Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 058

Monday, November 26 2001

• Re: Confessions of a hyper correct leiner?
• Eliezer Berkovits
• Not in Heaven: R' Eliezer Berkovits
• Re: Rabbi Berkowitz (zt(?)"l)
• Re: Dr. Eliezer Berkowitz and the Abrogation of the Shulchan Aruch
• Re: Dr. Eliezer Berkowitz and the Abrogation of the Shulchan Aruch
• re: Dr. Eliezer Berkowitz and the Abrogation of the Shulchan Aruch
• Rabbi Dr. Eliezer Berkovitz zt"l and the Ethics of Halakha
• Re: Dr. Eliezer Berkowitz and the Abrogation of the Shulchan Aruch
• Re: Avodah V8 #57
• aveilut
• Re: Avelut/aninut
• Rambam and tzaddik
• Rambam on nature of G-d
• Re: mitzvot tzrikhot kavanah
• Re: Herzl
• tzrichos kavanna

Tangentially,
near the 3end of sheini in Vayetze it says:
V'nasson li:
  1) lechem le'echol
  2) uvegged lilbosh

Why is the svir under the lechem instead of the li?
The way it is under Lechem it reads more like:
Vnassan li lechem
   le'echol vuegged lilbosh

AISI the svir should go under the li meircha under lechem tipcha under
le'echol Meircha under uvegged and sof passuk on lilbosh

What am I missing in this sequence?  

Shalom and Regards
Rich Wolpoe

With regard to this principles, all of them are s fairly mainstream,
and fairly easy to defend (indeed, opposition to some of them might even
be close to kfira in the torah shebealpe) The question is the extent
to which one is actually willing to apply them in concrete situations
- having the power is not the same as using the power, and halacha is
intrinsically conservative and respectful of precedent. I think that
R Berkovits poses uncomfortable questions, in that, in response to the
Reform and Conservative movements, which have distorted and misaplied
these principles, we have denied the capability for change (hahadash
assur min hatora), and have created an ideology of torah shebealpe which
is quite different from the traditional one.
The one issue over which there is much practical disagreement is the
extent to which acharonim can disagree with rishonim. We have had this
discussion - while some posit an absolute break in periods, that is hard
to maintain. clearly there is great reluctance, but also clearly many
acharonim (the gra is the most famous, but others too) do disagree.

Meir Shinnar

From: Harry Maryles <hmaryles@yahoo.com>
> Subject: Dr. Eliezer Berkowitz and the Abrogation of the Shulchan Aruch

Already one sees the critiquer's perspective. Yes, that is indeed what
Berkovits suggests, but then, what do the nosei keilim on the SA do,
if not subvert the literal pshat of the SA in many places? If they
didn't do so, there would be no need to print them/follow them. Also,
that he's called "Dr." rather than "R'" or "R' Dr."
 
> This past Tuesday evening I attended The HTC annual banquet and at each
> of the tables was several copies of a new publication by yeshiva, a
> journal of Orthodox Jewish thought consisting of faculty entries. In it,
> I found an essay by R. Chaim Twerski critiquing Dr. Eliezer Berkowitz's
> book "Not in Heaven - The Nature and Function of Jewish Law", a book
> published in 1983.
 
> Never having read the book, I was curious about the article.

You should read it. I passed it along to a friend, who passed it along
to his yeshivish father, who read it and said it's appropriate material
for a rav, but the masses may misinterpret it too liberally.
 
> R. Twerski proceeded to state the main elements of Dr. Berkowitz's
> thesis and I was amazed at the extent of the departure from mainstream
> Orthodoxy his views really were. In essence he adopted the view of the

Really?  Or is it just the critiquer's perspective coming through?

> Conservative movement that Halacha could easily change. What makes this
> view so unusual is that Dr. Berkowitz considered himself Orthodox.
> He rejected the Conservative theology which denies the divine origin of
> the Torah , the Torah only being divinely inspired. (This of course leaves
> the Conservative movement much room to maneuver and change Halacha as
> needed since ultimately the Torah was written by Man, divinely INSPIRED
> though he was, and subject to error.) Dr Berkowitz's held to the
> Orthodox theology that the Torah is of Divine origin. Never-the-less,
> as R. Twerski points out in the essay, Dr. Berkowitz, right along with
> the Conservative clergy, claims that it can be altered quite readily.

Which history shows that it can, but current practice is hard to overturn.
 
> In this Dr. Berkowitz stands alone and it is quite shocking for me to
> have read the outline of his ideas in R. Twerski's critique.
 
> I will repeat Dr. Berkowitz's arguments here and am interested in hearing
> (seeing) discussion and debate as to the legitimacy of these views or
> the refutation thereof. Obviously if there is anyone on the list who has
> read his last and most controversial book, I would be interested to hear
> from you and your take, defending or refuting Dr. Berkowitz's ideas.

It's been a while, but most of the points he makes are valid.
 
> The following are Dr. Berkowitz's principles which he elicits from the
> Talmud and are taken from R. Twerski's critique:

Does R' Twerski give the Talmudic sources, or does he leave that
derivation as only an allegation?
 
> A) The Halacha is meant to viewed from the subjective truth of the human
> perspective and not from the Divine objective Truth.

Yes. It's a posuk: Lo Bashamayim Hee, the title of the book. My thoughts
are not your thoughts, etc. We *can't* know God's truth, we can only
know our truth, no matter how hard we try to get to the "objective" truth.
 
> B) Both minority and majority opinions are equally valid, since
> objective Truth is of no concern to the Halacha. That is to say that

Eilu v'eilu, what Micha would call multi-valued logic.

> majority opinions are valid even if it veers from the objective truth.

That's exactly the message of the Tanur shel Achnai story, viewed
from the Orthodox perspective. That story is a critical point for
all three movements - how they view the overturning of R' Eliezer's
opinion is indicative of their approach to Torah. For us, it's
"chazal/sanhedrin/whatever carries that authority in the current
generation has the right to decide halacha, even if it isn't objectively
true." For Conservatives, it's "rabbis have the right..." For Reform,
it's "humans have the right..."

> Minority opinions can be followed in later generations in instances
> where it's logic or where practical considerations render the minority
> opinion more reasonable than the majority opinion.

Yup. See, e.g., Tos. Sens and Raavad on Eduyot 1:5. It's the whole basis
of much of Talmudic argumentation: one can argue on a decided halacha if
one has a Tanna, even a minority Tanna, on whom to rely.
 
> C) A judge is instructed to render his rulings according to the
> dictates of his own intellect and not necessarily to the intellect
> of his predecessors. He is thus free to disregard the rulings of his
> predecessors if his intellect compels him to disagree.

Implicit in the above. Also, the ideas "ein lo ladayyan ela ma sh'einav
ro'ot," and "halacha kebatrai."
 
> D) The Halachic authority may uproot and overturn Biblical laws if the
> situation calls for it.

Does anyone deny that there exists the possibility of eis laasos?
Not that it's invoked that often; more usually, some loophole is found to
get around the Biblical law, e.g. pruzbul and heter iska, or the change
in preference from yibum to halitza - all examples Berkovits brings.
Although, I think he brings them as examples of eis laasos, even if they
aren't actual reversals of Biblical laws.

> E) When needed, authorities have the power to abrogate a minor law in
> order to uphold a major one.

Yes, so?  There are priorities in halacha: aseh docheh lo taaseh,
ein aseh doche lo taaseh v'eseh, etc.
 
> F) Certain situations are so unique that no previous law can govern
> the situation and a Haroas Sha'ah (law of the hour) will be dictated by
> common sense.

Again, so?
 
> I repeat, Dr. Berkowitz's elicits these ideas from the Talmud.

Indeed.

> Dr Berkowitz further contends that the codification of Torah SheBal Peh
> (oral law) is an aberration of it's essential nature, an imposition
> created by historical exigencies, compounded by the destruction of Bayis

Again, so?  There's plenty of support for this idea.

> Sheni. He claims that Judaism in Galus is a confrontation of Torah
> and reality in which preservation of Halacha in adverse situations is
> the primary concern. The codification therefore is nothing more than
> an exercise in the preservation of Judaism itself and as conditions
> in Galus became more adverse, Halacha became more restrictive and
> defensive binding itself to a text, as self-preservation became the

That's the nature of binding itself to a text. As texts are used, they
gain sanctity, and one feels less free to deviate from the dictates of
the text. As time goes on, ambiguities in texts are resolved, and the
resolutions become textual dictates themselves, so with the reduction in
ambiguity one has a concomitant increase in "restriction", or at least
definitiveness of halacha.

> primary goal. He further claims with the advent of the State of Israel
> and therefore in control of our own destiny, we no longer need the oral
> law codified but rather we should attempt to return it to it's pristine
> stage of being just that... oral.

If we could restore the Sanhedrin per Rambam, yes. Otherwise, we are,
as Isaiah Leibowitz used to complain, stuck in a golus mentality in terms
of halachic development - lots of small authorities making up ideas on
their own, depending on the secular authorities to run the state rather
than on creating a halachic context in which a modern state can run.
The religious parties may want power, but until they find ways within
halacha to run a modern technological state, they cannot present a
reasonable governing alternative to Labor/Likud.

I don't think having a state stam is enough to justify de-textualizing
halacha. Restoring the Sanhedrin, however, which has the absolute
authority to ignore precedent...

> R. Twerski does a masterful job in critiquing Dr. Berkowitz which I
> am not going to go into because this post is long enough. But I would
> love to see a debate by the many scholars on Avodah on the merits of Dr.
> Berkowitz's arguments, especially those who have read his works.

I'm not much of a scholar, but I read his book a couple of times,
although not for several years.

One of the interesting things (to me at any rate) about Rabbi Berkowitz's
biography is that he originated from the Klausenburg area (I'm not
sure whether from Klausenburg itself or one of the surrounding towns).
The first yeshiva that he attended was my grandfather's in Klausenburg.
I seem to recall my father telling me once that R. Berkowitz actually
received smicha (presumably the first of many) from my grandfather, but
I could be mistaken. This fact, which I gather from Harry Maryles's
brief account of his career is not widely known, is obviously of more
than purely personal relevance inasmuch as most of the controversial
points asserted by Harry Maryles (8:57) are taken directly from the Dor
Revi'i's haqdamah to Hulin. Not having seen R. Berkowitz's volume,
I can only assume that he did in fact cite the Dor Revi'i among the
sources on which he was relying for those assertions. Of course the Dor
Revi'i did not make it up himself either, so there are plenty of other
sources on which he could have been relying. But no doubt he was merely
repeating girsa d'yankuta from the Klausenburg yeshiva and his rebi the
Klausenburger rov. I also do not mean to suggest (especially since I have
not seen the book in question) that the Dor Revi'i or his son would have
entirely agreed with R. Bekowitz's application of their principles.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

--- David Glasner <DGLASNER@ftc.gov> wrote:
> One of the interesting things (to me at any rate) about Rabbi Berkowitz's
> biography is that he originated from the Klausenburg area... The first
> yeshiva that he attended was my grandfather's in Klausenburg. I seem to
> recall my father telling me once that R. Berkowitz actually received
> smicha (presumably the first of many) from my grandfather, but I could
> be mistaken. This fact, which I gather from Harry Maryles's brief
> account of his career is not widely known, is obviously of more than
> purely personal relevance inasmuch as most of the controversial points
> asserted by Harry Maryles (8:57) are taken directly from the Dor Revi'i's
> haqdamah to Hulin. ...

On page 82 of the HTC journal in footnote 13, R. Twerski indeed does
mention Dr. Berkowitz's connection to the Dor Revi'i and he does follow
the thesis of Rav Glasner, the Rav of Klausenberg and author of the Dor
Revi'i, as written in the introduction. My apologies for this omission.

To qoute (from page 82):

"Dr. Berkowitz defines Halacha as "the wisdom of the application of the
written word of the Torah to the life and history of the Jewish People".

"With this insight, we readily understand why Halacha is necessarily an
oral and not a written law, for it is impossible for any text to deal
in advance with all the changes which occur in the course of historical
development. Only an oral law has the innate flexibility to deal with
changing situations".

It is easy to see how such a view could be used to abbrogate the entire
Shulchan Aruch.

Does Dr. Berkowitz qualify as an Apikores or is he merely way out on
the extreme end of legitmate Orthodoxy?

HM

I've never read anything of Dr. Berkowitz and have no opinion of him or
his teachings. I'm only commenting on the post to Avodah.

>He rejected the Conservative theology which denies the divine origin
>of the Torah, the Torah only being divinely inspired.

This is not the place to debate this, but normative Conservative theology
is (or rather, was) positive-historical. The positive reflects their
attitude towards the divine origin of the Torah. They only utilized
historical methods for Torah SheBe'al Peh. R. Jacob Neusner recently
eulogized this approach in his review of the C movement's new Chumash.

>A-F)

I don't think that anyone can deny these concepts. However, the key
is application. For example, R. Chaim Soloveitchik took the concepts of
gavra and cheftza and applied them all over Shas. Others have taken the
concept of nishtana hateva and applied it to many more cases. There are
ideas in Shas that are used sparingly and others can come and apply them
more widely.
  Just like there are those who object to Brisker classification and
overly changing nature, there will be plenty who object to applying
concepts A through F in new contexts.

Who would disagree that rabbanan can be oker a mitzvah de'oraisa beshev
va'al ta'aseh? On the other hand, who is willing to apply this to a
case today?

>Dr Berkowitz further contends that the codification of Torah SheBal
>Peh (oral law) is an aberration of it's essential nature, an
>imposition created by historical exigencies, compounded by the
>destruction of Bayis Sheni.

The Dor Revi'i says similarly in his introduction to Chullin.  He argues 
that we are stuck with whatever was codified in Shas.  The Oral Torah cannot 
progress beyond that point.

Others, however, argue that this is the natural, historical progression
that Hashem intended.

Gil Student

From: Harry Maryles <hmaryles@yahoo.com>
> I found an essay by R. Chaim Twerski critiquing Dr. Eliezer Berkowitz's
> book "Not in Heaven - The Nature and Function of Jewish Law", a book
> published in 1983. ...
> Never having read the book, I was curious about the article.

As a student HaRav Dr. Berkovitz I am suprised to read that you never
read "Not in Heaven". May I suggest you read the book before debating
Rav Tweski's critique. I believe the book will deepen your understading
and appreciation of an Adam Gadol and a true Talmid Chacham.

aharon

Regarding the question on R. Berkovitz, zt"l. This is quite clearly
going to become one of those discussions that I won't have even a slight
chance of keeping up with, so I'm not going to even try in the future.
But for now, some hopefully helpful points:

1. For a more balanced essay than the one you read, I suggest
looking at a recent article in the last issue of Tekhelet, "Al Eliezer
Berkovitz ve-Torat ha-Musar ha-Yehudit", by David Hazony (brother of
the controversial author). I had the pleasure of briefly meeting David
Hazony in Yerushalayim this summer; he is writing his doctoral thesis
on Berkovitz under the supervision of Aviezer Ravitzky.

If I am not mistaken, the articles in Tekhelet may be available online,
including the English versions.

2. R. Berkovitz zt"l himself would have been horrified by language like
"the abrogation of the Shulhan Arukh", and I think it should have been
left out of the subject line.

Bivrakha,
Seth (Avi) Kadish

This was sent to me on Areivim but I am forwarding it to Avodah as I
believe that my it belongs there. - HM

--- Moshe Rudner <mosherudner@hotmail.com> wrote:
> R' Harry, I haven't read the book, but the six principles that you
> mentioned (A - F) do not seem to be extraordinarily controversial or
> original. Perhaps a few examples of how R' Berkowitz utilizes these
> principles would clarify his position.

MY paragraph after those principles articultes the problem somewhat:
>Dr Berkowitz further contends that the codification of Torah SheBal Peh
>(oral law) is an aberration of it's essential nature, an imposition
>created by historical exigencies, compounded by the destruction of Bayis
>Sheni. He claims that Judaism in Galus is a confrontation of Torah
>and reality in which preservation of Halacha in adverse situations is
>the primary concern. The codification therefore is nothing more than
>an exercise in the preservation of Judaism itself and as conditions
>in Galus became more adverse, Halacha became more restrictive and
>defensive binding itself to a text, as self->preservation became the
>primary goal. He further claims with the advent of the State of Israel
>and therefore in control of our own destiny, we no longer need the oral
>law codified but rather we should attempt to return it to it's pristine
>stage of being just that... oral.

This is quite an astonishing conclusion on the part of Dr. Berkowitz
utilizing the above mentioned principles


Two examples:

1) Dr. Berkowitz wants to do away with the observance of Shmittah,
which is D'Rabbanan today.

2) He want's to solve all of problems In this he uses the concept that
Svara can and does have the ability to change the pervailing law. He uses
the Gemmara in Kesuvos 3A where the Gemmara tries to find a source for
Rava's ruling of Ain Onaise B'Get. Rava ruled that the husband cannot
claim that the situation was beyond his control (Onaise) and that a Get,
that stipulated that he would be "back in town" by a certain time and was
prevented by Onaise from doing so, the Get is never-the-less, still valid.

The Gemmara goes throgh several Tannaitic proofs and rejects them all
concluding that Rava based himself on Svara for the sake of the modest
and immodest women.

IOW, practical considerations are the basis for Rava's ruling, not
precedent. This gives us TODAY, precedent to do the same when practical
considerations warrent.

Thus does Dr. Berkowitz open up an entire pandora's box enabling us
to dispense with hundreds of years of Teshuvos by merely utilizing his
afforementioned principles as in Rava's case where Rava himself utilized
savra for the sake of the rectifying a difficult situation for woman.

Innovative Genius... misunderstanding of the Gemmarrah... or Apikorsus?

HM

[Can we please stay away from analyzing the C movement? It is off topic. I
allow RDSF's comment through because the comparison was made. However,
I do not think we should take this tangent much further. -mi]

> R. Twerski proceeded to state the main elements of Dr. Berkowitz's
> thesis and I was amazed at the extent of the departure from mainstream
> Orthodoxy his views really were. In essence he adopted the view of the
> Conservative movement that Halacha could easily change. What makes this
> view so unusual is that Dr. Berkowitz considered himself Orthodox. . . .
> Dr Berkowitz's held to the Orthodox theology that the Torah is of Divine 
> origin. Never-the-less,
> as R. Twerski points out in the essay, Dr. Berkowitz, right along with
> the Conservative clergy, claims that it can be altered quite readily.

> In this Dr. Berkowitz stands alone and it is quite shocking for me to
> have read the outline of his ideas in R. Twerski's critique.

I dunno. Talmudic debate is always about "change" in the literal sense
(i.e.,"you say it means this; I don't agree, it means that"). Rabbinic
exegesis is sometimes more ore less legislative, sometimes more or less
interpretive, but it is always dynamic. A good book on this point is R'Zvi
Lampel's "The Dynamics of Dispute: The Makings of Machlokess in Talmudic
Times" (Judaica Press, 1992). (There's a great picture on the cover of
the paperback edition. It shows a bunch of the Chazal arguing with other
over a passage of scripture. Eyes are rolled, arms are flinging, hands
are opened unto Heaven, others are coiled tight and aimed at the guy down
the table. It reminds me of Shabbos dinner at my parents' house when I
was a teenager.) This dynamism continued until at least the 1880s, when
the last editions of the Talmud were printed in Russia. What's happened
since then is a little more complicated, but the process of halachic
change (again, in the literal sense) continues, even in B'nai Brak.

Nowadays the Conservatives (i.e., the RA) "change" halacha through the
sort of multi-tiered committee process that universities use to decide
whether to tear down the Classics Building and replace it with a new
basketball court. That's what happens when you decide that there's
nothing Divine about halacha. Halacha becomes boring, which, I think,
is the worst fate to which Jews can consign it.

David Finch

1. R'YBS held(see Nefesh Harav p253) that it's inappropriate to learn
mishnayot in the bet avel. AIUI, a common practice seems to be to
learn mishnayot even with the avel present. Is anyone aware of what
the mattir is to allow the avel to learn? (I've heard it said that he's
being passive but that seemed weak to me)

RYBS is based on the Rambam. I guess others don't pasken like this Rambam.
I have heard people learn mishnayot that deal with hilchot aveilut
(moed katan) to avoid this problem.

2. During aninut-is one permitted to learn halachot pertaining to one's
immediate duties as an onen? I've seen it brought down with regard to
shivah but not with regard to aninut.

It would seem to me obvious that one can do anything in aninut needed
for the proper caring for the dead. The Onein is exempt from mitzvot so
he can devote his time to the funeral preparations. Should he need to
know some halacha I don't see why he should not be able to look up the
appropriate halachot

-- 
Eli Turkel, turkel@colorado.edu on 11/26/2001

Joel Rich wrote:
>1. R'YBS held(see Nefesh Harav p253) that it's inappropriate to learn 
>mishnayot in the bet avel. AIUI, a common practice seems to be to learn 
>mishnayot even with the avel present. Is anyone aware of what the mattir is 
>to allow the avel to learn? (I've heard it said that he's being passive but 
>that seemed weak to me)

I think it is a big chiddush and certainly not the normative minhag.

Carl Sherer wrote:
>In most places that I have been what has been learned is Ailu M'galchin 
>with the idea that since it is nogea to the aveil l'maase it's mutar for 
>him to hear.

I did that also when my mother was sitting shiva.  But that is probably just 
a reflection of our chumra generation.

Gil Student

I apologize in advance for not quoting the sources exactly as I am
currently in galus without seforim and so I rely on my memory and all
errors on mine.

The Rambam in hilchot teshuva defines a tzaddik and rasha based on a
majority of sins vs mitzvot. I heard a shiur in the name of Rav Weinberg
Zt"l that asks that in the second halacha Rambam seems to define tzaddik
again and slightly differently than in the first halacha. He asks why we
need two definitions one general and the second concerning who will live.
He answers that the first halacha defines the concept of tzaddik without
immediate application. The name tzaddik applies to one who has more
mitzvot than aveirot. In the opposite for a rasha. This determines the
direction that the person has to work in in doing teshuva. In the second
halacha Rambam is stating who will live and who will die. This requires a
different definition of tzaddik that depends on ones total lifeview and
is not just dependent on the amount of mitzvot vs averirot even defined
qualitatively and not quantitatively.
This also explains why every rasha does not not die immediately (or within
the year) even when we know the person is a rasha qualitatively. This
is because the balance of mitzvot vs sins applies only to halacha 1 and
halacha 2.

As applying to Herzl I don't see how anyone can claim he personally
was a tzaddik. The more pertinent question is what happens to a person
who does not keep mitzvot but saves the Jewish people in some sense. As
already suggested a better representative of this would be Ben Gurion
than Herzl. It is not clear to me how Jewish Herzl was. On the other
hand it is clear that Ben Gurion was knowledable and acted from a
Jewish viewpoint. It is also clear he was no tzaddik in any halachic
measure. However, he fought for the Jewish people and did what he thought
was best. Compared to some of todays Meretz leaders he could be viewed
as a tzaddik both in terms of his love of Tanach and his love of the
land of Israel.

We know from various gemaras that people that gave up their lives to
save the jewish people go straight to Gan Eden even though they may not
have been the greatest tzaddikim in their lives. Similarly people who
are killed al kiddush hashem i.e. killed because of their Jewishness get
a full reward in the world to come in spite of the misdeeds in this world.

-- 
Eli Turkel, turkel@colorado.edu on 11/26/2001

> I believe that Rambam's definition of a'hdut haBore & noncorporeality
> to be philosophically derived. Those who keep tabs may have noticed that
> this is the only ikkar on which I posted, mentioning as a normative but
> differing position the various inyterpretations of 10 sefirot.

Unity and incorporeality are logically entailed by the existence of G-d. A
being who lacks these attributes simply wouldn't be G-d, according to
the Rambam.

Chaim Steinmetz wrote:
> From: "David Glasner" <DGLASNER@ftc.gov>
>> Rabbi Bechoffer (8:52) forwarded the following anonymous query:
>> Since when do we pasken "mitzvot eyn tzrichot kavana" (esp. by deorayso)?

> Of course we pasken "mitzvot tzrikhot kavanah." But that is simply
> to exclude putative mitzvot committed without any intention to perform
> the act, in other words, mitaseik.

In other words, the one who holds "ein tzrichos kavanna" holds "misasek"
fulfills the mitzvah?!

>> No one holds that one is obligated
>> to perform a meritorious act with a specific intention to fulfill the
>> mitzvah of performing the meritorious act. v'zeh barur.

> See SA OC 60:4 that we pasken "tzrichot kavana" - meaning "Kavana Lotzais"
> and without this kavana you didn't fufill the mitzva (see MB 7-9, and
> other poskim there).

I apologize for posting from memory without checking my sources.
Clearly there is a hiyuv to intent to fulfill the mitzvat ha-borei when
performing a mitzvah she-b'guph, like tefilin. However, for mitzvot like
tzedakah or even shehitah where the mitzvah is a means not an end, there
is no requirement to have kavanah to be yotzei. Whatever mitzvot Herzl
performed were so far as we know of the latter and not the former variety.

>> The only case
>> where such a shitah has gained any wide acceptance is in connection with
>> shmurah matzah where there are many who hold that it is necessary to
>> prepare the matzah with the intention of fulfilling the mitzvah of matah.
>> But there is a special limud from which those who accept this shitah
>> for matzah derive and it applies only to this single mitzvah.

> Diffrent issue - Lishmo in making the matzoh (also by tzizis), we're
> discussing kavana lotzais.

The question is whether the matzot have to be baked l'sheim matza or
l'sheim mitzvat matza.

>> All those
>> who eat machine matzah and even many of those who eat hand matzah agree
>> that it is sufficient that the matzah be prepared for the sake of being
>> used for matzah, without any specific intention to fulfill the mitzvah
>> of matzah.

> AFAIK they hold that through a machine is also lishma, not that you don't
> need lishma. 

l'sheim matza or l'sheim mitzvat matza?  The machine can be run for the 
sake of baking matza but not for the sake of fulfilling the mitzva

> Which is the reason many (who eat machine matzos during
> pesach) will fulfill the mitzva with hand matzos.

I agree, but those who eat machine matzot hold that there is no need
for shemirah l'sheim mitzvat matzah only l'sheim matzah.

Thanks again for setting me straight.

[In a 2nd email. -mi]

Just one addendum to my earlier response to Chaim Steinmetz. According to
the Dor Revi'i's drush on the pasuq v'haya eiqev tishm'un, even though one
has not properly discharged his obligation to perform a mitzvah she-b'guph
unless one has the intent to perform the requisite act because it is a
Divine commandment, it would appear that there is still some aspect of
fulfillment inherent in the act for which one would nevertheless merit
some reward.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

The tshuva by Rav Herzog re: Herzl appears in his Psakim u'Ktavim Vol.
5 SHU"T b'dinei Yoreh Deah Siman 127, dated 17 Tevet Tashat and sent
to Mar Shragai of the Jewish Agency. Not only does he refer to Herzl
as 'z"l' in the opening line, he also repeats Herzl z"l 3 more times
in the tshuva. But then again, he also refers (in the same tshuva)
to R. Menachem Ussishkin as 'z"l' and Dr. Pinsker as 'z"l' :-)

Josh

In Ahavas Chessed pg 43b the CC requires kavanna latzais by all mitzvos,
even chessed. This was eloquently explained by an earlier letter as
the position which "no one holds".

Shlomo Goldstein 

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