Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 107

Wednesday, February 6 2002

• Re: Avodah V8 #90
• Kesav Ashuris
• Re: halakhic methodology - Mayyim Acharonim
• Re: Checks, etc.
• Re: Heter Iska
• Din Torah
• Re: reproducibility
• Re: Isha Psulah Ladun
• Ma'alas Gerah
• minhag and bet din
• Re: Rambam: Hakdama
• CY/ChC
• RE: CY/ChC -- Rav Yitzchok Frankel's reply to my query; ChC in E.Y.
• CY/ChC
• CY/ChC
• Re: CY/ChC -- Rav Yitzchok Frankel's reply to my query; ChC in E.Y.
• Re: When Science Contradicts Torah
• Re: Checks, etc.
• Segulos
• Re: When Science Contradicts Torah
• Puppy love

                                                                 Bs"D
An anonymous chaveir asked me to post this:

>>It was asked how does a posek take into account one's personal tikkun
>> nishama?

>See Rambam Peirush HaMishnayos end of Makkos.  There he explains that one's
>level in Olam HaBa is determined by doing fully at least one mitzva.

>I think this means according to halacha.  I never heard anyone claim that
>one's tikkun nishama can only be reached through performance of chumros.
>Therefore a posek should be unable to interfere with tikkun neshama by
>ruling according to halacha.

>> It was claimed that certainly there is no room for daas Torah regarding
>> investing in Enron derivative trading.

>See Bava Metzia 42a that asset distribution can be learned from the Torah.
>There also is what to discuss if such trading can be considered "yishuvo
>shel olam".  Perhaps it is not always permitted to engage in such trading.
>It seems, therefore, that such an issue certainly warrants consultation with
>a talmid chacham.

>> It was claimed that exceptional cases are an abrogation of halacha.

>Rather it seems that Rabban Gamliel is explaining the laws of aveilus as
>they apply to an istnis (a rare and extremely sensitive individual).  This
>IS the halacha, not an abrogation.

>So too tanhumim can be accepted for the extremely rare case of a slave who
>is a talmid chacham.

>Also, the poskim's view that the application of the case of suicide who is
>buried outside the cemetery is very limited.  The Gemara discusses several
>times if, in fact, the wind was what killed someone.  This view of the
>poskim is also based in Shas.

>In conclusion, the Ibn Ezra notes that there were some who asked what did
>Moses do for 40 days if all he has to show for it is two tablets of the Ten
>Commandments.

>So too those who think Kitzur Shulchan Arukh is a comprehensive definition
>of Torah sheBaal Peh have a mistaken, limited view of Torah.

>Rather halacha itself is very broad. Torah itself is very broad.  There is
>much to be learned in Torah.  These topics obviously include investment
>strategies, aveilus, burial conditions etc.  Since we have a Toras Chaim, a
>Torah of life, the Torah speaks about all of life.

Is there any indication that ancient near-Eastern cultures used an
alphabet similar to Kesav Ashuris? Ugarit and Akkadia did not. Do we
have anything from Assyria or Babylonia that corresponds to it?

Gil Student

[And if not, why is it called *Ashuris*? -mi]

RRW wrote:
> Comment:  No doubt that is easier and more elegant to say:
> The Bavli had a Gzeira on melach Sdomis
> Said Gzeira - while nispahset in Bavel - simply was not nispashet in
> Ashkenaz and therefore Tosafos is more reporting or documenting that
> fact as opposed to apologizing {IOW limud zchus}.  Tosafos rationale
> addresses more WHY it was not nispashet.

me:
> IOW, according to this rationale there is no need in Ashkenaz to
> ever be ma'hmir on MA, except when hands are dirty, because the gezeirah,
> never having been properly accepted, should not be 'hal outside of the
> mela'h Sdomit confines?

RRW:
> I never said there is NO NEED TO BE MACHMIR in Ashkenaz

Sorry, but you misunderstood me. You quoted Tos.'s justification of why in
Ashkenaz people do not insist on MA. Then you proceeded to explain that
the reason why Tos. can contradict Bavli in this is because the gezeirah
was not nitpashet in Ashkenaz. I replied that if the mechanism here is
whether or not the gezeirah was nitpashet, then there is no reason -
in Ashkenaz - to be ma'hmir on MA, as a gezeirah that was not nitpashet
is no gezeirah. OTOH, I do not agree. I wrote the above to show the
inconsistency of your approach, on the one hand giving a good reason
to absolv Ashkenaz of MA, and OTOH saying that Tos. was only melamed
zkhut on minhag Ashkenaz. You also proposed that minhag Ashkenaz was
as authoritative as Bavli, and according to that reasoning too, there
would be no reason to be ma'hmir for MA, assuming one is of Ashkenazic
stock. I do buy that later argument.

However, as I stressed my disagreement with your gezeirah shlo nitpashtah
mechanism (shall we call it 'Fred'? ;-)) let me offer a reason and an
alternate interpretation. First of all, the notion of hitpashtut of
a gezeirah occurs in the sugya of gentiles' oil, where we learn that
when a gezeirah would be promulgated, there would be a 12 month flux
period, and at the conclusion of that period, the gezeirah would either
be cemented in law and tradition, or be null and void. The status of
the gezeirah depended on 'Fred'. However, once 'Fred', always 'Fred',
and even if the reason for the gezeirah diappears, the gezeirah does
not become obsolete. Thus, I cannot imagine that a gezeirah would cease
to be Fred merely because hundreds of years later (remember that the
gezeirot were the product of Sanhedrin - am I right? - and if so predate
even the earliest settlement in Ashkenaz) it wasn't Fred in Ashkenaz
(was it Fritz? ;-)).

The mechanism I propose - let's call it Faivel and pronounce it with a
Galitzianer accent - is that a gezeirah would be promulgated in a way
that is very similar to government regulations. If the law says you
should wash your hands after handling mela'h Sdomit, then so you must,
but only if so you handled. OTOH, if the law stipulates washing hands
after any meal, then so you must. The question is whether Faivel was
promulgated on all meals, or only on meals involving that nasty salt
(it could lead to blindness, 'Hazal tell us), and was merely inaccurately
recorded. In the latter case we would explain the sloppy recording with
the fact that the contemporaries of 'Hazal always used MS, and thus
there was no reason to be medayyek that the issue was MS. The whole
Faivel mechanism is similar to the MBs reasoning on why we are allowed
to read on Shabbat by wax candles' light.

As I pointed out in another post today, the same applies to ChC/CY/CA. The
question is not whether Fred or not, but whether Faivel or not.

Kol tuv,
Arie Folger.

PS: For those of you asher imanu po hayom, and those who will browse
the archives in the future, who wonder what the ganeiden Fred, Fritz
and Faivel have to do with this, please look up RYGB's recent post on
Ta'anit Ester, in fact the last post on that issue to date. ;-)

> I posted this in the first issue dealing with this din Torah. An Israeli 
> cheque is a shtar that obligates the party issueing the cheque to pay. A US 
> cheque is easy to cancel, and therefore is no more than a promise to pay, 
> which is does not give rise to a debt, and should be considered nothing 
> whatsoever, payment pending.

Honestly, this is not accurate. The fact that an U.S. check is relatively
easy to cancel has nothing to do with its legal status as a form of
payment. Under the Uniform Commercial Code, which regulates this stuff
in 48 or 49 of the U.S. states, a check is a negotiable instrument with
the same value as cash. Under the UCC, a person who writes a check cannot
stop payment without significant legal exposure unless he has a sufficient
reason for doing so. Specifically, a check does not constitute a voidable
debt or an unenforceable "promise to pay." It does not create a mere
estoppel or contingent obligation. It constitutes payment, period. If
the check bounces, the drawer could be in serious trouble.

This points to a very practical issue: the utter futility of trying
to dovetail the modern law of negotiable instruments into a Talmudic
framework. Some of the concepts preserved in the UCC reflect a common
law of commercial transactions with distant roots in ancient trade that
may have been conducted under Jewish auspices. Judaically, that's about
all you can say about it. The same applies to international commercial
protocol.

David Finch

> More important is that the gemara insists that a heter iska be as far
> from profit as from loss. By putting in details that prevent in practice
> any loss this principle is violated in spirit if not in law.

Heter iska has nothing directly to do with the idea of a "corporation"
in the modern legal sense. Indeed, profit and loss per se has nothing
to do with corporations, either: one incorporates a not-for-profit
business for many of the same reasons (ability to sue, tax advantages,
insulation of shareholders or members from corporate debt, etc.) as a
for-profit business.

Heter iska is a well-established halachic loophole. Corporations are
not loopholes. They're a necessary structure for business operations.

David Finch

You're all going to be disappointed. 

This morning, the mazik's lawyer faxed a letter to the Beis Din saying
that he did not wish to adjudicate in the Beis Din, that he was not
willing to accept the Beis Din as an arbitrator, and that he had
defenses against me that he intends to raise in the secular courts at
an appropriate time.

The Beis Din issued me a ksav siruv on the spot (the last time I had to
do this, that defendant showed up on the third try so I was glad that
this time they at least said they had no intention of coming and I got
the ksav siruv on the spot).

And they may even refund my filing fee....

-- Carl

David Riceman wrote:
>   Perhaps some of the practicing rabbanim on the list might comment on this.
> How does one go about determining exactly what tikkun a particular neshama is
> here to effect? Why does the Shulhan Aruch not discuss this more explicitly?
> This doesn't seem to fit neatly into categories like hefsed mruba and shaath
> hadchak.

When I sent this I left things unsaid which I thought didn't need saying.
Several other people commented, also without saying them. As a result of
a recent post, I suspect that they need saying, so I'm saying them here.
Please ignore if you think this is obviously true.

IIRC the Pri Megadim says that when using heteirim like hefsed m'rubah
and shaath hadchak one must explicitly tell the shoel that one is using
them, so that he doesn't take the psak as a precedent. This is an
example of a general principle: there typically is a normative psak, but
unusual circumstances are often accomodated by the halacha. When those
circumstances occur, part of horaah is clarifying the normative halacha,
or, at least, the exceptional nature of the sheilah. Typically a rav
can manage this even if [like me] he is incapable of determining the
shoresh of the neshama of the shoel.

There are circumstances when a rav might deem it appropriate for the
shoel to be machmir or meikel for a particular reason. IT IS NOT THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE RAV TO MAKE SUCH A DETERMINATION. Instead he should
phrase it as a suggestion. My favorite version of this is a friend,
who's rav once said to him "Do me a favor and be machmir about ...."

A particular person, in a particular circumstance, will invariably
have multiple ways of performing avodath hashem. It is often useful to
consult with people about which to choose [and if you know someone who can
determine the shoresh of your neshama so much the better]. The choice,
however, is that of the oved, not of his local rav. I suspect that
Rebbitzin Freedenberg is using the term "psak" loosely to include not
only psak but advice. This confusion is unfortunately encouraged in
modern Hebrew where "chayav atah" can mean either "you are halachically
obliged to" or "I strongly suggest that you".

I was not at the speech which inspired this thread, but I believe that
the subject there was psak, not suggested behavior.

David Riceman

Since that exchange on scjm, I recieved a personal email that lends
support to both of my (mutual exclusive) suggestions about the role
of Devorah. As the author hasn't chosen to share it with the cherah,
here's the part that is relevent to my earlier post.

I proposed two possibilities to scjm, as I inserted into RJJB's summary:

1- That she was a "soferet" (as in "divrei soferim") not a
"rabbanit". That Tosafos were not necessarily proposing that her rule
was a hora'as sha'ah, but rather that because she was a nevi'ah she is
different in kind than a rav.

This seems to be shitas Rashi in Avos 1:1, who considers Devorah amongst
the Zeqeinim listed there.

2- That the word "shofeit" was meant for its 2ndary meaning. IOW, that
she was a wartime ruler, and not necessareily a judge.

The Rashba on Shevu'os (pereq 4) writes "delo shofetes mamash, elah
minaheges keshofetim shashafetu es Yisrael".

In any case, it's clear from the rishonim (and not "only" Tosafos) that
the notion of a shofetes poses a halachic problem that needs addressing.
It's not a usable precedent.

Nor to I understand RJJB's line of argument that there is no source
predating Tosafos. As though that gives us permision to hold against
the one (group of) rishon(im) who does come out with a pesaq? Perhaps
their silence is merely because no one asked the question.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905             - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

From: Arie Folger <afolger@ymail.yu.edu>

:Shafan is, I believe, a rabbit, and arnevet a hare

Al zeh anu danim.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

RYGB writes
<Minhagos are subject to Lo Sasur (Mamrim 1:2), but we do not make
berachos on them nevertheless, as that is part of their "etzem cheftza":
"D'lav toras mitzvos be'hu l'vareich aleihen, d'rak al mitzvos mevorchin,
v'lo al minhagos." He proves this from the Rambam Megilah v'Chanukah
3:7. Both mitzvos d'rabbonon and minhagos d'rabbonon require Beis Din
ha'Gadol to institute, but they are chalukin as above. Thus, on Yom Tov
Sheni, which is a Toras Minhag, we can make all berachos at the second
Seder, despite the fact that there is no brocho on the Second Day in and
of itself. He brings several ra'ayos to this yesod. Inter alia he cites
his father's well known explanation of why women make Birchas ha'Torah>

As an aside is it obvious that the present day minhag of 2 days of yomtov
outside of israel was instituted by a Sanhedrin hagadol. The gemara in
Beitzah says just they sent from EY without any indication who sent. Was
there still a Sanhedrin in their days?

More generally does Beis Din ha'gadol require lishkat haGazit or just
many people with semicha which is probably the status of the sanhedrin
in the days of the Amoraim.

-- 
Eli Turkel, turkel@colorado.edu on 2/5/2002

RaphaelIsaacs@aol.com wrote:
> Assuming these definitions to be approximately accurate, why a third
> type of law whose only difference is that it lacks a bracha? Surely
> there must be something different about what a Takana accomplishes,
> or strengthens, no?

No doubt you've looked this up more recently than I have, but I recall
that the Rambam defines a taqana as specifically designed to solve a
problem. So that yom arava [minhag neviim] and the annual [minhag pashut]
or triennial [minhag but not pashut] Torah readings are minhagim because
they fall under neither category, as are things like customary forms of
kinyan (handshakes).

I don't think the Rambam uses this terminology consistently. He describes
kuppa and tamhui as minhag even though they qualify as taqana. See his
tshuvoth on refraining from riding boats in the Euphrates on Shabbat,
where he says that it is an illegitimate custom but a legitimate humra.

I don't think the Rambam uses taqana for local ordinances [again, I may be
wrong - check out his tshuvoth about grounds for divorce - I don't recall
the details and am away from home], so you may find that he describes
everything that's not universal as minhag. That still doesn't explain
kuppa. Though he may mean that even though it's universally practiced
it's not required.

That paradigm might also explain the Rambam's introduction to his version
of tefillah (again he uses nohogu). Even though a fixed text is required,
the particular fixed text we use is not [did the Rambam really believe
that?].

Anyway, I'm just musing at my desk with no sefarim.

David Riceman

Akiva Atwood <atwood@netvision.net.il> wrote 
> RDF has told him many times that when one has a choice one should
> choose CY.

and Akiva Atwood <atwood@netvision.net.il>  also wrote:
> RYF said that RMF held ChC to be l'chatchila mutar, irrespective of what
> many try to claim from the t'shuvos.

I am a little confused. If RMF held ChC was l'chatchila mutar why did
RDF say that when one has a choice one should choose CY.

Furthermore, a chaveir of mine once asked RDF if there is any adifus to
keeping chalav yisroel and RDF told him there was no adifus.

On 5 Feb 2002 at 9:58, Akiva Atwood wrote:
> RYF said that RMF held ChC to be l'chatchila mutar, irrespective of
> what many try to claim from the t'shuvos. (As an aside, RYF mentioned
> that Harav Nissan Alpert told him that while RNA used only CY products
> he was not makpid this stringency for his family.)

I'd be curious to hear what RYF has to say about the tshuva published
in the posthumous volume of the Igros Moshe. I always understood RMF to
hold that ChC was l'chatchila mutar based on the tshuvos in the earlier
volumes, but ignoring some of the attempts on this list to do so, I find
it difficult to reconcile the tshuva in the posthumously issued volume
to the previous tshuvos.

Also, with respect to the question of hefsed meruba, is quality a
factor. For example, if the only decent tasting chocolate is made with
ChC, or if certain types of milchig liqueuer only come made with ChC,
would that come under hefsed meruba? (Obviously, you can choose not to
eat chocolate or drink liqueuer, but then you can choose not to drink
milk too).

-- Carl (who was recently disappointed to see a notoriously unreliable
hashgacha from the US on Swiss chocolate marketed in Israel)

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

An anonymous reb wrote:
<<My LOR has a privately published letter from R' Dovid Feinstein
  answering the rumour that he (and his family) drinks ChC. He says quite
  clearly there that he and his family don't drink it.>>

I doubt this. An eid e'had who is neeman, and lives in the LES (so do
I ;-)), and is my friend, and is an Oveid (who mostly lurks) and is
a friend of RYGB (by now I hope said Oveid will do me the favour of
personally introducing himself) told me he was at RDF's home, and was
served Breyer's yoghurt. Said Oveid may also elaborate on whether ChC
ice cream is being served there as well, or similar products.

Arie Folger

It's very interesting how everyone has a different take on what the
feinstien family does or does not do in regards to chalav stam. Especially
since everyone has claimed to have first hand knowledge. Well let me
just add to the confusion.

A chaveir of mine who is a close talmid of Rav Mordechai Tendler told
me that Rav Mordechai Tendler told him that Rav Moshe kept Chalav Stam
in his house for 40 years.

From: Akiva Atwood <atwood@netvision.net.il>
> I e-mailed Rav Yitzchok Frankel and asked for a clarification...
> Regarding the rumour that RDF uses ChC, he replied that the rumour was
> false, and the farthest thing from the truth. As far as R' Frankel knows,
> RDF has never had ChC; RMF only had CY in his home; and RDF has told
> him many times that when one has a choice one should choose CY. (RYF
> did say that as a child the Feinstein children did have ChC.)

An interesting footnote to this (at least to me) is that when I was a young
teenager in Telshe, I once came home Bain HaZmanim to Toledo, Ohio and had
an opportunity to meet RMF by his brother-in-law, R. Nechemia Katz.  RMF
used to "escape" to Toledo for small vactions. During that time my father
had the honor of taking RMF to outlying farms so he could observe the
milking of the cows and therefore have CY to drink.  This was back in about
1961 or so. It was nice being one of only three people in a room (R. Katz,
my father, and me) with RMF on a Friday night. I remember him asking me what
I was learning (Eleh Metzios) and how I was doing and wishing me well.

HM

On Sat, Feb 02, 2002 at 08:48:12PM +0200, Maryles wrote:
: In the above example the fact that the world is 15 billion years old does
: not in fact contradict the Torah. R. Aryeh Kaplan presented a paper to
: the Union of Orthodx Jewish Scientists in effect proving through classic
: sources that the universe is in fact 15 billion years old.

Which is now /older/ than the current scientific estimates of 9 - 12bil.
This is the problem, IMHO, of investing too much effort being meyasheiv
the two. I'd agree with the approach, but I find the excercise of actually
applying it to be futile. You could end up turning some theory into a
quasi-ikkar emunah only to see it rejected before you're done.

: How, for example does one explain an exploding star seen today that is
: 200 million light years away? The speed of light was proven by Albert
: Einstien to be constant (at 600,000 miles per second, I believe)....

Whether Einstein was the one to prove it, or it was Michaelson and Morley
or Lorenz who did so aside, and whether an inductive proof is actually
a proof of anything aside...

While the speed of light is a constant in all frames of reference, the
time span and distance are not. Only a certain kind of combination of
the two is. This is the core of Gerald Schroeder's resolution, in which
he shows that under the proper gravitational density, the universe could
age 15bil years in 6k years of history. In his book, "The Heavenly Time
Machine: Essays on Science and Torah" (don't judge a book by its title),
Dr Morris Engelson shows how different assumptions about energy level
at which particules become distinct would change the age implied by
Schroeder's resolution.

Therefore, we can justify the current range of estimates, although the
15.6 bil year calculation given by RYmA doesn't work.

I recommend Dr Engelson's book, to anyone familiar with this genre. (And
not just because his son just joined Avodah. <grin>) It's basically a
survey of current works on resolution of the two, but with the author's
thoughts excending each theory. The coverafge of others' ideas, though,
I found overly terse for someone who hasn't been exposed to them already.

The first chapter, on the problems and dangers in trying to engage in
dialogue with people who work in the other side of the science - torah
divide, was particularly useful in approaching dialogue with non-frum
Jews on scjm.

<ad>
You can get it at <http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0964287005/aishdas>.
</ad>

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905             - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On 5 Feb 2002 at 11:54, DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
>> I posted this in the first issue dealing with this din Torah. An
>> Israeli cheque is a shtar that obligates the party issueing the
>> cheque to pay. A US cheque is easy to cancel, and therefore is no
>> more than a promise to pay, which is does not give rise to a debt,
>> and should be considered nothing whatsoever, payment pending.

> Honestly, this is not accurate. The fact that an U.S. check is
> relatively easy to cancel has nothing to do with its legal status as a
> form of payment. Under the Uniform Commercial Code... a check is a
> negotiable instrument with the same value as cash. Under the UCC, a
> person who writes a check cannot stop payment without significant legal
> exposure unless he has a sufficient reason for doing so....

You're right. But it's still significantly different from an Israeli
check in four respects. First, in the US, the sanction for passing a
check for which you know there is no coverage is criminal - you go to
jail. In Israel, there is often no such thing as "knowing that there is
no coverage." Because while you have a "permitted" overdraft at the bank,
it is rare that the bank will bounce a check unless you are signficantly
over the permitted overdraft (the permitted overdraft is known as your
"misgeret;" once you are beyond that, you are in "chariga" and the
interest rate goes up another three points. Overdraft interest rates are
so high anyway, that the extra three points are rarely a deterrent). So
in Israel, if you pass a check for which there is no coverage, and the
bank returns it, the person who got it back doesn't go to the police to
file a criminal complaint - he goes to the courts and asks them to levy
against your property. That's why the Israeli check is a true shiabud
while the American check is not.

Second, while it has been some years since I have used the UCC on more
than an occasional basis, I know that it is not the practice in the US to
have multiple endorsements of checks. While retailers may still "factor"
(sell a check at a discount), it is rare in the US that you will find a
check with more than one - or two - endorsements. Here it's commonplace. A
check here almost has the status of cash - it is certainly accepted as
currency subject to discounting for post-dating.

Third, in the US, you can call your bank and stop payment so long as
you pay the fee. No one will ask you why you are stopping payment. If
you weren't entitled to stop payment, see you in court. Here, AFAIK,
the bank is not allowed to stop payment unless you prove to them that
you are entitled to stop it.

Fourth (and this kind of derives from the first three), in the US
there is no practice of post-dating checks (except in Jewish schools
for tutition :-). Here, post-dating of checks is common, which is the
motivation behind the second and third differences above.

-- Carl

Areivim is warming up to the topic of segulos again, as in LH or no
Kiddush as the cause for no Shidduch, and the converse proposition.

I just finished listening to Hawking's "A Brief History of Time." Mildly
interesting, but b'nogei'ah l'nidon didan, one might think of a shidduch
as the spiritual equivalent of the scientific concept of the "wormhole"
in space-time. V'duk.

Kol Tuv,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
> On Sat, Feb 02, 2002 at 08:48:12PM +0200, Maryles wrote:
>: In the above example the fact that the world is 15 billion years old does
>: not in fact contradict the Torah. R. Aryeh Kaplan presented a paper...
>
> Which is now /older/ than the current scientific estimates of 9 - 12bil.
> This is the problem, IMHO, of investing too much effort being meyasheiv
> the two. I'd agree with the approach, but I find the excercise of actually
> applying it to be futile....

It doesn't matter so much to me the details of whether the age of the
universe is 15 billion years or 9-12 billion years. It only matters that
the age of the universe is infinitely greater than 5762 years. Wheher
RAK's proofs are valid or not wasn't my point. I was merely trying
to say that one should not paint oneself into a corner by believing
rigidly in an assumption about the age of the universe based on a
simplistic understanding when all the physical evidence contradicts
it. It was certainly not my intent to make RAK's theory an Ikkar of
Emmunah. I was using his theroy as a demonstration as to how one CAN
if one tries... legitimately reconcile science and Halacha. It is not
necessary to do so. But it IS necessary to recognize that problems exist
when scientific discoveries SEEM to contradict previously held religious
doctrine. If we can't reconcile the two, intellectual honesty requires
us to at least recognize there is such a contradiction. Otherwise one
is only fooling oneself.

...
> While the speed of light is a constant in all frames of reference, the
> time span and distance are not. Only a certain kind of combination of
> the two is. This is the core of Gerald Schroeder's resolution, in which
> he shows that under the proper gravitational density, the universe could
> age 15bil years in 6k years of history.

I am a fan of Dr. Schroeder's. I haven't read the book but the fact
that under the proper gravitational density, the universe could age
15bil years in 6k years of history... seems a little far fetched... No?
Never-the-less if he can come up with a legitmate scientific explanation
I would be the last one to have a problem with it.

...
> Dr Morris Engelson shows how different assumptions about energy level
> at which particules become distinct would change the age implied by
> Schroeder's resolution.

> Therefore, we can justify the current range of estimates, although the
> 15.6 bil year calculation given by RYmA doesn't work.

Sounds a "little bit"  out of my area of expertice .  :-)

HM

I am trying to understand better the Torah view of dogs, and of owning
a dog. First, some references. (I hope I got them right.)

We have the issur of raising dogs:
Gemora BK 15b about not raising a bad (ra) dog, and the Maharsha there.
Gemora BK 83a comparing raising dogs to raising pigs.

One who raises dogs lacks fear of Heaven and pushes away chesed.
Shabbat 63a.
HaMaharal there -- because a dog is instrinsically bad.
HaMaharal also says a dog is separated and pushed off from all other
creatures.
Furthermore, regarding the case in BK 83a of the woman who miscarried, a
dog drives aways the Divine Presence from klal Yisrael.

The Maharsha on the Gemora in Shabbat says that it is forbidden to keep
a dog even even if the dog is not dangerous.

The Maharsha also says that one who keeps a dog for protection is
exchanging it for the protection of the mezuzah.

The Maharal on RH 3b, "How could Koresh have relations with a
dog"? Because like attracts like. I heard from Rav Daniel Goldshmidt of
Kiryat Sefer that the connection between non-Jews and dogs is so strong
because of their similarity.

Shulchan Aruch: 
Border towns -- can keep dogs, but must be tied up during the day.
RAMA adds that for bad dogs (ones which bark or scare?), it is not enough
just to tie them.

A dog that damages others:
TAZ (YD) writes that a dog that causes a loss to others, e.g., by eating
someone's food, can be poisoned, and it's not considered a transgression
of the prohibition of causing unnecessary tzar to the animal.
If a dog bites, we cannot collect damages from its owner nowadays,
but get rid of the dog any way you can.
A cat that harms children does not need to be returned to its owner.
Whoever finds it should kill it. Imrei Yaakov says it's the same for
a dog.

Halacha:
Feed your dog (or other animal) before starting your meal, unless it's
a seudat mitzvah.

Beautifying your dog:
Trumas Hadeshen: Can trim a dog's ears. Since there's a purpose, there
is no transgression of the prohibition of causing unnecessary tzar to
the animal.
Rama says nevertheless not to do it because it demonstrates cruelty
(like hunting for sport).

See also Sefer Chassidim about the proper way to drive away a dog that
doesn't bite.

"But against all the Jewish people no dog shall whet its tongue..." (Shemot
11:7). No worthy act is overlooked. As a reward, the Torah advises that
treifah meat be given to the dogs (Rashi, Pesachim 22a)

Maharsha on Sanhedrin 96a, re BiLaden ben Biladen (Bin Laden?), a king who
changed his face:
There is nothing more disgusting in the yes of creatures than a dog. Cf
Yaavetz.

Dogs are last in Perek Shira. The question is even asked, "What praise do
dogs sing?", as though it's a question what possible song it could have. 
They sing the verse from Psalm 95, "Come, let us bow and kneels before G-d
our maker", which is sort of like the only song that they can offer is
that, in the final analysis, G-d created them.

In addition to the above, almost anywhere dogs are mentioned throughout
Tanach, it is as an example of, or comparison to, something despicable. 

("Like a dog returning to its vomit")

On the other hand, the world has its sheepdogs, Lassie, Man's Best Friend,
and so on, and when children were asked which they would save if both their
younger sibling and their dog were drowning, the standard answer is, "I'd
save the dog." The reason given, "Because I love my dog."

But maybe this is exactly the problem? Should a dog be a Man's Best Friend?
Isn't it sad that old women pay millions to clone their deceased dog,
because nobody else would give the women that companionship and feeling of
being needed. 

I worked on a distress line and we had a woman who called for years because
she was in such mourning and loneliness after the demise of her dog.

In Hungary, the divorce rate is very high and the birth rate is low. But
everyone has a dog. 

So maybe the strong connection people form with their dogs is part of the
problem. Maybe that kind of connection with an amimal is very goyish. 

The less religious criticize the very religious neighbourhoods where pet
dogs are scarce, but maybe there is a good rationale.

In one of the few religious neighbourhoods in Israel where dogs and cats
are commonly kept as pets, there was recently a fire on Shabbat. In a
panic, a teenager went around breaking windows and trissim because she was
worried her cat might be trapped inside the burning house.

In many communities, even otherwise reasonable dog owners are notorious for
disregarding by-laws. It can become a major source of contention with the
neighbours.

Fear of dogs is widespread. Young children in particular are often scared
of dogs, and will sometimes be late for school because they are afraid to
pass by a dog, even one that is tied up. 

So now I have typed out a collection of sources and ideas, what do we make
of it all? What does the Torah think of cute little doggies, spoiled
poodles, mangy mutts, etc. 

Shlomo Zalman Jessel

*********************


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