Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 115

Wednesday, February 20 2002

• Ktav Amim/Ktav Galchut/Ktav Meshita
• Re: Avodah V8 #114
• Re: Halachic methodology and chalav hakompanies
• Knas/nidui bizman hazeh
• Re: lehadliq ner shel shabat qodesh
• FW: lehadliq ner shel shabat qodesh
• Re: FW: lehadliq ner shel shabat qodesh
• Re: Moshiach ben Yosef
• tzaddik vs. tzaddi
• Re: tzaddik vs. tzaddi
• Re: Segulos
• Re: tzaddik vs. tzaddi
• Re: 4 Minim: Ta'amei haMitzvah
• On Purim, Clothing, and Ma'aseh Bereishis
• Later additions to Shas
• Re: Later additions to Shas
• RE: Later additions to Shas
• Re: Segulos
• Women Reading Megillah For Men

Apropos the posts on ktav ashurit, I have had a problem for 25 years
understanding the difference between Ktav Amim, Ktav Galchut and Ktav
Meshita. On shabbat, for a Choleh she'ein bo sakana, bi'shaat hadchak
when there is no goy around, the doctor writes not only kilachar yad
(e.g. left hand) but also with a shinui (gav ha'yad) and preferably
to use Loazit. This is based on a Rema OC 306:11. [Although the Mishna
Brura brings down the source as from the Or Zarua (Hilchot Shabbat 76)
as being a daat yachid and the Aruch Hashulchan OC 306 # 22 goes as far
as saying the Rema is a "ta'ut dfus" and the Hagaoht Maimoniot Hilchot
Tfilin 1 #70 "yesh limchoko min hasfarim !") Rav Ovadia Yosef in Yabia
Omer OC III 23 rejects the objections of the Mishna Brura.

The Magen Avraham OC 340 s"k 10 seems to differentiate between ktav amim
(galchut ??) and meshita [See Machatzit haShekel OC 306 s"k 19). Meshita
being an issur drabban and galchut an issur d'oraita.

Now I checked in the Or Zarua and he seems to equate Ktav galchut with
Ktav meshita.

I sort of figured that Ktav Galchut must be medieval Latin but what is
Ktav Meshita ?? [It looks like a Jewish script based on Ktav Ashurit].

Could anyone sort out the difference and explain precisely what the
different scripts are ??

And what is English: Meshita or Galchut ???

Josh

>     My understanding is that a "minhag" is a "way of acting"; a person
> (or group of people) takes it upon himself. A "gezerah", in contrast, is
> imposed on the group from the outside....

Minhag is custom. It is sociological, anthropological, adaptive,
reality-based, human, ordinary, faulty, sometimes ill-fitting, sometimes
ill-advised, ultimately glorious. It reflects the immanence of HaShem in
all things. Gezerah is law. Law can be argued, disputed, in an effort
to identify the true strain or strains given at Sinai. Gezerah is for
rabbis. Minhag is for people.

David Finch

I wrote <<< My understanding is that a "minhag" is a "way of acting";
a person (or group of people) takes it upon himself. A "gezerah", in
contrast, is imposed on the group from the outside. >>>

R' Micha Berger wrote <<< Perhaps, but there is a role of beis din in
a minhag. Hilchos Mamrim 2:2-2:3 refers to a beis din that "hinhigu
minhag". I suggested that they endorse a norm already being practiced
rather than takanos which they craft themselves. A gezeirah is only one
kind of takanah -- that which was created to avoid violation of an issur
through accident or habit. Takanos can also be ... >>>

Thank you for the clarification, which seems to support the way I used
to describe my distinction: A minhag is something which originates with
the people, and is ratified by the rabbis. (If the rabbis reject it, or
choose not to endorse it, it is considered a silly minhag, or mistaken
minhag, or wrong minhag, and the followers can and should cease to
follow it.) In contrast, a takanah (which includes gezeros and perhaps
other forms of d'rabanan) originates with the rabbis, and is ratified by
the people. (If the majority of the people are unable to abide by it,
it ceases to have the force of law, but stays on the books as a strong
recommendation. Pas Palter and Tevilas Ezra are my favorite examples.)

I acknowledge that this distinction between minhag and d'rabanan is very
simplistic, and is the output of this comparatively uneducated mind.
Nevertheless, I have found it to be useful, have not noticed any
exceptions to it, and I offer it to the public for whatever little use
they might find it.

Akiva Miller

Micha Berger wrote:
>Those of us learning C"M with the limud yomi program learned today
>(1:5) about the use of nidui in cases where other the ba'al din really
>deserves payment but it's a qenas and the case is outside E"Y. Nidui is
>not considered tevi'as qenas, despite the similarity of effect.

A minor point here I'd like to understand: My understanding was that
the case itself could actually be held *inside* of EY, however, the
BD is one of non-semukhin. I've understood the phrase "einam semukhin
beErets Yisrael" to mean "don't have *real* semikha", but it doesn't
matter where the case takes place. Nisht azoi?

Shlomo

PS: Great thing, this limud yomi!  Yiyasher ko`hakhem!

>>Has any one ever seen the word qodesh added to the end of the berakhah
>>for lighting Shabbat candles.
>>All sources I've seen say lehadliq ner shel Shabbat.

>Nusach Ari (Chabad) has the word "Qodesh" at the end of the Bracha.

>Then again, Nusach Ari is by far the most radical in terms of
>Candle-Lighting Brachos. On Rosh Hashana, the nusach is "L'hadlik Ner
>Shel Yom HaZiqaron"!

Interesting. The "short" nussach is brought down in Shulchan Oruch in Siman 263 and nobody argues.

Does somebody have easy access to a Shulchan Oruch Horav to see what he says?

There is no mention in 263 about Rosh Hashana.

- Danny

From: Joe Schoemann [mailto:joe@theschgroup.com]
> The Shulchan Oruch Harav says "lehadlik ner shel shabbos" without the qodesh
> There is no mention in 263 about Rosh Hashana.

My father looked it up for me. 

Where do Chabad get their Nussach from if not from the SA Horav? (Both for qodesh and for Rosh Hashana.)

In a message dated 02/18/2002 3:52:24pm EST, dannys@smtp2.atomica.com writes:
> Where do Chabad get their Nussach from if not from the SA Horav? (Both for 
> qodesh and for Rosh Hashana.)

As Jon Baker will tell you, Chabad follows Minhag Chabad, which means
that they will pasken like the S"A Harav, unless it is overruled by the
Alter Rebbe himself in his siddur, a psak of the Tzemach Tzedek or a later
Rebbe or Minhag HaNesiim. "Shel Yom HaZikaron" is stated in the Siddur.

R.

From: "Gil Student" <gil_student@hotmail.com>
>I don't know if this is the first time, but [MBY] is mentioned in Sukkah 52b.
>I just did a Bar Ilan search and was surprised that this is the only place
>in Mishnah, Tosefta, Bavli and Yerushalmi that he is mentioned explicitly....

The oldest is in the Targum Yonason.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------
moshe shulman mshulman@NOSPAMix.netcom.com    718-436-7705
CHASSIDUS.NET - Yoshav Rosh       http://www.chassidus.net

What is the correct name for the eighteenth letter of the Aleph-beis? Is
there any other letter with two (somewhat, alebit similar) different
names?

Mordechai

R. Mordechai wrote: <What is the correct name for the eighteenth letter
of the Aleph-beis?>

The name of the letter is tzadi (without a dagesh in the dalet). All the
rishonim and the early aharonim who mention it spell the name without a
final qof, with tzaddik being a very late development. The source of
this latter "name" for the letter is simple: you say peitzadikufreish
when you are reciting the alphabet as a child, and some children took
that as pei - tzadik - kuf, etc. But to me this is ein kleinigkeit, not
even worth a CQ getting his dander up (although things like "the b'nei
Yisroel" still drive this CQ crazy). And even CQs don't object to people
making droshos about the name of the letter, since such droshos are just
vertlakh with nothing to do with historical development of the letters,
and CQs hope that everyone understands that.

As an aside, it is worth noting that very few of the letter names
correspond to the Hebrew words. I.e. had the alphabet in its present
form been of standard Jewish origin, the first two letters would be
elef and bayit. Of the letter names with attested Hebrew cognates,
only vav, zayin, 'ayin, and tav have Hebrew forms (nun is Aramaic,
and tav is extremely rare). The forms beis, pei, kof, mem, reish,
inter alia, clearly show that Jews took this alphabet from some area
where they did not speak standard Hebrew. These are all standard
Phonician foms, but the possibility that Jews in far northern EY, who
spoke Hebrew like Phonician, could have been the source, and there is
also the possibility that K'tav 'Ivri used Hebrew names for the letters,
and the current names were brought back from Bavel with K'tav Asshuri.
But it is indeed remarkable that Hebrew speakers never tried to "reform"
the letter names to match Hebrew words (Greek speakers, of course, would
never have had any reason to change such "barbarian" names as alpha beta).

Seth Mandel

On Thu, Feb 14, 2002 at 02:09:26PM -0500, David Riceman wrote:
:> 1- Physical causality aids in hester panim. Metaphysical causality is a
:> ra'ayah that there is Something beyond the chushim.
: 
: There's no more reason that there should be a law describing how
: cannonballs move than a law describing how curses work. Both or neither
: imply the existence of God - I don't see how you can logically distinguish
: them...

Agreed that there is no reason. But people aren't always logical. One
has sensory evidence with which one can accept proof that cannonballs
follow parabolic trajectories. There is none for curses or kemei'os.
And this is what we actually find -- more people admit to the former
than the latter.

:       The difference is cultural. We live in a materialistic culture
: (we are trained to believe only in what we see) which accepts physical
: laws but denies any reason they should exist. My guess is that if we
: started developing a technology based on kishuf the magical engineers
: would wholeheartedly deny that it had any religious implications.

But there is a reason why such a technology never emerged. (Although
RJJB pointed me to a cute science fiction short story in which the
permutations of letters and kemei'os was treated as a technology.)

The empirical is far harder to deny. It is also easier to explore and
therefore easier to study and use for predictions. (See below, I address
this more fully in response to a point you make later.)

:> This is the Ramban's reason for why it was fair that "hikhbadti es leiv
:> Par'oh". Because otherwise the makos would have been undo influence
:> toward tov.

: No!

"No that's not what the Ramban meant", or "No, the Ramban is mistaken"?

:     A miracle is not something that violates physical law - it is
: something that was assigned religious significance by a navi.

The reason given for neiros Chanukah is pirsumei nisa. Chanukah post-dates
the hiatus of nevu'ah, and yet the word "nisa" is applied.

: <2- Since we can not fully know these metaphysical laws of [non-]nature,>

: a. do you fully know physical laws?

No. But we have been able to make predictions based on them since before
science (or natural philosophy) was a formal study. Imperfect predictions,
yes. But still good enough for knowing what will probably happen if you
drop a rock on someone's foot -- and therefore make you accountable if
you so injure him. Bechirah is therevy enhanced, not reduced.

: b. why can't you fully know miraculous laws?

There are a few distinct issues that need sorting out here. I don't want
to stick with a discussion of "miraculous laws" as I think it's far too
vague.

First chiluq is between:

1- The repeatable event that occurs on cue as needed or as predicted by
   nevu'ah. Purim's events come to mind. 

2- The singleton solution to the physical law. Nature, if properly
   formulated would allow for this event -- however this particular
   solution to the equations only came up once and is therefore totally
   unexpected. The notable issue is its uniqueness.

3- The violation of physical law. There is no equation that includes
   both the event in question and more typical ones.

Nissim nistarim are typically of class 1. They could be in class 2,
but only if people are capable of usiung that formulation to hide their
belief. In truth, there is a spectrum betrween the first and second
classes, as events get more rare and startling it's more of a neis that
they occur on queue or as needed.

FWIW, the term "neis nistar" is a shade oxymoronic. A neis is a banner,
a standard. In this case, a flag calling attention to the One Who runs
things. A hidden banner doesn't call much attention. The resolution is
that the "banner" is only for those who chose to look for the it.

The existance of the term "lema'alah min hateva" as a description of
events in olam hazeh implies that this does occur.

Second chiluq is between 1, 2, 3 and normal expected occurances vs.:

4- The event -- regardless of whether or not it follows physical law --
   that can be fully explained in terms of non-physical law.

It is actually non-trivial to define the line between physical
and non-physical law. After all, one never witnesses a magnetic or
graviational field, one only witnesses their effects on a magnet or
object (respectively). If one could do a study of non-physical laws,
wouldn't one also be studying the effects of something they can't directly
witness? IOW, what is non-physical law if what we're talking about are
physical events?

I do not have a rigorous answer, which is certainly hampering my
ability to make my point clearly.

Here we're talking about forces that are outside Olam ha'Asiyah having
effects within it. In order to even have that dicussion there needs
to be a belief in other olamos (or "higher realms" or whatever) which
in turn presumes a modicum of emunah.

Empirical realities do not presume emunah. Yes, only a ma'amin has a decent
explanation for why they follow rules rather than being simply random. But
the rules themselves are inductive conclusions built on observation directly
by the senses.

That was my first problem: Physical causality allows one to ignore
questions of emunah -- whether or not that's logical, that is the normal
human reaction. What is the purpose of a causality that *presumes*
a modicum of emunah in order to be noticed at all?

Second problem was that it reduces the predictability of choice for
the eino ma'amin, and therefore reduces bechirah chafshi. It increases
the disjoin between what rules of thumb a person can build inductively
and the effects of a particular decision he happens to make.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

Phyllostac@aol.com wrote:
> What is the correct name for the eighteenth letter of the Aleph-beis?

Isn't there something in Sefer habahir related to this (or at least to
Rabbi Mandel's response)?

David Riceman

Way back in v4n19 <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol04/v04n019.shtml#19>
I noted a relatively well-known idea from R' AY Kook. That the "eitz oseh
peri" of ma'aseh bereishis denotes a schism between means and ends that
is not part of the ideal reality. The reason why we have a notion of chol
is because the physical means (the tree) lacks the ta'am qedushah of the
ends (the fruit).

With that in mind, here's an excerpt from R' Pinchas Winston's devar Torah
for this week, citing the Keli Yaqar:
> In explaining why Adam HaRishon ate from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and
> Evil -- the poison -- before eating from the Tree of Life -- the antidote --
> the K'li Yekar explains that the fruit of the former was visible whereas
> the fruit of the latter was its bark. However, if one did not know this,
> then he could easily be fooled into thinking that the Tree of Life was in
> fact fruitless, while the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil was fruitful.

> That WAS the test. Knowing that the Tree of Life was precisely that, Adam
> HaRishon should have forgone his original assumption and taken from the
> bark of the Tree of Life first. What he would have learned from "tasting"
> it would have illuminated his mind far beyond any knowledge the Tree of
> Knowledge of Good and Evil could ever have imparted to him, as he found out
> too late. As they usually find out too late.

> This IS the test. Knowing that the Torah is called the "Tree of Life," ...

Compbining the two, we get that the Torah is the way of infusing qedushah
to the means, the restored unity of "eitz peri".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

 From this week's Shabbat-B'Shabbato (from Machon Zomet).

-mi

NAKEDNESS AND COVER; HIDDEN OR REVEALED
Rabbi Yehuda Shaviv, Zomet Institute and Yeshivat Har-Etzion

Ever since Adam and Chava were expelled from the Garden of Eden,
there has been a yearning to return to that enchanted place. And it
seems that in some ways the Tabernacle (and the Temple afterwards) is a
replacement for the Garden, as has been described by others. (For example,
see Rabbi Yehuda Kiel, "The Tabernacle, the Temple, and the Garden of
Eden," in his collected works, "Issues in the Tanach and in Education,"
pages 64-90.) However, there is one big difference between the original
garden and the Tabernacle. In the garden, the "priests" (that is, Adam and
Chava) were naked, while as can be seen from this week's Torah portion G-d
gives a command to make priestly garments for Aharon and his descendents.

There are those who feel that it is appropriate for a human being
to move around looking (almost) exactly as when he was created by
the Almighty. For such people, a human body is a model that gives
inspiration for works of art. This is not true in the cathedral of
Jewish creativity, the new model of the Garden of Eden. In the Temple,
the Kohanim have been commanded to wear different articles of clothing,
from trousers for modesty on to a shirt and a cloak, and even a hat,
for the purpose of honor and glory. The return to the Garden of Eden
does not imply returning to the same situation as before, but rather
a return that takes into account the changes in holy values that have
taken place since the earlier events. Now creative art will no longer
search for bare bodies but rather for people who are covered and clothed.

Clothing plays an important role in the Megilla and in the many detailed
descriptions included. For example, look at the different changes of
clothing by Mordechai, starting with sackcloth as a sign of approaching
danger and leading to the royal dress of purple and gold after the
great salvation. It is clear that nothing can rival garments as a way of
indicating the status of a person. In fact, according to the traditions of
our sages, Achashverosh appreciated the look of a naked body and wanted
to share this beauty with the participants in his party (see the Midrash
with respect to Esther 1:11). He was interested in what was revealed,
but the Megilla clearly prefers the qualities of concealment and modesty.

It is interesting to note exactly when Adam and Chava discovered nudity
and became ashamed of it. This happened after they had eaten from the
Tree of Knowledge, and began to understand. Perhaps one might foolishly
think that on Purim, when we are commanded to reach a stage that "one
is not aware," it might be appropriate to return to nudity, like before
the sin. There can be no greater mistake than this.

Also from this week's Shabbat B'Shabbato and RYS. We're spoken about
this subject in the past.

-mi

NOTES ON THE DAILY "DAF": A Later Addition
Rabbi Yehuda Shaviv

It is written in the Talmud: "Rava says, if someone claims that another
owes him 100 coins and the reply is that he definitely owes him 50 but
is not sure about the rest, he must pay the money since he cannot take
an oath about it" [Bava Metziya 98a]. The Tosafot quote Rabeinu Chananel,
"These words of Rava are not found in the original Talmud."

This is a phenomenon that occurs in other places in this volume of
the Talmud. It has been discussed by Maharatz Chayut. "We have seen
before that this volume contains many additions that were written by
Rabbi Hai Gaon, all of which have been noted by the Ritva and the Shita
Mekubetzet. He added many items to the Talmud which were not known to
the earlier sages."

In a message dated 2/20/02 10:33:03am EST, micha@aishdas.org writes:
> NOTES ON THE DAILY "DAF": A Later Addition
> Rabbi Yehuda Shaviv
 
> It is written in the Talmud: "Rava says, if someone claims that another
> owes him 100 coins and the reply is that he definitely owes him 50 but
> is not sure about the rest, he must pay the money since he cannot take
> an oath about it" [Bava Metziya 98a]. The Tosafot quote Rabeinu Chananel,
> "These words of Rava are not found in the original Talmud."
...

This particular attribution is to Rava(the most quoted amora). Do you
understand this as the gaonim adding an actual attribution that the
original editors were unaware of, or is it putting a later insight into
the mouth of Rava(a la our earlier discussion of quoting something in
someone else's name in order to get credibility)

KT
Joel

> NOTES ON THE DAILY "DAF": <snip>
> The Tosafot quote Rabeinu Chananel,
> "These words of Rava are not found in the original Talmud."

> This is a phenomenon that occurs in other places in this volume of
> the Talmud. It has been discussed by Maharatz Chayut. "We have seen
> before that this volume contains many additions that were written by
> Rabbi Hai Gaon, all of which have been noted by the Ritva and the Shita
> Mekubetzet. He added many items to the Talmud which were not known to
> the earlier sages."

I seem to recall that whenever I encountered such Talmudic sections in
the past, the speaker was always stama d'gemara. Does the Maharatz Chayus
mention other examples where an Amora is cited rather than stama d'gemara?
How do we explain the fact that Rav Hai Gaon cited Rava--that there was
a oral tradition that he said those words but they were never part of
the Talmud? Or do we assume that there was a ta'us soferim?

Kol tuv,
Moshe

Micha Berger wrote:
>: There's no more reason that there should be a law describing how
>: cannonballs move than a law describing how curses work.

> Agreed that there is no reason. But people aren't always logical. One
> has sensory evidence with which one can accept proof that cannonballs
> follow parabolic trajectories. There is none for curses or kemei'os.
> And this is what we actually find -- more people admit to the former
> than the latter.

Shocking as it may seem, could it be that more people admit to the former
because there is evidence against segulos? Part of the problem here is
that you have to distinguish true cases of metaphysical law from poplar
superstition. If I understood you correctly, before this post you were
assuming that segulos worked; if you actually want to discuss evidence
than popular beliefs about segulos are irrelevant.

> But there is a reason why such a technology never emerged.

What is it (other than the one I suggested above)?

<<The empirical is far harder to deny.>>

What has empirical to do with anything? The gemara gives detailed
prescriptions for curing certain diseases. How hard is it to perform
a clinical trial? Surely no harder than for any modern medicine. Yet I
would classify these (at least those containing incantations) as segulos,
and I strongly suspect that many of them don't work.

> :> This is the Ramban's reason for why it was fair that "hikhbadti es leiv
> :> Par'oh". Because otherwise the makos would have been undo influence
> :> toward tov.
>
> : No!

> "No that's not what the Ramban meant", or "No, the Ramban is mistaken"?

Actually I had thought you wrote Rambam. I don't recall what the Ramban
said about "hichbadti ..." but I am familiar with the opinion to which
you allude from other sources. I don't know how comfortably it fits
with the Ramban's definition of nes.

I wrote what the Rambam's opinion would have been had he accepted that
pshat in "hichbadti" rather than holding that God retracted Pharoa's
free will."

>:     A miracle is not something that violates physical law - it is
>: something that was assigned religious significance by a navi.

> The reason given for neiros Chanukah is pirsumei nisa. Chanukah post-dates
> the hiatus of nevu'ah, and yet the word "nisa" is applied.

I accept the amendment. It needs to be assigned religious significance,
but the assignment need not be made by a navi.

> : <2- Since we can not fully know these metaphysical laws of [non-]nature,>

> : a. do you fully know physical laws?

> No. But we have been able to make predictions based on them since before
> science (or natural philosophy) was a formal study. Imperfect predictions,
> yes. But still good enough for knowing what will probably happen if you
> drop a rock on someone's foot -- and therefore make you accountable if
> you so injure him. Bechirah is therevy enhanced, not reduced.

I think this is the crux of our argument (which goes back at least to
Peter Abelard). Even if you can predict the physical results of an action,
can you predict its social significance? It is the social significance
which impacts people's characters, and which impacts yiras shamayim
(see the Rambam's long discourse on hakol biydei shamayim hutz miyiras
shamayim in his introduction to the Peirush hamishnayoth).

> There are a few distinct issues that need sorting out here.
> 1- The repeatable event that occurs on cue as needed ...
> 2- The singleton solution to the physical law. ...
> 3- The violation of physical law. ...
> FWIW, the term "neis nistar" is a shade oxymoronic. ...

[The following is corrected as per a second email. -mi]

The Ramban preferred "nes b'thoch neis". I don't think he distnguished
between your 2 and 3. In fact I don't think the Rambam did either.
The only reason to have category 2 is to avoid the exstence of category 3
("hithna hkbh im maaseh breishith" - that Rambam on Avoth again).

> Actually I had thought you wrote Rambam.  I don't recall what the Ramban said
> about "hichbadti ..." but I am familiar with the opinion to which you allude
> from other sources.  I don't know how comfortably it fits with the Ramban's
> definition of nes.  What I wrote was the Rambam's opinion.


> Second chiluq is between 1, 2, 3 and normal expected occurances vs.:

> 4- The event -- regardless of whether or not it follows physical law --
>    that can be fully explained in terms of non-physical law.

No! The Ramban's point is that ALL events can be explained either as
physical or non-physical law. Now reread my first post and the entire
section of the Guide about the Kalam. Your 1-3 are all included in
4 as are events which are not nisim but which follow non-physical law
(segulos and kishuf are examples that come to mind).

> Here we're talking about forces that are outside Olam ha'Asiyah having
> effects within it. In order to even have that dicussion there needs
> to be a belief in other olamos (or "higher realms" or whatever) which
> in turn presumes a modicum of emunah.

No. Let us suppose that the incantations recommended in the gemara work
by either coercing or confusing shedim. We could certainly imagine
demonology as a respectable pursuit without ascribing any religious
significance to it. How different would it be from people scouring the
rain forests for novel drugs?

> That was my first problem: Physical causality allows one to ignore
> questions of emunah -- whether or not that's logical, that is the normal
> human reaction.

My response was that your observation is culturally determined. Until the
French revolution physical causality was studied primarily by clergymen
as part of their appreciation of God's creation. Not normal human,
normal twenty first century.

David Riceman

>I'm even more confused about what may be a more basic issue. I understand 
>that women can be motzi women in Megilla, but I was taught that women 
>cannot be motzi men because men are one d'Rabbanan and women are two....

Professor Aryeh Frimer, on Areivim, posted an article by Rabbi Daniel
Landes arguing that women can be motzi men in the evening reading of
megillah <http://www.pardes.org.il/articles/purim1.html>. I don't have
my seforim with me, but based on what I found via CD-ROM I don't think
that this is as simple as Rabbi Landes claims. He quotes the famous
Bahag who says that women cannot be motzi men but says that based on
the Marcheshes's analysis, women can be motzi men at night but not in
the day. Once this was "conclusively demonstrated" by the Marcheshes,
there is very little to discuss. Especially since HaRav Tzvi Pesach
Frank agreed with him.

Of course, it is not so simple. There are other explanations of the
Bahag.

The Turei Even, Megillah 4a sv nashim explained the Bahag as meaning that
men are obligated in reading megillah midivrei kabbalah while women are
only obligated miderabbanan. See Yeshuos Ya'akov 689:1; Sedei Yitzchak
43; Zichron Yehudah OC 78; and She'eilas Ya'akov 13 who agree.

The Or Samei'ach, Megillah 1:1 has a slightly different twist.
Midivrei Kabbalah women are only obligated in keriah be'al peh while
men are obligated in keriah min hakesav.

The Chelkas Ya'akov OC 232:2 and Mishnah Berurah,Sha'ar HaTziyun 689:16
argue against women being motzi men for kevod hatzibbur/tzenius reasons.
But this is not just a product of the chumra generation. The Orchos
Chaim, Megillah 2; Kol Bo 44; and Eshkol, vol. 2 p. 30 say that there is
a problem of kol ishah with women reading megillah for men. The Semag,
Hilchos Chanukah also says that women cannot read megillah for men and
the Re'em explains that it is because of kevod hatzibbur. The Eshkol,
vol. 2 p. 30 offers this reason as well.

This is not to say that a rabbi does not have the right to pasken
the women can be motzi men. He just should not be saying that "it is
incontestable that women may fulfill the obligation for men by reading
the Megillah on Purim night." It is, in fact, contestable.

Gil Student

*********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]