Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 063

Monday, June 18 2001

• Re: Curious Chabad Minhag
• Re: Umasbi'ah lichol chai ratzon
• Benching
• Terms for Bnei Yisroel
• Terms for Bnei Yisroel
• Re: Dor Revi'i on the m'kosheish eitzim
• Re: Dor Revi'i on the m'kosheish eitzim
• Re: yibum vs rape
• Re: yibum vs rape
• Re: Umasbi'ah lichol chai ratzon
• Re: bentching (was: curious chabad minhag)
• Re: Tzitzis on Shabbos - d'Rabanan?
• Re: Tzitzis on Shabbos - d'Rabanan?
• RE: Tzitzis on Shabbos - d'Rabanan?
• bearing bad news
• Re: Ain Simcha Elah B'Basar... A Vegetarian's Dilema.
• RGS on Why does G-d Punish?
• Re: Umasbi'ah lichol chai ratzon

In a message dated Fri, 15 Jun 2001 8:20:53am EDT, Micha Berger
<micha@aishdas.org> writes:
> How fixed is this matbei'ah? ...                      Every bencher I
> own offers the list of who to include as conditional.

I've wondered about this issue as well, particularly in the context of the
nusach of other "brachot" (eg what the kahal says at the end of birchat
kohanim) sometimes parents, sometimes children... I wonder whether there
is something inherent in the nature of the bracha (eg in birchat hamazon
should we limit to the provider of the food or is it a general opening
for any we wish to bless)?



In a message dated 6/14/01 5:50:22pm EDT, aes@ll-f.com writes:
>> I have heard that when one is bentching in a room where there are also
>> gentiles present...

In a message dated Fri, 15 Jun 2001 8:21:09am EDT, Yzkd@aol.com writes:
> One says ..Yevoreich Osonu *Bnei Bris*...

>> Two questions: 1) where is this brought down; 

> M"A O"C 189:1, S"A Horav 189:4, KS"A 44:18, it is also found in the Tehilas 
> Hashem Siddur.

Interesting - this would apply to restaurants, parks, cafeterias.....I
wonder why it's not more well known - are there any sh"ut that are
meikil??Why wasn't it brought down in M"B?

SS
Joel

Micha Berger wrote:
> How do you translate this phrase?

In Tanach the primary meaning of ratzon is goodwill; desire is only a
secondary meaning (think ritzuy of a karban).  As people have noted on a
different thread, you can satisfy someone with a bowl full of gruel or
with steak au poivre.  It means that not only does God satiate us, he
does it in particularly nice ways (admittedly you'd expect b'ratzon, but
its absence is not uncommon in Biblical usage).

David Riceman

> As for what I say when benching myself... I felt funny dropping the
> opportunity to ask for a berachah for my parents when I got married.
> So, I include them, but not as "ba'al / ba'alas habayis hazeh".

That is the nusach in the NCSY bencher.

If you follow the coming parashios carefully (Shelach, Korach, Chukkas),
I believe you will agree with me (and *not* with the Malbim) that:

Goy = The lowest level of a defined nationality ("Lavo lokachas lo
goy mei'kerev goy") - common names, garb, and tongue - as opposed to
a Lashon ("V'romamtonu me'kol ha'leshonos") which is like saying "the
English-speaking peoples."

Am = A nation with a sense of national idea (me'lashon "im") - one
of the reasons Dr. Breuer preferred the term "Am Yisroel" over "Klal
Yisroel". We are not simply a "goy". We are a "goy kadosh". Kedusha is
the national idea that makes us an Am.

Eida = A group convened for a specific purpose (the Malbim says that
an "eid" in the Torah is always two because the two witnesses are
a mini-eida, and RSRH learns that both are connected to "yo'ad" -
designation). But an eida can be an "eida ro'oh". It is a lower form of
gathering, and thus related to the word "eider".

Kohol = A group convened in a religious or refined manner (we spoke about
this Pesach time. I am not sure of the derivation, and have not looked for
it in RSRH, but assume that one can be found). The purpose of many mitzvos
is to transform Adas Yisroel into a Kahal Hashem, or Kehal Adas Yisroel.

As I noted, there are numerous times in the upcoming parshi'os where
you can identify these themes.

I should note an interesting phenomenon in this regard, that in Parashas
Acharei Mos the punishment of kareis is sometimes applied to an "ish"
and sometimes to a "nefesh" (the Ramban, IIRC, deals with that and states
that there are two levels of kareis) - but those are kareis from the
"Am". In chukkas, those who are metmeh mikdosh are subject to kareis
from the "Kohol".

One phenomenon for which I have no working hypothesis as of yet, and I
welcome input, is the distinction in the Torah between the times when
"Bnei Yisroel" vs. the times when plain "Yisroel" (this appears more
frequently, I think, towards the end of Devorim - where there is also
an interesting "Kehal Yisroel" at the end of Vayeileich) are used to
denote the Jewish people.

Yishme'u Chachomim v'Yosifu Lekach!

[In a second email, RYGB adds the following. Since I'm interjecting,
I also want to go on the record frustration at his not giving
us more than a day from raising the question before sending this
semi-spoiler. <semi-grin> -mi]

At 09:59 AM 6/15/01 -0500, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
>If you follow the coming parashios carefully (Shelach, Korach, Chukkas), I
>believe you will agree with me (and *not* with the Malbim) that:

I should have noted my point of disagreement with the Malbim: He holds
eidah to be a higher form than kohol. I, obviously, hold the opposite
to be the case.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

My response to a correspondent who wishes to remain anonymous:
>One place that immed. comes to mind where the terms are used interchangeably
>- baMidbar 10:3 and 10:7 where both pesukim refer to the same idea of
>gathering the congregation and both terms kahal and eidah are used
>interchangeably (and you can;t argue that it refers to two types of
>gathering, otherwise you ruin the limud of Rashi that pasuk 7 which refers
>to the kahal explains pasuk 3).

Nesei sefer v'nechezei. they cannot be interchangeable. Either I am right 
or the Malbim is.

>Am is identified as the lowest level (e.g. hamon am) including eirav rav,
>vs. bnei yisrael, the "believers" by Chasam Sofer at the beg. of Beshalach
>(I think GR"A there as well, I think it is based on the Ramban there), the
>idea that BN"Y/am split into seperate groups.  "Bshalach Pharoah es haAm"
>they couldn't be led down the path of the Plishtim because of the fear of
>war, yet Bnei Yisrael came out chamushim=armed, prepared for the battle.
>The term am as a national identity makes no sense there as the national
>identity of klal yisrael had not yet been defined.

They are called an Am already in Parashas Shemos. While the precise 
national ideal was only formulated at Har Sinai in the formal sense, the 
Avos already instilled some sense of nationhood in their progeny - but, 
more than that, it was Galus Mitzrayim that made the nation. That was the 
crucible.

>It should be fairly simple to check a concordonance for all the terms and
>see how they are used - I have a feeling there will be many exceptions, esp.
>in chumash shmos.  One more example - 32:1.  What does "am" have to do with
>the Eigel if it reflects a national idea - but acc. to Chasam Sofer's pshat
>it fits well.

What's the Chasam Sofer?

[In a second email, RYGB adds:]

As to my anonymous correspondent's issue with Bamidbar 10:3 vs. 10:7, if 
anything I think the gratuitous duplication with a different phrase is 
obvious proof to my hypothesis. Take a look at the Ramban there (a 
Kabbalistic one) which I believe verifies my position.

My correspondent wrote me under separate cover:

>V'im kol *adas* yisrael yishgu, vne'elam davar m'einei hakahal...v'hikrivu
>hakahal...v'samchu ziknei ha-eidah (Vayikra 14).
>
>If you say they are first called eidah bec. they sinned, and then kahal bec.
>of tshuvah, why are the zekeinim first called kahal and then "demoted" to
>ziknei ha-eidah?

A good example. The sin was committed by Yisroel as an Eidah, because those 
who were supposed to make them a Kohol failed at their task. The Korbon 
recreates the bond of the Kohol, but those who failed to prevent the sin 
are the ones degraded to do the semicha (note the double rebuke: 1. They 
are no longer Kohol; they are Eidah. 2. They are no longer Einei; they are 
Ziknei.

>By avodas Yom Kippurim (Vayikra 16,17 and 16,24) - Ahron's korban is
>mechaper on kol *khal* yisrael, but it also says kapparah for ha'am (even if
>you argue the korbanos are for 2 groups, why mix in a term signifying
>national identity here?)

Another good example. The kapporoh in the Kodesh Kodashim is for the Kohol; 
the one ba'Chutz is for the Am.

I am very tempted to write a book on this topic. Maybe after my sefer on 
Shoftim is out...

OTOH, perhaps someone else here would like to take up the cause...

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

In a message dated 6/15/01 8:21:24am EDT, micha@aishdas.org writes:
> But I have a question of my own. How does one distinguish an aveirah lishmah
> that one is instructed to do, as RAN describes here, from a hora'as
> sha'ah?

> Does a hora'as sha'ah require lishmah?

In the case of Hora'as Sha'ah, which can only be done thru a Novi, it becomes 
a Mitzvah, (of Eiluv Tishmaun).

Gut Shabbos, v'Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

On Fri, Jun 15, 2001 at 11:30:13AM -0400, Yzkd@aol.com wrote:
:> But I have a question of my own. How does one distinguish an aveirah lishmah
:> that one is instructed to do, as RAN describes here, from a hora'as
:> sha'ah?

: In the case of Hora'as Sha'ah, which can only be done thru a Novi, it becomes 
: a Mitzvah, (of Eiluv Tishmaun).

Which takes us back to my question: Given that Shimshon and Shelomo haMelech
were described as being ordered, either by a navi or via their own nevu'ah,
to marry these not-fully-converted women, why isn't this a case of hora'as
sha'ah?

In which case, I asked:
:> Does a hora'as sha'ah require lishmah?

Is "eilav tishma'un" one of the few mitzvos that require kavanah, never
mind "lishmah"?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On 15 Jun 01, at 0:51, Chana/Heather Luntz wrote:
>> The Gemara Bava Basra 48 is very relevant.  There we find the Torah accepts
>> forced transactions.  1.One can be forced to sell your field. 2. One can be
>> forced to bring a korban to Mikdash. 

> Are you referring to where the person is forced by beis din or in other
> circumstances? 

I think he's referring to "talyuha v'zavin zvinei zvinei." That does not 
seem to be connected to Beis Din.

>> 3. A man can be forced to divorce his wife.

> Again, via beis din - 

Because get, like a korban, requires ratzon on the husband's part.
That doesn't mean that every transaction in halacha requires ratzon.

> Part of the point I was making by bring the sources I brought (in
> relation to forced relations within marriage, damages payable on rape and
> prohibitions on general violence) is that the use of physical force is,
> in general, ossur (unless it is sanctioned beis din - and even there is
> one of the forms of force specifically permitted by the torah, makkos).

That's true within a marriage. But I don't think it's true for yibum - or
for that matter for yefas toar - at least with respect to biah rishona.
See the Gemara in Yevamos at the bottom of 8b and Rashi there s"v
b'al korcha.

-- Carl
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

In message <200106151556.f5FFube00538@lmail.actcom.co.il>, Carl Sherer
<sherer@actcom.co.il> writes:
>I think he's referring to "talyuha v'zavin zvinei zvinei." That does not 
>seem to be connected to Beis Din.

Yes (I thought I said the forced sale was a different case, something
found in Western legal systems as well for good logical reasons, but
noted that Beis Din had the power to unravel the sale should it choose
to do so). My comment above was on the second part, ie relating to a
korban. However, vis a vis kiddushin, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer
siman 42 si'if 1) poskens like Mar bar Rav Ashi who holds that such
kiddushin is uprooted by the Rabbanan (see the Nosei Kelim there who
state this explicitly).

...
>Because get, like a korban, requires ratzon on the husband's part. 
>That doesn't mean that every transaction in halacha requires ratzon.

What I was attempting to do was to go through the list provided and show
that none of them actually applied as described. The issue is not actually
one of transactions in halacha, because many if not most transactions
are not mitzvas, the question I thought we were discussing was the
permissibility in the use of force to compel another in the carrying
out of mitzvos (that is clearly something permitted to beis din, but it
is not clear that it is something permitted to others). But if we are
looking at transactions, you can easily have a case where a transaction
may be valid but the individual(s) who effectuated it may have rendered
themselves liable to being flogged by beis din. In such circumstances,
would you say the halacha permits or forbids the transaction?

>That's true within a marriage. But I don't think it's true for yibum - or 
>for that matter for yefas toar - at least with respect to biah rishona. 
>See the Gemara in Yevamos at the bottom of 8b and Rashi there 
>s"v b'al korcha. 

You have to distinguish between an act being ossur and yet still
performing a mitzvah.  Within a marriage, as demonstrated, rape may be
ossur, but children produced from such relations still fulfil the
mitzvah of pru u'rvu (even if they are, according to the gemorra, bound
to be problematic children).  I would suspect that the Rabbanan would
have a similar position vis a vis yibbum ie that the yibbum is effective
to make her his wife and therefore to require a get d'orisa.  But this
does not necessarily mean that the act is also not ossur on different
grounds (the argument against the yibbum being effective according to
the Rabbanan would have to be based on the same kind of uprooting
discussed above vis a vis a forced kiddushin, ie because the Rabbanan
have forbidden yibum without may'mar, which is like kiddushin, one might
therefore apply the same rules to it as with kiddushin mamash, ie that
it works d'orisa but is uprooted by the rabbanan considering his bi'ah a
bias znus - I said the argument was complicated).

It is only the position of Abba Shaul re yibbum that has the extra
mental element required for the mitzvah (a higher state than ratzon
even) which it would seem to me prima facie rules out the yibbum
actually being effective in a rape situation.

regards
Chana

In Avodah V7 #62, Micha asked:
> How do you translate this phrase?

Just as if it was written, "...umasbi-ah Rotzon l'chol chai." Unless I
misread them, not one of your three possibilities assumes that "ratzon"
could actually be a category of blessing from hKbH (think of "shefa" :-)).
BTW, as written in T'hillim 145:16, this 4th possibility assumes a ta'am
mafsik on "chai" -- I could be wrong, but I believe I checked some time
ago that such was the case.

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

Another "Horachamon" that may not be so pashut is
"brocha meruba babyis hazeh, v'al shulchan zeh".
Do you say this when:
1. eating at work (business owned by non-Jews)?
2. gentile-owned restaurant?
3. simcha hall owned by gentiles?

kol tuv
Sender Baruch

I thank R' Yitzchok Zirkind for his response to my post.

It sounds to me like he feels that (1) wearing a beged without tzitzis
on Shabbos does not violate any d'Oraisas, yet (2) wearing a beged *with*
tzitzis on Shabbos does fulfill a d'Oraisa.

That view seems contradictory to me, and is exactly the point I am trying
to clarify. If there is no statement in the Torah which says that I am
wrong for wearing a tzitzisless beged, then which statement do I fulfill
by wearing the tzitzis?

Isn't the (weekday) prohibition against a tzitzisless beged learned out
directly from the obligation to put the tzitzis on? If the aseh exists
on a d'Oraisa level, how can the issur not exist? And if the issur does
not exist, how can there be an aseh?

I am also confused by the assertion that <<< 3) By putting on a garment
without Tzitzis, one does not violate the Mitzva, only if he continues
wearing it without puting in Tzitzis. >>>

Is this a reference to "chetzi shiur", or what? Can a person deliberately
put on a pasul tallis, claiming that it does not violate any mitzva,
and then continue to wear it on the grounds that it's merely a "shev
v'al taaseh"?

Good Shabbos to all,
Akiva Miller

A hashkafic note about tzitzis and Shabbos.

The Maharal on Menachos writes that a person wears three things: a
tefillah shel rosh kineged the neshamah, a tefillah shel yad kineged
the ru'ach, and tzitzis kineged the nefesh.

Shabbos is an os, but only on the levels of ru'ach and neshamah. Which is
why "Nishmas kol chai tivareich es shim'cha, veru'ach kol basar..." is
said on Shabbos, but there is nothing in there about nefashos.

(I had thought that "kol basar" implicitly qualified.)

That is why, the Maharal continues, wearing tefillin on Shabbos is
considered a zilzul, but wearing tzitzis is not.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

From: Kenneth Miller [mailto:kennethgmiller@juno.com]
> That view seems contradictory to me, and is exactly the point I am trying
> to clarify. If there is no statement in the Torah which says that I am
> wrong for wearing a tzitzisless beged, then which statement do I fulfill
> by wearing the tzitzis?
...
> I am also confused by the assertion that <<< 3) By putting on a garment
> without Tzitzis, one does not violate the Mitzva, only if he continues
> wearing it without puting in Tzitzis. >>>

> Is this a reference to "chetzi shiur", or what? Can a person deliberately
> put on a pasul tallis, claiming that it does not violate any mitzva,
> and then continue to wear it on the grounds that it's merely a "shev
> v'al taaseh"?

(Without any research) I assume that the explanation is that the reason it's
assur to wear a tzitzis-less beged is that this is a bitul aseh of "v'asu
lahem tzitzis."  A beged in the closet is not mechuyav in tzitzis.  Only
when you put it on are you mechuyav.  On a weekday, if immediately after
putting on the tzitzis-less beged you make the effort to put on tzitzis, you
have not been mevatel the aseh.  Similarly, on Shabbos, because it is
impossible to tie the knots of tzitzis, you have not been mevatel the aseh
by not adding tzitzis to the garment.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

The sources  for not delivering bad news are in Mo'ed Katan 20a Pesachim 3b
and Yoreh De'ah 402:12. Stuart Fischman

I wrote:
> The Sha'agas Aryeh (65-69) paskens like the Rambam. 

RY Zirkind wrote:
> ???

My mistake.  The Sha'agas Aryeh only paskens like the Rambam that the obligation
of simcha today is de'oraisah.  He disagrees over whether it is specifically 
with basar and holds that it can be fulfilled with other things.

Gil Student

RGS just posted a web page with the title "Why does G-d punish?" at
<http://www.aishdas.org/articles/punish.html>. As the article is
in response to our recent discussion here, I assume it's of
interest.

For people who don't use web browsers, you can get the page by emailing
<gabbi@aishdas.org> with the request (unindented):
    get articles/punish.html
or, if you want the plain text rather than the html:
    view articles/punish.html

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

(After some private e-mail dialogue, Micha requested clarification.
Hope this helps rather than confuses....)

I previously wrote:
> Just as if it was written, "...umasbi-ah Rotzon l'chol chai."

The concept of "ratzon," as I see it, is a two-way street. (1) A
human being tries to be "m'ratzeh" another human or hKbH (see RaShY on
B'raishis 33:10) -- as part of this way, a human usually does or says
something [physical]. (2) hKbH grants a certain state of being which
indicates that the human was successful (see RaMBaN on D'vorim 33:23)
-- as part of this way, the understanding human feels a [physical]
effect of his effort at being "m'ratzeh" hKbH. I mention the pairush
RaMBaN on that posuk to especially highlight the ambiguity inherent in
"ratzon" (as opposed to "vatirtzaini" or, to get back to our discussion,
"r'tzon y'rai-av" in T'hilim 145), because that same ambiguity inhabits
the phrase Micha publicly examined last week.

Before I continue, let's address the t'omim:
>> It fits the trop, assuming some similarity to Navi trop, meircha
>> sof-pasuk implies that the two words should be paired.

> this 4th possibility assumes a ta'am mafsik on "chai"

I didn't clearly contradict Micha's statement because I wasn't
sure of the trop, although I did recall that "ratzon" stood alone.

After having conversed with Micha and having checked the trop, he may
have had a point if "l'chal-chai" was graced with a maircha, but it's
not: the ta'am is munach (tangent: as opposed to a "shofar" -- long ago,
I wanted to query 'Mesorah'-niks whether the ancient name of "shofar"
applies to the ta'am m'shorais of all s'forim aside from sifrai EMeS
and someone renamed the ta'am as "munach" when, in sifrai EMeS, it was
a mafsik), and, at least in this case (and, possibly, all cases just
ahead of an esnachta or a sof pasuk), is a mafsik, separating "umasbiah
l'chal-chai" from "ratzon." (Another tangent: tipcha, which is a ta'am
mafsik in all s'forim aside from sifrai EMeS, is a m'shorais in sifrai
EMeS; the ta'am mafsik in sifrai EMeS which looks just like it, and which
relates to it much as y'siv relates to mahpach in non-sifrai-EMeS s'forim,
is called d'chi.)

As a consequence, not only Micha's 2nd possibility but also, it seems to
me, his 1st one, fall by the wayside. What is left? A possibility very
similar to his 1st (he, and y'all, are free to disagree and say it _was_
his 1st :-)), in which "ratzon" is translated as if it was "r'tzono"
and refers to the object of "masbiah," or the possibility I outlined, in
which "ratzon" means "ratzon hKbH" (which is why I capitalized it in my
previous post). This is the same ambiguity we saw in D'vorim 33:23, and I
imagine it occurs whenever "ratzon" is used (sans s'michus or pronoun).
Most m'forshim seem to go with the former possibility, considering
"ratzon" to be in the same mode as "r'tzon y'rai-av" (see RSRHirsch).
I have difficulty with this derech, given that the posuk just says
"ratzon," that "kal-chai" may include more than humanity while "ratzon"
may be hard to apply to more than humanity, and that this posuk is meant
to be one of praise rather than request (there's a lot more to be said,
but ain kan m'komo), hence I raised the latter possibility.

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

********************


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