Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 051

Thursday, May 31 2001

• Limits to TuM
• Yehudah and Yosef (as archetypes)
• Re: Hirhur/Machshava
• Devarim shebichsav
• CI
• Re: CI
• Re: CI
• Yiud
• Re: Yiud
• rape and yibum
• Re: Yiud
• Re: being yotzei with Yikum Purkans through shliach tzibbur
• RE: RYGB's principle

Rabbi Aron Tendler's email ("Rabbi's Notebook") for this week raised a
question that I don't think we've ever explored.

He writes:
: The Rambam in the Laws of Teshuva 6:1 writes the following. "If society
: is so evil that they do not leave you in peace unless you assimilate
: and act like them, then you must flee to the caves and the deserts
: rather than learn from their sinful ways." Has society degenerated to
: the level where we must "flee to the caves and the deserts?" Must we
: isolate ourselves from societies affront to what should be our Torah
: honed moral and ethical sensibilities? Must we divorce ourselves from
: the acceptable norms of contemporary society? Should self-preservation
: become the singular focus of our identity and efforts?

At what point has the surrounding culture passed the limits of DE or
of acceptible mada? Is there a way of defining a shiur?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

In Shlomo Katz's Hamaayan for this week, he opens with the following
devar Torah. I thought it would be of interest.

: Sunday, the twelfth of Sivan, is both the birthday anniversary and yahrzeit
: of Yehuda, the fourth son of the Patriarch Yaakov (Shalshelet Hakabalah;
: Melitzei Esh). R' Joseph B. Soloveitchik z"l taught: Of all of Yaakov's sons,
: it was Yehuda who earned the right to be the forebearer of the Davidic dynasty
: and of mashiach. The Torah portrays Yehuda as a person whose righteousness
: was tested many times; unlike his brother Yosef, whose behavior was the
: model of consistency, Yehuda sometimes struggled and fell. Yosef and Yehuda
: are examples of what the Rambam calls the "chassid me'uleh" and "moshail
: b'nafsho," respectively.
: 
: Rambam explains (Shemonah Perakim, ch.6) that a chassid me'uleh is a
: person who is innately righteous. He wants to do what is right, and he
: does it without any obvious internal struggle. Rashi suggests (Shmot 1:4)
: that Yosef was such a person; "The same Yosef who shepherded his father's
: flocks is the righteous Yosef who ruled Egypt."
: 
: The moshail b'nafsho, on the other hand, is a person who feels the pull of
: the evil inclination, even if only to the slightest degree, but overcomes
: the challenges. This is what Yehuda did in saving Tamar, and what he failed
: to do completely (see Rashi, Bereishit 38:1) when given the opportunity to
: save Yosef -- an error which he in turn corrected by risking his own life
: to save Binyamin.
: 
: This is why Yehuda, not Yosef, was chosen as the ancestor of kings. The
: Torah concept of a king is not someone who is "better than" his subjects,
: but someone who has experienced their spiritual struggles, and has overcome
: them. Only then can he lead them in conquering their own evil inclinations
: and fulfilling G-d's will. (Yemei Zikaron, pp. 70-75)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

I was wondering if the difference between hirhur and machshavah is similar
to that between lishmah and kavanah. Perhaps:
    hirhur : lishmah  ::  machshavah : kavanah
(Hirhur is to lishmah as machshavah is to kavanah.)

-mi

This Shavuos's crop of email divrei Torah had two on an Avodah perennial --
the separation between TSBP and TSBK.

:       ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)
:           YHE-HOLIDAY: SPECIAL HOLIDAY MAILINGS
:                       SHAVUOT 5761
: ...
:   Maintaining the Boundaries of Written and Oral Torah
:                   By Rav Moshe Taragin

: The gemara in Gittin (60b) cites a contradiction between two halves of
: one verse. G-d tells Moshe:

:  "Transcribe for yourself these matters, for 'al-pi' (lit., by the
:  mouth) of these matters I have signed with you a covenant and with
:  Israel." (Shemot 34:27)

: The first half of the verse suggests a written form of transfer
: ("Transcribe..."), while the latter half evokes a verbal manner
: of teaching and transmitting Torah. How, then, should Torah be
: conveyed? Ultimately, the gemara recognizes the fundamental difference
: between two segments of Torah: she-bikhtav" (written) and "she-be'al peh"
: (oral); this verse teaches us that the original format of each must be
: maintained. Hence, the gemara derives two prohibitions:

: 1) Torah she-bikhtav cannot be rendered in the manner of be'al peh.

: 2) Torah she-be'al peh must not be written.

: These prohibitions establish a blatant division between the two parts
: of Torah; indeed, for close to a millennium these distinctions were
: maintained. Obviously, the landscape was altered irrevocably once Torah
: she-be'al peh was written (a decree which will be explored later in
: this article).

: CONVERTING WRITTEN TORAH TO ORAL FORMS

: The prohibition against writing the Oral Torah is clearly defined. Talmud,
: which existed as a purely oral tradition, could not be written in
: any formal or organized fashion. The parallel prohibition relating to
: "verbalizing" the Written Torah is less clear. How do we define "be'al
: peh?" If a person writes Torah she-bikhtav as a text, but deviates from
: certain classic requirements of transcribing Torah, would he or she
: violate the prohibition?

: Perhaps the clearest expression that even written texts can qualify as
: "be'al peh" if certain criteria are not met can be found in the words of
: Tosafot (Shabbat 115a). The sixteenth chapter of Shabbat allows works
: of Scripture (kitvei ha-kodesh) to be saved from a fire on Shabbat
: even though extra effort (tircha) is involved. The gemara questions
: the permissibility of saving from a fire texts written in different
: languages. As the gemara itself asserts, this issue would depend upon a
: famous dispute in the mishna (Megilla 8b). The mishna discusses Scriptural
: texts written in various languages other than Hebrew and cites a dispute
: between the Rabbis, who classify these texts as kitvei ha-kodesh, and
: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who excludes foreign-language texts from the
: category of kitvei ha-kodesh.

: This fundamental argument about the nature of foreign-language Scriptural
: texts has several applications. For example, the gemara itself recognizes
: the consequences regarding "tum'at yadayim." (See the Rambam, in chapter
: 9 of Hilkhot Avot Ha-tum'a, who delineates the rabbinical decree that
: kitvei ha-kodesh confer impurity to teruma, the priest's portion of
: produce. This institution was developed as a manner of assuring that
: holy texts would be distanced from teruma, and would not be ruined
: by hungry rodents.) According to the Rabbis, Scripture written in any
: language would qualify as kitvei ha-kodesh and cause impurity to teruma;
: conversely, according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, such texts would
: not be impure. This debate would assuredly impact upon our question of
: saving these texts from a fire. Presumably, Rabban Shimon would not
: allow Shabbat to be violated to save a foreign-language text because
: these texts do not enjoy the status of kitvei ha-kodesh; the Rabbis,
: by contrast, would allow it.

: Indeed, the gemara does consider the influence of the argument in Megilla
: upon our issue. What is startling, however, is the language the gemara
: employs to describe Rabban Shimon's position: the gemara asserts that
: Scripture in foreign languages cannot be "read." It is one thing to
: question their holiness, as well as laws, such as impurity, which are
: dependent upon that status, but it is quite another to claim a prohibition
: of reading them. Tosafot (ibid., s.v. Lo), in defending this syntax, cite
: the position of Rav Porat that it is forbidden to render these texts in
: foreign languages because this violates the principle that Torah she-
: bikhtav cannot be converted into be'al peh. Even though the Torah is
: being written physically, since the language is foreign, the standards
: of Torah she-bikhtav have not been met, and the prohibition applies.

: A second example of "incorrectly" written texts which qualify as "be'al
: peh" can be discerned within the gemara Gittin (6b). The gemara invokes
: the principle of "sirtut" when reproducing Scriptural verses; i.e., if one
: includes a verse within a personal letter, the writer must draw a straight
: line (normally by carving an indentation in the parchment) directly above
: the verse. The concept of sirtut is, again, a familiar one; see the gemara
: (Menachot 32b) which requires sirtut for the mezuza and sefer Torah, and
: the gemara (Sota 17b) requiring sirtut for the sota scroll. Why, however,
: should verses written out of the context of these items require sirtut?

: Many have invoked our principle to justify this requirement: when
: rendering Scriptural texts, the status of Torah she-bikhtav must be
: preserved not only by creating actual text, but by fulfilling certain
: standards. Just as -- according to certain opinions -- only Hebrew fonts
: are considered Torah she-bikhtav, certain types of contextual elements
: (such as the line above these verses) are necessary to generate Torah
: she- bikhtav. The prohibition against writing verses without sirtut
: stems from the prohibition to convert Torah she- bikhtav into be'al peh;
: omitting sirtut is tantamount to not writing at all.

: A third example of actual writing which does not qualify technically as
: "bikhtav" can be found in Gittin (60a). The gemara forbids reading from,
: or even composing, a book which contains the haftarot, the passages from
: the Prophets selected for each Shabbat morning. Since an entire "sefer,"
: i.e., one of the twenty-four volumes of Scripture, was not composed, but
: rather fragments of several of them, one cannot read from it. Rabbeinu
: Crescas explains that such a document is defined as be'al peh and violates
: the prohibition against converting bikhtav into be'al peh.

: Indeed, the same gemara prohibits writing a "megilla," a few chapters
: of one of the five books of the Torah for a child to study from ("ein
: kotevin megilla le- tinok le-hitlamed"). Though the gemara does not
: clarify the exact nature of the prohibition, we might speculate that it
: emerges from our concerns of not changing bikhtav into be'al peh. Not
: only must the proper font be employed, and not only should the lines
: surrounding Scriptural text be reproduced, but a certain structural
: integrity must be maintained. By producing less than an entire sefer,
: one might strip the product of its status as bikhtav.

: THE PROHIBITION TODAY

: Most opinions suggest that the prohibition of converting Scripture into
: less-than-bikhtav formats no longer applies. The gemara (Gittin 60a)
: cites the verse in Tehillim (119:126), "Eit la'asot la-Hashem heifeiru
: Toratekha" (understood as, "When it is time to act for G-d, abrogate your
: law"), to justify the lifting of the prohibition against writing Torah
: be'al peh. As the generations weakened in their retention of an oral
: tradition, writing it down was sanctioned. Does the same repeal apply
: to the complementary issur of converting bikhtav into be'al peh? See
: Tosafot (Bava Kama 3b, s.v. Ki-de-metargem), who suggest that it does,
: despite the fact that the gemara never explicitly applies the verse to
: our prohibition.

: A famous story is recounted that Rav Elchanan Wasserman Hy"d visited
: Rav Mosheh Soloveitchik zt"l (the father of the Rav zt"l) in Warsaw and
: asked him why the Rambam did not list the prohibition of transcribing
: Torah she-be'al peh in his Mishneh Torah. (Although the Rambam discusses
: it in his introduction, he never addresses it within the halakhic code
: itself.) Rav Mosheh did not have an answer and asked his young son to
: consider the question. The Rav zt"l responded that the prohibition is not
: a formal one, but rather it demands that Torah be transmitted in a manner
: which would best facilitate its study. Ideally, an oral transmission
: should be delivered without texts because people are more vigilant and
: precise regarding a text which is unwritten. Similarly, the written Torah
: should be conveyed bikhtav because many derivations stem from textual
: nuances (extra letters and other textual phenomena). However, once social
: situations demand altering the original formats of these tracts (to better
: facilitate study under current conditions), the original prohibitions no
: longer apply. The Sages did not have to rescind the biblical prohibition;
: rather the prohibition itself is limin its scope.

: If we accept this understanding of the prohibition, we clearly have little
: room to differentiate between the two applications and no ability to
: suggest that the allowance of "Eit la'asot" applies to one prohibition
: and not the other. If these native forms are not sacred per se, but
: merely the preferred way to study, each would yield to alternate formats
: were the situation to demand it. As such, most are of the opinion that
: in our generation, we are allowed to convert Scriptural texts to be'al
: peh format because this will support our learning.


The 2nd from Yeshivat haKotel:
From: Nehemiah Klein <ndk@hakotel.edu>
X-Sender: ndk@mail
To: rambam list <hk-rambam@lists.hakotel.edu>
Subject: HaRav Steinberger's Shiur #5761-6
Precedence: bulk

		"Kenetinatah" - Preserving Maamad Har Sinai"

> The dispute about the permission to write down the Oral Law (whether
> it is an uprooting of a Biblical prohibition by a later Beit Din -
> Rashi in Gittin, or an adjustment permitted as long as it serves the
> need to improve spreading the Torah - Rambam, see previous shiur) has
> many possible ramifications.

> I. The "Levush" (R' Mordechai Yoffeh, 16th century - a disciple of
> Maharal from Prague) rule that the reading of the Haftarah should be
> from a scroll (like a Sefer Torah which has the whole "Navi", since
> there is a prohibition to read the Written Law, unless it is written on
> a parchment with all the laws of (Sata"m) Sefarim/Tefillin/Mezuzot. The
> "Taz" (quoting the "Levush" in his commentary to "Shulchan Aruch" -
> Orach Chaim 284,2) disagrees. Based on Gittin (60a), "et laasot" - the
> permission given to change the state of the Torah from its original form
> - the Oral Law to become written and the Written Law to become oral,
> he permits learning/reading the Written Law also from illegal writing,
> recorded on paper by print, and reading paragraphs even if they are
> written separately, not in the form of a full book.

> The Levush apparently holds that the Gemara in Gittin deals with
> uprooting. If so, we should minimize it to the absolute necessary
> basics. Therefore, since it is not such a big problem to find a complete
> Bible even if it is printed we should use it for the Haftarah. By doing
> so, we achieving the appearance of reading from Scripture. But the Taz
> obviously holds that since we have made an accommodation in the form of
> teaching Torah - we do not have to emphasize any more a resemblance to
> previous forms and styles. (The Rashi would, accordingly, correspond to
> the Levush - the Rambam to the Taz).

> II. This can explain also an obscure passage in the rulings of Rabenu
> Tam (and others). The Tosafot (Gittin 6b - "Amar R' Yitzchak") says that
> "Sirtut" (engraving lines in a parchment for writing on it Pesukim) is
> necessary only when a pasuk is written for the purpose of teaching Torah.
> But when one writes a pausk just for literary or stylistic purposes -
> "sirtut" is unnecessary. The possible explanation is based on Gittin
> 60a by the same token that the Oral Law should not be written down -
> the Written Law should not be oral. Furthermore - it should not be
> even written without the specific requirements of Sata"m, among them
> "sirtut". Accordingly, if writing the Oral Law is permitted for personal
> use and it is forbidden just for teaching others (see the previous shiur)
> - the same would apply to the violation of the state of the Written
> Law. That is, if relinquishing of the requirements is permitted in the
> case of personal use in the Oral Law - the same applies to the Written
> Law. But since this very point is the subject of a dispute between Rashi
> and the Rambam (see also the previous shiur - where we have pointed
> out that Rashi, who considers "et laasot" as an uprooting - considers
> even writing for personal use as a sin. But the Rambam, who learns the
> sugya in Gittin as an exercise in adjustment, permits personal writing)
> - therefore Rabenu Tam, who does not require "sirtut" when writing a
> letter, would correspond to the Rambam's opinion. The other opinions
> (in the Tosafot, ibid.) would side accordingly with Rashi. Therefore
> even for personal use, a pasuk needs "sirtut".

> III. The Rambam, who seems to rely on the concept of "kenetinata"
> (see the previous shiur) probably expands it to another interesting
> area. There is a Minhag to stand during the Torah reading. Others are
> lenient about it (see Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 146:4). Besides,
> there is also another diversification of customs: even those who sit,
> stand up while the Ten Commandments are being read. The Rambam in his
> responsa (46 - Freiman Edition, Jerusalem 1934) objects to this custom on
> the grounds of the principle to equalize all paragraphs of the Torah. It
> is unacceptable according to the Rambam, to attribute significance to a
> certain paragraph (even to the First Commandment "anochi" of the Ten)
> versus others in the Torah. (See the Eighth Principle of Fait of the
> Thirteen - the Rambam's introduction to "chelek", the tenth chapter of
> Sanhedrin in the Commentary to the Mishna). Therefore the Rambam is
> vehemently opposed to standing. But if it were not for this reason,
> even the Rambam would endorse standing. This is proven from the fact
> that the Rambam considers the reading of the Torah as an act of Kedusha
> (Hilchot Tefillah 8:4) and in describing the reading of "Hakhel" (at the
> gathering which marks in Sukkot the end of the Shmitta - the Sabbatical
> Year) he compares it to a reconstruction of "Maamad Har Sinai" - the
> forum of giving the Torah in Sinai (Hilchot Chagigah 3:6). In other
> words the reading of the Torah is tantamount (on a miniscule scale
> at least) to the great moment of the birth of Torah. Thus, each time
> the public reads the Torah it is a reenactment of that great historic
> event. No wonder that standing would be mandatory, especially when the
> Ten Commandments are read (were it not for violating another principle),
> since at the moment of giving the Torah everybody had to stand. (See
> also Mishna Brurah ibid. 19, in the name of the Bach). Here, we have
> yet another aspect of "Kenetinata" - the need to reenact the code of
> behavior dictated by the awe felt at Sinai. (See about this custom also
> "Yechave Daat" from R' Ovadiah Yoseph 20).

> IV. The same idea, concerning the definition of reading of the Torah,
> in general, and the portions dealing with the Sinaic Revelation, in
> particular, is behind the following issue, as well. The Ten Commandments
> have two different versions concerning the division of the psukim and the
> musical notes ("taamei hamikra"). 1) The one as it appears in the Chumash
> - the Scripture. It is not arranged according to the division of the
> Ten Commandments. Most of the Commandments have more than one pasuk. At
> the same time, the last ones are described tersely in just two words and
> a few appear in one pasuk. This is called "taam tachton". 2) The other
> version relates to the Ten in a way that each commandment gets exactly
> one pasuk. Thus the earlier ones have very long psukim and the last ones -
> very short ones. This fact changes also the musical notes. So even if the
> wording is the same, as in our chumash - yet the sentences and the melody
> are different. The second version is called "taam elyon". (The first is
> described as the "inferior taste", describing both the understanding
> and the music. "Taam" means taste and spiritual reasoning. It also
> refers to the musical notes applied to the Torah reading. The second,
> the more festive and in accordance with the division to Ten, as it was
> given in Sinai - as the "superior taste". See Beur Halacha on Hilchot
> Shavuot Orach Chaim 494). Rav Soloveichik (in "Shiurim LeZecher Aba"
> part 2, pages 210-213) develops the idea of using a different type of
> reading when the Ten Commandments are read, especially on Shavuot -
> the day of the giving of the Torah, as a manifestation of "Kenetinata".

> He says that the reading of the Commandments in "Taam Elyon" indicates
> that we insist on preserving the atmosphere of the first time
> these commandments were given. Naturally, they were delivered in ten
> installments. Therefore, when we read them in the Torah, especially on
> "Chag Matan Torah", on Shavuot, we try to create a maximal resemblance
> to the original. This teaches us that reading the Torah in public is
> a reenacting of Matan Torah - "kenetinata"; with the same division of
> sentences and with the same awe as in the first time.

> V. The custom that three people are supposed to surround the "bimah",
> the table with the Torah scroll, is also anchored in the concept of
> "kenetinata". The Yerushalmi learns this out from Matan Torah. With the
> same token that then and there three separate authorities functioned
> in the process - Hashem, Moshe Rabenu, and Klal Yisrael; so every time
> the Torah is being read there is a need for three people who represent
> symbolically those three instances.

> If this concept is so important, and so many laws and customs are
> reinforcing it - obviously it teaches us a lot about both "Maamad Har
> Sinai" and learning Torah. "Har Sinai" epitomized Divine Revelation. (See
> the Rambam, Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah chapter 8). Many psukim (in Yitro
> and the beginning of Devarim) emphasize the unique event and the awe
> inspiring atmosphere of "Maamad Har Sinai". [Incidentally "Maamad" means
> two things: a) A special exciting event and forum, usually associated with
> very festive ceremonies. b) The public is standing - see our previous
> discussion about the issue of standing. Rav Nebenzahl Shlit"a holds
> that one has to stand during the chupah, unlike the recent custom of
> sitting on prearranged chairs. The original custom of standing can be
> attributed to a) an obligation to honor the Mitzvah and the blessings,
> b) an effort not to imitate the gentiles who sit while the couple walks
> down an aisle, c) according to our understanding that "Maamad Har Sinai"
> functioned as the ultimate symbolical wedding between the "Dod" and the
> "Raayah" - Hashem and Klal Yisrael as in Shir HaShirim - see also the
> end of the last Mishna in Taanit, we compare a "maamad" of every Jewish
> wedding to that of "Matan Torah". The Sephardim have a custom of even
> reading a "Ketubah" on Shavuot. This "Ketubah" represents the mutual
> vows of Hashem and Knesset Yisrael, taken at Sinai ... ].

> Learning Torah cannot be just an intellectual exercise or an academic
> pursuit. It has to be a total experience of getting unified with the
> Shchina. It has to preserve the unique aroma of the history and the roots
> of Torah. It certainly has to emphasize the belief of the Divine Torah
> (the Eighth Principle of Faith according to the Rambam). If this is an
> important less all year round, it is certainly even more important each
> Chag Shavuot - Zman Matan Toratenu!

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

>> In summary. 1) are we talking about psak or a takana?

> 1. Psak.

Given a psak then any other posek can argue with the psak.
Does RYSB insist that no one can use an indirect metal to hold up schach
because CI prohibited maamid de-maamid even though most poskim disagree?


>> 3) Is the authority because of the posek or because it was 
>> accepted by the majority of poskim[?]

> 3. No.

At this point I am completely lost. Do we paskin like Rambam because he
was the greatest posek?
Who makes these decisions?

>>                    4) Is the authority primarily because the posek is
>> your rebbe or your rav?

> 4. No.

I strongly disagree. There is no such thing as an authority who is
not your rebbe or rav. No rabbi can pasken for other communities.
Even rabbanim like Chatam Sofer refused to pasken when there was a local
rabbi. Does the authority of a litvishe posek affect a chassidic group
or vice versa? Did the psak of the gedolim in Poland affect the German
community? The Divrei Chaim on the other hand asserts that gedolim have
ruach hakodesh.

I agree with Daniel that psak in the absence of a Sanhedrin is based on
the power of persuasion. The only exception to this rule is the psak of
a rav for his talmidim. No one has the right to declare rabbi X as THE
gadol hador whose psak automatically is accepted.

Daniel brings down the Divrei Chaim on the other hand asserts that
gedolim have ruach hakodesh.

However, Chatam Sofer denies that even the Sanhedrin HaGadol had Ruach
haKodesh otherwise they couldn't make mistakes. However, the Gemara
certainly allows for such a possibility. Furthermore, it would violate
the principle of "lo ba-shamayim hi"

Even when the Shulchan Arukh was written its authority was not accepted.
Sefardim used the argument that 100 rabbis accepted it to prove that
it was a community decision and the gadlut of Rav Karo. Ashkenazim
never accepted the Ramah blindly and commentaries frequently disagree.
Does RYSB feel that CI is greater than Ramabm, Gra, R. Karo etc. none
of whom had their psak dinim universally accepted.



[A second email from RET on the same subject... -mi]

> I continued that a similar area of fuzziness may be found in the CI's 
> application of Boneh to electricity. I noted that one may certainly argue 
> on the CI - RSZA, for one, does - but that is because, at least from our 
> perspective, we see the CI and RSZA as occupying the same stratosphere of 
> chochmo and minyon. This does not necessarily apply to others.

At this popint I am completely lost. Why is a psak about electricity
different than a psak in any other area. RYGB seems to be saying that
the fuzzier the grounds for the psak the more it holds?
If CI gives a reason that most poskim find reasonable than one can argue
however, if it sounds strange than one cannot argue with it?
There is certainly nothing in Rav Moshe's teshuva on disagreeing with
CI that indicates any such thing.

Eli Turkel

At 03:19 PM 5/31/01 +0200, Eli Turkel wrote:
> >> In summary. 1) are we talking about psak or a takana?
>
> > 1. Psak.
>
>Given a psak then any other posek can argue with the psak.

Correct. You can argue on the Rambam as well. If you would like to exclude 
him because he is a Rishon, then take the Gr"o.

There is no theological impediment there. Only a rational one. If you do 
not understand a Gr"o, then it is presumptuous to argue with him. I should 
really use  stronger term than presumptuous.

>Does RYSB insist that no one can use an indirect metal to hold up schach
>because CI prohibited maamid de-maamid even though most poskim disagree?

MDM is a fascinating example. Look how many people are machmir because of 
the CI! But, in fact, it is different. There the CI laid down a psak based 
on proof and evidence, one argues the proof and evidence on their merits.

>At this point I am completely lost. Do we paskin like Rambam because he
>was the greatest posek?
>Who makes these decisions?

Am Yisroel.

>I strongly disagree. There is no such thing as an authority who is
>not your rebbe or rav. No rabbi can pasken for other communities.
>Even rabbanim like Chatam Sofer refused to pasken when there was a local
>rabbi. Does the authority of a litvishe posek affect a chassidic group
>or vice versa? Did the psak of the gedolim in Poland affect the German
>community? The Divrei Chaim on the other hand asserts that gedolim have
>ruach hakodesh.

I fail to understand how you can disagree. Of course you can argue on any 
Posek you want. That is not the issue at all.

But to say the Posek is not an authority?!

>I agree with Daniel that psak in the absence of a Sanhedrin is based on
>the power of persuasion. The only exception to this rule is the psak of
>a rav for his talmidim. No one has the right to declare rabbi X as THE
>gadol hador whose psak automatically is accepted.

No one has declared that.

Frankly, you and RDE are beating strawmen, not me.


KT,
YGB

ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

Eli Turkel
>                                          RYGB seems to be saying that
> the fuzzier the grounds for the psak the more it holds?
> If CI gives a reason that most poskim find reasonable than one can argue
> however, if it sounds strange than one cannot argue with it?

I think this is exactly the point-like the famous story of R' X who sent
a shailah to R' Y but told him not to tell him the reasons for his psak
since he might find fault. This type of psak is more sod hashem lyereav
or from the posek's "lev shel torah" and thus not easily subject to
rational debate.

KT
Joel

[From Areivim. -mi]

[I]t occured to me yesterday as we were learning Daf Yomi, (Yes we are
a bit behind) that the institution of Yiud that is codified in the Torah
seriouisly mimics the rape of a minor jewsih girl. How is it possible for
G-d through his holy Torah to force a girl under 12 years of age to marry
her master? This is exactly the principle that the Torah mandates. In
fact a father can either forcibly betroth his minor daughter to any
man against her will or he may sell her to any master who may force
marraige upon an Amah Ivriah, who by definition is a minor, through
Yiud? The minor girl has no recourse whatsoever and must stay married
to her master for the rest of her life if the master so chooses. How
does Derachecha Darcei Noam apply here?

Just my thought for the day.

HM

On 31 May 2001, at 4:03, Harry Maryles wrote:
> were learning Daf Yomi, (Yes we are a bit behind) that the institution of
> Yiud that is codified in the Torah seriouisly mimics the rape of a minor
> jewsih girl. How is it possible for G-d through his holy Torah to force
> a girl under 12 years of age to marry her master? ...

Don't we learn from "lo y'ada" that her consent is required?

-- Carl
Carl M. Sherer, Adv. Silber, Schottenfels, Gerber & Sherer
Telephone 972-2-625-7751 Fax 972-2-625-0461 eFax (US) 1-253-423-1459
mailto:cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il             mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

>                                      The minor girl has no recourse
> whatsoever and must stay married to hermaster for the rest of her life
> if the master so chooses. How does Derachecha Darcei Noam apply here?

I'm so glad you asked the question.
I tried asking it when we learned the sugya in yavamosand did not receive
much of an answer, not here and not from others.

My question then, and now,
how is it that one can perform a MITZVA (yibum) by raping a woman.?

Reuven

--- "Carl M. Sherer" <cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il> wrote:
>>                                    In fact a father can either forcibly
>> betroth his minor daughter to any man against her will or he may sell
>> her to any master who may force marraige upon an Amah Ivriah, who by
>> definition is a minor, through Yiud? The minor girl has no recourse
>> whatsoever and must stay married to her master for the rest of her life
>> if the master so chooses. How does Derachecha Darcei Noam apply here?

> Don't we learn from "lo y'ada" that her consent is required?

Actually it's a Machlokes. The Rambam in Hilchos Avodim 4:8 states that
a master cannot do Yiud unless it is Midaitah. The Kesef Mishneh there
interperates this to mean that a master cannot force Yiud upon his Hebrew
maid-servant. She must be a willing participant. If she is not willing,
then any action of Yiud is null and void. However, Tosefos (DH: SheKen),
in Kiddushin 5A states in the name of Rabbenu Tam that indeed, a master
may at his discretion perform Yiud forcibly upon his Hebrew maidservant
in that it is MeDaitah of the father who IS willing, having sold her
into slavery which he may forcibly do. So, at least according to RT,
my question remains.

HM

In Avodah V7 #50, Mordechai wrote:
> In fact, I suspect that 'originally' that may have been the way that
> was done - hence the words 'vinomar omein' at their conclusions.

Two points:
-1- You would probably feel the same way about the "v'nomar omain"
and the "v'imru omain" in Birchas haMozon ("BhM"), and one would think
those bentching did indeed listen to the BhM leader at those points
(if not during the entire BhM).

-2- Anyone want to comment on the chiluk (above and beyond the difference
in meaning) between "v'nomar omain" and "v'imru omain" in those respective
paragraphs (my $0.02: "oseh shalom" in BhM is comparable to "oseh shalom"
in Kaddish)? Thanks.

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

RYGB wrote:
>There was a poster(s) on Areivim who suggested that he comprehended the 
>CI's reasons for his ruling - which I, really, do not - and that, therefore
>s/he, said poster(s), could ascertain that socio-econo-historical 
>circumstances having changed - and, said poster(s) having attributed the 
>CI's ruling to these reasons - s/he therefore proposed the conclusion that 
>the CI's ruling is no longer applicable.

As the said poster, I am surprised at the misunderstanding of my post, as I
never argued that I fully understood the CI shitta, nor that the CI ruling
is not applicable because the socio econo historical circumstances have
changed ( although some of us never accepted it).

I argued that my understanding of the CI shitta implied a general approach
to a  problem - the  employment of women outside their home and community.
Rather than being a socio eoonomic analysis, it was an axiological analysis
of the value of zniut (broadly defined) in today's society.

However, today, that approach seems restricted only to a particular facet -
sherut leumi, without the more general application of that approach to other
facets.    I therefore  wondered about the justification for such
limitation.  Somehow, that seems a very different position than ascribed by
RYGB to me.
IF RYGB wants to argue that the CI shitta is so mysterious that we can not
infer a general approach, and are bound only by the strict letter of what he
forbade, that is one answer.  I did hope that someone might be able to point
out either a conceptual distinction, or even explain the CI shitta so that
the distinction is evident (something that so far hasn't happened)

>(To me, BTW, said poster(s)' positions are reminiscent of the Historical 
>School, a la Zechariah Frankel.)

This sort of personal invective should have no place on avoda, and I am
moche.  None of my posting seems remotely related to Zecharia Frankel,
unless the belief that a specific psak (as distinct from halacha in general)
is related to the particulars of the specific question being paskened is now
the Historical School.  (BTW, my position can be better described as that
the CI's psak was general, but that it was treated by the haredi community
as being limited to a particular socio economic milieu - I supppose that
they too now should be described as adherents of Zecharia Frankel)

With regard to RYGB's principle, it seems (IMHO) very radical. It seems that
there are several different levels on which the issue of discussions
1) Psak of the sanhedrin, which hilchot mamrim deals with.  There the issue
is specific to the power of the sanhedrin, and extending it to questioning
every gadol would seem to require some proof.  

2) A psak which one has asked a posek.  There, the actual reasons may be
irrelevant.  There is a well known story (although some versions have a very
different mussar) that R Chaim asked for a psak from R IE Spektor, and asked
that the reasons not be given, so that he wouldn't have questions about the
psak.  That seems directly related to the notion of asking a psak, rather
than the general validity of the psak for others.

3) Halachic discussions.  It would seem that RYGB would radically limit
discussions in ways heretofore unknown.  After all, last I heard, with all
due deference to our list members, avodah and areivim are not considered
major halachic organs where the discussions are halachically binding on
anyone.  The question I raised was not the practical psak, but the rationale
behind it.  Given the requirements of showing proper respect, one might
express questions even of gdolim.  When I learn (and I suspect that others
here are also guilty) I am used to questioning rashi, rambam, and yes, even
the CI..

4) Even with regard to actual psak halacha, RYGB's position seems (IMHO)
radical.  I think that the best counterproof is the discussion surrounding
the Rambam's Mishne Torah, where he deliberately did not include his sevara.
While we may try to reconstruct his sevara, we can never be sure that we are
correct.  However, that does not mean that we are bound by it (although we
clearly respect it).  
Some of RYGB's statements seem to suggest a difference between psak given ex
cathedra and a  sevara  which is fuzzy, but I confess I don't understand the
distinction - if we are bound to respect the explicit sevara when we don't
understand it, why shouldn't we respect the sevara when it is only
implicit(and therefore clearly we don't fully understand it?)

5) Lastly, the very notion of a "star system" that is beyond argument to
mere mortals is something that seems inherently against the notion eyn
ladayan ela ma sheeynav ro'ot.  Clearly, one gives deference to people who
have demonstrated repeatedly their halachic mastery, and one is reluctant to
go against them, but the level of deference suggested by RYGB seems
unprecedented.  As Rav Eidenson pointed out, Rav Moshe says that his tshuvot
function on the level of sevara, rather than on the level of personal
authority (perhaps we should defer to this position on the basis of Rav
Moshe's authority, even if we don't understand the sevara :-)). After all,
most poskim don't believe that they are on the same level as previous
generations, but that doesn't mean that we can't argue with previous
generations.  While we must give deference to the ba'ale hamesora, that
doesn't eliminate our rights of inquiry.

Meir Shinnar
 

********************


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