Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 085

Thursday, January 3 2002

• Re: Seli'hot
• KOFUY TOVAH
• secular studies
• MiPeninei Harav
• Pluralism
• RE: Pluralism
• Re: Pluralism
• RE: Pluralism
• Re: Pluralism
• Pluralism
• Re: Pluralism
• Re: Daas Torah
• Re: Daas Torah
• Re: Daas Torah
• Re: halachik methodology
• Re: halachik methodology
• Re: The Ramchal on Logic and Theology
• daat torah
• Re: Daas Torah

On 2 Jan 2002 at 15:26, Arie Folger wrote:
>> Most Ashkenaz Nuschaos for Shachris and Mincha on Yom Kippur
>> go straight from Yaaleh v'Yavo to Zchor Rachamecha. At Musaf, after
>> the several pages of piyutim at the end of the Avodah, they go
>> straight to Zchor Rachamecha. What RYBS re-established was saying
>> Slichos before Zchor Rachamecha and after Yaaleh v'Yavo and the Avodah.

> I just checked both Hama'hzor hamefurash and Artscroll, both nussa'h
> Sfard, and saw no selo'hot between ya'ale veyavo and zekhor
> ra'hamekha. 

Correct. They used a different Machzor at Maimonides (where RYBS davened)
which I don't recall seeing anyplace else. Since, alas, I did not live
in Brookline and did not daven there, maybe RSM or RDJB can help out
with the name of the Machzor.

> OTOH, at mussaf there are seli'hot, and there are a few
> (very few) piyutim of seli'hot after zekhor ra'hamekha but before sha'
> kolenu. 

I meant BEFORE Zchor Rachamecha. You're referring (I assume) to Aileh
Ezkera, which is not exactly a Slicha. For that matter, in Mincha,
you could have referred to Keil Na R'fah Na l'Tachlooay Gefen Poreeya
(Tfilla against childhood illnesses R"L) which is also said with
Chatanu Tzureinu. Note - I only have Artscroll - I don't have HaMachzor
HaMefurash.

> Is that possibly what you are refering to? What seli'hot did
> RYBS reintroduce - give me some opening words so that I can see if
> they are or are not in the nussa'h sfard ma'hzorim. 

I have not seen them anywhere other than in the Machzor they used in
Maimonides. Sorry. See above.

-- Carl

Carl and Adina Sherer
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

Recently looking into a new edition of the sefer Peileh Yo'etz -
with nekudos - under "Kofuy Tovah" I noticed that they have it as
"Kefuy Tovah".

I have always heard it pronounced as KOfuy tovah.

Which led me to wonder what the actual meaning of the word is.
Most people seem to confuse it with 'kofar' - deny - which it actually
means.
However I was trying to find the source of this word.

The only sefer that has helped is the Tishbi which says that it is
'miloshon kefiyeh...shehu kovesh hatoveh shenaaseh lo v'eino modeh bo..

Comments?

SBA
PLEASE NOTE NEW E-MAIL ADDRESS: sba@iprimus.com.au

It has been recently asserted that the important poskim freely use secular
knowledge in judging technical questions. Unfortunately, that is often
or sometimes not the case, especially where such knowledge conflicts
(or appears to conflict) with statements in the Talmud. I will cite
one example that has previously come up in the context of science and
halacha but which was still shocking to me when I read the responsum.
I refer to the teshuva about blood typing and paternity in "Tzitz Eliezer"
13: 104 (p. 212)., a popular and well-respected multi-volume collection
of responsa by Dayan Waldenberg. Harav Waldenberg dismisses the use
of blood typing as providing a basis for denying paternity since he
accepts the dictum of T.B Niddah 31a that the blood of the offspring
is derived exclusively from the mother (according to the Gra's girsa).
Therefore the blood type of the father is irrelevant and can not be used
to exclude the husband as the father.

Never mind that the Vilna text does not mention the offspring's blood and
that the dictum is given in an aggadic context, blood being strictly of
maternal origin is considered an inspired statement of fact that medical
knowledge can not supercede. He argues further that science is always
changing and therefore unreliable. Moreover, he feels that blood type
is not constant but can change as a result of transfusions, for example.

The latter statements bespeak a rather shocking ignorance of Western
science and general medical knowledge. It is one thing for some Rishonim
to have preferred the views of chazal about nature to those of the
contemporary natural philosophers. In those times science was not
empirically based, but speculative. Aristotle's physics and chemistry
held sway despite the lack of supportive facts. However, Western science
is based on observation and experiment. Duplication of the observations
by independent investigators leads to their acceptance as facts that
need to be organized and generalized by some principle - preferably
expressed in quantitative mathematical terms- that will lead to further
experiments and verification of the mathematical relationships (or their
modification). While the mathematical abstractions and generalizations
may change as more observations are made, the underlying facts remain.
The newer theories must account for the old observations together with
the newer ones.

Blood typing is a well established fact as is their transmission to
offspring in a Mendelian fashion. The discovery of blood types and their
transmission to offspring resulted from the disasterous consequences
of some early blood transfusions wherein incompatible blood types
lead to massive antibody reactions and death. Anyone who requires a
blood transfusion implicitly accepts that the medical understanding of
blood typing and compatibility is correct. That understanding gives the
father's genes an equal role to the mother's in establishing the blood
type of their offspring. We even know the subtle molecular difference
that constitutes the surface markers for types "A, B, and O" ("O" is
really the absence of a marker and is thus a recessive trait).

We can state confidently, for example that a husband and wife of the same
blood type will not produce offspring of type "AB". The latter can only
come from parents of mixed blood types. Whether that type of evidence is
sufficient in halacha to free the husband from child support is another
matter. Certainly, it should not, by itself, lead to the declaration of
the child as a mamzer. But to casually dismiss well-established physical
evidence on the basis of a particular reading of an aggadic statement
is unfortunate. How can the honor of Torah and its scholars be upheld
if they show ignorance of matters that are common knowledge? It seems
to me that those who undertake to judge technical questions must become
generally knowledgeable in how things work in order to be able to ask the
right questions to experts and to evaluate for themselves the reliability
of these consultants.

Yitzchok Zlochower

We recently got a reference to the sefer miPeninei Harav by RHS and I
found some interesting and strange things there. Some are:

1. As was referenced he discusses tan du
He quotes a known orthodox rabbi (R. Rackman?) that said that the
psychology has changed and so tan du doesn't apply. RYBS partially
disagreed. He said the same logic might apply to the chazakah that in
things that will be revealed people don't lie. RYBS stated that today
(his example was Krhushev) people brazenly lie even when the truth is
easily revealed. However, tan du is based on pesukim of Bereishit and
not psychology. Furthermore, anyone who deny (dovrim divrei buz) what
chazal say are apikorsim.

I found this very unconvincing. The difference between the two cases
is a chiddush of RYBS and to say that someone who doesn't accept this
chiddush is an appikorus seems far fetched.

He also said that RYBS would not accept scientific proof as to whether
meat had been salted.

However, RHS strongly objects that this opinion would apply to the 
Ethiopians were DNA seems to show they are not Jewish.
However, I am pretty sure that ROY objected to the DNA evidence on
exactly the grounds that RHS says doesn't apply!

2. RYBS changed the date of his daughter's wedding after it had been set
because of his surgery in spite of some customs never to change the date
of a wedding. Also RYBS had a double headstone already prepared by his
wife's grave though some object to this

3. RYBS spoke with cardinal Cushing to have him speak with catholic
countries in South America to support the establishment of the state of
Israel and their votes made the difference.

4. When asked by a talmid for permission to marry his fiance RYBS replied
that he knew of no halacha requiring the agreement of one's rebbe for
a marriage. However, he did agree to give the marriage his beracha.

5. A fascinating letter in which RYBS aplogizes for never having moved
to Israel and he says hw was wrong but that after the death of his wife
he is no longer capable of such a move.

6. R. Chaim held like the GRA and against MA that the day is from sunrise
to sunset based on a Rambam defining derech rechokah for korban pesach.

Eli Turkel, turkel@colorado.edu on 1/2/2002

On Wed, Jan 02, 2002 at 12:51:22PM -0500, Gil Student wrote:
:                                    He said that Rav ... is a gadol, but 
: not the only gadol.  IOW, he deserves our absolute respect even though
: we do not follow every shitah he has.

Included here is a basic paradox inherent in plurality.

Plurality says that all the derachim are valid. How to define the spectrum
of deracheha darchei no'am is left as an excercise for the reader. But
within that spetrum, they're all good. Even if they're mutually exclusive.

What about a derech that does not believe in plurality? Can a pluralist
say that he's right and I'm right when he himself denies that "and"?

IOW: Eilu va'eilu divrei E-lokim Chaim is a topic of a number of Avodah
discussions of vol 1 and 2. R' Tzadoq takes it quite literally and
pluralisticly. R' Moshe does not, saying that it speaks of the equal
zechus of the side that is honestly seeking emes but errs.

Can R' Tzadoq's eilu va'eilu include RMF's which itself is a denial of
that whole concept?

With respect to the rav in question: Doesn't the fact that derech X
leads to putting the proponents of derech Y into cheirem imply that it is
worried about the propogation of that derech? That it's not just "another
derech", but not a derech at all? In which case, how can Y include in
its eilu va'eilu X -- since X includes the idea that Y is false?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

> just "another
> derech", but not a derech at all? In which case, how can Y include in
> its eilu va'eilu X -- since X includes the idea that Y is false?

Y can include X, since Y's plurality allows other derechs to reach different
conclusions than Y would have reached. Assuming, of course, that X fits
within Y's spectrum.

IOW, If Torah M'Sinai is THE deciding belief to be accepted, then ALL groups
that accept it are within my spectrum. Even if I don't agree with their
conclusions.

Beis Hillel/Beis Shammai comes to mind.

Akiva

On Wed, Jan 02, 2002 at 09:31:19PM +0200, Akiva Atwood wrote:
:> just "another
:> derech", but not a derech at all? In which case, how can Y include in
:> its eilu va'eilu X -- since X includes the idea that Y is false?

: Y can include X, since Y's plurality allows other derechs to reach different
: conclusions than Y would have reached. Assuming, of course, that X fits
: within Y's spectrum.

But contradictory ones?

In general, such contradictions can be dismissed as being about two different
models of reality. However, when derech X refers to derech Y which refers back
to X, it's not so pashut.

IOW, I have little problem with R' Saadia vs the Ari on gilgulim. However,
I do have a problem explaining how X can accept a pesaq against X itself.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

From: Micha Berger [mailto:micha@aishdas.org]
> With respect to the rav in question: Doesn't the fact that derech X
> leads to putting the proponents of derech Y into cheirem imply that it is
> worried about the propogation of that derech? That it's not just "another
> derech", but not a derech at all? In which case, how can Y include in
> its eilu va'eilu X -- since X includes the idea that Y is false?

Perhaps the aspect of putting proponents of derech Y in cherem is not an
essential aspect of derech X but a side aspect of derech X.  If so, derech Y
can include the essential aspects of X, but not this side aspect of derech
X, in affirming the concept of elu v'elu.  

Generalizing this: does elu v'elu mean that I have to affirm every aspect of
a different derech, or merely that I believe that derech X overall is a
valid derech even if it has certain negative aspects to it?

Kol tuv,
Moshe

Can an honest pluralist have a relativistic rather than an absolutist
approach? Rather than say "all derachim are valid" why not say, "what is
valid for me may not be valid for you? There may be an absolute truth,
but the different paths by which we all reach that truth can be valid
for each of us. Thus, what may be valid for you is not valid for me and
vice versa. However, each of these paths are valid for each of us."

				//Avi
				Avram Sacks

R' Micha Berger asked:
<<< Plurality says that all the derachim are valid. How to define the
spectrum of deracheha darchei no'am is left as an excercise for the
reader. But within that spectrum, they're all good. Even if they're
mutually exclusive. What about a derech that does not believe in
plurality? Can a pluralist say that he's right and I'm right when he
himself denies that "and"? >>>

To me, an honest pluralist must not merely say that "A is (or might be)
correct, and B also is (or might be) correct". He also has to admit that
"I might be wrong."

(Now, until he is PROVEN wrong, he can and must follow his own path. But
unless he allows for the possiblity that someone else is more correct,
then he is being disingenuous about his pluralism.)

Akiva Miller

Li nir'eh we have three definitions of pluralism.

I was using R' Tzadoq's (RTzhK) model of eilu va'eilu -- that both are
true, even though they contradict. The Law of Non-Contradiction holds in
the olam hapo'al, but not in the olam hamachshavah. (See Resisei Laylah
17, or a translation of the relevent portion by RYGB in his Eilu va'Eilu
article at <http://www.aishdas.org/rygb/eilu.htm>. RYGB also refers you
to Sichas Mal'achei haShareis 5a, Or Yisrael 28, and Michtav meiEliyahu
III p 353.

This notion was the topic of a lively discussion back in volume 1.

R Avram Sacks is suggesting that there is a "valid for you" -- IOW,
that each derech is appropriate for a different set of people. I
would think that in terms of emes, one would have to say that either:
(a) both are true, a la RTzhK, or (b) both are equally valid
models of that subset of the truth we can understand.

To explain (b) with a mashal:
In psychology there are a number of models of the psyche: the Freudian
id-ego-superego, the Child-Adult-Parent of transactional analysis,
etc... They could all be right but describing the mind by dividing
its features into different categories. This then leads to differening
approaches to helping the client -- but it could well be that they all
would work.

I do not know if RAS here is suggesting (a) or (b), but the possibility
of (b) gives us a 2nd mehalech. 

R Moshe Feinstein has a different peshat in eilu va'eilu. His is
closer to the notion posted by R' Akiva Miller:
: To me, an honest pluralist must not merely say that "A is (or might be)
: correct, and B also is (or might be) correct". He also has to admit that
: "I might be wrong."
: (Now, until he is PROVEN wrong, he can and must follow his own path...)

IOW, that each derech produced through honest torah learning should be
respected by us, and is respected by HQBH -- even though only one is
true.

This is a pragmatic pluralism. Not at all what I was talking about.

My problem is in saying that both are fully divrei E-lokim Chaim even
though one not only implies a different hanhagah then the other, or
one requires what the other assurs, but that one requires rejecting
the other's philosophy -- its devarim themselves -- as qefirah.

(Ignoring the question of whether or not the maaseh that lauched this
thread was about someone who actually did cry kefirah. I'm talking
theoretically.)

What I'm really asking can be boiled down to whether R' Tzadok's version
of eilu va'eilu is capable of including RMF's as divrei E-lokim Chaim.
Applying the rejection of the Law of Non-Contradiction to the shitah
that the Law of Non-Contradiction does hold.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org            excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org       'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (413) 403-9905          trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

I found R' David Finch's post (in Avodah 8:84) about the definitions and
history of "Daas Torah" to be very interesting. I was going to respond,
explaining how "Daas Torah" was explained to me, and how my view is
significantly different than either of the explanations that he gave.

Then along comes Rabbi Bechhofer, pointing out that 

<<< I do not beleive it will lead to any understanding and will just have
people shouting at each other. Since DT is not defined in a universal
manner, you can define it so everyone is forced to believe it and you
can define it in a way that it would be ludicrous to accept it, so the
target moves too much and is impossible to define. No ahavas or yiras
Hashem will be enhanced by this discussion! >>>

I totally agree. Discussions of "Daas Torah" will produce much more heat
than light. I second the motion to drop it.

ON THE OTHER HAND, we can still discuss specific issues (such as
obedience to a Torah leader, or other issues) without using the term
"Daas Torah". This will keep us focused and productive.

Akiva Miller

R. Mordechai Willig on Ziknei Yisrael
http://www.torahweb.org/torah/2000/parsha/rwil_shmini.html

Gil Student

On Wed, Jan 02, 2002 at 06:07:56PM -0500, RYGB wrote:
: WADR to Arie Folger and my good friend Reb David, I find this thread 
: noxious. I do not belive it will lead to any understanding and will just 
: have people shouting at each other. Since DT is not defined in a universal 
: manner, you can define it so everyone is forced to believe it and you can 
: define it in a way that it would be ludicrous to accept it, so the target 
: moves too much and is impossible to define.

OTOH, DT is fundamental to a few derachim, and leaving it an open and
vague notion is not ideal either.

If people are willing to let me use a heavier hand in controlling the
tone of this thread, which also implies longer delays between posting
and approval, I think it ought continue. I will edit out value judgements.
Saying that "I disapprove of DT" or "I can't see how a maamin could
reject DT" is just reiterating viewpoints we all know exist, anyway.

For example of things I would personally love clarified: What are the
range of meanings? Who espoused each? Their meqoros?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org            excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org       'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (413) 403-9905          trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

In Avodha 8:84, R' Eric Simon asked:
<<< From Tannaic times thru the S"A, we learn that we can't read by candle
light (on shabbos) because we might tip a candle for better light. Then
the M"B comes along and says, "our candles aren't like that anymore, so we
_can_ read by candle light." I thought gezeiros like that were binding,
even if the underlying reason went away. If the M"B can do that, then
why can't we say, "we don't grind medicines anymore, so we can consume
tablets/capsules of medicine in non-threating situations on shabbos"? >>>

I think that there is a subtle difference between "the reason went away"
and "this is a different situation".

For example, the reasons for keeping a second day of Yom Tov in chu"l
have gone away, but we keep it anyway. In contrast, I suspect that what
the Mishna Berurah meant was "the light of an oil lamp will improve if
you tilt it, but this halacha never applied to wax candles."

It is a very fine line which separates those two ideas, and it is the mark
of a true chacham to determine which applies in any specific case. Not
being such a chacham myself, I can only hazard a wild guess that medicines
remain forbidden on Shabbos because they are in fact manufactured by
means of tochen and other melachos, even if not at the consumer level.

Now I'll suggest an entirely different answer.

You have to look at the whole picture. In some cases, the reasons for the
halacha are very clear, and this makes it easier to detemine when it will
no longer apply. In others, the reason is less clear, and we have to stick
by it for fear of the other important reasons which we are not aware of.

Regarding reading on Shabbos, there were various conditions by which
one *could* read by lamp light. One was if a friend was there to remind
you not to tip it. I think having two or more lamps would also allow
it. These rules make it easier to say that it does not apply to modern
candles. In contrast, the prohibition against medication on Shabbos was
extended to *all* therapies, including things like exercise, which could
not possibly lead to grinding. This makes it very hard to say that modern
pills are exempt.

Akiva Miller

> From Tannaic times thru the S"A, we learn that we
> can't read by candle light (on shabbos) because we might tip a candle
> for better light. Then the M"B comes along and says, "our candles aren't
> like that anymore, so we _can_ read by candle light." I thought gezeiros
> like that were binding, even if the underlying reason went away.

> If the M"B can do that, then why can't we say, "we don't grind medicines
> anymore, so we can consume tablets/capsules of medicine in non-threating
> situations on shabbos" ? (FWIW, I _think_ the SA-HaRav _is_ mekil in
> this area).

The gezeirah re: candles included all candles of the time, but all of
those candles were consistent with the reason for the gezeirah, therefore
when a different type of candle was developed, it wasn't necessarily
included in the original gezeirah. The gezeirah re: medicine, on the
other hand, included _all_ medicines, even those which at the time were
not ground. Hence, our medicines, which might not be ground, were part
of the original gezeirah.

Judging from private email from RIS, I could have been clearer.

::> OTOH, see Derech Hashem. The Ramchal argues that logic itself is a beryah,
::> so how could HQBH be limited by it?

To give his argument in whole, the subject was hakol tzafui vehareshus
nesunah. The Ramchal holds that yes it is a paradox, but sinse logic
is a beryah, HQBH can violate logic.

I could think of three potential meanings for "logic" in our context:

1- That which a given person can comprehend, as in "The Maharal's logic
   is..."

   Taking this definition of logic is simply appealing to man's
   limitations. Of course HQBH can do things we do not comprehend, or that
   seem paradoxical to us because we can not comprehend their resolution.

   But then the Ramchal's lashon of logic being a beryah would be
   unnecessary. This is not an issue of IQ.

2- Formal logic, the notion that a statement can be either true of false,
   nothing in between, and not both.

   As I posted to the plurality discussion, R' Tzadoq haKohein does not
   believe this is true of machshavah. People's minds do entertain
   opposite ideas simultanously. It is only bepo'al that we must choose
   on or the other.

   (BTW, I noted in the past the similarity between this shitah and
   Kant's notion of "antinomies" which must arise in analyzing noumena,
   but never arise in the empirical world.)

   RYBS writes also of halachah not using a two value, true vs false,
   logic. Safeiqos are resolved in a manner closer to treating each
   outcome's probability -- not that one outcome is emes and we don't
   know which. Bein hashemashos can be both day and night. Two chatichos
   cheilev and one shuman may all be eaten -- perhaps because each is
   1/3 assur, and other examples as per our earlier discussions here.

   (Lest this seem overly weird, quantum mechanics even requires that
   teva does not always follow a two valued logic.)

   This notion of two-valued logic, and how "and", "or", "implies" work
   under those two values could very well be a beryah.

3- The set of all possible logics, the meta-logic that underlies these
   formal systems bichlal.

   For that matter, we have no idea what the Rambam would say of such a
   thing, as to him the only possible logic was two-valued. We have no
   indication it ever crossed his mind that other logics could exist.

   To the Rambam emes had to refer to this two-valued notion. Therefore
   he identifies the emes of HQBH with logic, and says that for Hashem
   to implement a paradox would run counter to His essence.

   But there are logics in which paradoxes are allowed.

: In this case, efshar lomar mima nafshach.

This bit also could use more explanation.

There are two possibilities: that Hashem is subject to logic, or that He
is not. In the first case, our entire discussion must be logical. If
the logic of the discussion breaks down, we can eliminate that alternative.
It is valid for the Ramchal to use a logical argument about Hashem to
prove that he goes beyond logic.

After all, within logic we would say that if something leads to paradox
it must be false. (This is a common tool in geometric proofs; disproving
the opposite by showing it leads to a paradox.)

And if we allow to imagine beyond logic, we would not be troubled by the
paradox. But then it's an /example/ of what it is we're trying to show --
it's a fact about HQBH that isn't bound by logic.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 "The most prevalent illness of our generation is
micha@aishdas.org            excessive anxiety....  Emunah decreases anxiety:
http://www.aishdas.org       'The Almighty is my source of salvation;  I will
Fax: (413) 403-9905          trust and not be afraid.'" (Isa 12) -Shalhevesya

> In this case, efshar lomar mima nafshach.
> 
> If you assume that logic can be used to study theology, we conclude that
> most logical arguments do not apply.

I don't understand what you are saying here.

 Since the use of logic leads to a
> paradox, our assumption must be false.
> 
Which paradox? Must lead to paradox?
We may be talking around ourselves. Self-evident logic, or call it our 
intellectual capacities or reasoning ability, is according to Rambam etc. the 
betzalmeinu kidmusseinu! This is not merely some philosophical stance but 
affects our very Torah-life (lav bashomayim hi). Of course our reason is 
finite per se, never mind the different degrees in IQ, and therefore must 
always submit to revealed truth. That G-d has His own way of thinking 
differing from ours is unquestionable (ki lo machshevosai machshevosechem 
etc.), and leis machshovoh tefiso bei klal. Nonetheless, we are mandated to 
follow it. Logic will indeed raise paradoxes. A paradox, however, is not a 
logical absurdity - merely a problem in reconciling two affirmed truths 
(e.g., yediah and bechirah). A logical absurdity (e.g., square circle, the 
notoriously heavy rock etc.) is mufrach me'ikoro, as excellently explained by 
RSaadia: "there is no such thing - so you are talking nonsense, or making 
non-intelligible sounds - by referring to it" (shades of modern logical 
positivism). This, therefore, has nothing to do with "limiting G-d". I must 
confess, though, that there may  be a problem with it in terms of thepremise 
I cited earlier, i.e., the Rashbo's concept of nimna hanimno'os. The usual 
argument for it, from ho'oron eino min hamidoh, is quite powerful. I did not 
find any early sources trying to reconcile it with the view of the chokrim 
(though I do experiment to myself with some distinctions - along the line of 
paradox vs. contradiction - but have a feeling that it is bedochek).

Daas Torah places a premium on solidarity of practice and opinion 
among Orthodox Jews who otherwise would be subject (especially in EY) 
to divide-and-conquer tactics directed by their political opponents.

And hence when R. Wein complains about the lack of choices in schools 
it is basic to the system rather than an external flaw.
-- 
Eli Turkel, turkel@colorado.edu on 01/03/2002

At 03:20 PM 1/3/02 +0000, Micha Berger wrote:
>OTOH, DT is fundamental to a few derachim, and leaving it an open and
>vague notion is not ideal either.
...
>For example of things I would personally love clarified: What are the
>range of meanings? Who espoused each? Their meqoros?

This is how I wrote to my friend Reb Dovid, and it pertains to Reb Akiva's 
and you post as well:
>Thanks - if you define: "DT" means X, and let us use X as the term for our 
>conversation," then it would be far more beneficial, I think, so why don't 
>you do that?

Kol Tuv,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

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