Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 086

Monday, January 7 2002

• Rashi Sanhedrin 3a
• Re: KOFUY TOVAH
• Re: Pluralism, Daas Torah.
• Re: davening 'credits'
• eilu v'eliu
• Re: Moshiach
• Re: eilu v'eliu
• Re: eilu v'eliu
• Kofuy tovah
• Re: halachik methodology and secular studies
• Re: eilu v'eliu
• Re: The Ramchal on Logic and Theology
• pluralism

A while RGD asked, why Rashi (Sanhedrin 3a D"H Dgomir) writes Chachomim
vDayonim.

Land"d Rashi goes Lshitasei that Gemara must include some level of
understanding (famous Machlokes Rambam/Rosh), see S"A Horav Hil. Talmud
Torah Kuntres Achron (1) in Perek 2, where he discusses this at length and
is Midayeik in Rashi Shabbos 63a D"H LIgmar Inish "LKULHU" Tamei, which
refers to the depth of the Taam, but the simple Taam Rav Kahana did know.

Kol Tuv,
Yitzchok Zirkind

In a message dated 1/3/02 8:28:15am EST, sba@iprimus.com.au writes:
> Recently looking into a new edition of the sefer Peileh Yo'etz -
> with nekudos - under "Kofuy Tovah" I noticed that they have it as
> "Kefuy Tovah".

Kofuy refers to the person (Retzuy/Rotzuy)

> Most people seem to confuse it with 'kofar' - deny - which it actually
> means.
> However I was trying to find the source of this word.

See Rashi Breishis 3:12, Dvorim 26:3

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

A few points,

1) There is the Inyan of 13 Sha'arim 1 for each Shevet, and 1 that is fit for 
all.

2) Basrei Dmar Hilchisa Kimar (since no Sanhedrin may not be able to reach 
decision).

3) The reason we can be Mtzareif a Daas Yochid, is because something that has 
been agreed upon by majority can Betzem be reversed.

4) Tos. Y"T 2nd Perek of Tmura says that it is not possible to reject a 
Sevara Lhalacha (rather it's application).

5) See Chinuch on MItzvahs Mamrim who applies it even when no Sanhedrin, many 
ask where is the Source, but IMHO he took it from the Rambam's Hakdama to 
Pirush Hamishnayos.

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

On Mon, Dec 31, 2001 at 06:02:49PM +0200, Avi Burstein wrote:
: I've always wondered about this type of thing: How is it that some people
: look at tefillot and zechuyot with a simple mathematical formula? For
: example: If I say tehillim for a group of people, is it less effective
: than saying for one person in particular?

A number of aggaditos, if learnt without rishonim and acharonim, seem
to imply this. (And how many of us do more than skim the aggaditos?)

For example, R Chanina ben Dosa almost traded a bit of his olam haba
(a golden leg from his table there) for wealth in olam hazeh.

Or the notion in the mishnah that a rasha might get hana'ah in olam hazeh
to use up his zechuyos earlier rather than get them in olam haba. (Vechein
lehefech, for the tzadiq vera lo.)

I think the fact that "vechol ma'asecha baseifer nichtavim" and similar
parts of the machzor are usually explained by saying that the seifer is
"G-d Ledger" also pushes people to think in this direction.

And then there are the stories of the ilk of buying that last available
esrog, but the seller will only do it on the tenai that he gets the
sechar.

All of these can be explained with lomdus as being more in compliance with
din and gam zu litovah. But the impression of the peshat certainly is
that sechar is a fungible commodity.

As for the mechanics of davening for A going to help B, I was able to
come up with three approaches:

1- R Chaim Vilozhiner might say that a tefillah draws down or connects this
   world to a given supernal koach. (Many mequbalim would say that. R Chaim
   would strees that only people, who are made from the kochos from all
   the olamos, have the power to connect Asiyah to a higher power.) Once
   you brought the koach down, it can be mashpi'ah on others.

2- Perhaps the same idea in different words: We often say that once the
   mal'ach hamaves is given permission to act r"l, he can hit
   indiscriminately. For example, once Klal Yisrael is getting an onesh
   r"l, even innocents may die in it.
   Why shouldn't Refa'el have similar rules?

3- On Mon, Dec 31, 2001 at 09:25:04PM -0500, RAK <kennethgmiller@juno.com>
   wrote:
   : the person is close to me, and that if he is in pain, it pains me as
   : well. It is not a heavenly accounting trick that the zechus that I get
   : for a certain mitzvah should go on someone else's account. Rather, I ask
   : Hashem to relieve *my* pain by healing that *other* person.
   
   I heard this mipi RYBS, who contrasted it to sneding someone to jail. When
   a father is jailed, he is punished, his wife is lonely and without his help
   running the home, his children lose the availability of their father,
   his parents and siblings are embarrassed and spoken about in hushed tones,
   etc.. That is not absolute, perfect, din -- it also hurt innocents.

   HQBH's din has to be measured not only in terms of the direct recipient,
   but even all these indirect ones.

   When someone davens for another, he not only binds himself to that
   individual's pain, but also strengthens his emotional bond with
   all Jews (and all people) going through something similar. This isn't
   an individual thing, this is a corporate, and therefore statistical
   and actuarial thing.

   When one r"l has a friend who is suffering with "yenem machalah", the
   general feel of hearing such stories floating around the community
   hurts more. It's therefore that modicum less likely that we're go
   through a mageifah, an abnormally high number of such cases, that
   would affect me through my feel for the tzibur.

   And the tzibur, after all, is many individuals, and statistics about
   disease boil down to real people suffering. Including someone who
   may thereby be helped even if I don't know who he is.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org            excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org       'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (413) 403-9905          trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

> What I'm really asking can be boiled down to whether R' Tzadok's version
> of eilu va'eilu is capable of including RMF's as divrei E-lokim Chaim.
> Applying the rejection of the Law of Non-Contradiction to the shitah
> that the Law of Non-Contradiction does hold.

Before asking the above question it is necessary to ascertain what Rav
Moshe's shitah was and whether he would have any inherent disagreement
with Rav Tzadok.

Compare his discussion found in the introduction to the Igros to the
discussion of the same topic in OH IV #25 p43. I think this latter
discussion could be quoted in the name of Rav Tzadok without raising
any eyebrows.

I once asked Rav Eliyashiv about this and he simply said that eilu v'eilu
is explained by Rashi Kesubos 57a. Unfortunately that Rashi seems to
contain the same ambiguity and can be cited as supporting either side.

My current position is what I understand of Rav Tzadok (Dover Tzedek
Os 4) i.e., that eilu v'eilu is simply beyond human comprehension."this
matter is in truth beyond intellectual comprehension how opposites could
both be truth. Truth by definition has to be one. How could distinctly
different things be at the same time an identity...However when you go
beyond human intellect a multiplicity can be a unity..."

It is a moving target that seems to change as you look at it. The classic
sources don't fit comfortably into Greek conceptual boxes nor do they
belong there.

I recently asked Rabbi Shabtsai Rappaport about Rav Dovid Feinstein's
conceptualization of halacha. His response was that Reb Dovid was totally
immersed in halacha and would not understand how to express himself in
academic conceptual boxes which are alien to the world of pure Torah. I
have heard similar statements about the Greek nature of Brisker learning.

                            Daniel Eidensohn

In a message dated 1/2/02 4:50:11pm EST, micha@aishdas.org writes:
> On a totally different note. The 12th ikkar is the only one in which
> the Rambam, followed by the paytan who wrote Ani Ma'amin, includes a
> question. Why even mention the navi's "im tismahmeiha, chaqei lo"?

See the Rambam in his Pirush Hamishnayois on Perek Chelek by the 12th Yesod.

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

On 3 Jan 2002 at 21:20, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
> My current position is what I understand of Rav Tzadok (Dover Tzedek
> Os 4) i.e., that eilu v'eilu is simply beyond human
> comprehension."this matter is in truth beyond intellectual
> comprehension how opposites could both be truth. Truth by definition
> has to be one. How could distinctly different things be at the same
> time an identity...However when you go beyond human intellect a
> multiplicity can be a unity..."

I've heard this explained as there being different truths that are
appropriate for different eras in the world. Thus, for example, the Gemara
that says that l'osid lavo we will follow shitas Beis Shammai, because
the world will be different and we will be on a different level. This
would mean that there is no one absolute truth if you look across the
entire spectrum of time.

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

Carl and Adina Sherer
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

On Fri, Jan 04, 2002 at 08:54:24AM +0200, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
: I've heard this explained as there being different truths that are
: appropriate for different eras in the world...

I don't see this as all that different than talking about different
derachom being more appropriate to different people ("right for me")
who live at the same time.

In a previous email I listed three kinds of pluralism:
1- Somehow two contradictory things are both true, because the normal
   two-value logic doesn't apply.
2- Two shitos coexist because they are based on different models, different
   perspectives on man and his tafkid. They contradict because they frame
   the problem differently, not because on is wrong.
3- One shitah is not emes, but equally qadosh because it is the product
   of true ameilus baTorah.
and now
4- Different shitos are true of different (groups of) people.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

From: "SBA" <sba@iprimus.com.au>
> Recently looking into a new edition of the sefer Peileh Yo'etz -
> with nekudos - under "Kofuy Tovah" I noticed that they have it as
> "Kefuy Tovah".
> I have always heard it pronounced as KOfuy tovah.
> Which led me to wonder what the actual meaning of the word is.

A while ago I heard a lecture by R. Paysach Krohn in which he talked
about hakoras hatov and lihefech, this inyan....

IIRC, he gave around four different pshotim re the meaning of the
expression.

One of them was covering over of the tovah - miloshon kofeh olov keli.

I think another was something like rounding (?).

I will pose the question to him and perhaps he will honor us with a
response for the group here....

Mordechai

On Thu, Jan 03, 2002 at 12:26:36AM -0500, Eric Simon wrote:
: The question is benefitting from a malacha done on shabbos. R Meir
: (Chullin 15a) says that if b'shogeg, it is muter during shabbos; R Yehuda
: says is it ossur until after shabbos. Apparently the Geonim, the Rif,
: and Rambam all agree with R Yehuda. (And so does the Rosh, and do the
: Mechaber). But Tosafos holds by R Meir. The obvious question: how can
: Tosafos do that? Can a Rishon resurrect a tannaic opinion, even tho'
: everyone subsequent to the tanna has rejected it? ...

Actually, you do not site anyone of a different era than the baalei Tosafos.
Rishonim regularly argue with geonim and other rishonim. Now if you can find
the topic nispasheit by amoraim or savoraim, you'd have a stronger
question.

: Another question: From Tannaic times thru the S"A, we learn that we
: can't read by candle light (on shabbos) because we might tip a candle
: for better light. Then the M"B comes along and says, "our candles aren't
: like that anymore, so we _can_ read by candle light." I thought gezeiros
: like that were binding, even if the underlying reason went away.

To give the same answer as RYW and RAM's first answer, but in a manner I
found more forceful. What if some sefer had written the same about reading
by electric light? It would not have been much of a chiddush. The MB is
saying that "our candles" are a different thing than theirs. We aren't
putting ourselves in the same situation as they did.

In our case, this is literally true. The MB's candles were solid wax or
parafin candles. His light was either electric or a gas lamp. People were
not using anything like flax wicks in a bowl of oil. Even though the
same word, "neir", was used.

But I don't know if the situations really need to be as different as all
that. As RAM writes, the difference between being in a new situation vs
being in the same situation w/out the cheshah arising is subtle. I do not
know where to draw the line exactly.

I think RAM's 2nd answer is convincing. By refu'ah, the gezeirah always went
beyond situations that actually have the problem in question.

Another chiluq we have to make, which is part of this 2nd answer,
is whether the hesber is the bit of gemarah /after/ the lashon of the
gezeirah, or part of the gezeirah itself. If the latter, then we could
argue that the gezeirah was implicitly conditional.

We could raise the same question WRT many contemporary questions: basar
kafui, chalav hacompanies, etc...

:                          (FWIW, I _think_ the SA-HaRav _is_ mekil in
: this area).

I think you mean he is machmir in oneg shabbos in this situation. <grin>

On Wed, Jan 02, 2002 at 11:28:25PM -0500, Isaac A Zlochower wrote:
: It has been recently asserted that the important poskim freely use secular
: knowledge in judging technical questions. Unfortunately, that is often
: or sometimes not the case, especially where such knowledge conflicts
: (or appears to conflict) with statements in the Talmud...

Yes. This is a primal difference.

We were talking about freely using secular knowledge to determine the
metzi'us for new pesaq.

That is very different than asking questions not on the metzi'us, but on
the validity of the pesaq itself. I presume RRW would say that once the
halachah exists, its authority exists divorced from the initial sevarah.

I would say something similar here, however, I would argue it for a different
reason. Takanos exist regardless of the sevarah, but not pisqei halachah.
(As per our long conversation about Hil Mamrim 2:1-3.) However, you would
need to be confident that the published reason for the pesaq is the only
one.

Which gets us back to the question of whether the sevara is given within
the pesaq, or provided by the gemara as an explanation. In the former case,
one can assume an implied conditionality.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

On 3 Jan 2002 at 21:20, Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
> My current position is what I understand of Rav Tzadok (Dover Tzedek
> Os 4) i.e., that eilu v'eilu is simply beyond human comprehension."this
> matter is in truth beyond intellectual comprehension how opposites could
> both be truth. Truth by definition has to be one. How could distinctly
> different things be at the same time an identity...However when you go
> beyond human intellect a multiplicity can be a unity..."

Much like R' YBS describing the meaning of oseh shalom bmromav -in the
heavanly spheres there is no contradiction between emet and chesed; we may
not be able to understand it but that's because of our own intellectual
limitations (much like hashgacha pratit versus bchira chafshit)

Shabbat Shalom
Joel Rich

Most of this thread is above my head, but I want to offer an idea for
others to consider.

In Avodah 8:85, R' Micha Berger wrote <<< The Ramchal holds that yes it
is a paradox, but since logic is a beryah, HQBH can violate logic. >>>

I'm not sure of how "logic" is defined for this conversation, and in fact,
I do realize that defining it is one of the aims of this thread.

In any case, I am curious how Avraham Avinu would react to that Ramchal
(or how the Ramchal understands Avraham Avinu):

Notwithstanding "lo machshevosai machshevosechem", Avraham Avinu
nevertheless insists that "Chalilah laCh! HaShofet kol haaretz lo yaaseh
mishpat?" (Ber. 18:25)

What might be the relationship between "logic" and "mishpat" in this
context?

Doesn't some types of pluralism already exist in halacha.
If a gentile comes to convert we try and persuade him not to and to just
keep the 7 mitzvot of bnei noach.
Doesn't this mean we tell him Judaism is good for us but not necessary
to you. You can choose a different way as long as it contains certain
minimum principles.

Similarly, I would define pluraism among Jews as my way is fine for
me but there are many ways within Torah Judaism as long as they meet
certain minimum principles. There is no need to admit I may be wrong
any more than we would tell a potential convert, don't convert because
we may be wrong. Instead we tell him don't convert because what is good
for us is not necessarily good for you.

-- 
Eli Turkel, turkel@colorado.edu on 01/04/2002

********************


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