Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 090

Wednesday, August 22 2001

• Barchu vs. Barachu
• Re: Apology and Query
• SR and yishuv EY
• Re: Mitzvat yishuv Eretz Yisrael and sinne
• Re: Minhag was Re: The SR's views on yishuv EY
• Re: shiva denechemta
• Re: shiva denechemta
• Re: shiva denechemta
• Re: shiva denechemta
• source request
• Re: Shabbos m'vorkhim
• Re: Shabbos m'vorkhim
• Answer to question re: Rabbi Yochanan
• Re: Kant, Kuzari & Wittgenstein
• Barachu/Barchu
• Re: Shabbos m'vorkhim
• Re: rishonim
• Re: Barachu/Barchu
• moshav y'karo
• RE: knowledge and proof
• re: knowledge and proof
• Re: knowledge and proof

In a message dated 8/20/2001 1:08:52pm EDT, sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu writes:
> Something that came up in a discussion over Shabbos fazed me: In the 
> Roedelheim Siddur, the grammar for Barchu is Ba-rachu (chataf pasach 
> instead of shva). I have heard Barchu done as a shva-nacha, and, based on 
> the nusach, as a shva-na, but never as a chataf pasach.

The shva na under a Reish is the subject of a machlokes - the details
of which I am not sure

Aleph, Heh, Ches, and Ayin get a chataf patach.
Reish is disputed

It is clear that Heidenheim v'sayosso (IOW Yekkes) hold chataf patach.

Related to this is the double osiyos. Heidenheim has chataf patach under
the 1st Lamed in Halalukah and the 1st Veis in Rivavos. Most others have
shva na.

I don't know the theory behind this machlokes - I'm sure R. Seth Mandel
can elaborate further.

Shana Tovah
Rich Wolpoe
Moderator - TorahInsight@yahoogroups.com
"Knowledge without Insight is like a horse in a library" - Vernon Howard    

In Avodah V7 #89, RYGBechhofer wrote:
> Something that came up in a discussion over Shabbos fazed me: In the
Roedelheim Siddur, the grammar for Barchu is Ba-rachu (chataf pasach
instead of shva). I have heard Barchu done as a shva-nacha, and, based
on the nusach, as a shva-na, but never as a chataf pasach. What am
I missing?<

Nothing, except perhaps more Roedelheim texts in your library (where you
can find many examples of this phenomenon, e.g. "por'ku" in my BM parsha,
Sh'mos 32:2). I'm sure RSMandel, REMTeitz, and/or others can fill in the
details -- I just wanted to chip in with a "worry not," as REMT made it
clear to me that the chataf under a raish should not be read differently
than a sh'va na.

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

>      I assume he meant that within the realm of "eilu ve'eilu", halachah
>is determined by consensus of the kelal. A minhag ta'us doesn't become
>non-ta'us just because it became popular.

>Solomon Schechter proposes a notion of "Catholic Israel" to parallel
>RMF's notion of "the klal of shomrei torah umitzvos. He does not spell out
>the klal (pun intended) I am suggesting. I think that without it, aside
>from having no anchor in emes (.... ta'abaso emes -- since G-d wrote it,
>there is an absolute component), one is left with a circular definition.
>One can't just say that halachah is defined by what most observers of
>halachah do....

Let us please remember we were discussing the viewpoint of SR versus
that of Agudas Yisrael and certainly RAK or even more R. Zvi Yehudah
Kook. We were not discussing minhag taus or reform Jewry.

I again insist, independent of the present discussion, that bottom
line most halacha is based on practice and what is accepted. Bringing
in nonobservant Jewry or obvious mistakes is irrelevant to the topic.
When there is a disagreement among poskim in most cases the general
community, over a period of time, decides in favor of one of them.
Occasionally the disagreement remains in which case it becomes a custom.

I dont have examples of hand but I have no doubt that over the past
few hundered years there have been many piskei halacha given by poskim
that have fallen by the wayside because they were minority viewpoints
that never were accepted. The gadlus of the posek is irrelevant to this
path. Thus, most of us would admit that the Gra was greater than CI.
Nevertheless it many ways the impact of CI on actual practice is
greater than the Gra. In fact much of the practice of the Gra only
exists because some talmidim went to EY which at that time had a very
small Jewish population.

Similarly, R. Yitzchak Elchanan (Spektor) was considered the major
posek of his generation. However, today his piskei halacha do not seem
to carry the same weight.

Eli Turkel

On Fri, Aug 17, 2001 at 11:28:35AM +1000, SBA wrote:
:> .....Nowhere do we find that one should not perform one Torah mitzvah
:> because he violates others, and tuma hutra betzibur has nothing to do
:> with it.

: No, of course we don't say that "Just because you eat treif, you may
: also be mechalel Shabbos".

But we do say "mitzvah haba'ah ba'aveirah". And ought one make a berachah
if one succombs to a ta'avah for lobster?

Couldn't one argue that aliyah by on avaryan is similar?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                    Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org                   The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                    - R' Binyamin Hecht

On Fri, Aug 17, 2001 at 02:25:08PM -0400, RabbiRichWolpoe@aol.com wrote:
: The pre-supposition that a Minhag has validity is paritally based upon the 
: fact that many rabbonim and Talmidei Chachamim...

And not the power of the klal itself?

...
: And then it is IMHO essential and critical to note whether the matter is in 
: flux or settled.

Which would alone be sufficient to explain why older, longer settled
minhagim, should be less questionable.

: AIUI Micha's essential point is valid, that is minhag and text form a tension 
: - a dialectic - with each other.

That wasn't my essential point. I was arguing that the twho don't
conflict because they serve different roles: the texts provide the means
of determining "divrei E-lokim chaim", but consensus it the determinant
that "vehalachah ki..."


On Mon, Aug 20, 2001 at 04:23:55PM -0400, Eli Turkel wrote:
: Let us please remember we were discussing the viewpoint of SR versus
: that of Agudas Yisrael and certainly RAK or even more R. Zvi Yehudah
: Kook. We were not discussing minhag taus or reform Jewry.

Agreed. So, to get back to that subject, given that both shitos /are/
Torah, that neither are ta'us, which becomes "halachah" does depend on
klal Yisrael.

But this question isn't lema'aseh because it's about whether Jews who
wouldn't ask a sha'alah ought to be making aliyah. The only people
involved by definition don't care whether RAYK or the SR is right.

: I again insist, independent of the present discussion, that bottom
: line most halacha is based on practice and what is accepted. Bringing
: in nonobservant Jewry or obvious mistakes is irrelevant to the topic.

I only brought in Schechter's theory as a point of contrast, to show
the need for there to be a guideline by which to define "mistake",
obvious or otherwise. Please do not confuse my use of ad absurdum
to mean that I think that all mistakes are obvious. One example that
I brought, kapparos, involves a machlokes about whether or not it is
a mistake.

To give another example I've used here in the past, the Gra considers
saying "moshav yeqaro" in Aleinu to be a mistake. (He holds that it is
only mutar to use anthropomorphications that appear in Tanach.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                    Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org                   The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                    - R' Binyamin Hecht

In Avodah V7 #89, CSherer replied:
> FWIW, we read only Aneya So'ara today. The luach brings a minhag of
adding the first and last psukim of Machar Chodesh, but we did not follow
that minhag. <

In his s'udah-sh'lishis-fulfilling divrai Torah after Minchah this
past Shabbos, Rabbi EMTeitz noted the minhag (followed in the JEC and
elsewhere) of adding the first & last p'sukim from (depending on the
situation) the haftorah for Rosh Chodesh or Erev Rosh Chodesh. He also
noted that communities which use a k'laf cannot flip between sifrai
NaCh (nor, if I understood him correctly, backwards within one saifer,
e.g. T'rai Osor), hence they cannot add those first and last p'sukim.
As for the question of what to read for the haftorah of P'R'ai, he
noted that we would have read "Hashomayim Kis'ee" if RC Elul had been
on Shabbos, as it contains words of n'chomo, but "Mochor Chodesh" never
overrides "Aneeya So'ara" when, like this past Shabbos, RC Elul is the
day after Shabbos (and mochoroso :-)), as it not only doesn't contain
words of n'chomo but also is a newbie in the realm of haftorah readings.

[[Any mistakes in the above are most likely mine, not REMT's.]]

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

On Mon, 20 Aug 2001 17:41:20 -0400 MPoppers@kayescholer.com writes:
> Rabbi EMTeitz noted the minhag (followed in the JEC and elsewhere) of
> adding the first & last p'sukim from (depending on the situation) the haftorah
> for Rosh Chodesh or Erev Rosh Chodesh.  He also noted that communities
> which use a k'laf cannot flip between sifrai NaCh (nor, if I understood him
> correctly, backwards within one saifer, e.g. T'rai Osor), hence they cannot
> add those first and last p'sukim. ...

Does anyone have any sources whether the issur of ein medalgin minavi
lenavi refers exclusively to a klaf?

The idea of not going backwards is preserved in the haftorah of Shabbos
Shuva,  so would it not make sense to preserve the entire halacha?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

> ...not going backwards is preserved... <

Also preserved, IIRC [forgive any errors, please!], in the haftorah
readings for Chag haSh'vuos; for the first day of Paisach and, if nec.,
its Shabbos Chol Hamoaid; not preserved in haftorah readings for Shabbos
"Shuva" and Minchah shel Yom HaKippurim.

All the best from
--Michael via pager

On Tue, 21 Aug 2001 08:40:21 -0400 MPoppers@kayescholer.com writes:
>> ...not going backwards is preserved... < 

> Also preserved, IIRC [forgive any errors, please!], in the haftorah
> readings for Chag haSh'vuos; for the first day of Paisach and, if nec., its
> Shabbos Chol Hamoaid; not preserved in haftorah readings for Shabbos
> "Shuva" and Minchah shel Yom HaKippurim.

Please 'splain.  If you refer to skipping,  that's okay within a sefer.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

Forwarded :
<<I remember seeing somewheres that R Yochannan did not wear Tfilin shel
Rosh because it made his nose run The quote was from a yrusalmi first
perek of Brochos>>

        source, anyone?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

In Avodah V7 #89, SMandel wrote:
> It is also true that Nusah Ashk'naz/S'farad is not grammatically
incorrect; in it the habelt just refers to the second of the two days rosh
hodesh. <

Silly me, I always thought "habo" referred to Rosh Chodesh
and that there was only one Rosh.

May k'lal Yisroel be l'rosh v'lo l'zanav...all the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

R. M. Poppers: <Silly me, I always thought "habo" referred to Rosh
Chodesh and that there was only one Rosh.>

That, of course, is the best solution as far as meaning goes, but, as I
said, is syntactically very difficult. Try the English equivalent: "The
new month of Elul will be on Sunday and Monday, which is approaching us
for good." Either way is difficult, but I was saying that to emend it to
"which are..." is not the solution. Would you emend it to "rosh hodesh
Elul habo 'oleinu l'sholom yihye b'yom rishon uvyom sheni"?

Seth

From my brother:

It's at the start of Halacha Gimel in the second perek in Brochos. It
doesn't say anything about making his nose run. It says that it hurt his
head and there are two girsa-os in the commentaries, whether his head
hurt
in the winter because he caught colds or whether it hurt in the summer
because it was hot. Whichever one it was, in the other season he did wear
both Tfilin.

On Sun, Aug 19, 2001 at 03:57:02AM -0400, Shalom Carmy wrote:
: One may accept the principle of causality (whatever that means) without
: any direct experience of causality because without it science is
: impossible.

Actually, science is willing to throw causality out. All the equations
work whether time is a positive or negative number. The "arrow of time"
is usually attributed to entropy. IMHO, since entropy is a statement
of the law of large numbers, this merely begs the question. I have my
own theory on the subject, but I'm not sure it's on topic. (I'll take
requests, though.)

: 2. This kind of transcendental deduction can be utilized in a Jewish
: context if one is convinced of Torah miSinai and then infers that there
: cannot be a Torah without a G-d who commands it. Such a situation is
: logically possible, but I'm not sure how much use these ideas have for
: anyone who is at sea respecting G-d.

I think they suggest that if one's experience with halachah leads one to
accept Mesorah as a reliable source, that experience could then lead to
belief in TmS and therefore G-d.

:> Emunah peshutah is an example. However, "complicated" emunah can be
:> founded on such ideas as well. Only the person who rests his emunah
:> on proving the Borei's existance entirely because of the nature of the
:> beri'ah -- such as an argument by design, or by the miraculous permanence
:> of the Jewish people -- who seems to say that only empirical propositions
:> can be posited a priori.

: Empirical propositions are NOT a priori. They are derived from sense
: experience (that's the meaning of the word "empirical") not prior to
: experience.

You are correct, of course. I abuse the words "a priori" repeatedly
in my post in that I meant them in a non-Kantian sense after defining
the words as per my recollection of Kant. My apologies. (At least it's
not only shiurim that I similarly garble.) I just meant "as opposed to
considering them a conclusion from some line of reasoning".

:> Ma'amad har Sinai allows the dor hamidbor a synthetic empirical
:> proposition that G-d exists. They experienced Him directly.

: For Kant, this is dubious. If G-d is not an object of sensual
: manifestations there is no direct experience of Him.

You're right, in Kantian terms it would be the revelation itself that
was the phenomenon experienced. Not the One doing the revealing. No?
However, one is a pretty direct conclusion from the other.

: >                                                    To the Kuzari,
: > this gives us the right to also accept Hashem's existance a priori.

: No. If the dor ha-midbar has sense experience of G-d, that does not mean
: that people not at Sinai have a priori knowledge...

I meant "empirically" (which isn't the product of a philosophical
argument), with that tiny detour noted in the previous paragraph from
myself.

:> The Rihal made it clear he was NOT attempting a philosophical argument.
:> Yet modern popularizations of the idea turn the notion of mesorah about
:> a public revelation into the subject of analysis (which I mean in
:> the sense given above). Proving that such traditions can't be forged.
:> The Rihal himself would not have us turn this into a proof. We believe
:> our mesorah and not someone else's legends for the same reason that
:> one believes their own perceptions over someone else's. If a ball
:> is clearly visible to me, and it looks red, I'm not likely to
:> accept someone else's claim that it's blue. I don't need to prove why.

: Why does Rihal then assume that Christians and Moslems accept testimony of
: mattan Torah? Why bring the number of people who stood at Sinai into the
: picture? Why does he state explicitly that the relative privacy
: characterizing Christian and Moslem claims to revelation weaken those
: claims insofar as they conflict with Torah?

The Chaveir opens with a key point that philosophy is a necessary second
best for people (like the Greeks) who lack a mesorah. The Chaveir doesn't
bring in the rest of it until after the king asks if this means that
people like him, who come from outside the mesorah, have no place in
Yahadus. So for the king's benefit, he has to establish the uniqueness
of our mesorah. For the rest of us, where mesorah ought to be subjective,
this should not be the foundation of our belief.

The position of the not-yet-frum today is similar to the king's, in that
they too are unaware of having a mesorah. However, we shouldn't be buying
into the "all traditions are equal" mindset, thereby requiring some
kind of proof that ours isn't. Ours is unique simply because it's ours.
As I was trying to say about the red ball.

And is much akin to your later paragraph:
: The miasma of secularism affects many Jews with a Jewish education too.
: But I don't believe that "proving" things is of much help. It is as if one
: were to attempt a proof that Beethoven's string quartets are musically
: better than the noise made by the garbage truck. The important thing, for
: a musically impoverished person, is to facilitate a sensitivity to music.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
Fax: (413) 403-9905             - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

RYGB wrote:

> Something that came up in a discussion over Shabbos fazed me: In the 
> Roedelheim Siddur, the grammar for Barchu is Ba-rachu (chataf pasach 
> instead of shva). I have heard Barchu done as a shva-nacha, and, based
> on the nusach, as a shva-na, but never as a chataf pasach.

Not particularly prescriptive, but at least descriptive reply.

From the Baer siddur: Barachu: the resh with chataf-patach, so it must be
according to the tradition, for every language of bracha if it has the
trup on the bet, the resh has a shva,  and if the trup is on the caf,
the resh has a chataf-patach except for one case  borcheit in Dan. 4:31;
and if one is surprised about the RVV"H above in Psukei Dezimra, it is
pointed as "barachu et H'" according to the law, and so we find is the
rule.  And the bracha is based on Brachot 49b and the Sifri in Haazinu
on the verse Ki shem H'.

It may be worth pointing out that hataf-patach can be pronounced as either
a patach or a shva.  Apparently, they are grammatically equivalent.

I don't know what the RVV"H abbreviation means.

  Jonathan Baker     |  Mishenichnas Elul marbim becheshbon hanefesh.
  jjbaker@panix.com  |  Don't know if it's classic like Av, Adar, but is true.
                Web page <http://www.panix.com/~jjbaker>

On Sun, 19 Aug 2001 22:51:05 +0000, Seth Mandel wrote in Avodah, Volume 07, 
Number 089:
>I once heard a Ba'al Tefilla say in "Rosh Hodesh Bentchen" - "ha-ba'IM 
>alenu le-tova"....

> This is not a "nusah," but something he invented himself, and therefore 
> it may be a bit below the belt to change a nusah because you think it 
> should be something else.

You flatter him! The Hertz siddur, for example, gives haba'im as an 
alternative reading for haba.

>It is true that it is hard to see what habbo 'oleinu l'tova in nusach 
>Ashk'naz could be referring to, except to the days of the week, since to 
>have it refer back to Rosh Hodesh would be syntactically almost impossible.
>It is also true that Nusah Ashk'naz/S'farad is not grammatically 
>incorrect; in it the habelt just refers to the second of the two days rosh 
>hodesh.

No. It refers to the month, haba `aleynu . . . letova, and not to the 
*days* of Rosh Hodesh nor to Rosh Hodesh itself.

I'm sorry no one has brought up the nusah (from the Aderet) of "shetehadesh 
aleynu et hahodesh haba".  That may even make more sense, depending on how 
we understand the concept of renewing a month.

And the discussion of bizekhut (or Berakhot) tefillat rabbim/Rav would have 
been interesting here also. (Except that everyone is probably familiar with 
this already.)

-----------------------------------------------------
                         Ira L. Jacobson
                         mailto:laser@ieee.org

As a further to our on-again, off-again discussion about the halachic
significance of manuscript works, I came across a discussion of this
regarding contraception. The Tosefos Rid (Yevamos 12b), which was
first published in 1931, is surprisingly lenient regarding certain
forms of contraception. R. Moshe Feinstein (Iggeros Moshe EH 1:63) used
this Tosefos Rid in a teshuvah dated 1935. R. Yitzchak HaLevy Herzog
(Heichal Yitzchak EH 2:16) also used this in a teshuvah dated 1940 and
explicitly says, "Veyadua dechol heicha sheha'acharonim lo rau divrei
harishonim... vezehu rav kadmon vehu yesod chazak lekula."

Gil Student

At 02:19 PM 8/21/01 -0400, jjbaker@panix.com wrote:
From the Baer siddur: ...
>and if one is surprised about the RVV"H above in Psukei Dezimra, it is
>pointed as "barachu et H'" according to the law, and so we find is the
>rule.  And the bracha is based on Brachot 49b and the Sifri in Haazinu
>on the verse Ki shem H'.
...
>I don't know what the RVV"H abbreviation means.

RVV"H = R' Wolf Heidenheim.

Micha Berger wrote:
>To give another example I've used here in the past, the Gra considers
>saying "moshav yeqaro" in Aleinu to be a mistake. (He holds that it is
>only mutar to use anthropomorphications that appear in Tanach.)

I had thought that was an anti-missionary emendation (ykro is gematria
for yshu).

David Riceman

[Moderator's note: I originally bounced this discussion to Areivim, since
I instinctively reacted to the softer tone of the emails. On reflection,
though, if a discussion of where emunah comes from doesn't qualify as
"avodah", we've grossly transvalued the term. I am therefore copying the
following emails back here. -mi]

>> Proofs are
>> this help. They are not for those who already understand that Hashem exists,
>> they are for those that still need to be shown.

> How many people do you know have come close to HKBH via proof?
> How many because they felt an emptiness or a longing or a yearning?

I have the feeling that if you polled all ba'alei teshuva, you'd find that
there had to be a combination of both. The BT's I knew had to feel an
emptiness and also get proof that Yiddishkeit was the way to solve it.

---Rena

WARNING: Different people are of different minds. One size does NOT fit
all. In this post, I am trying to describe how *I* relate to things. If
you misunderstand me, thinking that I am telling you how I think *you*
should relate to things, then you will be very offended by what I have
to say. So please understand that I am *not* telling anyone else how to
think. I am only describing how *I* think.

Rabbi Rich Wolpoe asked, <<< How many people do you know have come close
to HKBH via proof? How many because they felt an emptiness or a longing
or a yearning? >>>

I can't speak for others, only for myself.

In my high school years, I was never aware of any "longing or yearning"
for a connection with a Higher Power. I *was* aware of many contradictions
between the Judaism as practiced by my family and the Judaism that I
was taught at the Shabbatons and TLS Seminars run by YU's Youth Bureau.

For various reasons, I felt a need to resolve those contradictions,
and deliberately chose to gradually increase my level of observance. (At
the time I thought my logic to have been very original, but I have since
learned that it is a famous concept known as Pascal's Wager.)

As time went on, I suppose that my emunah increased simply as a by-product
of doing the mitzvos, and from my contact with other observant Jews. But
I do not recall ever noticing any increase in my emunah, until one day
in my fourth year of learning.

We were somewhere Kiddushin (possibly near the beginning of third perek)
where the gemara introduced three psukim, each of which seemed to
contradict the other two. It was quite a puzzle, but after a couple of
blatt of analysis, the gemara finally showed how if each pasuk was read
carefully and properly, all three were actually very consistent with
each other, and how in fact all three were necessary for the lessons
which those psukim were to teach.

Of course, I had to review the gemara a few times, to make suke I
understood the contradictions of the hava amina, and the consistency
of the maskana, but I finally got it, and I can very clearly recally
remarking to myself at that time, "Now I *REALLY* believe that G-d
wrote the Torah! No human could come up with this!" (I consider this to
be the sort of "proof" that Rabbi Wolpoe is asking about, because this
piece of logic caused my emunah to become significantly stronger.) And
this epiphany was further enhanced a few years later (I can't remember
exactly when, as it was a slightly smaller leap) when I first heard of
the Kuzari's historical proof.

I realize that I am probably in a very small minority of people who take
such a rigorous analytical view of things. My feeling is that it is good
to have these proofs, to benefit those who will be benefitted by them.
People who have a less analytical nature would probably not be affected
by them very much. I believe we need a mixture of approaches, for the
different people who will be hooked by them, each to his own.

R' Micha Berger wrote <<< Yiddishkeit isn't an analytic proposition,
it relies on postulates. Postulates are either taken "on faith", or in
the case of emunah, accepted by the weight of experience. Which brings
us back to the original topic of this thread. >>>

And Rena Freedenberg wrote <<< the proofs are a "hook" to grab someone's
attention and make him think a bit. Then, once he/she has opened a hole
the size of a needle, Hashem [by way of a Shabbos experience, etc.] can
make an opening big enough for a whole herd of camels. >>>

To *my* analytical mind, the only "experience" relevant to emunah is that
of nevuah. Every other experience is suspect of being delusional. But
that's just *my* way of looking at it.

I've never understood how experiences such as Shabbos or davening can
convince a person of how real HaShem is. But that's only because my mind
works differently than other people's minds. Communal situations can
certainly help someone feel more *comfortable* doing mitzvos, and they
can create a contact high to make them more meaningful. And many mitzvos
have certain very real side-effects (such as the relaxation of Shabbos or
the self-control of kashrus) which help "hook" a potential baal t'shuva.

These things can help convince a person that Judiasm is the right way
to go, but I've just never figured out how they can convince a person
how HaShem is real. But again, that's because my mind is different than
others. To Ms. Freedenberg, proofs are the hook and experience is the
clincher. In my case it was the other way around. No big deal. I believe
that all approaches are valid, the main difference is figuring out which
will work best for any given individual.

I also believe that -- in order to preserve Bechira Chofshis -- HaShem
has designed the world in a manner such that our yetzer hara does have
access to methods of causing us to doubt HaShem's existence. And none of
the approaches is exempt from this. Those who get close to Hashem through
experiences may be tested by having difficult experiences, and those who
get close through logical analyses may come across holes in that logic.
(I have not yet met a logical "proof" that *didn't* have holes in it.)
None of the approaches is stronger or more wear-resistant than another.
It depends more on the person than on the method.

Chanoch l'naar al pi darko. We need ALL the approaches - who is to say
which one will work with the next person you meet?

Akiva Miller

On Mon, Aug 20, 2001 at 09:30:17PM -0400, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
: I've never understood how experiences such as Shabbos or davening can
: convince a person of how real HaShem is...

Let me try, so that at least objectively you can understand. And perhaps,
so that you can get a chizuk emunah from Shabbos and davening.

To someone who follows the derech that fits them, halachah fits their soul
in ways that couldn't be matched by a system written by someone other
than the Creator of that soul. There is an aesthetic there that says
"there is something real here". People can directly experience that aesthetic.
As you put it:
: These things can help convince a person that Judiasm is the right way to
: go, but I've just never figured out how they can convince a person how
: HaShem is real....

The second step would come from learning to believe the source. After
all, if the mesorah is right about something as counter-intuitive as the
importance of not tearing toilet paper on the dotted lines on Shabbos,
maybe the system accurately describes other things as well. Such as its
own origins.

A proof? No. But an argument in favor, certainly.

A second aesthetic that is out there to be experienced is the beauty
of learning. Of finding an idea in one inyan that explains something
totally unrelated. With sheker, unexpected overlaps tend to conflict.
To repeatedly find that the puzzle pieces fit in amazing and unexpected
ways is another aesthetic experience that argues for a statement's truth.

In the past, on Avodah, I suggested we call this notion "cognitive
consonnance", as an antonyn to "cognitive dissonance". The confidence we
gain in an idea because it repeatedly fails to jar us with contradictions.

As strong an argument that which lead most of us to conclude that all
birds fly. After all, when you as a toddler see one that can fly, and
then another one, and then another... We reach the conclusion because
of repeated examples that fail to disprove it. And then, as we see this
theory verified again and again, we have strong confidence in it.

Until you see your first penguin (or ostrich, or...) The question then
boils down to what does one do then? In our case, what do you do with a
mitzvah like mechiyas Amaleik (even down to newborns) or whatever else
it is that doesn't intuitively shtim. Or in learning, when one finds
a setirah one can't resolve, a question that is far better than the
answers you can come up with.

If they are greatly outnumbered, you shelve it, assuming there's an
answer that you just don't know yet.

Physicists do the same. When a well tested theory fails a single
experiment they assume that the theory is basically right, and some other
factor comes into play, or that there was some minor misunderstanding
of one of its implications. Such as realizing that not *all* birds fly,
"just" those where <fill in whatever>... The generalization itself still
stands, though.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Life is complex.
micha@aishdas.org                    Decisions are complex.
http://www.aishdas.org                   The Torah is complex.
Fax: (413) 403-9905                                    - R' Binyamin Hecht

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