Avodah Mailing List

Volume 07 : Number 030

Thursday, April 26 2001

• An undestanding of mitzvas tzora'as from YHE
• Re: FW: Shema Yidadmenu
• Pesukei Dezimra
• Re: Davening in Biblical vs Mishnaic Hebrew
• Re: ideas for improvement in Tefillah
• Re: Yoga and avodah zara
• Re: Monogamy w/o marriage
• sefira customs
• Rambam and Yerushalmi
• Re: Rambam and Yerushalmi
• falsifying the Torah
• Re: Monogamy w/o marriage
• Re: falsifying the Torah
• Re: Yoga and avodah zara
• RE: Monogamy w/o marriage
• Re: falsifying the Torah
• Re: falsifying the Torah
• RE: Yoga and avodah zara
• RE: Monogamy w/o marriage

PARSHA61 -- 26: Parashat Tazria-Metzora
Yeshivat Har Etzion's Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash (YHE VBM)

The One Who Mourns For Himself
By Rav Yonatan Grossman

This Shabbat we read two closely related parshiyot: Tazria and Metzora. So
strong is the relationship between these two portions that one wonders
why they are ever separated into two parshiyot. Parashat Tazria discusses
primarily the various types of tzara'at (loosely translated as leprosy)
and the laws relevant to the metzora ("leper"); in Parashat Metzora we
read of the metzora's purification process and one additional form of
tzara'at (that which surfaces on the walls of houses).

In this week's shiur we will try to understand the primary laws governing
the metzora as they emerge from the Biblical text. In doing so, we will
hopefully arrive at a better understanding of the process the metzora
must undergo and the nature of his purification.

A person who suspects he has contracted tzara'at must consult a kohen. If
the kohen's diagnosis confirms his suspicion, then the individual
becomes formally categorized as one stricken with this disease. (As
the verses indicate, this diagnosis may require a lengthy, complex,
multistage process before being issued.) Once the skin infection has
been identified as tzara'at, the person must leave the camp and live in
solitude until the illness has fully healed.

During his period of isolation, the metzora bears several obligations:

    "As for the person with a leprous infection:
    his clothes shall be rent,
    his hair shall be disheveled,
    and he shall cover over his upper lip
    and he shall call out, 'Unclean! Unclean!'
    All the days that the infection is upon him he shall be unclean; he
    is unclean;
    he shall dwell in solitude -- his dwelling shall be outside the
    camp." (13:45-46)

Even a cursory reading of the verses reveals two distinct groups of laws
outlined in the text, highlighted by the two headers: "As for the person
with a leprous infection... "; "All the days that the infection is upon
him... "

In other words, the Torah first charges the metzora with four obligations:
1. to rend his garments; 2. to leave his hair to grow; 3. to cover his
mouth; 4. to declare publicly his state of ritual impurity. The Torah
then proceeds to an additional command, which appears as an independent
imperative, not as an integral component of the previous group of laws:
5. to live in isolation.

We must, therefore, understand wherein lies the significance of these
special laws relevant to the metzora and why the Torah divides them into
two distinct categories.

The first three commandments appear several other times in Tanakh, in
the context of the laws regarding mourning. For example, after the death
of Aharon's two sons, Moshe turns to Aharon and his remaining sons and
instructs them, "Do not dishevel your hair and do not rend your clothes,
lest you die and anger strike the entire community. But your kinsmen,
all the house of Israel, shall bewail the burning that G-d has wrought"
(Vayikra 10:6). Moshe must specifically order Aharon and his sons not
to let their hair grow and not to rend their clothes in response to
their recent loss. Were it not for this special command, they would have
observed these measures of mourning. Moshe emphasizes that instead of
Aharon and his sons observing these practices, the rest of the nation
will "bewail the burning." This contrast clearly suggests that letting
one's hair grow and tearing one's garments constitute standard methods
of expressing grief over the loss of a close relative.

We learn this not only from this specific episode, but also from the
Torah's formulation of the general prohibition against a kohen gadol's
observance of mourning for a relative: "The kohen who is exalted above his
fellow, on whose head the anointing oil has been poured and who has been
ordained to wear the vestments, shall not dishevel his hair or rend his
garments" (Vayikra 21:8). The kohen gadol, on whose head the anointing
oil was poured, is ordered not to let his hair grow, and the one who
dons the special priestly garments may not tear his clothing. Here, too,
the context refers to a prohibition against observing mourning practices
for a deceased family member.

We also find the metzora's third obligation -- covering his mouth --
in similar contexts. An explicit reference to this practice appears in
Yechezkel. G-d forewarns the prophet of the imminent death of his wife
("the delight of your eyes") and forbids him from mourning for her. In
this context, Yechezkel mentions the practices observed by mourners
from which he must abstain. These practices include the covering of the
mourner's mouth:

 "O mortal, I am about to take away the delight of your eyes from you
 through pestilence;
 but you shall not lament or weep or let your tears flow.
 Moan softly, observe no mourning for the dead:
 Put on your turban and put your sandals on your feet;
 do not cover over your upper lip,
 and do not eat the bread of comforters." (Yechezkel 24:16-17)

Chazal derived the laws of mourning from these verses. Everything
from which G-d ordered Yechzkel to abstain, a regular mourner must
observe. As stated, these observances include the covering of the mouth,
implying that it, too, constitutes a practice of mourners. Indeed, Rashi
(on 13:45) comments on the metzora's requirement of covering his mouth,
"Like a mourner." (Compare with Ibn Ezra.)

It thus emerges that a metzora must observe the practices of mourning. If
so, we can readily understand the fourth obligation -- to proclaim his
state of impurity, as mourners, who have recently buried a relative,
are ritually impure.

This then raises the obvious question: for whom does this leper
mourn? Even if this skin disease generates a special form of ritual
impurity, how did issues of mourning creep into the laws governing the
metzora, even if no one around him has died?

It appears that Chazal themselves sought to solve this mystery for us when
they formulated an equally mysterious proverb: "A metzora is considered
dead" (see Rashi, Bemidbar 12:12, based on the Sifrei). Chazal apparently
understood that the laws of mourning that found their way into the world
of the metzora represent the metzora's mourning for himself! He himself
has "died," and he must therefore observe the practices of mourners.

In order to understand this phenomenon, of one "burying" himself and
"mourning" for himself, we must remind ourselves of the physiological
phenomena that took place on the metzora's skin and prompted the kohen
to declare him impure. The Torah presents two primary criteria:

I. The infection's color: it must be white in order to attain the status
   of tzara'at that generates impurity.

II. The infection's appearance: it must appear deeper than the person's
    skin.

(In instances of uncertainty, the kohen isolates the person for a period
of time and examines him again later. In these cases, the infection's
growth and expansion also indicate impurity.)

However, most Rishonim do not view these as two distinct criteria. Rather,
one determines the existence of the other. Rashi, for example, writes
(13:3), "Deeper than the skin of his body -- every white spot is deep,
just as the sunlight appears deeper than the shade." (See also Ramban
there.) In other words, the white discoloration must affect the appearance
of the infection, such that it appears lower than the skin.

Thus, the color white emerges as the critical color within the system of
leprous infections. It alone determines whether the given discoloration
signifies tzara'at, which generates ritual impurity, or a standard skin
disorder unrelated to tzara'at. As we would expect, much of Masekhet
Nega'im (the tractate dealing with the laws of tzara'at) deals with
the various shades of white in order to clarify which shades render the
individual a metzora and which do not.

Why does the Torah focus specifically on the color white? Stated
otherwise, is there some particular reason why this special disease,
which yields far-reaching spiritual and social ramifications, surfaces
on the body specifically in this color?

It seems to me that one verse in our parasha alludes to this issue:
"But if the live flesh [referring to undiscolored skin] again turns
white..." (13:16). The text here contrasts "live" -- or healthy --
skin with "white" skin; white signifies the polar opposite of life. It
stands to reason that the color white relates fundamentally to the
concept developed earlier of the individual mourning for himself. In a
certain sense, if only symbolically, the individual's body begins to die.
He suddenly notices that "life" -- the normal reddish hue, which relates
to blood and life -- has begun to leave his skin, replaced by a dead,
white coloring. The skin of his body appears to him like the skin of a
corpse. Obviously, we are dealing here with symbolic allusions, but it
seems that this disease serves to hint to the individual that G-d's anger
has been aroused against him. In this sense, the significance of this
illness exists exclusively on the level of symbolism and subtle allusion.

However, this symbolism finds expression in real-life, concrete terms,
upon which the final of the metzora's obligations is focused: "He shall
dwell in solitude -- his dwelling shall be outside the camp." The metzora
must leave his place of residence and relocate outside the camp. The
Midrash Halakha emphasizes that he must exit all three camps (that of
the kohanim, levi'im, and the rest of the nation) and live in isolation
(as opposed to a "zav," for example -- see Torat Kohanim, Nega'im 14).

It seems to me that this last requirement is more than just another
law relevant to the metzora; it constitutes the very essence of his
"death." It stands to reason that the significance of his death lies
specifically in the sphere of social activity. The metzora must detach
himself from communal life, in which the Shekhina resides, and through
this very detachment he "dies." The individual's existence outside the
camp, meaning, outside the general, public partnership of the community,
is the functional equivalent of detachment from life, detachment from
the life of the nation within which the Shekhina resides.

This commandment appears separate from the rest, for it, as mentioned,
constitutes the essence of tzara'at, whereas the other requirements
reflect the result of this detachment. In our shiur two years ago
(Parashat Tazria, 5759), we analyzed the sins for which we find tzara'at
as a punishment in Tanakh, and discovered that they all involve communal,
social wrongs. We will not repeat that discussion, but we must mention
Chazal's claim that tzara'at served as a punishment for lashon ha-ra
(gossip). The metzora's penalty thus becomes readily understandable:
one who harmed another by casting aspersions on his social standing is
now banished from society, considered dead (compare with Rashi, 13:46).
"Whoever publicly WHITENS the face of another is considered as having
shed blood." His punishment thus directly parallels the crime.

In light of this, I would like to address the metzora's purification
process and consider how the metzora makes his way back into society.

This process consists of three stages:

I. Return to the camp -- by bringing two birds.
II. Return to his tent (i.e. to his wife) -- after seven days of residence
    in the camp.
III. Return to the mishkan -- on the eighth day, when he brings special
     sacrifices.

I would like to focus specifically on the first stage, by which the
individual reenters communal life, when he returns to the camp. After
the kohen visits the metzora outside the camp and sees that the illness
has in fact healed, he must follow a series of procedures (14:1-7):

 A. The kohen shall order two clean, LIVE BIRDS, cedar wood, crimson
    stuff, and hyssop.
 B. The kohen shall order ONE OF THE BIRDS SLAUGHTERED in an earthen
    vessel over LIVE [i.e. fresh] WATER.
 C. He shall take the LIVE BIRD, along with the cedar wood, the crimson
    stuff, and the hyssop...
 C1.... and dip them together with the LIVE BIRD...
 B1... in the blood of the SLAUGHTERED BIRD over the LIVE WATER.
 A1. He shall then sprinkle it seven times on him who is to be cleansed
    of the tzara'at and cleanse him; and he shall set the LIVE BIRD free
    in the open field.

Notice that the verses outline this process in chiastic structure, which
can be very easily discerned through the repeated use of the term "chayim"
("live") in reference to both the water and the bird.

The outer frame of this segment (A-A1) mentions live birds, one of which
the kohen ultimately, at the end of the process, sets free "in the open
field." In B, the kohen slaughters a bird over "live water," and in B1
we learn what the kohen does with this blood-stained water (dip the live
bird therein). The centerpiece of the process, itself doubled (C-C1),
describes the dipping of the live bird (with additional elements).

Wherein lies the significance of this ritual? As this procedure does
not occur anywhere near an altar and nothing is brought as an offering,
it clearly does not fit into the framework of sacrifices. Why, then,
does the kohen slaughter a bird over fresh water, dip a live bird in
its blood and then send it away?

It seems to me as no coincidence that "chayim" (life) emerges as the
most prominent term in this unit. This ceremony marks the transition from
death to life, or the rebirth of the metzora who seeks reentry into the
camp. There is room to assess each of the items dipped into the water
(the cedar wood, the crimson stuff, and the hyssop), but we do not have
space in this context to develop this issue. I would, however, like to
emphasize two important points.

First, this list also appears elsewhere, as part of the purification
process of one who had come in contact with a dead body (as described
in Parashat Chukat).

Secondly, the "crimson stuff" colors the fresh water red, and the kohen
later adds the bird's blood into the colored water. From this redness
the bird bursts forth and flies freely. I believe that the color red
assumes so prominent a role in this ceremony because it represents the
antithesis of the white coloration that had surfaced on the metzora's
skin. If the white color signifies the whiteness of death, then redness
relates to blood, or to life, as we know from the Scriptural association:
"Blood is life."

The live bird, which flies away from the red solution, represents the
individual returning to life, his rejoining society and life with the
Shekhina.

Immediately following this ceremony, the verse commands the cured metzora
to turn himself, as it were, into a small child:
 
    "The one to be cleansed shall wash his clothes,
    SHAVE OFF ALL HIS HAIR, and bathe in water;
    then he shall be clean.
    After that he may enter the camp." (14:8)

We are familiar with immersion in water as a form of purification, but
why must the metzora shave his hair? Apparently, this ritual expresses
rebirth, symbolizing a brand new entry into the world and a desire to
live. The departure from the immersion waters without a single hair on the
body very much brings to mind childbirth. In the context of our shiur,
the metzora must indeed be seen as reborn, in the sense of a "dead"
person coming back to life.

(Translated by David Silverberg)

On 25 Apr 01, at 17:54, Joelirich@aol.com wrote:
>> Presumably, the answer is that Hashem decrees sadeh zu or isha zu
>> l'ploni, only if ploni merits it; otherwise he'll get the sadeh or
>> isha which is more fitting for him if his bechira chofshis puts him
>> on a lower madreiga.

> why isn't the gemora bothered by sadeh and bayit?

I remember hearing several answers to this question when I learned the
sugya last year:

1. Bas ploni l'ploni only refers to first zivug (I think the Gemara
actually gives that answer).
2. It can be changed by tfilla. Someone else can be mispalell to get
your zivug and "steal" her away.

There was at least one more answer, but I don't remember it. Sorry.

All I have in my notes was that the Magid Shiur brought a Maharal and
a vort from the Sqverer Rebbe on this (since my notes on the Daf are
Mareh Mkomos and I never found either of those, I don't have any more
than that...).

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

FWIW, Yeshiva Chaim Berlin puts someone up to the amud at Baruch She'amar,
(not before) and he says nothing until ending off before Yishtabach. The
story is that this is minhag haGra/minhag Yerushalayim.

I don't understand someone's post about ending off davening with kaddish
being a sour note. What's wrong with yehei shelama rabba and oseh shalom
bimeromav?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

R' Seth Mandel writes in Avodah V7 #29:
>Hazal are normally quite maqpid on correct gender; I have never
>found a case in mss. of the Mishna where they use a feminine numeral for a
>masculine noun,

Of course, because when they do such a thing, we immediately explain it
away as "well, that word in Mishnaic Hebrew is feminine" (or vice versa).

E.g., kos rishon.

That's a no-lose situation, isn't it?

>The more crucial change that many siddurim make is changing "hissar b'olamo
>k'lum," as it is in the g'moro, to "davar." K'lum, of course, is a
>well-known word in Hazal Hebrew. Only a confirmed Biblicist (like some of
>the self-appointed guardians of Hebrew) would see the need to "correct" it.
>So that is the more reliable yardstick to measure how fast and loose the
>publisher is playing with the matbea' hab'rokho.

I'm pleased to note that the siddur of R' Daniel Goldschmidt gives both
forms, with kelum in parentheses, marked as N"A.

Also, he adds shelo before hissar <g>.

The gemara has lehitna'ot bahen, while the siddurim have lehanot bahem.
Why did R' Seth not mention this?

-----------------------
IRA L. JACOBSON
-----------------------
mailto:laser@ieee.org

On Tue, Apr 24, 2001 at 06:38:10PM -0400, Feldman, Mark wrote:
: The AishDas Society Charter states:
:> As means of kindling a da'as of Hashem a member of the igud should
:> commit to: ... Enhancing tephillah through the use of music that both
:> fits the text of the tephillah, as well as touches the hearts and souls
:> of the mispallelim.

: Is this referring to actual music (as opposed to niggun)?

When I wrote those words, RYGB and I were in the middle of an e-discussion
about the use of niggun.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 Come to the AishDas Yom Iyun on Avodas Hashem
micha@aishdas.org            Sunday,  April 29th 2001,  12:00 - 2:00pm  in
<http://www.aishdas.org>     Kew Gardens Hills, Queens NY!  For more info,
(973) 916-0287               see <http://www.aishdas.org/yomiyun.html>.

									Bs"d
This thread came up on Torah Forum a number of months ago. I looked into it 
a little, and was told the following exact quote on the permissability of 
Yoga in the name of Rav Moshe Sternbach, shlitta: "Yoga should not be 
practiced. This is because it is done as a way of connecting with karma, 
and may very well constitute avoda zara.  Thus, even if the practitioner 
does not intend to worship, it would be forbidden."

Eli

Moshe Feldman wrote on Areivim:
>>Reform rabbi officiated.  R. Moshe felt that this would not be
>>considered a marriage and therefore not necessarily require a get. R. 
>>Henkin disagreed. ...

Gil Student:
> I believe that R. Henkin was also discussing common law marriages where 
> there was no actual ceremony, but I may be mistaken on this.

Even if he was, that does not detract from my argument. I too
distinguished between a common law marriage and two people living together
who are not willing to commit long term.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

Whence and why the minhag mentioned here not to do melacha from sunset
to shacharis?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

>>>                           I don't know that it needs to be said that
>>> many of the mekoros for the Rambam are from the Yerushalmi or midrashim
>>> that were lost....

>> Someone else wrote a while ago that Ri Migash followed by Rambam always
>> paskened like the Bavli against the Yerushalmi.

>> How does that square with this?

> It doesn't. It's wrong.

Which one is wrong ?

>> What is the status of the Mehcilta/Sifra/Sifrei and Tosefta after the
>> redaction of the Mishna?

> That of a baraisa.

What is the status of Mesechet Soferim

I heard a lecture that its use is relatively late, I think Maharam
MeRottenberg is the first to quote it for halakhah

On the other hand some of our minhagim that override shas seem to come
from there

Eli Turkel

In a message dated 04/25/2001 10:34:35pm EDT, Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com writes:
> Similarly, people are struggling with the Beis Yosef who did not always
> follow his own rule to pasken like his proverbial bes din of three....
 
> We have essentially two choices:
> 1) accept the rule or paradigm literally as is, and pilpulistically make
> everything fit.
> or
> 2) come up with a rule that is more accurate and inclusive with fewer
> exceptions, even though it might not fit the words so literally.

Doesn't this really describe 2 approaches to tsbp in general?
KT
Joel

>> You cannot imbue real and basic Judaism by utilizing cheap
>> sentimentalism and stressing empty ceremonies.

> The Yam shel Shlomo in Bava Kama says even at the point of death one may not
> falsify Torah.  This is true even to goyim, kol she kayn Jews.

Doesn't the recent daf yomi in Gittin about churban habayit imply that
this reasoning lead to the destruction of the Temple?

Eli Turkel

Moshe Feldman wrote:
> Even if he was, that does not detract from my argument. I too distinguished 
> between a common law marriage and two people living together who are not 
> willing to commit long term.
     
What is a common law marriage, if not two people who did not commit?

Gil Student

> The Yam shel Shlomo in Bava Kama says even at the point of death one may not 
> falsify Torah.  This is true even to goyim, kol she kayn Jews.
     
Eli Turkel wrote:
> Doesn't the recent daf yomi in Gittin about churban habayit imply that 
> this reasoning lead to the destruction of the Temple?
     
The Shu"t Yad Eliyahu (48) is cholek and says that it is muttar to lie for 
pikuach nefesh.  See http://www.angelfire.com/mt/talmud/lie.html

Gil Student

Eli Linas wrote:

>  in the name of Rav Moshe Sternbach, shlitta: "Yoga should not be
> practiced. This is because it is done as a way of connecting with karma,"

This must have been garbled.  "karma" means fate, and is an impersonal force
which, even setting grammatical considerations aside, cannot be "connected
with".  Hindus personify practically everything as gods, but, as far as I know,
they don't personify karma.

David Riceman

From: gil.student@citicorp.com [mailto:gil.student@citicorp.com]
> What is a common law marriage, if not two people who did not commit?

I guess I know the goyish/non-frum scene better than you.  :-)

Typically in that scene, a man & woman who are in love will live together
with the thought that they *may* get married. I understand that a large
proportion of those who get married nowadays were living together first.

In contrast, there are people who decide to get "married" except that
they will not have their marriage consecrated by a rabbi, or even a
justice of the peace, either for tax reasons or for philosophical reasons.

I would argue that there is a big difference between the two cases
halachically: in the first case, there is no intent to be permanently
together--it is a relationship for the time being. That is not a one-time
relationship (a.k.a. k'deishah) and is most similar to pilegesh. Note,
also, that one could argue according the Raavad/Ramban that this is not
pilegesh but not assur either--i.e., so long as she's not a k'deishah
(and IMHO, it's pashut that she's not), there is no issur.

In the second case, the intent to be together permanently, when joined
with the act of bi'ah, which is a maaseh kiddushin, creates the marriage.
There must be daas kiddushin, which does not exist in the first case.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

In a message dated Thu, 26 Apr 2001 10:28:55am EDT, Gil Student
gil.student@citicorp.com writes:
>>> The Yam shel Shlomo in Bava Kama says even at the point of death one
>>> may not falsify Torah. This is true even to goyim, kol she kayn Jews.

> Eli Turkel wrote:
>> Doesn't the recent daf yomi in Gittin about churban habayit imply that
>> this reasoning lead to the destruction of the Temple?

> The Shu"t Yad Eliyahu (48) is cholek and says that it is muttar to lie
> for pikuach nefesh. See http://www.angelfire.com/mt/talmud/lie.html

Just for sake of clarity, the machloket aiui was about ziyuf hatorah
not stam lies(eg the moon is made from green cheese). Wasn't the story
about roman emmissaries or was it really soldiers?

kt
Joel

On 26 Apr 01, at 11:47, Eli Turkel wrote:
>> The Yam shel Shlomo in Bava Kama says even at the point of death one
>> may not falsify Torah.  This is true even to goyim, kol she kayn Jews.

> Doesn't the recent daf yomi in Gittin about churban habayit imply that
> this reasoning lead to the destruction of the Temple?

I assume you're talking about the Gemara's statement that Zecharya ben
Avkulas' modesty led to churban ha'bayis. However, you are assuming that
both of R. Zecharia's halachic statements were correct (i.e. that it's
assur to accept a beheima baalas mum from a goy and that Bar Kamtza did
not deserve to be killed). While that is true with regard to the first
statement, IIUC, the mum was a mum over, and therefore they could have
waited for it to pass (Issurei Mizbeiach 1:5-6). Moreover, it seems that
Bar Kamtza may have been a moser and had a chiyuv misa. KNLA"D.

-- Carl

mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

From: Eli Linas [mailto:linaseli@netvision.net.il]
> This thread came up on Torah Forum a number of months ago. I looked into it 
> a little, and was told the following exact quote on the permissability of 
> Yoga in the name of Rav Moshe Sternbach, shlitta: "Yoga should not be 
> practiced. This is because it is done as a way of connecting with karma, 
> and may very well constitute avoda zara.  Thus, even if the practitioner 
> does not intend to worship, it would be forbidden."

From http://www.yogasite.com/yogafaq.html#Religion
<<Is Yoga a religion?
No and...maybe. It depends on how you define "religion" and how the
Yoga practitioner approaches his or her practice. The physical and
psychological benefits of Yoga are real and don't discriminate on the
basis of race, religion, gender, political persuasion or any other way
people like (or dislike) to categorize themselve. The benefits also don't
depend on chanting Om. On the spiritual side, most mystical traditions
-- East or West -- draw similar maps of the spiritual path. So in that
respect, Yoga is mainstream. Like Shakespeare said, "A rose by any name
would smell as sweet." For these reasons, many people feel they can
practice Yoga without conflict with their religious beliefs. However,
Yoga is connected to the Hindu tradition and draws on many Hindu beliefs
-- karma, dharma, reincarnation, Atman, etc>>

Could you please clarify Rav Sternbach's statement? If I do yoga
postures and yoga breathing and feel a certain way because of it (e.g.,
calmer and more at peace), perhaps Yogis use that to connect to karma
(frankly, even after reading http://www.yrec.org/karma.html I couldn't
figure out what that means; that site talks about being *free* of karma),
but isn't that a natural phenomenon which I can use in Jewish ways too?
After all, surely the fact that Yogis meditate should not prevent me
from meditating Jewishly.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

I'm not so sure there is a difference between common-law spouses and people 
"just" living together.  Unless you want to start changing chazakos...
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Gil Student

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