Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 070

Thursday, July 5 2001

• umasbia lechal chai ratzon
• Nir-eh Li
• Re: Nir-eh Li
• Asmachta and Get
• [none]
• Rambam on Aristotle
• HY"D
• Re: Tzitzis on Shabbos - d'Rabanan?
• Correct Spelling and Pronunciation of Tzitzis/Tzeetzis
• Re: Rambam on Aristotle
• Re: Rambam on Aristotle
• Re: Schar VeOnesh
• Re: Rambam on Aristotle
• Lashon Hara and the OU
• A proposal for preventing future agunos?

Apropos of the discussion of this pasuk recently I'd like to share what
Rav Schwab says on it (Rav Schwab on Prayer: very highly recommended):

He starts by bringing the Gemara about saying Tehila leDavid three times
a day, due to the combination of aleph beis and the paskuk pose'ach
es yadecha.

He asks what aleph beis has to do with parnasa? Then he asks on another
Gemara which says that the geula of Yaakov Avinu was al yedei malach
(hamal'ach hago'el osi) whereas parnasa was al yedei HKB"H himself:
haElokim haro'eh osi-what is there about parnasa that cannot be done by
a malach?

To answer, he quotes something a grandson of RSR Hirsch said at his
(Rav Schwab's) sheva berachos (how many of us were even listening at
the time-let alone saying it over 60 years later!).

A person's parnasa is largely dependent on how people like him.
Whether it's a schnorrer at the door, or a salesman making a pitch,
or a professor applying for a position, the success depends on how the
person on the other end likes the applicant/supplicant. This liking or
otherwise is from HKB"H. If a person succeeds in selling his goods or
services, it is due to HKB"H putting him leratzon in the eyes of his
customer/employer. This is Elokim haro'eh osi. No human can understand,
and no malach can provide, the ratzon be'einei Elokim ve'adam which is
required for a person's parnasa.

On the other hand, the seder aleph beis refers to the hishtadlus bederech
hateva which everyone is required to do and which IS subject to human
logic.

(The same applies to Torah. Although the chachmas haTorah is lisvunaso ein
mispar, we can and are required to apply our human sechel to it. This too
is symbolized by aleph beis, and is why the Tehilim 119, "temanya apei"
which refers throughout to limud haTorah, is in the seder aleph beis)

The question "nasasa venasata be'emuna" can also be understood as
referring to these two aspects: firstly emuna that regardless of your
hishtadlus, you had emuna that your parnasa was in the hands of HKB"H as
to whether you would find favor in the eyes of those who could provide
parnasa and second, did you conduct your affairs in an honest manner
keseder aleph beis?

Thus the saying of Tehila leDavid mishum de'is bei tartei: parnasa
bederech hateva as symbolized aleph beis, and masbia lechal chai ratzon
for that aspect of parnasa which is exclusively beyado shel HKB"H.

Yoseir mimah shekarasi lifneichem kasuv sham.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

I have heard it said that when the Rambam says "nireh Li" it is a
stronger statement of certainty as to how to conduct onesself then
when he simply writes the halacha. While one might think that without
support in shas bavli/yerushalmi or midreshei halacha a "nireh li" is
somewhat uncertain... however, according to this vort, the nireh li is
"stronger" than any other psak of Rambam because it entails ALL of the
torah that made the Rambam. It is the Rambam's kishkes so to speak.
I think that I heard something like this about the Chazon Ish.

Recently, two people have told me that they have seen quoted in a
secondary source in Rabbi Akiva Eiger about a RO"SH.

Perhaps someone can cite a marei makom (or marei mekomos) for anything
resembling the above propostion. Corrections, redirection and restatements
of the proposition are welcome.

The above was originally sent off-list to some list members and to date
I have received no useful response (though I have received some responses
skeptical of the "Rambam's kishkes.")

Your CD-ROM's etc. would be useful here.

Sincerely,
Noach Witty

In a message dated 7/1/01 9:02:15am EDT, nwitty@ix.netcom.com writes:
>                                    While one might think that without
> support in shas bavli/yerushalmi or midreshei halacha a "nireh li" is
> somewhat uncertain... however, according to this vort, the nireh li is
> "stronger" than any other psak of Rambam because it entails ALL of the
> torah that made the Rambam...

Interesting, I think this fits in with earlier discussions we've had
about disagreeing with an earlier posek where he gave no clear reason
for his psak.

I think it's clear that the Rambam himself used the term as you noted
and I don't think he claimed greater authority for those, in fact IIIRC
in one of the igrot harambam he used this in his own defence against
complaints that he didn't quote his sources. IIRC he says that everything
he quotes stam has a source(bavli, yerushalmi, tosefta...) except these -
seemed to imply that these other gdolim could argue with.

KT
Joel

On 28 Jun 01, at 20:14, Yitzchok Willroth wrote:
>>> What if every wedding were followed by the giving of a get alst tenai.
>>> The tenai: if she ever gets a civil divorce from him.
...
>> I'd think that there would be the problem of the baal never
>> having daas to megarish her when he gave the get - if he feels
>> that the tenai will never be kiam, there's no tenai.  It's similar
>> to an asmachta with a contractor, for instance, no?

From: "Carl and Adina Sherer" <sherer@actcom.co.il>
> If he gives her a get "mei'ha'yom im mati mei'choli zeh," (R"L), do
> you think he really expects to die R"L? And yet, we know that get
> works. If what you're arguing is correct, why should the case I
> posited work?

In the case of the sick person (or the person going to war) the person
realizes there is a real chance they will die(or be killed).  All tanaim
have some sort of chance that things could go either way.  In the case of
get immediately after marriage, no one thinks they may really get
divorced.

RMB>What if every wedding were followed by the giving of a get alst tenai.
> The tenai: if she ever gets a civil divorce from him.
> Wouldn't this be a practical way to include the possibility of anullment?

No.  These type ideas are discussed in a likut sefer called Ayn Tenai
b'Nsuin.   All gedolim record that they all fall.  This was discussed in
France in the 1800s.

Shlomo Goldstein

RGS>According to the Rambam, does Aristotle have a place in olam haba?
> I know that he held that A was the greatest philosopher, but what about
> olam haba? Does anyone see anywhere where the Rambam says or implies
> something relevant to this?

See Hilchos Melachim where chasidei umos haolam require an acknowledgement
of Toras Moshe.  This is expanded upon by Yaavatz and the Griz in the end of
his sefer.  Therefore, Aristotle, it seems, is out.

Shlomo Goldstein

From: Joelirich@aol.com
> Does anyone know the source of saying hashem yikom...

I would say - as sources for the idea of such an utterance - if not for the 
specific words - 

1) The Av Harachamim prayer on Shabbos after Yikum Purqan.

2) Avinu malkeinu nikom (le'eineinu in some versions) nikmas dam avodecha 
hashofuch.

3) Psukim in Torah (e.g. those mentioned in av harachamim) (harninu.....in 
Torah and others).

On a related note - It is Hashem yikom rather than Hashem yinkom? If yes, 
why? Grammatical / dikduk reasons?


Mordechai

I want to thank everyone who has posted recently on this topic, and to
let you know that I have not abandoned it. Rather, I am taking some time
to reinvestigate the sources, and I hope to post again in another week or
so, b'ezras HaShem. I want to especially that R' Michael Poppers for
discussion in shul, and R' Micha Berger for some off-line emails.

Meanwhile, for the benefit of others who are interested in this topic, I
suggest the following relevant sources, all in Orach Chayim 13:

Bach: "Daled Tzitziyos"
Beis Yosef: "Kasuv"
Darchei Moshe 1
Magen Avraham 8
Taz 5
Beur HaGra: "V'Davka"
Chochmas Shlomo: "Hinei"
Machtzis HaShekel 8
P'ri Megadim Mishbetzos Zahav 5
Mishnah B'rurah 9 and 15
Aruch HaShulchan 7
Kaf HaChayim 12

Most or all (like I said, I am doing a lot of double-checking) of the
above cite the Mordechai as the source for the idea that on Shabbos, one
does not violate any d'Oraisa by wearing a tzitzisless beged.
Unfortunately, I did not see anyone specify where that Mordechai can be
found, If anyone can locate it and let me know where it is, that would be
very helpful and appreciated.

For now, let me say that of the dozen sources I listed above, nine seem
to say that one is "not ovayr on the aseh", which I feel to be
frustratingly vague. The other two are more helpful, but in opposite
directions:

The P'ri Megadim (M"Z 13:5) does not say that he "is not ovayr on the
aseh", but explains "uv'Shabbos anuss hu" - "and on Shabbos he is anuss".
This fits the logic that the aseh is in full force, but the person is
unable to comply with it.

In contrast, the Magen Avraham (13:8, in the 2nd very wide line) writes
"lo chal b'Shabbos hamitzvah aseh" - "on Shabbos the Mitzvah Aseh does
not apply", which matches my contention that one does *not* get d'Oraisa
s'char for wearing a kosher tallis on Shabbos.

One last point: I am unable to address R' Micha Berger's comments about
"oker mitzvah biyadayim", because I am unfamiliar with that phrase. If
anyone can find a citation where it is used, I'd appreciate it.

Akiva Miller

R' Michael Poppers recently changed the subject line of my thread from
"tztizis on Shabbos" to "tzeetzis on Shabbos".

It seems to me that both spellings and pronunciations are accepted as
correct, but in different contexts, and I'm hoping someone can bring a
Kasuv Hashlishi which will resolve the contradiction.

(1) This word appears three times in the Maftir for Shelach, and a
fourth time in Yechezkel 8:3. All four have only one Yod, and nowhere
is there any notation that the Kri should have both Yods. Contrast this
with the word "v'niskayhem" in Bamidbar 29:33, where the margin notes
[in Mikraos Gedolos, Torah Temimah, and Soncino, though admittedly not
in Artscroll or Koren] call out attention to the missing yod. The lack of
such notes in Shelach suggests a single yod is *not* an unusual spelling
of "tzeetzees", but that in this context, the correct spelling is with
one yod, and the correct pronunciation is "tzeetzis".

(2) On the other hand, in every rabbinic writing I can ever recall, the
word is spelled with both yods. One could answer that by saying that
those writings lack nekudos, and therefore the extra yod is included
even though it is "wrong". But Rashi's comment in Sh'lach is totally
UNambiguous: The gematria of this word is 600, yielding 613 when you
add in the 8 strings and 5 knots. And a gematria of 600 forces us to
include both yods, teaching us that (according to Rashi, at least)
the correct spelling of this word is with two yods.

So which is it? Any ideas?

Akiva Miller

Shlomo Goldstein wrote:
> See Hilchos Melachim where chasidei umos haolam require an acknowledgement 
> of Toras Moshe.

What about the two nuschaos?  My impression from the Frankel Rambam is that the 
dominant nusach of the Rambam is that it says in Hilchos Melachim 8:11 that 
someone who keeps the 7 mitzvos based in his hechreia hada'as is "ela 
mechachameihem" rather than the printed "velo mechachameihem".

Gil Student

Gil Student wrote:
: According to the Rambam, does Aristotle have a place in olam haba?
: I know that he held that A was the greatest philosopher, but what about
: olam haba? ...

From the Dor Revii website (www.math.psu/glasner/Dor4/eikev.html
> V'haya eikev tishm'un et ha-mishpatim ha-eileh, v'shamar ha-Shem 
> Elokekha et ha-brit v'et ha-hesed. 

> Behold the question is evident, that if the Children of Israel will
> observe the laws that G-d has commanded them, why shouldn't their reward
> be complete without G-d's remembering the for them covenant that He made
> with their forefathers?

> And our master, spread his speech like dew, and he explained the verse
> according to the what the Rambam writes (Hilkhot M'lakhim, chapter 9):
> "Everyone who accepts the seven Noahide Laws has a portion in the world
> to come, provided that he accepts and performs them because the Holy One
> Blessed Be He has commanded to do so in his Torah. But if he performs
> those commandments because of his own judgment, he is not a ger toshav
> and he is not among the righteous of the nations."

> The Keseph Mishnah questions deeply to find out from where the Rambam
> brought this forth and what is its source in the Talmud. And see that
> which our Master found in the Talmud (Avodah Zarah 2b-3a) where they
> explain the verse ra'ah va'yater goyim. "He saw that the nations of
> the world were not observing the Seven Noahide laws, so He permitted
> them." And the Gemara concludes that even if the Gentiles observe the
> Noahide laws, they receive no reward for doing so. And every intelligent
> person will ask if the fathers sinned and did not wish to walk in His ways
> to observe the Seven Laws, why is it that the reward of the children who
> do uphold them conscientiously be withheld? And because the fathers sinned
> the children should be punished? The Rambam, therefore, in his wisdom,
> found it appropriate to explain that the meaning of the Gemara is that
> when G-d decided to permit the Seven Laws that they would not receive
> any reward for observing those Laws if they did so because of their own
> judgment and reasoning that would lead them to act accordingly. But only
> if they observe the Laws because G-d has commanded them to do so will
> they receive any reward. However, G-d does not conduct Himself in that
> way with the Children of Israel who are supported by the merit of their
> ancestors. For even if they observe His statutes and keep His laws only
> because of the dictates of their own reason should they succeed in finding
> some reason to observe them, G-d will not withhold the benefit from them
> and will give them their reward in the merit of their ancestors to whom He
> promised. And, behold, the word "eikev" denotes a reason or explanation,
> and that is why it is written "v'haya eikev tishm'un" even if you will
> observe these laws because of some other reason because of which your own
> judgment causes you to observe and fulfill them, nevertheless you will
> still be able to take your portion of reward. And the verse explains the
> reason: because the Lord your G-d will keep for you the covenant and the
> kindness that he promised to your ancestors. He therefore chose their
> descendants so that he will recognize and accept their performance of
> the commandments regardless of their intention in doing so.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

On Thu, Jun 28, 2001 at 04:31:02PM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
:> are. Giving a motivation to the concept of mitzvah altogether, not to
:> any particular mitzvah or din.

:>: As the gemara points out there were cases of children keeping
:>: shiluach ha-ken and also kibud av both of which guarantee a long life
:>: and then falling off the tree and dying.

:> Exactly my objection to RHM, above.

: Why do you think that I would disagree with you or Eli here? I do not
: understand what you are objecting to.

I was referring not to your original thesis, but to a later post of
Thu, Jun 21, 2001 at 11:23:53AM -0700, where you write:
: When I speak of Schar VeOnesh I should really limit myself to spiritual
: Schar VeOnesh. Obviosly we know that there is physical Onesh. The Tochacha
: certainly tells us that...

And, to remind you of my objection to that idea, I wrote:
> I read the newspaper this morning, I don't find it so obvious. I find it
> difficult to assert something that is so at odds with experience.

What Acheir saw in the case of that  is the norm, not the exception.

As for your thesis:
:          at it's most elemental level there must exist some form of Schar
: Mitzva. Otherwise there would be absolutely no motivation what-so-ever
: to perform any Mitzvos.

I would not quite agree. There would be a reason to follow mitzvos even
if there was nothing in it for us.

However, HKBH isn't arbitrary. If some act didn't serve His purpose in
creating us -- which was to have being to whom to do tov -- Hashem
wouldn't have told us to do it. IOW, to me the question isn't whether we'd
have reason to be good without sechar, but whether Hashem would have defined
the act as good if it wasn't something that causes sechar.

(Using my broader definition of that term; specified to avoid the
terminology issues I have with RSG.)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 For a mitzvah is a lamp,
micha@aishdas.org            And the Torah, its light.
http://www.aishdas.org                       - based on Mishlei 6:2
(973) 916-0287               

gil.student@citicorp.com wrote:
> According to the Rambam, does Aristotle have a place in olam haba?
> I know that he held that A was the greatest philosopher, but what about
> olam haba? Does anyone see anywhere where the Rambam says or implies
> something relevant to this?

See the letter to Ibn Tibbon (Igroth HaRambam, ed. Sheilath, p. 553)
"and Aristotle's daath is the ultimate human daath, with the exception of
... the prophets." Now look at the Rambam's description of the mechanism
of hishaaruth hanefesh (H. Yesodei HaTorah 4:9 and H. Teshuva 8:3)
and you will see that Aristotle qualifies.

Since people have cited the din in H. Melachim 8:11 to prove the opposite,
I will wax prolix about it. First of all, see the source cited by R.
Zalman Volozhiner in Toldoth Adam (cited in Sefer HaLikutim in Frankel's
Rambam) that the Rambam's source is agnostic about whther chachmei umoth
haolam get olam haba. The Rambam's own opinion should be clear from the
above citations.

Second, consider whether Aristotle meets the qualifications. Our unnamed
non-Noachide must either (a) not believe in God's existence, (b) not
believe in prophecy, or (c) doubt the veracity of Jewish tradition as
embodied in the sheva mitzvoth.

Person (a) is not a chacham (H. Yesodei HaTorah 1:1) and, a fortiori,
not Aristotle.

I would argue that person (b) is also not Aristotle. It was widely
accepted (not universally) by Medieval interpreters of Arsitotle that he
believed in the possibility of prophecy. The possibility of prophecy is
one of the 13 Ikkarim, and the Rambam says at the end of the list that
they can all be proved. That the Rambam sperates that Ikkar from the
Ikkar of the veracity of Moses' prophecy implies to me that the former
can be proved analytically, and given the citation with which I began the
letter, I deem it probable that the Rambam was among those who believed
that Aristotle accepted the possibility of prophecy.

Now reread Guide II:39-40, where he argues that divine law is unique
(i.e. there can be only one), and can be recognized by its content.
Conclude that Aristotle would have recognized the sheva mitzvoth as
stemming from a divine source.

Two further comments (slightly off topic). Point (b) is another example
of the Rambam as anti-HaLevi, since HaLevi's philosopher adopted this
position (a minority position, but convenient for the dramatic part of
HaLevi's dialogue).

The opposition of chasid and chacham appears in H. Deoth 1:5 (compare the
peirush on Avoth 5:6 ed. Sheilath p. 97). Aristotle, the codifier of the
doctrine of the mean, is the paradigm of the chacham. Compare H. Teshuva
3:5 (the source of chasiei umoth haolam yesh lahem cheilek l'olam haba)
where chasid wrt umoth haolam parallels tzadik wrt Jews.

David Riceman

On Areivim, Meir Shinnar asked whether the Chofetz Chaim's restrictions
regarding telling Lashon Hara in a situation of to'eles (among other
things, he prohibits the telling of information if the harm which could
befall OU officers as a result of publicizing negative information is
greater than the punishment which would have been meted out to them
m'tzad halacha) apply to arayos issues (i.e., fear of arayos in NCSY in
the future) as opposed to dinei mamonos.

I could not determine the answer from studying the CC. In Hil. Richilus,
Ch. 9, he does seem to not differentiate between mamonos and other
issurim, as the source for telling over the information in each case
is "lo sa'amod al dam rei'echa." (see Beer Mayim Chayim there, s"k 1).
BMC notes that the makor of lo sa'amod is a fear of someone dying, but
there is a drasha that this includes mamonos too (case of kovesh eiduso).

Throughout ch. 9, CC insists that one cannot tell the info if the
consequence to the person (e.g., from a gentile court, or from vigilante
action) will be worse than the consequence had he been judged in a
beis din. See BMC s"k 17 for a long discussion. The CC's proof is from
a case of mamonos, where Rava said that one should not help a gentile
obtain money from a Jew in gentile courts if the money would not have
been awarded to the gentile in Jewish court (because of the problem
of eid echad). In effect, this limitation of the CC does not deal with
the issur of LH *overcoming* lo sa'mod. Rather, the issue is within lo
sa'amod itself--the remedy to one person may overly damage another person.
The same din applies even if no LH is spoken.

IMHO the analysis of the CC should not apply to a case where the issue
is that withholding information could lead to a case of arayos. The CC's
reasoning was limited to mamonos, and is really focused on the issue of
what is the proper punishment for an avaryan. He does not deal with the
issue of *balancing* *future* irreparable harm (arayos) against damage to
someone's reputation. I would argue that lo sa'amod al dam rei'echa would
overcome the argument that the punishment exceeds the crime, at least
where it exceeds it by not that much--after all, if the crime deserves a
punishment of 8 and the only available remedy is a punishment of 9, then
if you choose to do nothing an avla of 8 will have occurred, but if you
choose to act, an avla of 1 (the excess of 9 over 8) will have occurred.

In fact, the CC is m'ramez my contention, though he does not flesh it
out. In Tziyur 3 (at the end of Hil Rechilus) se'ifim 6 and 11, the CC
says that there are no restrictions on telling the info (note that in
Hil Rechilus 9:2 five restrictions were established) if the choson is an
apikoros or if his family is a beis pritzus. In s"k 9 he gives the reasons
that it is permitted to violate the first three restrictions. He does
not give the reasons to violate the fourth and fifth restrictions--the
issue of the punishment not exceeding the crime is restriction number
5. Of course, one can argue that in these cases, the CC assumed that
the punishment of calling off the shidduch is proper (certainly, that is
a reasonable conclusion in the case of the apikoros, who is personally
at fault). But my guess is that in the case of coming from a family of
prutzim, the CC simply wishes to avoid the *outcome* of the woman marrying
a *possible* parutz, not that this a proper *punishment* of the *possible*
parutz. In effect, the case of shidduchim, unlike the other cases in the
CC, which involve mamonos, deals with outcomes rather than punishments
(i.e., the issue of voiding the shidduch is not viewed as a punishment
but as the best way to deal with the situation).

So we can see that the CC was concerned with avoiding negative outcomes,
not just with fair punishments.

Applying this to the case of the OU: If the only way to avoid future
Lanner cases in NCSY is to publicize the OU report, and such publicity
will cause some OU personnel to lose their jobs unnecessarily (because
of the "off with their heads" attitude of the public), then the proper
inquiry is not whether the loss of these jobs is a proper punishment but
whether the benefit of avoiding arayos situations in NCSY outweighs the
unfair loss of jobs by some individuals.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

Micha Berger writes:
> What if every wedding were followed by the giving of a get alst tenai.
> The tenai: if she ever gets a civil divorce from him.
> Wouldn't this be a practical way to include the possibility of anullment?

sorry to disappoint you, but in Shulchan Aruch, Even Hoezer Ch.148:2 it
says that a husband who gives a get on a tenai cannot be secluded with
his wife!

yosef stern

********************


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