable thoughts about the Czar.

Ignoring iii, I told him he'd probably have to move to a place like Iran
(maybe Tunisia?) to find a BD with the authority to do ii, and therefore
he's stuck.

Given that the Rambam in H. Deoth says that a Talmid Chacham is obliged to
live in a city with a competent BD, how do those of you who are Talmidei
Chachamim deal with this problem?

David Riceman

R' Seth Mandel wrote in vol. 6 no. 141 
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol06/v06n141.shtml#18>:
> It came to pass in the days of Ahasuerus that there was a member of the
> sanhedrin named Mordokhai, who had a cousin named Hadassa. But she
> was called Esther.
> I would have thought we could do better than that. Why didn't they use Hebrew 
> names? ...                                   Why not the other way around: 
> let the megilla call her Hadassa, and just note at the beginning that
> she was called by the goyim Esther? We don't even know M's Hebrew name...
> frum, ch'v?

> And even worse, what goyish names! Mordokhai is derived from Marduk, the
> chief god of the Assyrian pantheon, and Esther from Astoret, the chief
> goddess! ...

The Gemara in Gittin at the top of 11a and 11b discusses the case of
a shetar in which the witnesses have non-Jewish names. If the names
are obviously non-Jewish (shemos muvhakin), e.g. Lukus and Los, then
we can be sure that no one falsified the shetar and it was issued by
a non-Jewish court (and therefore falls under dina demalchusa dina).
But if the name may or may not be non-Jewish then it is possible that
the shetar is falsified.

To add insult to injury, the Gemara on 11b says that the MAJORITY of
Jews in chutz la'aretz had names like gentiles!

Gil Student

We are all familiar with the machlokes whether Tikkun Soferim were
emendations the soferim made in Tanach or were places in which the
authors of Tanach initially modified the phrasing like a sofer would.

I had someone check in the Samaritan Torah and it seems that in the
places in the Torah in which tikkunei soferim were supposedly made
(Bereishis 18:22; Bamidbar 11:15, 12:12) the Samaritan Torah has the
same version we have in our Torahs. Since the Samaritans split from
the Jews before Ezra and by all accounts the soferim were either at the
same time as or later than Ezra, does this not prove that the tikkunei
soferim were NOT emendations? Is there a flaw in this logic? If not,
has anyone noticed this before?

Gil Student

(I'm bouncing this thread from Areivim. Anyone who wants to elaborate
on positions I didn't get around to copying, please post them here. -mi)

From: Stuart Klagsbrun <SKlagsbrun@agtnet.com>
> Kavod is all in the eyes of the m'chabaid and the nichbad. My shiloh is 
> which set of eyes has the upper hand in making a final determination.

Also, WRT megilla, what is the importance of kavod?
 
On Thursday, February 21, 2002 5:40 PM, Rena Freedenberg 
>> Question, In SA where it states that women may be
>> oleh letorah - it immediately adds - however -
>> that they shouldn't 'mipnei kvod hatzibbur'.

>> Why is megilla any different?

> From what I remember learning, the kavod hatzibbur issue is that a woman
> would be allowed to read if no suitable man can be found who knows enough 

Because the Gemara uses the lashon of kevod hatzibur by women/minors
getting aliyot letorah (as well as certain other things), but davka *not*
by women leining Megillah? IIRC, all the gemaras which talk about women
leining use "likro"; it's only a Tosefta that didn't find its way into
the Gemara that uses "lishmoa". So the SA wouldn't have used "kevod
hatzibur" by megilla - it's not relevant there.

Perhaps I can restate the disagreement regarding kevod hatzibbur as
being over whether a tzibbur can be mochel on its kavod and say that
women reading megillah is not a slight to their kavod.

If this is correct, then I point to Magen Avraham 53:9 and Mishnah
Berurah 59:23 who pasken that a tzibbur may not be mochel on its kavod.

Gil Student

On Fri, Feb 22, 2002 at 01:02:19PM -0500, Gil Student wrote:
: If this is correct, then I point to Magen Avraham 53:9 and Mishnah Berurah 
: 59:23 who pasken that a tzibbur may not be mochel on its kavod.

Alternatively, the MA could be saying that the tzibbur's kavod is a
derivative of KY's, and they can no more be mocheil it than a melech
could.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

*********************


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