Avodah Mailing List

Volume 08 : Number 015

Sunday, October 14 2001

• Sukkah on Shmini Atzeres
• Re: Sukkah on Shmini Atzeres
• Re: sukkah bi-shemini
• Re: WTC stories, Hashgacha pratis and kiddush HaShem
• Re: Dor Revii on Smihat ha-Torah
• Re: bracha on arba minim-sukkah or shul
• Re: Havdala in the Succa
• RE: WTC stories, Hashgacha pratis and kiddush HaShem
• RE: Yom Tov Sheini vis-a-vis Yom Kippur
• Birkas Habanim
• Re: WTC stories, Hashgacha pratis and kiddush HaShem
• Re: WTC stories, Hashgacha pratis and kiddush HaShem
• free will
• Insight 5762 - 3
• Hoshanos - choice and order
• Re: arba minim in succah
• Piyut terminology - Yotzeir / Yotzros, Ofan, Zulas, Krovetz....
• missing thumbs
• Cutting nails on Thursday
• Re: Insight 5762 - 3

    I heard that Klausenburger Rav would every year on Shmini Atzeres
complain that it was very cold outside ad thus not eat in Sukkah. One year
one of the people in the room told him that it quite warm outside so the Rav
went to eat in the Sukkah.

On Mon, Oct 08, 2001 at 01:30:47PM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
: Since many of Acheinu B'nei Israel in Chutz HaAretz are Noheg not to
: eat in the Succah on Shmini Atzeres (Sh. A.) despite the clear Halacha
: in the Shulchan Aruch, I think we are required to be MeLamed Zchus for
: them. To that extent I would like to make an attempt to do so.

I've seen two comments from RYBS on this issue:

The first, in Nefesh haRav, suggests (presumably tongue in cheek) that this
is based on the din that a chasan and his shushvinin are patur from the
Sukkah. The gemara explains that this is because they wouldn't fit in a
Sukkah (except possibly Helena's) without being mitzta'arim. Similarly,
a Rebbe and his Chassidim ought be patur from the Succah. Chassidim would
go to the Rebbe for the "last days", i.e. Sh"A and the end of Pesach.
Therefore, they didn't have to sit in the Suckkah on Sh"A. As for at home,
this is probably because they remembered that when they went to the
Rebbe, /he/ didn't sit in the Sukkah on Sh"A...

The second he gave in a talk between minchah and ma'ariv on Sh'A '79 in
Boston, according to the anonymous notes one can find on 613.org. In it
RYBS uses the same din about a chasan, but the tongue is removed from
cheek. He likens the Chassid's relationship to Sukkos to that of a
chasan being mesamei'ach with his kallah. (FWIW, I saw that the Sfas Emes
does actually speak of the parallel between Sechach and Chuppah in those
terms.) The last day, which is for Klal Yisrael and HKBH alone, they do
so in private. The mignageid, however, is still relating to HKBH as
Av (c.f. "Avinu Malkeinu...")

: The Gemmarah in Sukkah 48A states that Sh. A. Is a Regel Bifnei Atzmo,
: a holiday unto itself independent and separate from Sukkos. ...
: The Gemmarah on 46B brings three possible approaches in dealing with this
: seemingly contradictory dilemma. 1) Not to sit at all in the Sukkah on
: Sh. A., 2) to sit but not make a Bracha, and 3) to sit and make a Bracha
: as well.
: The problem of 1) is that by not sitting in the Sukkah, we end up
: notobserving the Takanas Chazal of Sfeka DeYoma. The problem of 2)
: and 3) is Bal Tosef.

There are, as I see it two approaches to understanding the problem, both
of which you see in the lashonos of the rishonim:

1- As RHM writes, bal tosif or at least mechzei kebal tosif;
2- It's a bizayon to the qedushas hayom of Sh"A.

According to the S"A haRav I mentioned when we were discussing Rosh
haShanah and sefeiqa diyoma, the YT sheini shel golios is a rabbinically
created connetion to the same supernal atemporal Succos as the previous
days of Succos de'Oraisa.

We may have a problem, therefore, of a day being connected to two
lima'alah min hazman "entities" at once. In general, we hold that
you can't: e.g. when it come to counting shiv'ah neqiyim that start
in the middle of counting post-leidah.

In which case, the S"A haRav's approach would be a third reason why
you can't just celebrate both on the same day.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org                           - R' Zelig Pliskin
Fax: (413) 403-9905          

As RSBA notes this is a topic already discussed at length in the past,
so I will only note briefly that in his book Dor Dorim, my grandfather
R. Akiva Glasner (whose 45th yahrzeit will be observed next Wednesday,
exactly one week after the 77th yahrzeit of his father the Dor Revi'i
on Shemini Atzeret, and six days after the 162nd yahrzeit of his
great-great grandfather, the Hatam Sofer) cites the Targum Yonatan ben
Uziel on Bamidbar 29:35: "b'yoma t'mina'a t'hevun k'nishtin b'hedva min
matilkhon l'vateikhon."

From this my grandfather concludes (bringing many more proofs than I can
even mention here) that there is a Biblical obligation (hovat ha-guph)
on Shemini Atzeret to return from the dirat arai in which we dwell on the
first seven days of sukkot into the dirat q'va. The minimum requirement
for fulfilling this hovat ha-guph is to make kiddush in our home on the
night of Shemini Atzeret. Having made kiddush in our home on the night
of Shemini Atzeret, we are not obligated (any more than we are obligated
on nights 2-7 of Sukkot) to return to the sukkah to complete our meal.
But under the principle of meitav yatvinan b'rukhi lo m'varkhinan we are
obligated to return to the sukkah the following day. v'zeh barur v'emet
lamitah shel torah.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

>On Fri, Oct 05, 2001 at 04:37:26PM -0400, Jay Lapidus wrote:
>: Allowing "not to act" is not God's responsibility.  We do have free
>: will and responsibility.  That's what we learn from the sixth day of
>: creation.

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
>IOW, as I was arguing, you feel that G-d "stood back" from the situation
>because He values free will more than the lives lost.

"Stood back" is at best an overstatement.

>Hashem could have interrupted the natural order. 

Not interrupting the natural order is not the equivalent of "standing
back."  As you yourself have argued on another thread:

>                                                 And, as I was arguing on
>another thread, He could have prevented the hijackings /within/ the natural
>order. (The rate at which a fuel line cracks is probably non-deterministic.
>If not a zillion other things.)

Indeed, God does try to prevent the hijackings within the natural order;
however, God requires human assistance. God gives us mental, moral, and
physical capabilities. It's up to us to decide whether or not to make
the most of them. The hijackings were preventable, had the warnings of
terrorism and security experts been heeded for better airport security,
secure cockpits, and armed marshals on the planes.

>You say that the point of creation is that man ought to have free will and
>responsibility, but then isn't that simply an attempt to justify why He'd
>consider free will more valuable?

I never wrote that the free will of man is "the" point of creation.
It is one of many points.

I do believe that God finds the preservation of the natural order of
utmost importance.

MB:
>It's still a choice of the free will of the terrorists and authorities
>over the lives of the victims.

No, it's a choice between maintaining the integrity of the natural
order or not.  God has not interrupted the natural order at any time
during recent history...

Jay S. Lapidus     http://jlapidus.tripod.com
"I don't care what denomination you belong to, 
       as long as you're ashamed of it." 
            - Rabbi Yitz Greenberg

To be posted soon on the Dor Revii website, www.dorrevii.org

U-l'khol ha-otot v'ha-mophtim asher sh'laho ha-Sheim la-assot b'eretz 
mitzrayim l'pharoh u-l'khol avadav u-l'khol ha-yad ha-hazakah u-l'khol 
ha-mora ha-gadol asher assah moshe l'einei kol yisrael: B'reishit bara 
Eloqim et ha-shamayim v'et ha-aretz: 

Above (http://www.math.psu.edu/glasner/Dor4/Parsha/smihat.html) we
wrote how our master joined together, as if by well-fastened nails, 
the end of the Torah to its beginning.  And he lifted his hand a second time 
to unite the structure to be a single entity.  The Rambam writes (Y'sodei 
ha-Torah 8) that the children of Israel did not believe in Moshe because of 
the signs and wonders that he performed their eyes, for, inasmuch as such 
signs could have been performed by means of secret arts, magic, and 
sorcery, anyone who believes in signs is misguided.  All the signs that 
Moshe performed were required not to confirm the prophecy of Moshe but 
because of external necessity.  And they believed in Moshe only because 
they stood at Mount Sinai and saw with their own eyes the glory of the 
Eternal and heard with their own ears His words from the midst of the fire. 

Now in Bereishit the Ramban writes that the reason the Torah begins with 
the words "In the beginning, G-d created the heaven and the earth," is to 
teach us that anyone who does not believe that the G-d of the Universe is 
the Creator of the mountains and the winds, but says that the universe 
came first denies the most basic tenet of faith and denies the Torah.  Now 
one may ask that although we did indeed see with our own eyes and hear 
with our own ears that the Eternal gave the Torah on Mount Sinai, how 
can we know nevertheless with an irrefutable sign that He created the 
world and conducts it.  For there is no way for us to know that He is the 
Creator except by seeing a miracle or sign that displaces nature inasmuch 
as only the One Who has the capacity to control nature and reverse the 
laws of creation could, as the philosophers and scientists have written, 
have the capacity to create the world, so that only that Being could be its 
Creator.

However, when G-d descended on Mount Sinai enveloped in His Glory 
and Majesty, and we heard His voice from the midst of the fire, and every 
individual attained the paths of life and knowledge of G-d, they then also 
understood that the Eternal is the G-d of the universe and that His hand 
reaches the heaven.  For the souls of all Israel together as one were 
exalted up on high and they recognized at that moment the living G-d 
and their eyes saw the glory of the splendor of His greatness.

Now the signs and wonders that Moshe performed before Pharaoh and his 
servants were performed only to show them that there is a G-d that judges 
them in response to Pharaoh's question (Exodus 5:2):  "Who is the L-rd 
that I should hearken to His voice."  And this is the meaning of the verse: 
"for all the signs and wonders which the L-rd sent him to perform in the 
land of Egypt."  These were performed only for Pharaoh and his servants 
and his people -- that they should know that there is none like the L-rd our 
G-d and that the land and its fullness belong to the L-rd -- but not for the 
children of Israel.  The verse "and for all the mighty power and all the great 
and terrible deeds which Moshe wrought in the sight of all Israel" refers not 
to the signs and wonders in Egypt but instead to the giving of the Torah on 
Mount Sinai where they saw the G-d of Israel revealed to them in all His 
glory and splendor and they all heard His voice from the midst of the fire 
from which they understood with perfect clarity that "in the beginning G-d 
created the heaven and the earth."  At that moment they knew well and 
understood that the Eternal is the Creator of the heaven and the earth.  
And what need had they for signs or wonders?

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

I'm not 100% sure but I believe it has to do with what is mentioned in
Shulchon Aruch O"C 90:8 and more in S"A Horav 90:9.
See also Kaf Hachayim on this Se-if that there are those who say it doesn't
only apply to Shmone Esrey.
It's based on the Gemara Brochos 8:2.

kol tuv
yosef stern

On 12 Oct 01, at 0:37, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
> R' Stuart Klagsbrun wrote <<< The rov I asked holds it is not a chiyuv to
> make a brachah when going to sleep in the succah but it not a brachah
> l'vatalah either, so he in fact says one. >>>
> 
> R' Carl Sherer asked for a source. 
> Okay, first the sources. [Square brackets are my own additions.]
> Mechaber 639:8 -- The minhag is not to make a bracha on the sukkah except
> when eating. (And that's the minhag.)
...

I was asking what source there is for MAKING a bracha on 
sleeping in the Sukkah. I don't know anyone who does that, and 
given that we say Safek Brachos l'Hakel, it seems odd to try to find 
a rationalization for making such a bracha. Regarding MB 639:16, 
see the Biur Halacha there.

-- Carl

On Friday, October 12, 2001 12:45 PM, Jay Lapidus <jlapidus@usa.net> wrote:
> No, it's a choice between maintaining the integrity of the natural
> order or not.  God has not interrupted the natural order at any time
> during recent history...

......as far as you know.

sk

Stuart Klagsbrun <SKlagsbrun@agtnet.com> wrote:
> From 'the man in my backyard':
...
> By the way, your question applies, in reverse, in Yerushalayim according
> to Rambam z"l who believes that witnesses can come and make a chodesh
> ibur into a chodesh bizmano retroactively up to the fifteenth of any
> month including Tishrei. It is here that the MC asks his question and I
> gave my answer. I mistakenly misread your question to be this one. Sorry,
> in your case everyone in galus would be chayav a korban chatat. Pardon
> the error.

Would that be a candidate for par heelem davar, assuming that locality has a 
sanhedrin ketana?

Arie

-- 
It is absurd to seek to give an account of the matter to a man 
who cannot himself give an account of anything; for insofar as
he is already like this, such a man is no better than a vegetable.
           -- Book IV of Aristotle's Metaphysics

When I give my kids their bracha Friday nights, I've taught them to answer
"Amen" four times, once at each pasuk: Y'simcha/Y'simech; Y'varech'cha;
Ya'er; Yisa. I never really thought about it; it just seemed natural to
pattern it after the Birkas Kohanim in shul.

My b'chor noticed that in most other families, the children answer Amen
only once, at the very end. He asked me to investigate, and see what
reasons there might be for one way or the other.

Offhand, I think that answering only once might be a way around the
problem of doing Birkas Kohanim in a non-Birkas-Kohanim context. But I
thought that this problem can be solved simply by not intending to do
a real Birkas Kohanim.

Any other thoughts on this topic?

Akiva Miller

In message , Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> writes
>R' Yerucham Leibovich would say that they are unrelated. His Yahadus
>is founded on hakaras hatov; on the facts that Hashem is our Borei,
>and that He has (repeatedly) go'el oseinu mei'avdus lecheirus. HKBH
>as Dayan haEmes has nothing to do with our shibud to Him.

I have some difficulty with this. If, in fact, we cannot say Hodu Hashem
ki tov - what does it mean to say that we are required to have hakaras
hatov? Is not our obligation to have hakaras hatov itself rooted in our
imitation of the midos of Hashem? What does it mean to suggest that we
should be "better" than Hashem (which seems to be what you are saying of
you say that Hashem is malevolent but yet we must have hakaras hatov)?
Surely that is as nonsensical a statement as Hodu ki ra?

Shavuah tov
Chana

Chana Luntz

On Fri, Oct 05, 2001 at 04:37:26PM -0400, Jay Lapidus wrote:
>>: Allowing "not to act" is not God's responsibility.  We do have free
>>: will and responsibility.  That's what we learn from the sixth day of
>>: creation.

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
>> IOW, as I was arguing, you feel that G-d "stood back" from the situation
>> because He values free will more than the lives lost.

On 12 Oct 01, at 12:44, Jay Lapidus wrote:
> "Stood back" is at best an overstatement.

After going through one of Rav Nebenzahl's sichot this week, I am
convinced that Hashem does not necessarily value free will (as we think
of it), and that the idea that we have free will where we can make the
wrong choices is itself a consequence of Adam HaRishon's eating from
Eitz HaDaas.

Rav Nebenzahl argues that until Eitz HaDaas, Adam HaRishon had free
will but it was free will applied with a cold rationalism so that Adam
HaRishon would be as unlikely to make the wrong choice as you and I
would be to jump out of an office tower that was not on fire. He looks
at Eitz HaDaas as a conscious decision by Adam HaRishon to make things
"more complicated," to "up the stakes" if you will, by introducing the
possibility that emotions, feelings and temptations will get in the way
of making the right decision.

In any event, it seems that in the perfect world of Gan Eden, "free will"
was not quite what you and I think of as free will.

> Indeed, God does try to prevent the hijackings within the natural order;
> however, God requires human assistance. 

G-d doesn't EVER require human assistance, but He may use it in 
order to make things appear more natural and to give those who 
wish to deny a nes an opportunity to do so.

>                                      God gives us mental, moral, and
> physical capabilities. It's up to us to decide whether or not to make
> the most of them. The hijackings were preventable, had the warnings of
> terrorism and security experts been heeded for better airport security,
> secure cockpits, and armed marshals on the planes.

And why were those things not done? Maybe because Hashem 
didn't want them done....

>> You say that the point of creation is that man ought to have free will and
>> responsibility, but then isn't that simply an attempt to justify why He'd
>> consider free will more valuable?

> I never wrote that the free will of man is "the" point of creation.
> It is one of many points.

See above. I'm not even sure it's one of many points....

> I do believe that God finds the preservation of the natural order of
> utmost importance.

Then how do you explain things like kriyas yam suf?

MB:
>> It's still a choice of the free will of the terrorists and authorities
>> over the lives of the victims.

> No, it's a choice between maintaining the integrity of the natural
> order or not.  God has not interrupted the natural order at any time
> during recent history...

You obviously have not been in Eretz Yisrael recently. Every time a
terrorist manages to blow himself up without taking anyone else with
him, that's an interruption in the natural order for which all of us
here are grateful.

-- Carl

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
> IOW, as I was arguing, you feel that G-d "stood back" from the situation
> because He values free will more than the lives lost.
...
> You say that the point of creation is that man ought to have free will and
> responsibility, but then isn't that simply an attempt to justify why He'd
> consider free will more valuable?

Take a look at "Shield of the Spirit",   English rendition of Alshich on
Daniel from Feldheim,
Chapter 6  vs 19
Darius reasoned that Hashem would save Daniel from the lions -  awe of
Daniel would fall upon them. However he feared that the nobles would harm
him as G-d would not neutralize free will-  therefore he sealed the pit to
prevent the nobles getting at Daniel.

So the big question is,  WHY is it so important to preserve free will in the
scheme of history even though it costs many lives?
Can we even hope to answer this question?
Has anyone studied Da'as Tvunos of the Ramchal?  I would expect discussion
of this there.

[I thought this was thought-provoking. -mi]

Insight
Rabbi Benjamin Hecht
Nishma

Equal and Singular

The creation of Adam and Chava as the sole ancestors of all humanity
presents two important lessons for Mankind. One, as expressed in Malachi
2:10, is the inherent equality of all human beings.[1] As we are all
descended from one set of forefathers, we are all brothers; we are all
inherently equal. The second lesson, as expressed in T.B. Sanhedrin
37a,[2] is the inherent individuality of all human beings. Just as Adam
was created as a singular being, each and every human being has singular
value as a unique individual.[3] Through the process of Creation, we
are both inherently equal and inherently singular. The difficulty is
that these two concepts do not necessarily easily co-exist.

Equality implies similarity. It is easiest to promote the equality of
items if they are all the same. Singularity and individuality imply
exactly the opposite: distinction. The more one can demonstrate
a difference from the other, the more one is able to declare
a uniqueness. As we project distinction, we necessarily must also
recognize the reality of the inequality that is joined to it. While we
may wish to promote a theory of "different but equal" -- and, at times,
such a theory can be maintained -- when differences are enunciated, they
usually are accompanied with evaluation. Such evaluations typically lead
to disparate results. It would seem that if we are equal, we cannot be
fully distinct, and if we are distinct, we cannot be fully equal. How
we balance these two values is a most important consideration.

Lest one think that this issue is solely theoretical, this problem
of equality and singularity is the focus of the major political and
philosophical debates of our time. Essentially communism was an extreme
argument for the equality of all human beings. It wished all to equally
share in the responsibilities and fruits of the collective. It is
not surprising that such stress on equality necessarily demanded the
destruction of individuality. In the extreme, even clothes had to be
the same.[4] The message is that people are similar and to be treated
similarly. Yet, individuality suffers.

The ethical argument of the capitalist model is that it allows for
and encourages individual expression. While reward may not be totally
determined on merit, the argument is that this model favours merit
and promotes distinction within humanity -- for thereby one finds
greater reward. The result is also, thus, a difference in the benefit
each individual accrues and with this difference comes inequality. The
message is that people are distinct and to be treated distinctly. Yet
equality suffers.[5]

The debates within our political systems essentially focus on how to
balance these two concerns. One society may choose to stress equality
in one situation; another society may choose to stress individuality in
the same situation. One society may choose to see its citizens more as
singular beings joining to form a community; another society may choose
to see its citizens more as equal members of a community with individual
lives. The differences between political parties reflect movement along
this continuum. As the mishna in Sanhedrin states, G-d's greatness is
demonstrated in that He fashions all human beings with the stamp of
Adam but not one is like the other. We are all different yet we are
all human and thus similar. While this declares the greatness of G-d,
to us it also represents a dilemma in reconciling these two values.

Pragmatically, societies must set priorities. When is distinction to
triumph and when is equality to triumph? When are we to render decisions
based upon the simple equality of all human beings and when are we to
consider the unique attributes of a human being? In life-threatening
situations, are we to save men of ability or distinction -- the scientist
or the king -- first? or should we apply a lottery giving all an equal
chance?[6] Should we save loved ones first or must we maintain a standard
of objectivity? The answers are complex. The differences between societies
are very much determined by the answers to these question.

Similarly, within the Jewish world, differences in approaches to
Torah can be traced to different answers to these questions. There are
systems within Torah that stress equality and harmony. Uniformity in
the practice of Torah is the utmost consideration. There are systems
within Torah that stress distinction and individuality. Uniqueness,
as the expression of individual thought, is the highest value. Both
views have merit; the problem is that we practically have to render
decisions in action. Yet, when uniformity is asserted, the value of
the singular always questions the result. And when individuality is
asserted, the value of equality always questions the result. As Rabbi
Joseph B. Soloveitchik contends: within Torah there is often thesis and
antithesis but we do not necessarily find the synthesis.

Footnotes

1) For a further discussion of this concept as the basis of Jewish
morality, see Rabbi Shubert Spero, Morality, Halakha and the Jewish
Tradition, Chapter 5.

2) This mishna also provides an argument in support of the first lesson.

3) For a further discussion on the uniqueness of each individual, see
Rabbi Benjamin Hecht, Tree of Knowledge, Part 3, Nishma Journal IX.

4) Similarly, in the early Kibbutz movement, children were brought up as
part of the collective. Even the uniqueness bestowed by the parent-child
relationship was challenged.

5) Social welfare legislation softens the harshness of pure capitalism
and makes our modern capitalist societies just and equitable, within an
understanding of the broad Torah ethic, for equality is recognized. Modern
communism, however, continues to be seen as an evil implementation of
a societal norm for it appears to ignore any value in the singular.

6) For an example of a halachic discussion of this issue, with reference
to the main primary sources on this topic, see Dr. F. Rosner, Rationing
of Medical Care: The Jewish View, The Journal of Halacha and Contemporary
Society, Volume VI.

Minhag Chabad is to not say Hoshanos on Shabbos, and never to change
the order (on Sunday we say both for Shabbos and Sunday).

Chaim G. Steinmetz
cgsteinmetz@juno.com

From: "Carl and Adina Sherer" <sherer@actcom.co.il>
>> FWIW, Rav Elyashiv comes to the Kotel every day of Chol HaMoed to bentch
>> arba minim exactly at hanetz ...

On 12 Oct 01, at 9:05, Gershon Dubin wrote:
> I wonder if there is any element of lulav nitel shiva bemikdash
> included in this practice.

Yes, that's why Rav Elyashiv (and thousands of other people, including
me) go to the Kotel during Chol haMoed - to be choshesh for the Rambam
and the possibility of there being a d'oraysa even today. I thought it
was understood when I mentioned Rav Scheinberg's tnai of matana al mnas
l'hachzir even during Chol HaMoed (sorry I wasn't clearer).

This is the second year that I have NOT gone on Hoshana Rabba - because
I could not find a decent minyan in which it was possible to both do
hakofos like a reasonable human being and daven at a reasonable pace. But
other than that, I think I have been at the Kotel every weekday of Chol
HaMoed except for the year that I was in the hospital with my son during
Chol HaMoed.

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

From: "SBA" sba@blaze.net.au>
> (And aren't Yotzros called so - because they are said after and during
> the Yotzer Or tefilos??)

AFAIK the story is as follows -

Piyut in the brocho of yotzeir ohr is termed Yotzeir (technically
speaking, things that are often called 'yotzeir' bifi the hamon am,
e.g. 'yotzros for the arba parshios', said during chazoras hashat"z
or later, are not really yotzros as they are not said in the brocho of
yotzeir ohr).

A piyut a bit further on in shacharis - in the section of ' vihaofanim
vichayos hakodesh biraash godol....' is termed an 'ofan'.

Piyut just before 'Ezras Avoseinu atoh hu meiolam.....', just after
'ein Elokim zulosecha' is termed 'zulas.

There are some other related terms too - e.g. Krovetz (of which the oft
quoted [bifi the hamon am] etymology of it being an acronym for 'kol
rinah viyshuah bioholei tzaddikim' is said to be an example of incorrect
'folk etymology', by the way).

Mordechai

The pisikat rabah quotes a medrash on tehilim 137 (al naharot bavel) that the 
leviim bit their fingers off rather than  playing their kinorot for shirei 
tzion. Assumedly in general it's assur to mutilate oneself, what is the issur 
in singing shirei tzion that overcame this issur of selfmutilation?


KT
Joel

Shavuah Tov,

Please could somebody advise me if the practice of refraining from cutting
nails on Thursday includes Thursday Eve (leil Shishi - Erev Shabbos)
or perhaps Wednesday night.

KT
Reuvein Lichtman
mail to: reuveinl@hotmail.com

--- Rabbi Benjamin Hecht <nishma@interlog.com> wrote:
> The creation of Adam and Chava as the sole ancestors of all humanity
> presents two important lessons for Mankind. ...
>                                  Through the process of Creation, we
> are both inherently equal and inherently singular. The difficulty is
> that these two concepts do not necessarily easily co-exist.

> Equality implies similarity. It is easiest to promote the equality of
> items if they are all the same. Singularity and individuality imply
> exactly the opposite: distinction....

The essay seems to present a dichotomy between the concepts of
individuality and equality. IMHO, Nothing could be further from the
truth. Equality, as it is reffered to in the Declaration of Independance
is not meant to imply equality on all levels. The founding fathers were
not stupid. They knew that a doctor is different from a lawyer... is
different from a clergyman or a blacksmith. Equality is not based
on achievement. Nor is it even based on the relative ability to
achieve. Equality means equality in the eyes of G-d. All men are CREATED
equal and are to be judged that way starting out with a clean slate in
life, w/o prejudice. No one has ever claimed that the founding fathers
did not recognize the variable of individualized ability. It is moral
equality they were positing as the axiom in G-d's creation of Man.

In Judaism, equality means that Man is given a Tabula Rasa at birth
and commanded to follow G-d's Law. As one traverses life, one will be
judged by G-d as to how well one fulfills his obligations to G-d within
the limits of his own abilities, i.e. his own individuality. Was Rish
Lakish less equal than R. Yochanan HaSandler? Was Chuni HaMagal less
equal than R. Akiva or R. Meir?

Equality does not mean sameness. Even the most radical femminist would
not say that men and women are exactly the same, even while trying to
explain away innate differing gender traits that most definitely exist...
as culturally induced.

So it seems to me that Rabbi Hecht's essay is a non-starter as he seeems
to define equality as sameness. His use of the example of Communism,
however, is a good example of the concept of equlity gone awry when
it is misdefined as sameness and therefore denying each individual's
unique capacities.

This is partly the reason Communism failed. But to say that there is
no synthesis between "equal" and "singular" as he seems to conclude,
I think is to misread the way in which both the Torah and the founding
fathers intended the word equality to be understood. One can be singular
and unique and be treated as equal in the eyes of both the law and the
eyes of G-d.

HM

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