Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 069

Sunday, July 1 2001

• Intermarriage
• Re: Dor Revi'i on zot huqat ha-torah
• Re: Avodah V7 #68
• Re: Tzeetzis on Shabbos (was "tztizit :-( on shabbat")
• Rambam on Aristotle
• Re: More Sechar ve-onesh
• Re: More Sechar ve-onesh
• A proposal for preventing future agunos?
• Re: Schar VeOnesh
• Re: A proposal for preventing future agunos?
• Re: A proposal for preventing future agunos?
• Re: A proposal for preventing future agunos?
• HY"D
• Re: Tzitzis on Shabbos - d'Rabanan?
• Re: Sechar ve-onesh forever
• Re: Sechar ve-onesh forever
• Re: Tzitzis on Shabbos - d'Rabanan?
• Ketanim saying Kaddish
• Befi Yeshorim Tis'hallol

Regarding intermarriage itself:
    Avodah Zarah 36b
    Yevamos 76a
    Megillah 25a
    Eruvin 19a
    Rambam, Issurei Biah 12:1; Kessef Mishneh
    Ramban, Yevamos 78b sv Nesinim
    Rashba, Yevamos 76b sv Amar Leih
    Tosafos, Avodah Zarah 36b sv Dichsiv
    Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 4; 16;
    Nosei Keilim and Avnei Miluim, ad. loc.
    Minchas Chinuch 427

Gil Student

To be posted soon on the Dor Revi'i website
    www.dorrevii.org
    www.math.psu.edu/glasner/Dor4

zot huqat ha-torah:  Rashi comments:
    Because Satan and the nations of the world taunt Israel, saying,
    "What is this command and what reason is there for it?" the Scripture
    therefore writes the term "huqat" (ordinance) about it, implying: It
    is an enactment from before Me, you have no right to think critically
    about it (l'harheir ahareha).

Now one may ask, why do they only taunt us concerning the commandment of
the red heifer? Are there not many other ordinances besides this one?
It is also difficult to understand why Rashi says you have no right to
think critically about it (l'harheir ahareha). What transgression would
one commit if one did think critically about it?

And it appears to our master that an explanation can be deduced from the
fact that the red heifer was, as we know, instituted to atone for the
sin of the calf. (See what we have written concerning this in poroshat
Qorah.) So when Qorah saw the chapter concerning the red heifer, he
thought that by means of the red heifer the sin of the calf would be
completely forgiven and that the ultimate redemption (qeitz ha-yamin)
about which it is said (Isaiah 25:8) "He will swallow up death forever"
(bila mavet la-netzah) would be attained. The Eternal will then save
Israel forever, and bring eternal joy upon them. This implies that
whoever can find "the words of delight" (divrei heiphetz) by gaining an
understanding of the commandment of the red heifer will also comprehend
"the final wonders" (qeitz ha-p'la'ot), because they are mutually
interdependent. However, since the final wonders are a hidden secret
sealed from the sight of every living creature, and in the Talmud the
Sages said "woe unto those who attempt to calculate the end of days,"
the Eternal closed up the commandment of the red heifer and allowed
no one to think critically about it (l'harheir ahareha) in order to
understand its essence. That is why Satan and the nations of the world
taunt Israel by saying to them "what is the sense of this commandment?"
By this they mean to say "when will saviors come up on Zion?" In this
way they breathe forth lies (yaphihu k'zavim) about Israel -- that their
hope from the Eternal has been disappointed and "there is no salvation
for him in G-d" (ein lo y'shuatah vei-Lokim selah), which is a form
of verbal oppression. However, shall we not wait for him every day?
And He will hasten it in its time.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

[Micha Berger:]
<< The R' Tzadok RYGB quotes there asserts that the seichel can -- and
 is bound to -- entertain conflicting truths, while bipo'el we can only
 follow one. Fans of RYBS's exploration of unresolvable dialectics might
 enjoy playing with this idea. >>

We can only follow one truth at a time. If Reish Lakish is emes, there
might come a point when we should follow it. Getting to that point
involves all the questions of rabbinical Judaism. RYBS's Brisker view of
halacha assumed we can never get to that point. Thus he set the issue
up as a dialectic. My guess is that the early Rishonim saw halacha as
a somewhat more ambiguous process: in one era we follow R. Yochanan;
in another we might follow R. Lakish.

David Finch

In Avodah V7 #68, MBerger responded:
> I was thinking that perhaps the ikkar hadin of tzitzis isn't a mitzvah
> chiyuvis or even a machshir (like shechitah or gittin) but a pure mitzvah
> kiyumis.

When Akiva and I bandied about the well-known point that a man was not
m'chuyav in tzeetzis unless he was wearing a beged with four corners, he
noted that a similar mitzvah was m'zuzah, which requires the prerequisite
of a doorpost (and, at that, needn't be done immediately after one
becomes the master of the doorpost's domain, which fits in well with
YZirkind's thought that "[b]y putting on a garment without Tzitzis, one
does not violate the Mitzva, only if he continues wearing it without
puting in Tzitzis"). Given his question about what's really going on
with the mitzva of tzeetzis based on what criteria come into play on
Shabbos when a four-cornered beged suddenly doesn't have kosher tzeetzis
at every corner, one might also note what one can (read "can't"!) do
when a m'zuzah falls off a doorpost on Shabbos.

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

According to the Rambam, does Aristotle have a place in olam haba?
I know that he held that A was the greatest philosopher, but what about
olam haba? Does anyone see anywhere where the Rambam says or implies
something relevant to this?

Gil Student

On Wed, Jun 27, 2001 at 23:56:02 -0400, R' Micha wrote:
: I do not recall RHM talking about tangibility or worldliness to the
: sechar.

SG: Perhaps I embellished somewhat. On Tue, 19 Jun 2001 15:21:28 -0700 RHM
did say: "....that the Torah never speaks of any post mortem reward. It
only speaks of a worldly reward as in "Leman Yarichin Yamecha".

Quoted from me:
:as R' Yaakov asserted (when witnessing the young boy fall to his
:death after fulfilling Kibud Av and Shiluach HaKen together),
:designated for Olam HaBa....

RMB: While it was R' Yaakov's explanation of Shema's "lema'an yarichun
> yamecha", as well as the similar comment by shilu'ach hakan, but
> he wasn't the one who witnesses the death -- Acheir did. Ironically,
> R' Yaakov was Acheir's grandson.


SG: Pardon me. The Gemara (Kidushin 39b) states: "V'Dilma Lav Hachi Hava 
(perhaps there never was a such a case of the young boy falling ...) R' 
Yaakov Maaseh Chaza". Both Acheir and R' Yaakov witnessed such a tragedy.

Quoted from me:
: Since, as I have maintained, S'char cannot be mundane and physical..

RMB: What about the Ramban's shitah which says that Olam haBah and the
> ultimate sechar refers to the physical life after techiyas hameisim?
> But in any case, I agree that the ikkar sechar is in olam habah; it's
> a semantic argument as to whether or not to refer to the berachos one
> gets in olam hazeh as the tafeil of sechar. Since reshaim may be given
> things in olam hazeh to use up his sechar before olam habah, apparantly
> this terminology works.

But the substansive argument is whether sechar is imposed by HKBH or is
a *consequence* of the mitzvah (via a system that He created).


SG: Who knows what physical life after Techiat HaMaitim will be like ?
Perhaps all our S'char from learning Torah will be converted into a
200+ IQ, enabling us to reach new heights in Sodot HaTorah! I could
go for that. But let us not quibble. If the MaHaral and the Ramban met
to discuss this issue, I am sure they would understand each other alot
better than we do.

Is S'char imposed by HKBH or a consequence of mitzvot? It is both. The
S'char Mitzvah defined by the MaHaral is imposed and fixed. What we
receive in the form of a Segulah or facilitation is a consequence.

Quoted from me:
:The MaHaral further deals with the Rasha getting his "due"
:in this world, despite S'char being non-Tivi'i, by correlating 
:S'char,which belongs only to Olam HaEmet, with a person's true being.

RMB: He doesn't deny that sechar can come and does come where it doesn't 
> belong.He just calls it, in your words, "non-amiti".

> Furthermore, he posits a *causal connection* between mitzvah, and the
> person's being and between that state and sechar.

SG: But that is the definition of S'char Mitzvah that he uses. If it
is not Amiti, it cannot be S'char Mitzvah. It can be some other S'char,
like maybe Nachat. When you have Nachat from something your child did,
do you call that S'char Mitzvah ?!?

Quoted from RMB:
: Actually, this is a ra'ayah Rashi uses to show that chayim is bidavka a 
consequence of choosing Torah uMitzvos.

Quoted from me:
: Yes, Rashi does connect Chaim with doing good...

RMB: You missed my point. He shows that chayim (in Olam haBah, as per that
> Maharal, as well as the first intro to Gevuros Hashem) is a *consequence*,
> of the choice -- a causal connection. And you're looking in the wrong
> pasuk. See the Rashi on the original pasuk, not at the quotes he uses
> to explain it.


SG: I understood your point. I didn't argue with it. I just suggested that
4 Pesukim later, the Torah seems to repeat itself, almost unnecessarily,
urging one to choose life, and Rashi does not make the causal connection
to mitzvot.

Quoted from me:
: I did not see any Rishonim on R' Gil's web page that define S'char
: as you imply.


RMB:
> What do you call defining onesh as the product of dirt on one's soul
> or a disease one causes in it? And what about the Nefesh haChaim I
> cited?

SG: If we stick to the MahaRal's perspective on S'char Mitzvah being
Ruchani, then it makes sense to assume that Onesh Aveirah also takes on
such a character. A blight on one's soul might be exactly that. However,
in order to explain Onesh that we see or experience (L"A) in Olam HaZeh,
we could borrow the Or HaChaim's "Segulah theory" for a moment, and
designate certain Onshim as tied in some way to certain Aveirot.

You cited IIRC, from Nefesh HaChaim that R. Chaim Vilozhiner (Derech
Hachaim 1:21) derives from the Gemara in Eiruvin. "The wicked deepen
gehennom for themselves" that each sin causes a flaw in your soul. The
punishment that is the consequence of this flaw heals it. The Segulah
theory is sufficient to handle that as well, IMHO. Certainly sin has a
deleterious effect on one's soul and there are consequences to that. I
still maintain that there are two forces at work - one dealing with here
and now, while the other is storing away S'char V'Onesh like Yosef during
the Sava, for later.

Stuart Goldstein

On Thu, Jun 28, 2001 at 02:40:16PM -0400, Stuart Goldstein wrote:
: SG: Pardon me. The Gemara (Kidushin 39b) states: "V'Dilma Lav Hachi Hava 
: (perhaps there never was a such a case of the young boy falling ...) R' 
: Yaakov Maaseh Chaza". Both Acheir and R' Yaakov witnessed such a tragedy.

I sit corrected. (BTW, I recalled it from the last amud of Chullin.)

:> But the substansive argument is whether sechar is imposed by HKBH or is
:> a *consequence* of the mitzvah (via a system that He created).

: Is S'char imposed by HKBH or a consequence of mitzvot? It is both. The
: S'char Mitzvah defined by the MaHaral is imposed and fixed. What we
: receive in the form of a Segulah or facilitation is a consequence.

Then what are we debating?

Remember that according to the Maharal (and des Cartes) seichel and
neshamah are synonymous. The Maharal's usual antonym for gashmi is
sichli.

:> Furthermore, he posits a *causal connection* between mitzvah, and the
:> person's being and between that state and sechar.

: SG: But that is the definition of S'char Mitzvah that he uses. If it
: is not Amiti, it cannot be S'char Mitzvah...

Can you point me to where the Maharal says this?

How would this shtim with the statement refered to twice now about resha'im
getting sechar in olam hazeh, or with the story of R' Chanina losing sechar
in olam haba by gettin the table leg now.

: You cited IIRC, from Nefesh HaChaim that R. Chaim Vilozhiner (Derech
: Hachaim 1:21) derives from the Gemara in Eiruvin. "The wicked deepen
: gehennom for themselves" that each sin causes a flaw in your soul. The
: punishment that is the consequence of this flaw heals it. The Segulah
: theory is sufficient to handle that as well, IMHO...

"Segulah theory"? Please define.

:                                                                      I
: still maintain that there are two forces at work - one dealing with here
: and now, while the other is storing away S'char V'Onesh like Yosef during
: the Sava, for later.

How is this different than peiros vs keren? Other than your refusal to
call reward in olam hazeh by the word "sechar".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                     Time flies...
micha@aishdas.org                        ... but you're the pilot.
http://www.aishdas.org       		    - R' Zelig Pliskin
(973) 916-0287               

What if every wedding were followed by the giving of a get alst tenai.
The tenai: if she ever gets a civil divorce from him.

Wouldn't this be a practical way to include the possibility of anullment?

-mi

On Tue, Jun 26, 2001 at 10:54:19AM +0200, Eli Turkel wrote:
>: I am saying that G-d has his reasons and they are not arbitrary.
>: However, we cannot know the reasons, in general, and the reasons are
>: irrelevant to us in terms of keeping the mitzvot.

Micha Wrote:
> Agreed. We were discussing very vague outlines about what those reasons
> are. Giving a motivation to the concept of mitzvah altogether, not to
> any particular mitzvah or din.

>: As the gemara points out there were cases of children keeping
>: shiluach ha-ken and also kibud av both of which guarantee a long life
>: and then falling off the tree and dying.

> Exactly my objection to RHM, above.

Why do you think that I would disagree with you or Eli here? I do not
understand what you are objecting to. I am in effect saying that there
must be Schar... period. I am not limiting Schar in any way. I am not
refferring to Corporeal Schar or Sprirtual Schar. I am merely pointing
out that at it's most elemental level there must exist some form of Schar
Mitzva. Otherwise there would be absolutely no motivation what-so-ever
to perform any Mitzvos. Period.

The case of Kibud Av and Shiluach Es HaKan promising but not fulfilling
longevity in a particular case that caused Elisha Ben Avuya to become
an apostate, does not refute anything that I have said. We cannot know
G-d's ultimate plan. We can only speculate the speculation of a mortal
imperfect intellect and say that it is zero sum game and it all equals
out after "judgement day" upon one's arrival in Olam Haba,in the form
of Onesh for all of one's Aveiros and in the form of Schar for all of
one's Mitzvos. All we can say about that case is that we don't or can't
completely understand it. But it does not for one moment dispute (or
prove)the existence of an ultimate Schar Mitzvos nor does it demonstrate
that a Mitzva would be done without the existence of Schar VeOnesh which
I contend it wouldn't.

I have yet to be disproven.

HM

> What if every wedding were followed by the giving of a get alst tenai.
> The tenai: if she ever gets a civil divorce from him.
> 
> Wouldn't this be a practical way to include the possibility of anullment?

I'd think that there would be the problem of the baal never 
having daas to megarish her when he gave the get - if he feels 
that the tenai will never be kiam, there's no tenai.  It's similar 
to an asmachta with a contractor, for instance, no?

On 28 Jun 01, at 17:04, Micha Berger wrote:
> What if every wedding were followed by the giving of a get alst tenai.
> The tenai: if she ever gets a civil divorce from him.
> 
> Wouldn't this be a practical way to include the possibility of anullment?

Why is this any different than giving a get "mei'ha'yom u'l'achar 
misa? In which case it would work, but they could not live together 
as husband and wife. 

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

Carl and Adina Sherer
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

On 28 Jun 01, at 20:14, Yitzchok Willroth wrote:
>> What if every wedding were followed by the giving of a get alst tenai.
>> The tenai: if she ever gets a civil divorce from him.
...
> I'd think that there would be the problem of the baal never 
> having daas to megarish her when he gave the get - if he feels 
> that the tenai will never be kiam, there's no tenai.  It's similar 
> to an asmachta with a contractor, for instance, no?

If he gives her a get "mei'ha'yom im mati mei'choli zeh," (R"L), do 
you think he really expects to die R"L? And yet, we know that get 
works. If what you're arguing is correct, why should the case I 
posited work? 

-- Carl
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

Does anyone know the source of saying hashem yikom...

KT and SS
Joel

On Tue, Jun 26, 2001 at 10:40:26PM -0400, kennethgmiller@juno.com wrote:
: If you can find somewhere that actually says that it is *assur* to avoid
: the mitzva of tzitzis, AND it uses the word "assur" in a literal manner
: (rather than for rhetorical effect), I'd love to see it.
...
: Perhaps we should start a new thread on Avodah (or perhaps its been done
: already?) on whether all activities can be classified as chiyuv or issur
: (which seems to be the view you are following) or whether there is also a
: category of reshus, which includes the whole range of very advisable to
: really stupid activities.

I didn't intend to promote that view. The whole idea of promoting hanhagos
presumes that there are good idea that are optional.

You have me at a disadvantage. I'm trying to understand how "okeir
mitzvah biyadayim" works and how it's different than just saying that
someone was oveir on a chiyuv. I believe that the two are different,
otherwise why use a second idiom. Once you say they are different
then it's not a vanilla chiyuv and we've solved the problem at hand
WRT Shabbos.

But beyond that, I'm just groping. I'm reasoning from ideas I don't
fully understand.

Returning a bit:
: Actually, I think you are trying to straddle both sides of this
: literal/rhetorical fence. On the one hand you taske the literal angle
: when you wrote <<< OMbY says that one has a chiyuv not to pass up a
: mitzvah kiyumis for no reason -- so it ends up a chiyuv anyway. >>> But
: then you follow that with <<< IOW, it's a closer relative to mitzvah
: habah liyadecha al tachmitzenah. >>> which I have always understood as
: good advice, not a chiyuv d'Oraisa.

Agreed. I thought "closer relative" was sufficient to indicate that I
was using fuzzier thinking than halachic methodology here. (At least,
/I/ knew what I meant. <grin>) They seem to me to be hashkaficly related,
I was not suggesting a halachic outcome from that observation or that
the two were identical.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
(973) 916-0287               

RMB: But the substansive argument is whether sechar is imposed by HKBH
or is a *consequence* of the mitzvah (via a system that He created).

SG: Is S'char imposed by HKBH or a consequence of mitzvot? It is both. The
S'char Mitzvah defined by the MaHaral is imposed and fixed. What we
receive in the form of a Segulah or facilitation is a consequence.


RMB: Then what are we debating?

RMB: Remember that according to the Maharal (and des Cartes) seichel and
neshamah are synonymous. The Maharal's usual antonym for gashmi is sichli.

SG: I think the original premise under debate was: is there value to
mitzvot w/o an underlying S'char V'Onesh arrangement. I undertook to
establish that value in terms of stability, positive growth etc.. even
if we ignore S'char V'Onesh, since S'char is Ruchani anyway. Not to
rehash, but semantically, we could very easily refer to the positive
consequences of behaving according to the Torah, with a non-S'char word
(such as Peirot).

SG: But that is the definition of S'char Mitzvah that he uses. If it is
not Amiti, it cannot be S'char Mitzvah...

RMB: Can you point me to where the Maharal says this?

SG: Tiferet Yisrael Perek 60 - " Ki RaUi SheYihyeh HaTashlumin L'Adam Kefi
Asher Hu Tzadik O Rashah V'Zeh Shayach B'Olam Haba Asher Hu Olam HaAmiti
Lo B'Olam Hazeh, SheMitzad Olam Hazeh SheHu Olam Gashmi Ain HaOlam Hazeh
Olam HaEmet L'Shalem El HaAdam Bo Kefi Mah SheHu Tzadik O Rasha B'Emet".

RMB: How would this shtim with the statement refered to twice now about
resha'im getting sechar in olam hazeh, or with the story of R' Chanina
losing sechar in olam haba by gettin the table leg now.

SG: I dealt with that. The MaHaral continues that the "MiUt ZechuYot"
of the Rasha are not his "Atzmuto VaAmitato" and therefore, "RaUi
SheYihyeh Tashlum SheLo BaOlam SheAino Olam HaAmiti V'Hu Olam Hazeh...".
As to R' Chanina, I can only refer to the fear commonly found among
Tzadikim from Avraham Avinu until the present, that a concept of
"Menakin Lo MiZechuyato" somehow operates to affect their stored away
S'char Mitzvah. The MaHaral comments on this in Chidushei Agadot 1:20
in Masechet Shabbat that whenever HKBH deals with someone "SheLo B'Teva"
i.e., miraculously, He subtracts from their S'char which are also "Ainam
Tivi'im". So in effect, R' Chanina did not receive S'char in Olam HaZeh;
he received something miraculous for which he must pay with Olam HaBa
currency.

SG: The Segulah theory is sufficient to handle that as well, IMHO...

RMB: "Segulah theory"? Please define.

SG: I cited previously the Shitah of the Or HaChaim HaKadosh at the
end of Acharei Mot, where he explains Rasha V'Tov Lo and Hevay Zahir
B'Mitzvah Kalah etc.. by noting how certain mitzvot act as a Segulah
for specific, worldly rewards. In fact, he suggests that a mitzvah may
in truth have a very small S'char (in Olam HaBa) but provide a very big
worldly reward, from its being a Segulah, such as wealth, long life,
children etc.. Since HKBH did not want us to perform only those mitzvot
that provide the Segulot that we want, He did not identify to us which
Segulot go tt which mitzvot. The same theory works with punishment -
certain aveirot are a (n anti- ?) Segulah to cause exile, etc..


SG: I still maintain that there are two forces at work - one dealing
with here and now, while the other is storing away S'char V'Onesh like
Yosef during the Sava, for later.

RMB: How is this different than peiros vs keren? Other than your refusal
to call reward in olam hazeh by the word "sechar".

SG: Not different at all. Can we officially agree then, and go onto
other topics ?

Stuart Goldstein

On Fri, Jun 29, 2001 at 12:20:32PM -0400, Stuart Goldstein wrote:
: SG: I think the original premise under debate was: is there value to
: mitzvot w/o an underlying S'char V'Onesh arrangement. I undertook to
: establish that value in terms of stability, positive growth etc.. even
: if we ignore S'char V'Onesh, since S'char is Ruchani anyway. Not to
: rehash, but semantically, we could very easily refer to the positive
: consequences of behaving according to the Torah, with a non-S'char word
: (such as Peirot).

Except that even what you call sechar is a positive consequence as well.
The consequence issue isn't what divides keren from peiros, but rather
the wholeness, what the Maharal refered to as amito, of the sechar --
and therefore where one gets it.

Also including segulos -- which I'd simply define as sechar of a preknown
nature.

Anything which a person gets as a consequence of mitzvah I'm asserting
(based on the earlier citations) to be an effect caused by the mitzvah. 
Theerefore I see them all as "sechar". Including "sechar mitzvah mitzvah"
-- the fact that it's easier to do a mitzvah the second time around is
called a "sechar".

My point was that the reverse holds more than the original question:
If there was no positive growth causing sechar (keren and peiros), Hashem
wouldn't have told us to do it. It's not only that listening to Hashem
causes sechar, but also that Hashem told us to do those things that
-- because of how He created us -- cause sechar.

: SG: But that is the definition of S'char Mitzvah that he uses. If it is
: not Amiti, it cannot be S'char Mitzvah...

: RMB: Can you point me to where the Maharal says this?

: SG: Tiferet Yisrael Perek 60 - " Ki RaUi SheYihyeh HaTashlumin L'Adam Kefi
: Asher Hu Tzadik O Rashah V'Zeh Shayach B'Olam Haba Asher Hu Olam HaAmiti
: Lo B'Olam Hazeh, SheMitzad Olam Hazeh SheHu Olam Gashmi Ain HaOlam Hazeh
: Olam HaEmet L'Shalem El HaAdam Bo Kefi Mah SheHu Tzadik O Rasha B'Emet".

This doesn't say anything about not using the concept of "sechar" WRT
one one gets in olam hazeh. Rather, that one is not recieving "kefi
mah shehu ... b'emes". Of course: the majority of sechar is in olam
habah, one gets yissurin and other non-sechar and yet non-onesh, etc...

Because, as you later quote:
: SG: I dealt with that. The MaHaral continues that the "MiUt ZechuYot"
: of the Rasha are not his "Atzmuto VaAmitato" and therefore, "RaUi
: SheYihyeh Tashlum SheLo BaOlam SheAino Olam HaAmiti V'Hu Olam Hazeh...".

Some level of tashlum, the very same tashlum but more namok, IS bi'olam
hazeh.

: As to R' Chanina, I can only refer to the fear commonly found among
: Tzadikim from Avraham Avinu until the present, that a concept of
: "Menakin Lo MiZechuyato" somehow operates to affect their stored away
: S'char Mitzvah....

See the Nefesh haChaim on it. R' Chaim Vilozhiner argues that R' Chanina
now had to earn his amud shel chessed in ways that as a poor man he didn't.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 The mind is a wonderful organ
micha@aishdas.org            for justifying decisions
http://www.aishdas.org       the heart already reached.
(973) 916-0287               

Akiva Miller wrote:
> Perhaps we should start a new thread on Avodah (or perhaps its been done
> already?) on whether all activities can be classified as chiyuv or issur
> (which seems to be the view you are following) or whether there is also a
> category of reshus, which includes the whole range of very advisable to really
> stupid activities.
     
I recall two threads on this issue although there might be others.  I remember 
these because I contributed to them.

One thread started off as "Boys will be boys" and continued into "Recreation".  
The other is called "yiras Hashem/bringing Moshiach".  See specifically the 
following two posts <http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol07/v07n044.shtml#04> and 
<http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/vol07/v07n044.shtml#07>.

Gil Student

shalom berger writes:
> One of my colleagues pointed me to an Arukh HaShulkhan that says that
> "Kaddish Yatom" was instituted to allow those aveilim who could not be
> the Hazan to say kaddish, and argued that this kaddish was instituted
> specifically for ketanim. ...
> Is there any problem with a katan saying kaddish by himself?

actually the AH (yore deah 376:12) says it was made davka fot the
ketanim and therefore (-he continues-) someone who could daven for the
amud should only say the kadeishim that are in the middle of davening
and not steal the kadeishim from the ketanim!

also, the sefer Ho-Ogur (from R Yaakov the son of the Noda BeYehudah)
writes in Simon 334, that the reason it's called kaddish yosom is because
it was instituted for the ketanim who can't daven by the amud... and
therefore the ketanim are permitted to say it because it's not a chovah
like the other kadeishim.

yosef stern

From: "SBA" <sba@blaze.net.au>
> The Likutei Maharich brings b'shem the Kol Bo, Levush and sefer Haminhogim
> that even those who follow nussach Ashkenaz, change for RH to remind us
> the zechus of Rivkah.

See also peirush IyunTefilah in Siddur Otzar Hatefilos and the
RY Emden siddur.

I also noticed that R' Boruch Epstein (Baal TT) in Boruch She'omar,
writes that the nusach S'fard is "Ikkar" (for ALL year).

SBA

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