Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 062

Friday, November 30 2001

• Zoys Khanike
• Re: terefah
• Re: Breaking Glass Under Chupah
• Re: Confessions of a hyper correct leiner?
• Insight 5762 - 8: The Ethics of Wealth
• SICHOT62-08: The Reasons for Commandments
• Re: Zoys Khanike
• Re: FW: Rav Berkovits
• Re: R. Eliezer Berkovits
• Praying Without Kavana
• Re: Chazon Ish on Nature
• terefah
• Re: Chazon Ish on Nature
• Re: terefah
• Pregnant Women in Cemeteries
• Quantification
• Re: Avodah V8 #61
• Re: aveilut
• Re: yayin nesech
• shiurim and Chabad

Does anyone know the etymology of the term "Zoys Khanike"? I've seen it
said that the term comes from the leyning for the last day, but this
explanation is always given without attribution. A friend suggests
that it might be a folk-etymology for the original phrase "oys Khanike
[Chanukah's over]".

A real answer would have to start with the first appearance of the term.
Does anyone have a source?

Thanks.

Sholem Berger

Eli Turkel wrote:
>However, the gemara has a debate whether a terefah can live 12
>months. According to Rambam that halachah le-moshe misinai doesn't
>have a machloket this is difficult.

Only the categories of tereifos are HLMM, not that a tereifah cannot
live for 12 months. Also, following along the lines of Maharatz Chajes,
even if the general categories of tereifos are miSinai there can still
be machloksim on the details.

>Also there seems to be a
>difference in terefah of animals versus terefah of humans. Wouldn't
>they both be halachah lemoshe misinai.

There is a tumult in the rishonim over whether the tereifos of animals and
humans are the same. However, the Rambam is explicit that animal tereifos
are miSinai and human tereifos depend on the science of the times.

Gil Student

In a message dated 11/28/2001 5:48:01am EST, w.cinamon@worldnet.att.net writes:
> I seem to recall reading/hearing that [RYBS] was opposed to the practice
> of a chasan substituting a lightbulb for a glass - under the chupah -
> Tried to track it down last night but couldn't -Anyone have any info?

I dunno this
I heard besheim RYBS that the breaking was a reminder to show how fragile 
LIFE is (or perhaps how fragile are relationships) and was not necessarikly 
zecher lechurban.

Of course how fragile our status is in galus would be ipso facto zecher 
lechurban, too.

Shalom and Regards
Rich Wolpoe

In a message dated 11/27/2001 3:54:33pm EST, atban@inter.net.il writes:
> It seems to me, that T'vir is not as strong as Tipcha. Tvir is a Mishneh
> (ranked 3rd), while Tipcha is a Melech (ranked 2nd).
> Therefore, the right way to read would be:
> V'natan li lechem, le'echol
> U'Veged lilbosh.

Ein hachi nami that is how it IS lained.

My question is how come the Masorah forces this structure when putting
a svir under LI seems a more straightforward structure.

FWIW, I found out at least on other b'al Korei who was puzzled by the
same issue.

Shalom and Regards
Rich Wolpoe

RBH discusses an Areivim perennial.

Permission to repost this was granted if I include the following information:
    Insight is a product of and copyrighted by Nishma. For further
    information on Nishma, people are invited to visit our web-site
    at http://www.nishma.org

-mi

Insight
5762 -- #08

THE ETHICS OF WEALTH
Rabbi Benjamin Hecht

One of the blessings bestowed on each of our forefathers was the blessing
of wealth.1 For many, these blessings upon our forefathers present a
problem, for wealth and piety are often perceived to be at odds with each
other. And within the Torah literature, there are sources that would
seem to support such a conclusion.2 Clearly, one committed to Torah
values cannot see the accumulation of riches as the goal of life. Yet,
as evidenced by these blessings, neither can one see within Torah thought
wealth as antithetical to piety. In fact, there are sources that seem to
imply that wealth can actually further one's Torah growth. For example,
T.B. Nedarim 38a states that one of the necessary qualifications for
a navi, a prophet, is that the person be an ashir, a rich individual.3
The challenge is to understand the value of wealth and its role within
the ethical model of Torah.

When one considers an ethical approach to wealth, there are two issues
that must be addressed. The one that first comes to mind is the issue of
distribution. It is not wealth itself that is the concern but rather it
is the unequal distribution of resources that comes under examination. We
assume the pious individual to be concerned about the other -- perhaps
even more so than himself/herself. So how can a pious individual be
wealthy? Would not this individual consistently and constantly give all
his/her money to others who are less fortunate? Wealth, by definition,
means a concern for oneself. Regardless of how one may spend one's money
and use one's resources, the unequal accumulation of resources inherently
describes a distinction between oneself and the other, and oneself is
given priority. With the blessing of wealth, we must conclude that the
Torah is validating this concern for self. While Torah obviously demands4
concern for the poor and a sense of communal mutual responsibility
for all, the Torah also does not legislate a full equality in terms
of wealth. In the Jewish society, there are rich and there are poor;
more significantly, there are rich pious individuals and poor pious
individuals. The Torah actually legislates5 this concern for self by
placing a limit on how much one can give to charity.6 The gemara explains
that this limit was instituted to protect one from giving away so much
that he/she in turn requires charity. There is to be a concern for the
other but there first must be a concern for self7 -- even to be able to
help the other. But, still, is wealth not perhaps an over-concentration
on self?

The other issue involved in the ethics of wealth concerns wealth's
inherent nature. Wealth means an abundance of material belongings. For
many, implied in the nature of piety is not only a greater concern for
spiritual matters but, also, a lack of concern for the physical. It is
thus assumed that the pious individual is not only not interested in
wealth but has no desire for it -- in fact, even rejects it. A blessing
of wealth upon our forefathers would seem to challenge such a view as
it indicates a value in wealth. Furthermore Yaakov Avinu specifically
asks for material well-being and works hard to achieve his fortune --
indicating a desire for wealth. We thus must conclude that the Torah is
validating this concern for prosperity.

Clearly, hedonism and an all-encompassing interest in the physical are
outside the parameters of Torah. Yet Torah recognizes and validates
concern for the physical since human beings are physical. Avot 3:21
states: "If there is no bread, there is no Torah." To ignore the physical
is to ignore the reality of our dual nature. In addition, it is in the
realm of this physical world that the human being must act. The physical
and the spiritual cannot exist apart -- in the human being and in this
world8 -- thus, the human being must be concerned with both. Still,
is wealth not perhaps an over emphasis on physical concerns?

It would seem that we must be concerned with self and with material
well-being. The challenge the Torah presents us is to correctly determine
the extent of these concerns. They are not to be all-encompassing --
we are also to care for others and to devote a significant portion of
our energies to spiritual goals. We are called upon to find the correct
balance. The issue is not wealth but how we use wealth. Wealth can reflect
an incorrect balance and one must be wary of that possibility. Yet the
Torah's recognition of value in wealth indicates that wealth can also
reflect the goal of a correct balance of concerns.

Nedarim 7b declares that poverty is like death.9 A dead individual
cannot act within this world. Similarly, a poor individual is restrained
in his/her ability to act within this world. There is the limitation
of resources. There is the limitation of worry and discomfort that
often accompanies poverty. Wealth offers not only the removal of these
limitations but the ability to achieve higher goals. It offers resources
and a comfort level that can clear the mind and foster the body.10 It
also offers a challenge for one can misuse this gift. But nonetheless
we must recognize wealth as a gift for it can serve our Torah growth.

Footnotes

1) In regard to Avraham, see Bereishit 13:2. In regard to Yitzchak,
see Bereishit 26:12-14. In regard to Yaakov, see Bereishit 30:43.

2) See for example, Avot 6:4,6 which connects advancement in Torah study
with material lack. See, however, Gra.

3) Interestingly, Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah 7:1,
in outlining the qualifications of the navi, does not mention the need
to be an ashir. Kesef Mishna questions the absence of this qualification
and, building on the language of Rambam, develops an understanding of
Rambam's perspective based on Avot 3:1: "Who is an ashir? One who is
happy with his lot." Kesef Mishna, however, further states that it seems
from the simple reading of the gemara that ashir is referring to wealth,
i.e. mammon harbeh, much money.

4) As evidenced by the many mitzvot in this regard, including the
essential mitzvah of tzedakah. See Chinuch 478,479.

5) See Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 249:1. Of further note is that
this limit also applies in connection to the performance of positive
commandments. See, Rema, Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 656:1.

6) T.B. Ketubot 50a derives this rule from Yaakov's promise, in Bereishit
28:22, to give a tenth of his belongings to G-d. As the word 'tenth'
is repeated twice in the verse, we learn that there is a limit of 20%.

7) See, also, Vayikra 25:36 and Sifra, Behar 75.

8) One may question whether consideration for this dual nature of
the human being reflects an ideal or simply is an accommodation to
reality. This issue is, in fact, a major point of debate within Jewish
thought.

9) See also Rashi, Bereishit 29:10.

10) It is here that one must be careful. When is that additional luxury
simply a hedonistic pursuit and when is it a comfort that will propel the
individual to greater heights? This is similar to the question: when is a
recreational pursuit simply bitul Torah, wasting time from Torah study,
and when is it a deserved break that relaxes and will foster greater
study? See, further, Mesilat Yesharim, Midot HaPrishut.

RAL on on of our core topics. (Also, one of R Dr Berkovitz's favorite
topics.)

-mi

Sichot
Sicha of HaRav Aharon Lichtenstein shlit"a
Summarized by Ze'ev Frimer
Yeshivat Har Etzion

The Reasons for Commandments

"Therefore the children of Israel shall not eat the sinew of the vein (gid
ha-nasheh) that is upon the hollow of the thigh, to this day, because
he touched the hollow of Ya'akov's thigh in the sinew of the vein."
(Bereishit 32:33)

The Gemara (Chullin 101b), and subsequently the codifiers of the mitzvot,
regard this verse not as a description of custom but rather as a real
prohibition. But the Rambam, in his Commentary on the Mishna (end of
chapter 7 of Chullin), teaches an important and fundamental principle:

"Pay attention to the great principle included in this mishna,
namely:... whatever we refrain from doing or whatever we perform today we
do only by the command of the Holy One through Moshe Rabbeinu, and not
because the Holy One told it to the prophets before him. For example,
the fact that we do not eat a limb from a living animal is not because
the Holy One prohibited it to Noach, but rather because Moshe forbade
us from eating the limb of a living animal because it was commanded to
him at Sinai as a prohibition. Likewise, we do not perform circumcision
because Avraham circumcised himself and the members of his household,
but rather because the Holy One commanded us through Moshe Rabbeinu that
we should circumcise as Avraham our forefather did. Likewise the sinew
of the vein -- we follow not the prohibition to Ya'akov but rather the
command of Moshe. Did [the Rabbis] not teach, '613 commandments were told
to Moshe at Sinai' -- and all of the above are included in that number."

It would seem that we may question what difference it makes in principle
whether we perform a mitzva because G-d commanded it to Avraham or
whether we perform it as a result of G-d's revelation at Mount Sinai. Is
the ultimate result not the same -- i.e., that we perform the mitzva
because it is the will of G-d, and we thereby fulfill His will?

The answer to this question relates to three aspects:

A) From the point of view of the person accepting the mitzva:

Had we fulfilled the mitzva as a function of G-d's command to Avraham,
the performance of the mitzva would have resulted from a command given
to an individual. However, in performing a mitzva due to G-d's command
to the nation of Israel through Moshe, we fulfill the command as part of
Knesset Yisrael in its entirety, which accepted the command upon itself
directly. The performance of a mitzva that was given to an individual,
a "third person," is not the same as the performance of a mitzva given
to all of the nation of Israel, which includes each one of us.

B) From the point of view of the nature of the mitzvot:

When we perform a mitzva as a result of G-d's command to the
forefathers, all the mitzvot assume the nature of a motley collection
of instructions and rules, for some commands were given to one person,
and some to another. The mitzvot are thereby reduced to an ad-hoc list of
orders. This is not the case when we perform a mitzva because we received
the Torah in its entirety as a single, organic, complete unit given to
Am Yisrael through Moshe. In this instance, the mitzvot are perceived as
"torat Hashem temima" -- the whole, complete, perfect word of G-d --
and the performance of an individual mitzva is perceived as a part of
that complete entity.

C) From the point of view of the significance attached to the performance
of the mitzva:

When we perform a mitzva that is part of that Divine law given by G-d at
Sinai, then the mitzva entails recollection of that elevated occasion,
that one-time experience when G-d was revealed to our nation face to
face, when we heard the "voice of the living G-d speaking from within the
fire." The meaning of that event and its power come to mind, expressed in
the performance of a command given to Moshe at Sinai. These are completely
absent when performing a mitzva as the result of G-d's command to one
of the forefathers, and therefore the fulfillment is lacking.

Nevertheless, a command to the forefathers and the circumstance
surrounding it are still of great significance. The historical origins
of the mitzva have significance for the long term, since "The deeds
of the forefathers serve as a sign for the children." The midrash on
the verse concerning the gid ha-nasheh portrays one aspect of this
historical significance:

"'And [the angel] touched the hollow of [Ya'akov's] thigh' -- He touched
[i.e. injured] the righteous men and women, the male and female prophets,
who were destined to learn from him. And who are these? This refers to
a generation subject to anti-Jewish decrees." (Bereishit Rabba 77:3)

(This sicha was delivered on Shabbat parashat Vayishlach 5759 [1998].)

In a message dated 11/29/2001 3:32:11am EST, sholemberger@hotmail.com writes:
> Does anyone know the etymology of the term "Zoys Khanike"? ...
> A real answer would have to start with the first appearance of the term.
> Does anyone have a source?

A quick BI CD search yields few references, the earliest is sefer 
haminhagim(tyrnau) which is 14/15 century.

KT
Joel Rich

--- Jthedawn@aol.com wrote:
>> The irony of Dr. Berkowitz's view is that theoertically, Orthodox and
>> Conservative Jews could end up having no differences between them on
>> any practical level and indeed the differences between Jews and non-Jews
>> would disappear. Judaism would become nothing more than an intellectual
>> excersize debating the relative divinity of the Torah.

> How so?

The short answer: It becomes too easy to eliminate difficult religious
practice in the context of a modern society thus paving the way for
gross assimilation ala the C movement.

HM

In a message dated 11/29/01 3:31:08am EST, gil_student@hotmail.com writes:
> In other words, all three people/categories were extremely loyal
> to halachah. However, R. Eliezer Berkovits felt that halachah should
> bend when it comes into conflict with morality (as internally defined by
> Judaism - Hazony uses this to contrast R. Berkowits to the non-Orthodox).
> RYBS, however, defined halachah as the ultimate morality. The ba'alei
> mussar were concerned with morality but would not consider altering
> halachah and gave it precedence.

Bapahstus AISI it is OK so long as REB still wrestles with the Halachic
conflict. IMHO where C crossed the line is that they surrender Halachah
to political correctness w/o a struggle. In this weeks Parahs we see
Ya'akov struggling. This is important.

Going back to Rishonim etc. When paskening from a Gmara IMHO you cannot
ignore Rishonim. You may decide in the end you must over-rule them.,
but FIRST you msut struggle with how they view the sugya. IOW lo alecha
- you are not abolustely bound to pasken the same way, but you are not
ben chorin to ignore them either.

This is important to undrestanding the difference in how Tosfos seems to
overturn a Gmara and how C do it. Tosfaos strgulles to harmonize the text
with the practice. He eoes research, he comes up with a re-interpretatoin
to make pshat better fithte minhag. But he never AFAIK says" Hey who
cares what the Gmara says, it's not our minhag! <smile>"

FWIW, a freind of mine insisted that Jews were given a bigger midah of
agressiveness davka to apply it to learning Tosfaos and other knotty
problems in lamdus. He felt that secualr Jews who do not struggle
with Tosafos have to find other legitimate channels for that innate
agression. We probably got this middah it from that very first Yshoeiv
Ohalim Ya'akov Avinu. Mybe Ya'akov was angy with Shim'on and Levi
for channleing their agression towards Shechem and not enough into
learning! <smile>

Regards and Kol Tuv,
RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com

I saw this quoted in David Hazony's article on R. Eliezer Berkovits and
thought it would be worthwhile quoting for those who did not read it.
I found this to be very simple yet profound.

Eliezer Berkovits, Essential Essays, p. 25

"Such, of course, is not the ideal form of prayer; at the same time, it
is no small achievement to have taught the lips to 'pray' on their own,
without the conscious participation of the heart and mind. It shows that
the human organism, from whose own nature hardly anything could be further
removed than the wish to pray, has actually submitted to direction by
the will to prayer... Automatically 'praying' lips may count for little
in comparison with kavana, the directedness of the praying soul toward
God in ecstatic submission; yet, they too represent a form of submission
of the organic self to the will to pray."

Gil Student

First of all, the klal "siman l'treifa yud bet chodesh" is only regarding
a SAFEK treifa, not a *vadai* one.

Secondly, there is a machloket between the Pri Megadim and the Kreiti
u'Pleiti re: the status of treifot. The Pri Megadim regards all 70 as
being HLMS (halacha l'Moshe mi'Sinai); the Kreiti u'PLeiti indicates
that apart from *drusa* which is mefurash batorah, only the 8 general
(generic) categories [18 sections] were HLMS. Chazal derived toladot
from these 8 general [18 section] categories to get to 70.

Josh

Regarding Halachah Lemoshe Misinai - I believe there are 3 categories
- levels:
1) The issue whether a particular Halacha exists - acc. to the Rambam
(etc.) there cannot be a machlokes.
2) Concerning a specific detail whether it is included in the Halacha -
apparently there is a machlokes. In other words, there is a machlokes
(among Rishonim) if there can be a machlokes concerning details, and
possibly even those that agree with Rambam concerning 1 - can hold of a
machlokes in inclusion of details.
3) Concerning interpretation of the Halacha - in which we find many
machlokes in Shas - probably everyone (?) would agree.
I hope this helps.
Chaim G. Steinmetz
cgsteinmetz@juno.com

>>treifos is halacha l'Moshe while the other is not.

Gil Student:
> Are you saying that, according to the Chazon Ish, the 2000 years were
> for the establishment of the parameters of these halachos leMoshe miSinai?

This is all explained fully in Chazon Ish Yoreh Deah 5:3

Biology and medicine change over time. What works in one era doesn't in
another. [there is an old rule in medicine "use the new medicines while
they still work"]. In fact he asserts that the medical procedures and
medicine that we have today might not have worked in the time of chazal.

G-d gave the authority to define treifos to Chazal according to their
ruach hakodesh. It was necessary that this fixing of the definition of
treifos be done during the 2000 years of Torah. So even though our current
biology is not that of Chazal - the defintion of treifos is unchanged.


                        Daniel Eidensohn

> However, the gemara has a debate whether a terefah can live 12
> months. According to Rambam that halachah le-moshe misinai doesn't
> have a machloket this is difficult.

The Rambam's assertion that there is no debate on halacha l'Moshe
is very problematic. The Chavos Ya'ir #192 has a very very thorough
analysis of the Rambam. He also has another discussion of this in Mar
Kashisha. page 83-92. "The Rambam in his impressive commentary to the
mishna notes things that are halacha l'Moshe and says there are 20 which
is possibly all of them. He also asserts that it is absolutely impossible
to say that the basis of dispute of chazal is forgetting. In Chavos
Ya'ir #192 I went into great detail with refutations from many places in
Shas which are clearly in contradiction to the Rambam's assertion. In
fact forgetting was a major factor in dispute and doubt...However my
interest here is to focus on the issue of halacha l'Moshe and to show
that those cases cited by the Rambam are only a minority of the cases
in only a third...I will demonstrate that even in those cases cited by
the Rambam that some of them involve forgetting and disputes in chazal -
in contradiction to the Rambam's assertion..."

                Daniel Eidensohn

This issue has come up here before. I found that R. Shimon Eider in
his Hilchos Nidah (single volume edition, p. 272) "recommends" that
pregnant women not enter cemeteries because of the potential danger to
the unborn baby. He cites no source for this recommendation.

Gil Student

There has been some discussion on Areivim recently about the Novominsker's
proposal to limit weddings to 400 guests.

Several posters say that this proposal paints with too broad a
brush. There are many factors which influence the "proper" size for such
a simcha, and the number of guests is only one of those factors. In one
situation 500 might be bare-bones, while in another 300 is gaudy.

Others concede those points in theory, but say that this quantification
is the simplest way of getting some sort of uniform rule in practice.

I would like to suggest some precedent from Chazal which point clearly
towards quantifying a specific facet of the situation because it is the
simplest and most practical solution, even if it is not the most "proper"
or "accurate" solution.

Namely: the 20-amah height limit for the s'chach of a sukkah, or of a
Chanukah menora.

In both of these cases (IIRC) the reason for the height limit is to insure
that the thing is visible. But in both cases, the visibity is affected by
many things other than the height alone. Visibility is much greater if
the s'chach is very wide, or if the flames are very bright. Visibility
is much greater if we are in a wide-open town square, rather than in a
narrow alley.

But these other factors are not taken into account by halacha. A 21-amah
high menora is pasul even in the Kotel plaza, and a 19-amah high sukkah
is kosher even if the walls are 7-by-7 tefachim, IIRC. All this because
(I suppose) Chazal see a public good in having a simple, easy-to-apply
standard for all situations.

(One argument against the above might be that a menora can be in an
apartment window more than 20 amos above street level, provided that
there are nearby apartment buildings who can see it. My response would
be that this only modifies the starting point of the 20 amos, and does
not acknowledge other factors such as distance or brightness.)

I invite the chevra to give other examples to demonstrate where Chazal
did -- or did not -- take this "broad brush" approach.

Akiva Miller

> Re: Tsofaos above, the raionale I have made is that Tosfaos was
> presdrving or perpetuating a specific Minhag foreign to Bavel and his
> innovations were primarily reconciliaionts of Talmudic Text to Ashkenazic
> Halachic praxis. Im kein it is not so innovative for say the Chasam
> Sofer to abaondon Minhag Frnakfort and take on the mantle of Minhag
> PRessburg after having migrated. This is not Halachic innovation. this is
> re-indetifying with another Legit Masorah in the nahara v'nahar upasthei
> concept of multiple valid Massoros.

The Tosafos-as-Minhag approach provides a way to say that halacha stayed the 
same while its adherents innovated with it. The problem: Tosafos is dynamic 
legal argument, not a form of evolving normative custom. Law can speak only 
through its application, and Tosafos was an effort to reconcile halacha in 
the process of application. IOW, Tosafos was one of many incarnations of the 
dynamic halachic process itself. 

David Finch

In a message dated 11/26/01 4:04:30 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
Eli.Turkel@colorado.edu writes:
> 1. R'YBS held(see Nefesh Harav p253) that it's inappropriate to learn
> mishnayot in the bet avel. AIUI, a common practice seems to be to
> learn mishnayot even with the avel present. Is anyone aware of what
> the mattir is to allow the avel to learn? (I've heard it said that he's
> being passive but that seemed weak to me)
> 
> RYBS is based on the Rambam. I guess others don't pasken like this Rambam.
> I have heard people learn mishnayot that deal with hilchot aveilut
> (moed katan) to avoid this problem.

Whenever I do learn Mishna I make the liguistic connectoin to
neshamah. many rabbis do this. If possible, I darshen a given Mishna
into some kind of hesped lechavod haniftar

I'm not sure if this tehcnically would be sufficient for RYBS. To me it
works in avoiding learning Torah simly Lishma qua mitzvas Talmid Torah
and makes the learning lechavod hameis and for illuy neshamah of the meis.
This is simlar to saying kaddish.

BTW, IIRC the TB did not meniton Kaddish. instead saying Maftir, Barchu
and IIRC learning Mishnana were all done for aliyas hanehsamah. I also
recal seeing that if one is unable to make a minyan that one should learn
mishna instead. Of course this is usually after the shiv'a so it poses
no contradiction. Nevertheless, Limud Mishanyos is not "stam learning"
Talmud Torah. It is either similar to reciting Kaddish in one way or
perhaps like learning hilchos avleilus wjochi is also muttar afaik

Learning those mishanyos mei'inyan Aveilus is probabl ythe best of both
worlds, it is ma'leh the nehsam and does cover a subject of learning
muttar to an aveil at least for Rov dei'os.

It is also said that the kind of leraning that is mishkachas aveilus is
leraning be'iyyun. If you darshen hilchos Aveilues depl yenough there
is that sepcial jof of learning. Lich'ora such a joy - i.e. the joy
of forgetting one's tazroos - is not likely in limmud mishanyos alone
unless one goes very deeply into it.

I need not tell you that for RYBS there probably was no such thing as a
Mishna that he did NOT go into deeply! <smile> But for us mortals <g>,
it seems pashut that Mishna - simlaro to Halachah psuka before davening,
is not a great source of comfort, hence it should be OK.

I would also argue as a matter of Halachic practice, even if learning
Mishna was originally not OK midina digmara, that the mitigating factors
mentioned above have effectively removed Limmud Mishanyos form the pale of
prohibited learning when done in context of aliyas nesham of the niftar.
Kein Nir'eh LFAD.

Regards and Kol Tuv,
RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com

In a message dated 11/27/01 3:54:55pm EST, goldstin@netvision.net.il writes:
> Someone asked why is yayin nesech/stam yaynam an issue in non-wine items.
> The answer is that it is even assur when in a mixture. See SA Yoreh
> Deah siman 134 for example.

Sh'eilah:
If I have an bottle of Yayin shein'o muevhshal and I am afraid that an
Eino Yeshudi might contaminate the eino mevushal yayin, can i lechaitchila
mix in a bottle of yayin mevushal together - and if I do - will that
effectively make them the mixture mevushal in such a way that the eino
Yehudi will no longer passul it?

Regards and Kol Tuv,
RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com

>> 4. Their measurements seemed to be the same R. Chaim Naeh (eg 86
>>ml of  wine). Was this always so - is this from Baal haTanya?

>R'Chaim Naeh was a Chabad posek. His shiurim are standard in the
>Chabad world, except for mikveh measurements, which are closer to
>the Chazon Ish's numbers.

I don't think that R. Chaim Naeh quotes Chabad in his work on shiurim. His
main argument was based on the size of the Arabic Durham and that Sefardim
have kept the same shiur throughout their stay in Israel based on the
Rambam. This continuity proves that there could not have been a change
in shiurim from the days of rambam.

Is it pure coincidence that this shiur is the same as Chabad was using
from the days of the Baaal haTanya who probably did not know about the
Durham. Where did the Baal haTanya get his size from?

Or possibly did Chabad in this century accept the shiurim of RCN against
what had been accepted in previous years because RCN was Chabad?

kol tuv,
Eli Turkel

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