Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 060

Tuesday, June 12 2001

• Re: Copyright
• Re: Copyright (was Re: kedushei ketana)
• rape vs yibum
• Re: rape vs yibum
• Torah's Eternity
• okshartom
• Re: Ain Simcha Elah B'Basar... A Vegetarian's Dilema.
• Re: Whose fault is it anyway ?
• Re: Whose fault is it anyway ?
• CI
• Re: CI
• RE: Copyright
• RE: Ain Simcha Elah B'Basar... A Vegetarian's Dilema.
• Re: okshartom
• RE: Ain Simcha Elah B'Basar... A Vegetarian's Dilema.
• Shalosh Shevu'os
• RE: Ain Simcha Elah B'Basar... A Vegetarian's Dilema.
• RE: Ain Simcha Elah B'Basar... A Vegetarian's Dilema.
• Curious Chabad Minhag
• Curious Chabad Minhag
• preference not to be the deliverer of bad news
• Re: Reward, punishment, hashgachah and teva
• Re: Reward, punishment, hashgachah and teva
• Re: Yiud

On Fri, Jun 08, 2001 at 06:49:00PM +0300, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
: Isn't there something about Chidushei Torah not being subject to 
: copyright? I remember discussing that somewhere in the past. 

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
> Here's what I know about halachah and copyright law. Mostly from R' Zev
> Reichman (of REITS's Kollel Elyon). ...

Interesting. Last week I noticed a sefer in our Shul called "Lo kol
hazechuyos shemuros" which discusses this subject thoroughly.

I only glanced at it for a few minutes - but IIRC - he comes to the
conclusion that photocopying of seforim cannot be banned. (I think he
says the same with regard to copying of tapes.)

I'll have to get hold of it again and then give further details.

SBA

Micha Berger wrote:
> 1- Dina dimalchusa issues:
> According to Tosafos on Gittin, dina dimalchusah dinah is only on taxation.
> The Beis Yitzchak does rule that ddd applies here....

I'm puzzled by this. Copyright assigns as property something that,
naively, doesn't exist (not the book but the right to reproduce the book).
Even if Dina d'malchiutha is accepted as determining which person owns
something, is it obvious that it turns something unownable into property?

> 3- Hasagas gevul:
> There is an old cheirem, invoked in many if not most haskamos for a few
> centuries, against copying sefarim...
> Given this lashon, the CS concludes that the problem is hasagas gezul.

Was there really a general cheirem? I thought that local battei din had
the discretion of applying such a cheirem to books whose publishers
petitioned them. Note the difference from copyright law: this would
apply not to the author, but to the publisher.

> 6- Chilul Hashem
> In a case like Napster, where the case will have a kol and a trial in
> the press, I would think that the risk of chillul Hashem, and therefore
> *dinei nefashos*, is enough to assur it -- even in cases where the
> copying would be found to be technically legal.

If it's legal to do in what way does doing it cause a chillul hashem? Or
are you arguing that violating civil law is a chillul hashem (I agree)?

The second possibility, however, leaves open the question of whether a
Jewish author may obtain or enforce a copyright under conditions more
severe than those permitted under Jewish law. Is it muttar, for example,
to write in your book that it's assur to copy it "midin Torah"? Can a beit
din enforce American copyright law (if not how could one sue a violator)?

David Riceman

>:Yibum can be performed without the wife's consent, I think, according to
>: all tanaim. Abba Shaul is discussing motivation...

> Yes, and Abba Shaul would rule out the motivation of a rapist.

The question is can a woman be forced into marriage(yibum). I think you
are agreeing that the answer is yes. An ugly/obnoxious man could want
the mitzvah to help his brother without a motivation of lust, much to
the concern of his yavamah. Therefore, really, Abba Shaul is irrelevant
to the discussion of a forced marriage.

Shlomo Goldstein

In message , S. Goldstein <goldstin@netvision.net.il> writes
>Yibum can be performed without the wife's consent, I think, according to
>all tanaim. Abba Shaul is discussing motivation. If a husband has kavanna
>l'mitzva, he is koneh even without consent of the wife. Of course,
>as previously mentioned by several writers, this is not the preferred
>method of yibum.
>

It seems to me you are confusing a couple of matters.  Yibum, unlike
kiddushin, does not require as a necessary element of the mitzvah the
woman's consent.  In the case of kiddushin, no consent, no kiddushin,
but the same is not true of yibbum. That is what all tanaim agree.

What Abba Shaul is discussing is what he holds to be a different element
required for the fulfilment of yibbum, namely that it be done purely
l'shem shamayim *and not for any other reason* ie it is not just a
matter of having kavanna but also of the absence of any motivation eg
that the brother finds her attractive, so that the latter motivation has
to be totally absent, otherwise the brother is in fact over the issur of
eishes ach.  The Rabbanan disagree on the necessity of this requirement
of acting purely l'shem shamayim for the performance of the mitzvah (and
correspondingly if he did not act purely l'shem shamayim, but one
component of his motivation was in fact that he found her attractive
that would not mean he was over the issur of eshes ach).

But what I was pointing out was something that I would have thought was
pretty obvious.  If a woman is so dead set opposed to being married to
this particular brother, to the extent that he had to force himself on
her (just imagine to make the picture more vivid that she was kicking
and screaming and he had to use real physical violence to hold her
down), it is hard to consider him as genuinely performing the mitzvah
l'shem shamayim without any extraneous motivations.  The concept of
acting l'shem shamayim must, of necessity, it seems to me, mean that one
is not putting oneself in opposition to the whole thrust of the Torah in
so acting.

While this seems obvious to me,  - perhaps some further source texts
(that randomly occurred to me) will help make this clearer:

a) the gemorra in Eruvin 100b states that "it is forbidden for a man to
force his wife into the mitzvah [of pru u'rvu] as it says he who hastens
with his feet sins (mishlei 19:2)".  The mitzvah of pru u'rvu does not
come with Abba Shaul's condition that no l'shem shamayim, no mitzvah,
but forcing would seem to be a chet (with the consequence that one will
not have worthy children).

b) the gemorra in kidushin 39 in discussing the damages payable on rape
notes that the reason is because the pain of being flung to the ground
when coerced cannot be compared to the pain of one who has consensual
relations with her husband (you can argue that this discussion is
assuming the rape of a b'sula, but note that a yavama could be a b'sula
if she is a yavama who falls from eirusin - and even if she is not, the
point would still seem to be valid, rape causes physical damage over and
above that which is caused by consential relations);

c) Physically striking another Jew is forbidden (see Sanhedrin 58b) -
while even raising one's hand to strike them one is called a rasha
(ibid).  The mechanics of rape require a level of physical force that
would seem inevitably to breach this prohibition.

This is in addition to all the obvious general requirements of v'ahavta
re'echa kamocha and not to afflict anyone but particularly a widow
(Shmos 22:21) (which is after all what we are talking about here) even
with words, and how much more so with physical force.

And the issue, if one holds like Abba Shaul, is not just whether a
mitzvah can be done by way of an averah (although, as pointed out, it
would seem pretty close to inevitable in a real rape situation that the
act could not be done without averos being committed) but whether it is
possible for somebody to be purely and totally acting l'shem shamayim
when the act being done is so counter to everything the Torah stands
for.  It seems, at least to me, that the concepts are so inherently
contradictory that if you posit that a particular mitzvah must, to be a
valid mitzvah, be done purely l'shem shamayim, then it cannot be done in
a way that involves the individual performing the mitzvah physically
forcing another in the manner contemplated.

>Shlomo Goldstein

Regards

Chana

>

In message , Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> writes
>> I also do not understand the couple of posts that try to explain the
>> ethics of these dinim by focussing on the time and place the Torah was 
>> given. The Torah is just as true now, it wasn't given for the bayis rishon 
>> community alone.

From: Chana/Heather Luntz <Chana/Heather@luntz.demon.co.uk>
> But some halachas may be applicable or appropriate in only certain times and 
> places (clearly this is true of places, eg halachas in relation to eretz 
> yisroel are only applicable to eretz yisroel and to the beis hamikdash in 
> the beis hamikdash, but similarly for time - halachas vis a vis destroying 
> amalek are only applicable if amalek is identifiable...

Tha applicability of Halachot to a time and place was a factor even before
the Beit HaMikdash was built and, yea, even before Matan Torah, as we see
e.g. Yaakov marrying sisters, outside Eretz Yisroel, before Matan Torah
etc.. as various Meforshim deal with it. Certainly, if we cannot identify
Amalek or the Chilazon, we have a practical problem with performing a
mitzvah. One might almost compare that to the Europe of 1600-1900 where
finding an Etrog was often near-to-impossible. One could hardly say that
the Halacha of Arba Minim was in any way not "applicable" or "appropriate"
during that time. Okay, that would be an Ones. But (I think) that's my
point. If one is not in EY and therefore does not separate Terumot, he
is in essence an Ones as well. If one has no first-born son and cannot
fulfill Pidyon HaBen, he is also an Ones. These are mitzvot that are
meant to be eternal but if circumstances prevent them, then they cannot
be performed. Bamot, and even building the Mishkan were only NECCESARY
pre-Beit HaMikdash to facilitate Korbanot. Korbanot themselves, which
Bim'Heira B'Yameinu we will resume, are not "inapplicable" today -
we are Onsim again.

I can't resist adding the story which many may know, of the businessman
who hired an ignorant wagon driver to get him to the fair by a certain
date. So important was that date, that the wagon driver agreed that
if he did not get him there on time, the trip would be free. As it
happened, the muddy and wintry roads delayed them and the date was
missed. The businessman refused to pay and the driver took him to a Din
Torah, arguing Ones. When the Rav ruled in favor of the businessman,
the surprised driver asked what the P'sak was based on. The Rav replied
that it was based on the Torah. The driver asked when the Torah had been
given and the Rav said - Sivan. "Aha !" exclaimed the driver. "It was
given in the summer. Had it been given in the winter, with all the cold
and frozen mud, you definitely would have ruled for me !"

Stuart Goldstein

A friend of mine wrote this to me.  Any comments?

-- Eric

> Perhaps you can help me find an answer to a quetion or two:

> My friend Jack and I are studying Brechot 14b-15a. The Gemera discusses the
> mitzvah of tifilin and the use of the word okshartom (sorry about my
> transliteration). I am wondering , if you can explain, why this word was
> used instead of a derivative of akeidah. I looked them up in BDB, and
> understand the difference, but why this choice?

> Also, the same word is used in Bereshit to describe the sheep in Jacob's
> deal with Laban. What's the drash on this?

Harry Maryles wrote:
> So what's all the fuss about eating Basar on Yom Tov.

Being machmir for the shitah of the Rambam.

Gil Student

Stuart Goldstein wrote:
>>What was the Hava Amina ? Is that not the basic premise of S'char V'Onesh?

From: gil.student@citicorp.com
>The hava amina is that we cannot assume that people are suffering for their 
>sins.  We should assume that it is just a natural occurence i.e. mikreh.

Please pardon me for apparently coming into this a little late. Where did
such a Hava Amina spring from, in light of the Geamara (Berachos 5) that
one should attribute his sufferring to his deeds (Yefashfesh B'Maasav) or
Bitul Torah. Are you suggesting that this Chazal may be limited to general
sufferring as a result of sin, but no direct connection between a specific
sin and the sufferring ? That still hardly qualifies as Mikreh. And if I
am essentially beating a dead horse here, what did you wish to accomplish
with the Ramban that the Gemara did not already make clear ?

Stuart Goldstein

Stuart Goldstein wrote:
> Where did such a Hava Amina spring from, in light of the Geamara
> (Berachos 5) that one should attribute his sufferring to his deeds
> (Yefashfesh B'Maasav) or Bitul Torah.

This particular discussion started by my citing this gemara. It was
noted that this passage only deals with dealing with one's own sins,
not the sins of others. The gemara does not say that if you see someone
suffering you should attribute it to his sins. The Ramban does.

Gil Student

>: I strongly disagree. There is no such thing as an authority who is
>: not your rebbe or rav. No rabbi can pasken for other communities.

> But no competant rav of that other community ought ignore the opinion
> of a CI. So, while not binding (and thus not an authority in the sense
> RET seems to be using the word) that pesak does have influence (which
> is what RYGB is apparantly talking about).

If RYGB is stating that we should strongly consider the words of CI I
dont think anyone would disagree. I felt he was stating more than that.



>: Daniel brings down the Divrei Chaim on the other hand asserts that
>: gedolim have ruach hakodesh.

> However, since gedulah is a relative term, this only means that one is
> comparing quantity of intellect and of ru'ach hakodesh when considering
> someone else's pesak, rather than intellect alone. The dynamic is the
> same, though.

There is a story that someone once quoted Rav Diskin and said that his
words were like a Navi. At that point the Brisker Rav got very upset and
said that no posek has the din of a navi in having his words accepted
without reasoning.

What most disturbed me about RYGB's position is the concept that that a
psak without reasoning is somehow stronger than a psak with reasoning.
I am not an expert in the piskei of CI but I do recall one example that
may clarify the issue.

To make life simpler this in fact is not a halakhah le-mase question.
In his discussions on hilchot nezikin the CI mentions, in passing, that
one would not be required to pay for damage to someones health as this is
a hezek she-eno nikar. He states this without any further proof. According
to my understanding of RYGB since no proof is given this becomes a psak
binding on all communities whether or not that accept CI as their posek
similar to the case of electricity being Boneh.

My understanding of CI is that as a consquence smoking in a place where
it would damage other peoples health would not be punishable even if we
had judges with semichah who could issue fines. Rav Feinstein clearly
disagrees since he states that if a court did exist one could collect
damages for that inflicted by smoking.If someone short of the stature
of RMF disagreed does RYBG state that this is wrong since this is a psak
without full discussion and thus on the status of a navi?

Does this principle apply only to CI or to other modern poskim? RMF has
a question whether the prayer is morid hageshem or gashem. From memory
he gives a straight answer without proof. Does this make it more binding
than if he had a long discussion. I understand there is a whole booklet
on the question.

I am sure that there are many other such points made in CI which are
controversial. I find it hard to believe that one cannot disagree with
a statement made in passing without full justification but can disagree
with a lengthy discussion in which CI attempts to prove his point.

Eli Turkel

At 03:46 PM 6/11/01 +0200, Eli Turkel wrote:
>>: I strongly disagree. There is no such thing as an authority who is
>>: not your rebbe or rav. No rabbi can pasken for other communities.

>> But no competant rav of that other community ought ignore the opinion
>> of a CI. So, while not binding (and thus not an authority in the sense
>> RET seems to be using the word) that pesak does have influence (which
>> is what RYGB is apparantly talking about).

Essentially, RET's posting has nothing to do with my position. He created
a position that bears a vague similarity to mine, but is, of course,
an untenable and irrational position that I would never have espoused.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

[So, can we put this discussion to bed now? -mi]

According to a shiur I attended years ago on the subject, some authorities
hold that ONLY Divrei Torah have any kind of "copyright". Their reason is
that "intellectual property" has no basis in Torah, and therefore has no
value (as opposed to Karka, for example).

Divrei Torah, OTOH, HAS a clear value, and therefore can be protected.

Akiva

Harry Maryles wrote:
>> So what's all the fuss about eating Basar on Yom Tov.

From: gil.student@citicorp.com [mailto:gil.student@citicorp.com]
> Being machmir for the shitah of the Rambam.

I have a feeling that most people assume that there's a real chiyuv to
eat meat on Y"T, and not, as Harry says, that this is a shitas yachid.
If it is a shitas yachid, the benefit of being machmir for the Rambam
might be outweighed by health concerns associated with the consumption
of substantial quantities of meat (especially in Chu"l, when 5 out of
8 days can be Y"T or Shabbos).

Kol tuv,
Moshe

In a message dated 6/11/01 10:57:09am EDT, erics@radix.net writes:
>> My friend Jack and I are studying Brechot 14b-15a. The Gemera discusses the
>> mitzvah of tifilin and the use of the word okshartom (sorry about my
>> transliteration). I am wondering , if you can explain, why this word was
>> used instead of a derivative of akeidah. I looked them up in BDB, and
>> understand the difference, but why this choice?

See Rashi Breishis 22:9 the word Akeidah is used for tying hands and feet
together which is the way it is done on cattle, see also Melachim II 10:12
Beis Eked Horoim is called that way (according to many Mforshim) because
that is where the shore the sheep which are tied in above description,
this has no relation to regular tying of things.

>> Also, the same word is used in Bereshit to describe the sheep in Jacob's
>> deal with Laban. What's the drash on this?

WRT Yaakov and the sheep Yaakov with the Maklos had the Kavana of Tphilin.

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

On 11 Jun 2001, at 11:48, Feldman, Mark wrote:
> I have a feeling that most people assume that there's a real chiyuv to
> eat meat on Y"T, and not, as Harry says, that this is a shitas yachid.
> If it is a shitas yachid, the benefit of being machmir for the Rambam
> might be outweighed by health concerns...

At the back of his sefer on Chol HaMoed, Rabbi Zucker from the 
Chicago Kollel has an entire section on the chiyuv of eating meat 
on Yom Tov. AIUI, unless you find meat totally disgusting such that 
eating it would spoil your oneg Yom Tov, you are required to eat it 
on Yom Tov. 

-- Carl
mailto:cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il      mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il
Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

From my "anonymous" uncle, the Bar Plugta of the Satmar Rebbe:
>Your friend forgot another mishnah - hevei don es kol ho'odom
>lekaf zechus. It so happens that i did read the Vayoel Mosheh and also Al
>Hageuloh Vehatmuroh, and so did others who disagree with him. Briefly, the
>bottom line is that he offers his interpretation, and it is a daas yochid
>against most others. e) Re Maharal, see his comm. on the shevu'os (and also
>Netzach Yisroel 24-25)saying that they are gezeiros to retain the (temporary)
>gezeiro of golus. He clearly ties the shovuos to israel with those to the
>goyim, making them interdependent, which obviously implies what I wrote that
>the negation by them suggests a negation for us (al derech tiharu Amon
>uMoav). f) As I pointed out from Lik. Sichos, and supported by other
>authorities, the shevuoh of lo yimredu bagoyim (even if still valid) does not
>relate to present condition (including events of 1947-8) - and I would argue
>here also with the Steipler's suggestion (derech agav - what is the source
>for this citation) that the establishment of Israel was ossur [how would he
>distinguish it from hetter of bi'oh sheniyoh of Ezra???] and he accepts it
>only bedi'eved. g) Re 1000 years, see Ramban's Sefer Hage'uloh where he uses
>this similar time-limit argument to nullify prohibition of chishuv haketz. In
>short, acharei kichlos hakol - I repeat: mute and irrelevant according to
>preponderant views vs. Satmar.

KT,
YGB

At 11:43 PM 6/11/01 +0300, Carl M. Sherer wrote:
>At the back of his sefer on Chol HaMoed, Rabbi Zucker from the
>Chicago Kollel has an entire section on the chiyuv of eating meat
>on Yom Tov. AIUI, unless you find meat totally disgusting such that
>eating it would spoil your oneg Yom Tov, you are required to eat it
>on Yom Tov.

Required?

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

From: Carl M. Sherer <cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il>
> At the back of his sefer on Chol HaMoed, Rabbi Zucker from the 
> Chicago Kollel has an entire section on the chiyuv of eating meat 
> on Yom Tov. AIUI, unless you find meat totally disgusting such that 
> eating it would spoil your oneg Yom Tov, you are required to eat it 
> on Yom Tov. 

I looked up R Zucker's piece--siman 1 in the bei'urim.  He does *not* say
that one is required to eat meat on Y"T.  Rather, he says like the Beur
Halacha that the Bais Yosef is correct in disagreeing with the Rambam.
Consequently, there is no chiyuv to eat meat.  Nevertheless, by eating meat
one does fulfill a mitzvah.  He concludes that it is proper to be mehader to
eat meat, but if one prefers milchigs, then there is no reason to be mehader
after meat.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

Live and Learn!

Just learnt today of a most curious Chabad Minhag:

In the final Horachamon in Bentching, the one about Avi Mori etc.,
Lubavitchers, it seems, never vary the nusach: i.e., even if their
parents have been dead for many years, and even if they are eating at
someone else's home, and despite the fact that they have wife and kids,
they always say, precisely, no more no less than:

"Horachamon hu yevareich es Avi Mori Ba'al ha'Bayis ha'zeh v'es Imi
Morosi Ba'alas ha'Bayis ha'Zeh!"

I thought immediately that this is because the Romm printers of
the Tehillas Hashem siddur were stingy on ink and typesetting, and
shabeshta keivan d'al al. But I was assured that it was not a typo,
and that somewhere in "Ha'Yom Yom" the Rebbe wrote that it was b'davka
and b'mechuvan.

My next yishuv was that perhaps, it is known, Lubavitchers hold that
"Al yechasrenu" is not the siyum ha'brochom, and therefore the brocho
goes on until "B'Vrocho Sheleima v'Nomar Amen" - so to deviate from a
standard text would be meshaneh me'matbei'ah she'tov'u Chachomim.

But, in "contemporary" Lubavitch Bentchers they add the Horachamon for
Adoneinu, Moreinu v'Rabbeinu between the Horachamon for Shelichas Eliyahu
and the one for parents, so me'ma nafshoch...

One could learn that al pi Kabbbalah Aviv zeh HKB"H and Imo zu Knesses
yisroel, but that certainly does not fit into the words!

I'm open to explanations...

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

From a Lubavitcher relative:
>Bikitzur nimratz (5 AM here): Avi Moiri and Imi Moirosi are also reference to
>one's personal chachma and bina - v'ain kan mokom leha'arich.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

I recall learning that it is preferable not to be the deliverer of bad
news assuming there is no toelet to you delivering it now versus someone
else later, but I can't remember the source. Does this sound familiar
to anyone?

KT
Joel

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
> Actually, Rav Dessler does not say nature is a farce. He acknowledges
> that there are rules of behavior for science to discover.

> REED argued that there is no beryah called teva, rather that HKBH
> chooses to allow the impact of His actions to follow certain rules. And
> that bi'etzem those actions that do follow those rules are no different in
> kind than those that do not (nissim). However, there is a reason for these
> patterns of events, and as a group, we can call these patterns "teva".

I believe that my interpretation of Rav Dessler is correct.  See Michtav
Meeliyahu vol 1 maamar "ha'nes v'hateva" pp 177 ff.  R Dessler specifically
adopts my formulation on p 178 1st paragraph, last sentence: "teva does not
exist at all, rather it is like a slight of hand (achizas eiynayim) to man,
so that he will have the opportunity to err (or) choose the truth."  The
rest of the maamar is built on the foundation of this concept.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

On Mon, Jun 11, 2001 at 10:47:15PM -0400, Feldman, Mark wrote:
:> REED argued that there is no beryah called teva, rather that HKBH
:> chooses to allow the impact of His actions to follow certain rules....
:> we can call these patterns "teva".
: 
: I believe that my interpretation of Rav Dessler is correct.  See Michtav
: Meeliyahu vol 1 maamar "ha'nes v'hateva" pp 177 ff.  R Dessler specifically
: adopts my formulation on p 178 1st paragraph, last sentence: "teva does not
: exist at all, rather it is like a slight of hand (achizas eiynayim) to man,
: so that he will have the opportunity to err (or) choose the truth."  The
: rest of the maamar is built on the foundation of this concept.

Li nir'eh we're arguing over phraseology, not substance.

His "achizas einayim" is my "no beryah". I was objecting to calling it
a "farce" because, I saw that as claiming that there are no "rules of
behavior for science to discover" (to repeat my objection), and that
there is no hester panim behind predictability.

As REED acknowledges the latter, he is saying that teva exists as an
idea, albeit not as a "thing".

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Carl Sherer wrote:
:> I'm not sure I would attribute the status of Kedushei Ktana today to 
:> socio-economics. I think that, like Yibum, it's more a question of purity of
:> intentions. 

On Fri, Jun 08, 2001 at 10:17:41AM -0400, gil.student@citicorp.com wrote:
: Tosafos in Kiddushin says explicitly that it is due to socio-economic 
: conditions.

As I said, my complaint really does NOT apply to kedushei ketana. After
all, that's not a chiyuv, but investiture of power -- a statement that
such an act does have a chalos. So, as long as there exists some context
in which such a marriage is the moral choice, it is understandable why
HKBH gives people the power to perform it.

Chiyuvim and issurim, however, define our morality.

The same tactic was applied by the Rambam to explain korbanos -- which are
chiyuvim, and by others to explain eved Kenaani. Since one is not supposed
to free an eved without good reason, apparantly the Torah is telling us
that such avdus is moral.

On Fri, Jun 08, 2001 at 09:15:50AM +0300, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
: I'm not sure I would attribute the status of Kedushei Ktana today to
: socio-economics. I think that, like Yibum, it's more a question of
: purity of intentions. I don't think we can rely on a father today
: having only his daughter's best interests in mind, the way they did
: in other eras....

I think this distinction is a non-issue. After all, the change in
socio-economics is why the most common reason for kedushei ketana no
longer holds. The purity of the father's intent can only be explored in
light of the economic context in which he makes the decision.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

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