Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 062

Friday, June 15 2001

• RE: Reward, punishment, hashgachah and teva
• Re: Reward, punishment, hashgachah and teva
• Rabbi Guttman
• Tzitzis on Shabbos - d'Rabanan?
• Re: Headcovering In The Time Of The Gemara
• Re: Ain Simcha Elah B'Basar... A Vegetarian's Dilema.
• Re: Torah's Eternity
• Re: Headcovering In The Time Of The Gemara
• RE: bentching (was: curious chabad minhag)
• Re: bentching (was: curious chabad minhag)
• Re: Curious Chabad Minhag
• Umasbi'ah lichol chai ratzon
• Re: Ain Simcha Elah B'Basar... A Vegetarian's Dilema.
• Re: Tzitzis on Shabbos - d'Rabanan?
• Re: yibum vs rape
• Re: Torah's Eternity
• Re: Dor Revi'i on the m'kosheish eitzim
• kavod av

From: Micha Berger [mailto:micha@aishdas.org]
> Actually, Rav Dessler does not say nature is a farce. He acknowledges
> that there are rules of behavior for science to discover. ...

While scientific equations do allow you to predict the consequences of
actions, I would think that REED would advise someone against making his
life's work the study of science (a.k.a. "Hashem's achizas einayim").
If Hashem is merely following a pattern in order to trick us, why
devote lots of time to the study of the trick? Moreover, if we want to
be healthy people, we should not spend too much time paying attention to
scientific studies (so long as our health will not be considered an open
miracle) and instead spend our time davening for health and doing mitzvos.
My point is that a consequence of REED's theory is that believing Jews
shouldn't really take science seriously. Contrast that with the Rambam.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

On Wed, Jun 13, 2001 at 04:59:30PM -0400, Feldman, Mark wrote:
: My point is that a consequence of REED's theory is that believing Jews
: shouldn't really take science seriously. Contrast that with the Rambam.

My confusion was in how far you were taking that contrast. The Rambam
not only "takes science seriously" but considers teva to be a created
"thing" (a hypostasis) that sits "between" HKBH and the beri'ah. One
can deny that idea and still take science seriously.

FWIW, the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (the leading
sevara behind QM) agrees that reality doesn't work the same when no
one is looking -- that it's only deterministic after observation. Perhaps
that's why I didn't see that statement by REED as being kineged science.
Although to him, it certainly was.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

I took my own advice and, when I went to mincha today, "chapped a shmooze"
with Rabbi Guttman, whose proficiency in dikduk has been mentioned here.
I wound up buying a sefer which he reprinted, Masores Hakeriah, which
is a sefer on dikduk, keria, and written in the form of a mesora, with
sources from Minchas Shai, R"VH, Ohr Torah, etc.

He has many other sefarim, but is is quite amenable to shmoozing even if
you're not buying. My son, who was wondering what happened to me when I
didn't come home from mincha, told me that he goes to all the camps, and
will gladly, given only a willing ear, talk about dikduk "for dummies";
assuming absolutely no prior knowledge. Not that bad an assumption in
many circles, unfortunately.

I took a list of sefarim which he wrote or published which I'd be
happy to fax to anyone requesting. To give you an idea, he has 130
sefarim on dikduk, ranging from the "kerias shema card" now also
available for birchas hamazon, and on up. Also 22 sefarim on kiddush
hachodesh/astronomy, and dozens of tapes.


Nearly forgot the reason I put this on Avodah instead of Areivim: two
divrei Torah that he told me:

1. Why is the trop different for Yehoshua bin Nun as the representative of
shevet Efraim? The answer is we know that the yud from Sarai was mollified
by being put at the beginning of Yehoshua/Hoshea's name. Where, however,
did the sheva under that yud come from-there isn't any under the yud in
Sarai? If you take the word "ben" and change it to bin, you gain two dots.
These are the sheva under the yud. Using the trop used for the other
torei ha'aretz would have meant separating the name Yehoshua from the
bin-Nun part, which according to this explanation wouldn't be proper.

2. In Beshalach in the parashas hamon, why is the word vayiv'ash?
(vayorum tola'im vayiv'ash) It should have a komatz, since it comes at an
esnachta? Rashi says there that it's a mikra hafuch, since the natural
order is be'isha before tola'im. Therefore, despite its position in the
pasuk, the phrase _chronologically_ doesn't end at vayiv'ash.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

I was learning Hilchos Tzitzis recently, and came across something which
surprised me very much, and I'd like to share it with the chevra. Perhaps
I have misunderstood and someone can correct me, or perhaps someone can
confirm that I've understood it correctly.

Shulchan Aruch O"C 13:3 describes a situation where a person has
discovered that the tzitzis on his tallis are pasul, and he must
therefore remove that tallis immediately, so as not to be mevatel the
mitzvas aseh of tzitzis, even though it would be very embarrassing to
remove it. However, this exact same situation, if it occurs on Shabbos,
then he does *not* have to remove the tallis immediately.

Several sources give the same reason for this distinction between Shabbos
and other days: Normally, tzitzis is a mitzvah d'Oraisa which cannot be
overriden by Kavod Habrios. But on Shabbos, tzitzis is only a mitzvah
d'Rabanan, which is set aside in cases of great embarrassment. (The poskim
do give examples of embarrassing situations, but they are irrelevant
to my question. Suffice it to say that the same situation would yield
a different psak on Shabbos and on Chol.)

Those poskim explain exactly why they feel tzitzis to be only
d'Rabanan on Shabbos, and I'll leave it to the chevra to read it in
their own words. Specifically, I've seen this in Mishna Brurah 13:9,
Aruch Hashulchan 13:7, Taz 13:4, Magen Avraham 13:8, and Biur HaGra
13:V'davka. Similar logic appears in Chayei Adam 11:35, except that he
adds a situation where one's tzitzis became pasul on Chol, but there
are no tzitzis in the city to fix these with, and that makes me wonder
if I've really misunderstood the whole sugya.

Bottom line: It sounds to me like both (a) the prohibition against wearing
a tzitzisless beged, and also (b) the mitzva kiyumis to wear a beged
that does have tzitizis, - are both only d'rabanan on Shabbos. This was
a very surprising revelation to me, and I'd like to hear what the rest
of you think.

Thanks for reading this post. And a Good Shabbos to all!

Akiva Miller

Harry Maryles wrote on Areivim:
>For men, the Gemarah never mandated a requirement for Kisui Rosh
>at all. It is only mentioned that Chazal were careful to not walk
>around bareheaded. Many reasons are given in the Gemmarah for
>covering one's head mostly having to do with a tangible reminder
>of having the fear of heaven above, in order to prevent one from
>committing Aveiros.

I recently saw a teshuvah from R. Tzvi Pesach Frank (beginning of Orach
Chaim) in which he argued that covering one's head is min hadin for
everyone.

Gil Student

The Sha'agas Aryeh (65-69) paskens like the Rambam. The Magen Avraham
(529) seems to as well, which is what the Darchei Teshuvah that RYZ cited
discusses. The DT's son, the Minchas Elazar, implies that he holds like
the Rambam in his Nimukei Orach Chaim 529:2. The She'arim Metzuyanim
Bahalachah (290:4) does as well.

Gil Student

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
> For that matter, RMMS suggests that the avos were mekayamim the yesod
> behind the din, and not necessarily the din as nitztaveh. As I don't
> own any lekutei sichos, I leave it to someone else to provide the
> mar'eh makom.

He may be referring to the view expressed in the Nefesh HaCHaim [1:21
-mi], which I will rather clumsily attempt to summarize. In discussing the
"shorshei hamitzvot", R. Chaim Volozhin explains that the performance
of a mitzvah has mystical "otherworldly" effects. R. Chaim states that
before matan torah, people who understood the true shorshei hamitzvot
(such as the avos) were permitted to assess these impacts in determining
whether or not to perform a mitzvah. Thus, Yaakov was allowed to marry
two wives because he new that the positive effects of his action would
outweigh whatever resulting negative impact of the violation of the
torah. R. Chaim concludes that the meaning of "lo bashamayim hi" is that
after matan torah, we are no longer permitted to do this "cost-benefit"
analysis and must comply with the torah no matter what.

In a message dated Thu, 14 Jun 2001 11:45:53am EDT, "Gil Student"
<gil_student@hotmail.com> writes:
> I recently saw a teshuvah from R. Tzvi Pesach Frank (beginning of Orach
> Chaim) in which he argued that covering one's head is min hadin for
> everyone.

I did a tikkun leil shavuot on the subject and would be glad to fax the mekorot I used to anyone who is interested.

KT
Joel

I have heard that when one is bentching in a room where there are also
gentiles present (such as the waiters at a wedding), one should be careful
not to say "osanu" (in "Harachaman hu yuvoraich es....v'es kol asher li,
*osanu* v'es kol asher lanu"), but should substitute something to the effect
of "kol ba'alei bris" for the word "osanu."

Two questions: 1) where is this brought down; and 2) how many of you are
makpid to use the alternative language?

KT
Aryeh
aryehstein@yahoo.com  

In a message dated 6/14/01 5:50:22pm EDT, aes@ll-f.com writes:
> I have heard that when one is bentching in a room where there are also
> gentiles present (such as the waiters at a wedding), one should be careful
> not to say "osanu" (in "Harachaman hu yuvoraich es....v'es kol asher li,
> *osanu* v'es kol asher lanu"), but should substitute something to the effect
> of "kol ba'alei bris" for the word "osanu."

One says ..Yevoreich Osonu *Bnei Bris*...

> Two questions: 1) where is this brought down; 

M"A O"C 189:1, S"A Horav 189:4, KS"A 44:18, it is also found in the Tehilas 
Hashem Siddur.

> makpid to use the alternative language?

When one is aware!

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

[RYGB also gave the S"A haRav as a mar'eh makom. -mi]

On Tue, Jun 12, 2001 at 09:09:57AM -0500, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
: This individual noted (and if you look closely at the matter, is probably
: correct) that it is clear that this last Horachamon is meant to bless
: the Ba'al and Ba'alas ha'Bayis, and that A"M and I"M is only and sheerly
: coincidental when one is at one's parent's home.

Actually, I tend to say it every Shabbos, but only on Shabbos -- but
alst chinuch. When sitting around the table with the kids and singing
benching, I sing the harachaman as they would. Where else will those
who can't read well enough learn the words?

As for what I say when benching myself... I felt funny dropping the
opportunity to ask for a berachah for my parents when I got married.
So, I include them, but not as "ba'al / ba'alas habayis hazeh".

How fixed is this matbei'ah? After all, I don't see this discussion being
about whether or not to say "ve'es ishto..." when the host is single. Or
mentioning children when they are (so far) childless. Every bencher I
own offers the list of who to include as conditional.

And what if not all children in the home are genetic offspring? Does
one say "zar'am" or "benam uvnosam"? (In Mi Shebeirach, a similar issue
arises. At this point I no longer have to remind our gabbai to include
all "benah uvnosah", and not only those who are "yotzei chalatzeha".)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

How do you translate this phrase?

The obvious hava aminah would be "and satisfies every living being's
desires." But that would be "retzon kol chai" -- semichut gives us
"A of B" not "B of A".

(I'm going somewhere with this that made me decide to put it here rather
than Mesorah. Hang on...)

Alternatively, one could read it as "and satistfies every living desire",
attaching the "chai" to "ratzon". It fits the trop, assuming some similarity
to Navi trop, meircha sof-pasuk implies that the two words should be paired.
But that would be "kol ratzon chai" -- adjectives follow nouns.

Or perhaps the pasuk means, "satisfies every living being, may it be
[Your] will".

The basic problem is that ratzon lacks a possesive -- whose ratzon?
It lacks grammatical connection of any sort to the rest of the pasuk.
Some words in brackets are going to appear in a translation.

Aside from that, Dovid haMelech writes a few pesukim later, "Retzon
yerei'av ya'aseh". Not promising that the asiyah be for "kol chai" but
only for "yerei'av" and rather than promising sevi'ah, only the asiyah.

So the pasuk here can't be the satiation of all desires.

People need goals. A life without a purpose leads to ennui, to a sense
of futility, and unhappiness.

R' Noach Weinberg states that man is a happiness seaker. I would like to
respectfully disagree. Happiness isn't the particular goal that we chase;
I would define happiness by the pursuit itself! The act of pursuing and
accomplishing is what brings happiness. The more meaningful and longer
term the thing being pursued, the greater happiness one feels in that
pursuit.

And so, back to our pasuk, I would suggest the following derashah. David
haMelech is telling us that HKBH gives us with contentment by providing
us with desires. "Ratzon" is an explanatory phrase tacked on the way
"his poseik is in the sentence, "R' Aharon, his poseik, told him..."

I therefore would like to render this half of the pasuk as, "Satisfies
the lack in everyone alive, [which is] desire."


Speaking of the Tehillim's insights into human nature, consider "ach
tov vachesed yirdefuni". Note that the implication is that people often
run away from "tov vachesed", from what's good for them. And therefore
David haMelech asks that they *pursue* him.

And if /he/ made that mistake, think how often you and I must do it!

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

In a message dated 6/14/01 11:46:19am EDT, gil.student@citicorp.com writes:
> The Sha'agas Aryeh (65-69) paskens like the Rambam. 

???

BTW see Loshon Rashi on the Mishne in Chagiga 7b the reason for meat
(vs. poultry) is since only Basar is Masbia (and what about Lechem see
begining of Keitzad Mvorchin, and see Rashi D"H BAsar L'echol Shmos 16:8).

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

Here are the basic pointers to understand the above Halacho/s

1) There is a positive command to put in Tzitzis.
2) Putting on a Beged and not putting in Tzitzis one violates an Asei by 
being passive "Shev vAl Ta'aseh".
3) By putting on a garment without Tzitiz, one does not violate the MItzva, 
only if he continues wearing it without puting in Tzitiz.
4) On Shabbos one is prohibited from putting in Tzitzis.
5) Kovod Habriyos is Doche an Asei when done pasively in the case of a "Gnay 
Godol".
6) Kovod Habriyos is Doche a dRabonon, even in case of small embarasment
7) Wearing Beged with (some) Possul Tzitzis in a Rishus Horabim is a Lo Sasei 
(in addition to an Asei).

However a Beged that has Tzitiz in it is the same on Shabbos as Chol.

Accordingly here are some comments:

In a message dated 6/14/01 11:46:11am EDT, kennethgmiller@juno.com writes:
>Shulchan Aruch O"C 13:3 describes a situation where a person has
>discovered that the tzitzis on his tallis are pasul, and he must
>therefore remove that tallis immediately, so as not to be mevatel the
>mitzvas aseh of tzitzis, even though it would be very embarrassing to
>remove it. However, this exact same situation, if it occurs on Shabbos,
>then he does *not* have to remove the tallis immediately.

>Several sources give the same reason for this distinction between Shabbos
>and other days: Normally, tzitzis is a mitzvah d'Oraisa which cannot be
>overriden by Kavod Habrios.

Even in the week it can be overridden by Kavod Habriyos (S"A Horav 13:4)
it depends on the level of "Gnay"

> But on Shabbos, tzitzis is only a mitzvah d'Rabanan, 

On Shabbos the wearing of a Beged w/o Tzitzis is d'Rabonon.

>which is set aside in cases of great embarrassment. (The poskim
>do give examples of embarrassing situations, but they are irrelevant
>to my question. Suffice it to say that the same situation would yield
>a different psak on Shabbos and on Chol.)

Whereas the Issur is d'Rabonon even a "Gnay Koton" is Doche Asei passively.

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

In message , S. Goldstein <goldstin@netvision.net.il> writes
> Mrs Luntz writes
>> but whether it is possible for somebody to be purely and totally acting
>> l'shem shamayim when the act being done is so counter to everything the
>> Torah stands for. It seems, at least to me, that the concepts are so
>> inherently contradictory that if you posit that a particular mitzvah
>> must, to be a valid mitzvah, be done purely l'shem shamayim, then it
>> cannot be done in a way that involves the individual performing the
>> mitzvah physically forcing another in the manner contemplated.

>This is very similar to the original question of RHM which was, can the
>Torah allow major life decisions to be made without the consent of the
>involved parties.  I think the answer is YES. 

I don't agree that this "is very similar to the original question", I
think we are dealing with a totally different question here (the issue
of whether or not there are standards of morality outside or kodem to the
Torah is a fascinating topic, and is the one that RHM was alluding to, but
was not at all the one I was addressing). For one thing, I don't disagree
that major life decisions can be made without the consent of the involved
parties - but I hardly think that is a particularly novel proposition.

The more limited question I was addressing is a particular aspect of
yibum, at least according to Abba Saul, which is that yibum *must* be
performed l'shem shamayim, and if it is not, then in fact there is no
mitzvah but rather the yavam is over on the issur of eishes ach.

What I was discussing was what is comprised in this particular element,
namely "l'shem shamayim", and arguing that Abba Shaul (and the stam
mishna in Bechoros that follows him) would regard as impossible to keep
if we are talking about using force (that does not mean that this is
all that is required, to perform a mitzvah, any mitzvah, purely l'shem
shamayim is an extremely high level task - as is clearly indicated by
the fact that Abba Shaul believed that people at the time of *chazal*
were no longer on that level). Note however that an absence of force does
not necessarily mean the woman consents (that is not a requirement),
but there is a distinction between consent and active, communicated
non consent. One example of a nafka mina might well be a taus on behalf
of the woman - let us say to make it stronger that the yavam does not
realise that the woman is making the taus and believes whole heartedly
and on on reasonable grounds that she is at one with him in supporting
him performing the mitzvah l'shem shamayim. If consent was needed (as
in kiddushin) then such a taus may well render the kiddushin invalid,
but clearly it will not for the yibum.

>                                             RGS referred to this as the
>intellectual standpoint of the Torah in contrast to that of Western values.
>RHM replied that although he accepts Torah, he finds this idea unacceptable.
>RHM then continues to ask what is really going on here.

As I said, this is a different discussion. There are some very relevant
gemorras in Sanhedrin, and, inter alia, Rav Kook has written extensively
on the topic, but this is not the discussion I was getting into here.

>The Gemara Bava Basra 48 is very relevant.  There we find the Torah accepts
>forced transactions.  1.One can be forced to sell your field. 2. One can be
>forced to bring a korban to Mikdash. 

Are you referring to where the person is forced by beis din or in other
circumstances? My understanding is that while a forced sale is a sale,
a forced korban is only acceptable if it is a beis din doing the forcing,
and then only because we believe that a Jew *really* wants to listen to
the chachamim. In what other context can one be forced to bring a korban
to the mikdash? (eg what if I decided to force you without beis din
authority and sanction? My understanding is that the korban is invalid
in the same way that a get is invalid if I were to try and force you to
give it without beis din authority and sanction).

>3. A man can be forced to divorce his
>wife.

Again, via beis din - if we could do it any other way we would not have
the problems we have (a lot of the modern problems to do with gitten seem
rather to do with beis din not being willing to force men to divorce
their wives than the reverse, if being concerned for the position of
Rabbanu Tam over the Rambam, not to mention concerns regarding the extent
to which coercion is being used by other parties such as a secular court).

> 4. An adult woman can be forced to accept kiddushin from someone she
>does not wish to marry. 

What case are you thinking of here?

> In addition one can be forced to perform positive mitzvos.

Again, via beis din only as far as I am aware, and for the same reason.

>Though there are technical distinctions between this list and the previous
>list of kiddushei ketana, yibum and yiud(according to Tos); yet I think all
>would agree that this new list qualifies as being against a Western value
>system.

Err no, not really. Our secular court system regularly forces people to
a) sell their fields (Governments for example have rights to confiscate
your property to build roads etc) b) carry out the laws even when one
does not want to (yes they use imprisonment rather than flogging but the
principle of compulsion is the same); and c) divorce (in many many cases
of divorce, while one party may seek it, the other party is against it,
and a decree nisi is granted none the less).

Admittedly, neither korbanos nor other mitzvos bein adam l'makom are
dealt with by the Western system, but that is because the courts do not
regard themselves as having jurisdiction in such matters, not because,
if they did have jurisdiction, they could not then force you do to what
they tell you to do.

Perhaps the slightly different case in this list is the idea that a forced
sale between individuals being necessarily a sale. But again, while under
Western systems of law a court may well decide to unravel a sale if they
decide it was forced in circumstances against public policy (eg the sale
was under duress) but absent such proof in court, most legal systems
will tend to treat what appears to be a valid sale document as valid
(and I rather suspect that no legal system could function otherwise).
And again, under the principle of hefker beis din hefker, a beis din
has the same power as a secular court if it chooses to use it to annul
a sale and return the property to the original owner.

>So to the surprise of some, "everything the Torah stands for" does not
>include personal discretion to act in a way one chooses without external
>force.

And neither does any Western legal system. What is generally restricted
(although not completely) in the West is the personal discretion of
an individual to decide to force another individual without general
societal sanction. That is, as the saying goes, "the freedom to swing
my arm stops at your nose". The only legal system where this was not
the case that I am aware of was that of Sdom, where if you did decide
to swing your arm and hit my nose, not only was it perfectly mutar,
but I would be required by the legal system to pay you money for the
service of bloodletting you provided to me. Just about every other legal
system I have ever heard of has both a concept of criminality on use of
physical force (ie a concept of assault and battery) and a concept of
damages should the use of such physical force result in physical damage.

>So too, one may perform yibum by force while satisfying Abba Shaul's
>requirement of intention for the mitzvah.  To argue otherwise is to assert
>that Abba Shaul does not allow yibum by force, an opinion, I believe, that
>is not found in the Talmud.

Where is the opinion of Abba Shaul (or even the Rabbanan for that matter)
specifically allowing yibum by force found in the Talmud?


Part of the point I was making by bring the sources I brought (in
relation to forced relations within marriage, damages payable on rape and
prohibitions on general violence) is that the use of physical force is,
in general, ossur (unless it is sanctioned beis din - and even there is
one of the forms of force specifically permitted by the torah, makkos).
Note also that I specifically brought sources from the Talmud to this
effect, not from external (Western or otherwise) sources.

The question in relation to force must be by definition a bideved
discussion - what if yibum *was* performed by force - it is still to be
classified as performance of a mitzvah or is it in fact no mitzvah at all.
It may be that the Rabbanan might also hold it was no mitzvah at all,
but that argument is more complicated, which is why I focused on the
easy argument that according to Abba Shaul, given the extra element
that he requires, there would be no mitzvah at all and in fact force,
along with a whole range of other behaviours, would tip the balance into
the issur of eishes ach.

Regards
Chana

In message <F778Ua8d9Ee4zadTMVw0001f983@hotmail.com>, Stuart Goldstein
<stugolden@hotmail.com> writes
>                                    Certainly, if we cannot identify 
>Amalek or the Chilazon, we have a practical problem with performing a 
>mitzvah. One might almost compare that to the Europe of 1600-1900 where 
>finding an Etrog was often near-to-impossible. One could hardly say that the 
>Halacha of Arba Minim was in any way not "applicable" or "appropriate" 
>during that time. Okay, that would be an Ones. But (I think) that's my 
>point.

But not being able to find an Etrog in Europe was by definition caused
by socio-economic circumstances. If we are taking about a chiyuv,
as Micha points out, a socio-economic circumstance causes an ones
(the difference is that the kinds of socio-economic circumstances we
are discussing cause a community wide ones, and not an individual one).
The flip side, it seems to me, is when a Torah power is given which is
only meant to be used in certain socio-economic circumstances.

In message , Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> writes
>We were discussing whether one can derive the shoreshei hamitzvah (*)
>from the context in which the mitzvah was given. In order for this to
>be relevent, one would have to argue that HKBH hid the identity of
>Amaleik because this is not a time in which mechiyas Amaleik is the
>right thing to do. He Who gave the mitzvah is He Who allowed it to
>become unimplementable.

I supposed I jumped too quickly there, but it seems to me that this
is really the same answer and the flipside of the question. That is,
the original question that was being asked was, if you believe in the
Torah's eternity, how could HKBH permit something in the Torah that
was only applicable in certain times and places? But the equivalent
(and it seems to me more fundamental) question is, if you believe in
the Torah's eternity, how could HKBH give a chiyuv that he knew we would
be unable to perform for extended periods of time (and not just for an
individual because one of the ideas that is clearly articulated in the
Torah is that ultimately we function as a community, eg Cohanim have
chiyuvim that Yisroelim do not, and an individual may well not have a
son to do pidyon haben but it is statistically extremely unlikely that a
sizeable communitiy will never have this opportunity. Thus an ones for
an individual is one thing, but whole communities for generations and
generations)? To me the answer Micha gives above is the only answer I
can think of, for some reason HKBH permitted some generations to keep
certain mitzvos and made it impossible for other generations and He
did it by way of alteration of socio-economic circumstances affecting
such communities making it clear that such communities were not meant
to perform these particular mitzvos. If that is the case in relation to
something as fundamental as a chiyuv, then by comparison the idea that
HKBH built in to the Torah powers which are only meant to be exercised
in certain times and places seems hardly earth shattering.

It is only if we never faced the situation that a generation was prevented
by socio-economic circumstances from performing a mitzvah that it seems
to me that the other question would come to the for as fundamental.

Shabbat Shalom
Chana

On Wed, Jun 13, 2001 at 08:49:29PM +0300, Carl M. Sherer wrote:
: In Rav Nebenzahl's sicha (in the book - not on the net) on Parshas Naso,
: he discusses how Shlomo and Shimshon were both punished because although
: they were both instructed to be choteh l'Shem Shamayim by marrying
: non-Jewish women, they did not do so purely l'Shma. I'm trying to think
: of other examples in Tanach were someone did a cheit l'Shem Shamayim
: and whether their intent was pure or not. Any takers?

Esther, pure. "Veka'aser avadti, avadti."

But I have a question of my own. How does one distinguish an aveirah lishmah
that one is instructed to do, as RAN describes here, from a hora'as
sha'ah?

Does a hora'as sha'ah require lishmah?

-mi

I heard a shiur last night that quoted the Rambam that a convert is only
chayav in kavod av "miktzat" for his non-Jewish father (sounds like
hakarat hatov). This seems reasonable based on ger shenitgayer kkatan
hanolad dami if you assume that nonJews are not chayav in kavod av.

What about according to the opinions that kavod av is included in the 7
mitzvot. Why don't we say (as we do by the issur of prohibited sexual
relations with relatives) that on a Rabbinic level they are chayav in
kavod av or else people would say they have gone from a kedusha chamura
to a kedusha kalla?

SS
Joel

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