Avodah Mailing List

Volume 06 : Number 142

Thursday, March 1 2001

• Amaleik
• Re: Amaleik
• Re: Haman
• Amalek
• Re: Sechorah with Amaleik
• RE: Gra and Ba'al Hatanya (was RE: 72 minutes)
• RE: tzais Gra vs RT
• chelek Elokah mimaal
• Re: Tartei D'Asrei
• Re: Kuzari and Hashgachah
• Voss Iz Der Chilluk #3, MC vol. 1 p. 74
• re: Who can be a Dayan?
• re: Proper care avoiding AZ and shemos AZ
• Mechiyas Amaleik
• Mechiyas Amalek
• RE: Mechiyas Amalek
• Re: chelek Elokah mimaal
• Re: Gra and Ba'al Hatanya (was RE: 72 minutes)
• Re: Voss Iz Der Chilluk? #2: MC vol. 1 p. 102: Initial Summary
• Re: Voss Iz Der Chilluk #3, MC vol. 1 p. 74
• Re: Amaleik
• Re: Sechorah with Amaleik
• Fwd (yhe@vbm-torah.org): SICHOT61 -19: Parashat Teruma

On Thu, Mar 01, 2001 at 09:24:10AM +0200, Rena Freedenberg wrote to Areivim:
: I believe that a few people are very mistaken about something, but you are in
: very good company -- Shaul hamelech also made the very same mistake. We are
: *Commanded* by a mitzva d'oraita to wipe out every vestige of Amalek...

According to the Gra, the passuk says "destroy all reminders/memorials
of Amaleik", not "destroy all memory of Amaleik". The latter wouldn't
work with "lo tishkach". The whole "zecher" vs "zeicher" thing is over
which word means "that which causes a memory" and which word refers to
the memory itself.

R' Chaim Vilozhiner held that "zeicher" refers to something that causes
a memory. (FWIW, that fits my impression that the more rounded vowels
[such as tzeirei] are more common in causative words. Compare binyan
kal and nif'al -- flat patach and kamatz, to pi'eil and pu'al -- round
chirik and shuruk.)

But this is the very point over which I can't see how one can consider
comparisons between Amaleik and those who follow their footsteps to be
anything but aggadita. Definitionally, one is an ethnic group, whereas
on is limited by ideology. The former is far more inclusive.

:                                                  This is not something that
: racism or any other ism comes into.

What do you call it when you are saying that you must kill every vestige
of race X (Amaleik), or that men from race Y or Z (Amon uMo'av) can't
convert, or that Mitzriyim can convert, but can't marry into the general
community for three generations. Making distinctions based on race is
racism. The burden is to argue why this kind of racism isn't immoral.

To do so means providing a reason that is of greater halachic weight than
the immorality of racism. As Rena offers:

: A reason given that everything of the Ameleikim must be wiped out to the
: last is that some of a person's essence [or sparks of the person] is left
: in/on whatever was theirs and the Amaleikim are so evil that nothing that
: was theirs can be taken and used for holiness unless it was done by
: someones like Mordechai and Esther whose spiritual kochot were obviously
: stronger than Haman's.

: The last time that someone thought to leave even a small vestige of Amalek
: alive, a Haman was born and a descendant of Shaul had to m'takain the
: situation.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

> Halacha l'ma'aseh is parshas zachor taluy in the milchama and is zman
> gerama, or taluy in the chovas hayachid to kill Amalek, nafka minha for
> chiyuv nashim (Minchas Chinuch, etc.), and whether you can be yotzei
> with the leining in P' Beshalach (MG"A vs. M"B)?

I need to correct my own posting. The parsha of Beshalach is the one
which concerns itself solely with milchama; the P' of Ki Teitzei adds
the chovas hayachid of timche - the M"B/MG"A is not taluy in this.

Question: the Sifri has a limud that one must destroy even 'nin v'neched
shel Amalek'. Since the offspring of Amalek still have the yichus as
part of the nation, I don't understand why a special limud is needed?

At 09:04 AM 3/1/01 +0200, Carl and Adina Sherer wrote:
>> The Yerushalmi Megilla may be construed that Haman was not a born
>> Amalekite, rather he identified himself as an Amalekite (actually,
>> Agagite) in order to advertise his views (roughly parallel to Mordechai
>> *ha'Yehudi*).

>Apropos the claim yesterday that R. Chaim Brisker held that
>anyone who espouses the ideas of Amalek is Amalek, this
>Yerushalmi and our characterization of Haman as Amalek appear
>to be a raaya - no?

Yes.

Sorry, it is not in Megilla. It is Yevamos 13a.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

The Minchat Chinuch 604 d"h "v'ha'idna" states: "Ein anu metzuvim bazeh
[to destroy Amalek today] ki kvar alah Sancheriv u'bilbel et ha'olam,
V'KOHL D'PARISH M'RUBA PARISH" (caps mine).

One question: I know that 120 years ago the Aruch Hashulchan was
censored in Russia. Was the Minchat Chinuch, written around the same
time in Russia, also subject to the Russian censor (usually a meshumad
who could read and understand texts) ??

Josh

Checked the Rambam. Couldn't find any issur on their property, much less 
sechorah. Guess we don't pasken that it was a mitzva l'doros.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

From: "Wolpoe, Richard" <Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com>
:>I will just point out that they have more in common than just the old
:>80-20 rule - it's more like the 98-2 rule. IOW they really concured
:>about 98% of the time in face of a lot of standard minhaggim and
:>hashkafa.

Moshe Shulman:
: As to minhaggim (in general) I think you are correct, but hashkofa's
: were MUCH different. The Gra's talmid R. Chaim Voluzner, wrote a sefer
: to 'counter' Tanya (As The Solonomer wrote Yesod HaAvodah, to answer
: R. Chaim.)

I have never finished either the Tanya nor the Nefesh Hachayim.  Those
who have comleted both have told me that they  differ in one and only
one central nekudah - which I don't recall at the present moment. 

Now in the realm of their machlokes that nekudah is porbably extremely
significant.  But in the big picture, it is probably a nit.

Shalom
Rich Wolpoe

Shlomo Goldstein:
> It is interesting to note in Shaarim Mtuyanim B'Halacha he brings that
> communities in Europe, primarily Hungary and probably including Chasidim,
> were divided between straight RT and straight Gra, bein l'kula bein l'chumra.

It is my thesis that this got fuzzy as a result of the chumra-izatoin
that became popular in this cnetury amongst certain poskim.

E.G., The KSA, for exmaple, seems to follow straight RT.  AIUI actualyl
the MGA, but I'm fuzzy myself on the difference between the two.

I have made it a point to quibble with poskim that made this stuff fuzzy
by avoiding a straight delineation of who says what and trying to
amalgamate the two diverse shitos and leaving a lot of people in kind of
a dusky twilight <smile>

Shalom
Rich Wolpeo 

Mordechai, Phyllostac@aol.com wrote:
>One sometimes hears it said by some that every Jew is a 'chelek Elokah 
>mimaal'...
>My question is - How can such a teaching be reconciled with standard Jewish
>teaching.... I assume that for the above reason, the teaching is not heard
>from all Jews.

Everyone seems to be simply quoting nistar answers to the question...if
one looks at Aryeh Kaplan z"L 's Handbook of Jewish Thought Volume 2,
the Nefesh HAChayim, the Tanya and good older Shefa Tal and a number
of other sources such as the Shelah, Reshis Chochmah and others are all
such while Aryeh Kaplan z"l says the other approach is the PHILOSOPHICAL
one of Saadia Gaon and the Rambam.

The misnomer above is the word "STANDARD".... Who are the teachers of
this so called "standard" opinion ?! Can someone claim and say that the
former people are ALL on the fringe ? Whether non-Chassidic people who
revere the Vilna Gaon and his student quote or not quote their Kabbalah,
it is their opinion too...Kabbalah was m'kubel from Sinai also...Elu
v'elu Divray ELokim Chaim...not this is a fringe opinion vs the so
called Standard one. If one reads all the sources that have been being
quoted......J.C. and Lhavdil the Abishter are not one because the former
rejected the Torah....and as the Holy books say the Torah and HaKosh
Baruch Hu and the Jews are kulo chad.

On 1 Mar 2001, at 0:50, Noah S. Rothstein wrote:
>>AIUI, if you are going to daven Maariv early in the summer, you
>>should daven Mincha before Plag - otherwise it's a tartei d'sasrei.
>>See the first Rosh in Brachos.

> Many are maikul about this on Erev Shabbos, perhaps the reason is that
> the element of having been mikabel Shabbos shows that it is a dif. day
> for you.

See the Rosh at the beginning of Brachos.

-- Carl (in Yerushalayim where early minyanim on Friday nights are 
few and far between)

mailto:cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

On Fri, Feb 23, 2001 at 09:57:21AM -0500, Gil.Student@citicorp.com wrote:
: Let's move on.  I'm a little puzzled about the Kuzari's shitah, as stated in 
: ma'amar 5 ch. 20 [all page numbers are from the Devir/Even Shoshan edition].

Thank you for the motivation to return to the Kuzari. I particularly
enjoy the Kuzari because the Rihal's hashkafah is so close to those
that are popular today, which are going to be those that fit the lives
we lead today. His focus on existentialism rather than scholasticism
as the yesod haTorah also puts him more in line with the contemporary
Jew that many other rishonim.

(He gets very scholastic here, but this chapter isn't a foundation. The
yesodos are based on bitachon in mesorah and in national revelation.)

The Kuzari opens 5:20 by explaining that everything comes from HKBH -- some
things directly from Him, others via a chain of causes.

Since there are 3 different classes of causal chains, there are 4 types of
events in a person's life:
E-lokis: something that happens directly from Hashem, with no intervening
         cause. IOW, neis.
	 The Rihal's example of dibur E-lokis is when HKBH speaks through
	 the mouth of a navi without giving the navi any bechirah about
	 what is said.

Tiv'is: where the entire causal chain is both deterministic and passive.
        Objects behaving according to the laws of nature.
	Dibur tiv'is are gestures and body language, which the Rihal believes
	are innate, not learned.

Mikreh: events that aren't deterministic, but aren't the product of bechirah.
	His examples are the actions of a child or of a sleeping person. Dibur
	that is mikreh includes that produced by insanity.

Bechirah: products of free will. Note that the Rihal considers this a kind
	  of causal link between the First Cause and the event -- however,
	  it, like mikreh, is non-deterministic. It's a link in the causal
	  chain because it's a product of reasons and attituded created by
	  things the person experienced in the past and how he was made.
	  Bechirah is non-random.

I'm a bit confused about where the Rihal classifies things that happen
to you because of other people's bechirah. OTOH, he says that anger is
a meaningful emotion because people are blamable for things they choose
to do to you, while he also says mikreh doesn't involve blame or fault.
OTOH:
: On p. 225 (sv David A"H), he quotes the passuk in Shmuel 1 26:10 and explains 
: that the passuk is talking about three types of death -- Divine death,
: natural death, and death through mikreh (suicide is not mentioned because no
: "ba'al seichel" would commit suicide).

The example of mikreh is being killed on the battlefield. I can accept that
in battle, people probably don't preplan who they kill, so it's mikreh,
not bechirah. However, the target of a hired hit /is/ a product of another's
bechirah. Or someone challenged in a duel. Etc... Yes the Rihal assumes
that bechirah would equal suicide, and since sane people wouldn't make
that choice, and insane people don't have full bechirah, he rules that
out.

So that implies that from the victim's point of view, another's bechirah
isn't bechirah.

:                                         This, of course, implies that
: hashgachah is not absolute because one can die through mikreh.

Note that mikreh is more like broken instances of bechirah.

"Someone can truthfully say that everything is caused by G-d, and [yet]
someone [else] can truthfully say that man can choose." Which makes
sense, since the Rihal sees the world of causes as either intermediate
or HKBH.

I get the idea that his model is similar to REEDs. I can't say I'm fully
convinced without resolving that "mikreh" issue. But it seems like the
Rihal holds that even though mikreh and bechirah are possibilities, HKBH
controls which choices someone faces, and which further evolve to
impact you. Therefore everything you recieve is fully from HKBH.

Which follows with the next observation:
: On p. 227 (sv Ach hadavar - starting on p. 226) he adds that spiritual 
: preparation ... causes good and repels bad.

: In the next paragraph (sv Im yochaz) he says that someone who does hishtadlus 
: and has bitachon will see good and will not lose...

: Putting all this together, I might say that there is mikreh, however, one's 
: zechuyos can add protection and one's aveiros can add punishment.  How 

IOW, another point indicated a similarity between the Rihal's model
and REED's.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

This time, the issue is mei'inyana d'yoma. (BTW, I was tempted to pose the 
issue of the chilluk between Mechiyas Shiva Amamaim and Mechiyas Amalek, as 
concerning the former the Rambam writes "Kvar Ovad Zichrom", but not 
concerning the latter - the diyuk of the alleged R' Chaim Brisker - as this 
is an issue discussed by  many of the Acharonim we are surveying - check 
the Frankel Hil. Melochim Chap. 5 - but I am keeping to issues discussed by 
the MC. Do it for extra credit :-) .)

The Piskei Teshuva OC 140 wants to be mechaddesh that an Odom Choshuv is 
yotzei the mitzvah of Mishlo'ach Manos if someone else sends him Mishlo'ach 
Manos and he accepts it - just as in Kiddushin 7a, if a woman gives and 
Odom Choshuv a gift he can be mekkadesh her thereby, as his acceptance of a 
gift from another is regarded in Halocho as if he provided the other person 
with hano'oh. And, although the mitzvah of Mishlo'ach Manos is to give 
another person not hano'oh, but food or drink, the PT claims that hano'oh 
achieved via food and drink equals delivery of food and drink (and, of 
course, we might add, there is no chiyuv for the giver to ascertain that 
the recipient of his Mishlo'ach Manos in fact ate and enjoyed the gift).

Yet no other Poskim make this comparison.

Why not?

Voss Iz Der Chilluk?

What Derech have you used to resolve that Chilluk?

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

R' Micha Berger wrote:
: A beis din's ruling is different than an LOR's p'sak. Particularly
: since the gemara at hand says that only a musmach can do the former,
: but doesn't similarly limit the latter.

R' Gershon Dubin responded:
> Still lost. A musmach (the real type) is required for dinei knasos, etc.
> The Gemara says we can paskin hodo'os vehalvo'os because of shlichusayhu
> ka'avdinan. This is a ma'aseh bes din, AISI, not a psak. A psak of a
> LOR requires only the heter hora'ah of the mara de'asra (or his rebbi,
> or both).

My understanding is that semicha is needed for more than just dinei
mamonos. If a psak is given by one who has real semicha, then violating
that psak will violate the d'Oraisa of Lo Sasur Yemin O'Smol. This
would apply to both an individual or a beis din. Anyone disagree with
me on this?

Akiva Miller

Our resident Curmudgeonly Quibbler (R' Seth Mandel) has given us yet
another deep insight into how Lashon Hakodesh works:
> Daniel is in Hebrew Daniyyel, with a double y and the tsere under the
>yod. The aleph is silent. This is an unambiguous sign that the name is
>no longer "dani" plus "qel"...

Serious question: What about the city "Beit El"? Kodesh or Chol?

Thanks
Akiva Miller

I finally had a chance to look up the piece I saw in a sefer talking about
the issur hanaah on property of Amaleik. Below is a summary.

The sefer is called Brichas Hamayan and is a collection of sugyas based on
the 5 Megillas. THe sefer was published anonymously but the various pieces
originally appeared in Agudah's Am Hatorah journal. Agudah collated the
pieces into one sefer and published it in 1982. I seem to recall at one
point seeing th emechabers name but I don't remember where. 
 
Here is a brief summary: 
 
The mechaber says many achronim ask how Mordechai could live in Haman's
house and why bnei yisroel did not destroy the property of Amaleik since
there is a chiyuv to destroy amaleik's properyty. He doesn't mention who
these "achronim" are but he does mention the Oneg Yomtov discussing the
issue in his hakdamah.
 
Obviously, the question makes the assumption that such an issur exists. As
the sefer points out thisis not so pashut. He quotes the Ramabm and Chinucvh
who hold there is no chiyuv to destroy Amaleik's property. The mkor for such
a requirement is Rashi in Parshasa Ki Tzeitzei. who says mefurash there is a
chiyuv to destroy the rechush of amaleik. Rashi is l'chorah based on the
mechiltah in Beshalach and Medrash shochar Tov that hashem commanded us to
destroy any remnant of Amaleik including property. The only rishon who says
there is an issur hanaah on rechush Aaleik is Rabeinun Bachya in Beshalach. 
 
So in actuality, the original kasha is only a kasha to a few rishonim. 
The sefer proposes several answers some of which are interesting since they
shed light on the nature of mechiyas amaleik and when it does/does not
apply. I'll post the answers he suggests a bit later.

cmarkowitz@scor.com 
212-390-5297 

> The mkor for such a requirement is Rashi in Parshasa Ki Tzeitzei. who
> says mefurash there is a chiyuv to destroy the rechush of amaleik. Rashi
> is l'chorah based on the mechiltah in Beshalach and Medrash shochar Tov

If it is based on the parsha in beshalach, that parsha refers to the din
milchama, and maybe the chiyuv of destroying property does not apply to a
yachid (which explains how Mordechai took the rechush). I am suprised the
journal does not cite the Sifri in Ki Teitzei on killing the beheimos.
The Sifri is brought down by the Bais Yosef in 490 with an additional
derasha (not found in our text) of wiping out Amalek even from eitzim
v'avanim, which B"Y attributes our minhag of klapping for Haman to -
the idea is to bang together sticks which have Amalek written on them.

How does R' Bachye classify the rechush as issurei hana'ah when it is
not mentioned among the nikbarim or nisrafim?

From: C1A1Brown@aol.com [mailto:C1A1Brown@aol.com]
> am suprised the journal does not cite the Sifri in Ki Teitzei on
> killing the beheimos. The Sifri is brought down by the Bais Yosef in 490.

He actually quotes a Psiktah Zutra in Ki Teitzi. Don't know if that is the
Sifri your referring to.

Howard Schild wrote:
> Everyone seems to be simply quoting nistar answers to the question...if
> one looks at Aryeh Kaplan z"L 's Handbook of Jewish Thought Volume 2,
> the Nefesh HAChayim, the Tanya and good older Shefa Tal and a number
> of other sources such as the Shelah, Reshis Chochmah and others are all
> such while Aryeh Kaplan z"l says the other approach is the PHILOSOPHICAL
> one of Saadia Gaon and the Rambam.

I don't understand. The concept of the neshama as "cheilek eloka mimaal"
is a kabbalistic one, and would not have been accepted by, e.g., the
Rambam (see Guide I:1 where he says that all comparisons between people
and God are analogies required by our feeble minds, and the development
of negative theology later in part I). The question, if I understand
it, was the reverse. To what extent do mekubalim accept the doctrine of
God's unity as understood by the philosophers?

This is a type of question that some mekuballim found extremely
interesting. R. Moshe Cordovero, for example, in Pardes Rimmonim
(and elsewhere) regularly cites the opinion of "the philosophers" and
discusses the degree to which he finds them acceptable. The Maharal does
the same (though I think he has a different definition of philosopher).
R. Shabthai HaLevi Horowitz, as I said in my previous post, devoted a
whole book to the answer of this particular question, which he says was
asked by readers of Shefa Tal.

Please clarify your point.

David Riceman

>RMS:
>As to minhaggim (in general) I think you are correct, but hashkofa's
>were MUCH different. The Gra's talmid R. Chaim Voluzner, wrote a sefer
>to 'counter' Tanya

                                                 Bs"d

I learned Nefesh HaChaim b'chevrusa for a short time with a Litvishe Talmid 
Chacham who's been through both Tanya and N.Ch. numerous times. At one 
point, I mentioned the above to him and he told me that yes, he, too, has 
heard this, but he has no understanding of how someone could say it, and he 
could not point to any critical differences. Adaraba, in his eyes, they are 
very compatible and complimentary with each other. Can anyone comment?

Eli

On Wed, Feb 28, 2001 at 01:42:27PM -0600, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
: By Nezikin, each one caused and completed the Act of Nezek. The  chiyuvim, 
: therefore, can be transferred from one cause and completer to the other, 
: when necessary. In the case of dayanim, however, it is only the two that 
: constituted the Rov that caused and completed the Din.The third dayan did 
: nothing, but, rather, was only battel to the other two (via Bittul b'Rov, 
: again based on the Grach Stencil BK 27) - they thus constitute the entire 
: BD, vis a vis this psak, and therefore there is no chiyuv to be transferred 
: to the other two.

: This is, LAND, a tough sevoro to follow...

Good, I'm glad to know it's not just me.

The reishah looked like RCPS was going to present something like our
issue of multiple causes verses multiple participants in one cause.

Then he brings in bitul. If the two are mevateil the third dayan, then why
aren't each mechayeiv half because each are half of the non-mevutal part
of beis din? Or because they are each 1/2 of two causes of the hezek --
the find and the bitul? I guess what I'm missing is why bitul of the
third dayan means not paying the third rather than being mevateil his
connection to that third.

I also note that this addresses a point I raised to answer the first
chakirah. I suggested that there are three kinds of rov: azlinan basar
rubah, acharei rabim lehatos, and bitul. RCPS is combining the latter
two.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Thu, Mar 01, 2001 at 02:32:08PM -0600, RYGB wrote:
: The Piskei Teshuva OC 140 wants to be mechaddesh that an Odom Choshuv is 
: yotzei the mitzvah of Mishlo'ach Manos if someone else sends him Mishlo'ach 
: Manos and he accepts it...

Perhaps this is a machlokes on the basic purpose of "shalach manos", and
how it relates to the se'udah.

One could say that mishlo'ach manos is much like matanos le'evyonim -- the
ikkar is to assist someone in making the se'udah.

The PT, OTOH, seems more to indicate that the ikkar is to convert the
se'udas Purim into a communal activity. IOW, it's the shared simchah that's
the ikkar -- not the receipt of food usable for the se'udah. Sharing the
simchah is a basic element of a se'udas mitzvah -- e.g. hachnasas kalah,
the korban pesach.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

From this week's d'var Torah sheet from the United Synagogue of London,

This first part is from a d'var Torah by R' Harvey Brown, MA.

: The practical blotting out is obviously an act of war, but the commentators 
: are uncertain if this is a milchemet mitzvah, an obligatory war which would 
: also require women to participate. The Sefer ha-Chinuch feels that this war 
: is not obligatory and therefore puts the commands to remember and to blot 
: out Amalek under the same category and exempts women from both. Others make 
: a division between the two commands, and point out that history has 
: overtaken us anyway, as we cannot identify Amalek today. The destruction of 
: Amalek is according to Rambam the third of a triad of commands which must 
: be done in the proper order. On entering the Land of Israel, the people 
: were commanded to appoint a King, then to build a Temple and finally to 
: destroy Amalek. No wonder then that the commentary Haggayot Maimuni in its 
: notes on the Rambam describes three mitzvot as Messianic. Perhaps because 
: of its violent nature, our Sages restricted its formal observance to just 
: one Shabbat in the year.

Now, a bit from R' Bernd Koschland.

: Joshua (Shemot 17:3) only defeated Amalek; thus they still appear in the 
: time of the Judges. Later, King Saul was commanded to destroy them, but he 
: did not do so completely, as described in today's Haftarah. Their king was 
: slain by Samuel. In the reign of David, they still appear as enemies (2 
: Samuel 1:1, 8:12). They were eventually destroyed in the reign of King 
: Hezekiah of Judah, 8th century BCE (1 Chronicles 4:42-43), as foretold by 
: Bileam (Bemidbar 24:20).

Is this a makor for Hillel's assertion that we used up the opportunity
for mashiach with Chizkiyahu? After all, if the destruction is a din
in moshiach (as per above) and Chizkiyahu did it...

And, if so, who did Sancheirev scatter?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

RYBS:
> IIRC even the issur on the animals as korbonos (this week's haftarah) was
> an horo'as sho'oh.

Since mitzvos lav lehenos nit'nu, is it possible that korbonos would be
more mutar than hana'ah? I realize that achilah of a d'var mitzvah
qualifies as hana'ah, however, we could be talking about chatos or olah.

-mi

Some advice for our Avodas Hashem. Followed by my 2 mille.

-mi

Yeshivat Har Etzion
Student Summaries of Sichot of the Roshei Yeshiva
Sicha of haRav Yehuda Amital shlit"a
Summarized by Matan Glidai
Translated by Kaeren Fish

Performing Mitzvot Naturally

When describing the components of the mishkan, our parasha notes that
the planks should be made of acacia wood, standing upright (Shemot
26:15). From here, the gemara derives an interesting rule:

"Chizkiya said in the name of R. Yirmiya, quoting Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai:
A person does not properly fulfill any of the mitzvot unless he does
so in the way in which they grow, as it is written, 'acacia planks,
upright.'" (Sukka 45b)

The gemara is teaching us here that the lulav, etrog, etc., should
be held in the way in which they grow (not upside down or sideways),
but the significance of this concept extends to all of our service of
G-d in general. The mitzvot should be performed in a natural way. Some
people think that someone who is truly G-d- fearing should be nervous and
fearful all the time, lest he neglect to fulfill some precept properly,
and that natural behavior does not reflect fear of heaven. This gemara
teaches us that one should fulfill the mitzvot in a natural manner; the
idea is not always to seek a way to escape from the sense of naturalness
and to act in an artificial way.

Rabbi Elimelekh of Lizhensk used to say that after he died, when he would
ascend to heaven, if he was asked why he was not a Rambam or a Ba'al Shem
Tov, he would have a good answer: he was born just himself, and lacked
the conditions to become a Rambam or a Ba'al Shem Tov. But there was one
question for which he would have no answer: why he was not an Elimelekh? A
person must be what he is; he should not try to be someone else.

Obviously, one cannot deviate even slightly from the 613 mitzvot and
from the Shulchan Arukh, but concerning anything beyond that, a person
need not imitate others or force himself to do things with which he
cannot identify; he should be himself. The Gemara (Berakhot 35b) teaches
that many people tried to imitate Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, but were not
successful. The Chassidic masters comment on this gemara that they were
unsuccessful BECAUSE they imitated him, rather than being what they were.

In previous times, people used to recount stories about the Chazon Ish,
the Brisker Rav and others, who were particularly stringent in certain
matters. Today, any stringency that these tzaddikim took upon themselves
is imitated by everyone. The gemara (Chullin 105) quotes Mar Ukva, who
called himself "vinegar, the son of wine" concerning the fact that his
father would not eat meat and cheese on the same day, while he himself
would wait only from one meal until the next. Why was he not as strict
in this regard as his father was? Because his father was his father,
and he was himself, and not everything that was suitable for his father
was suitable for him.

The same gemara continues and teaches that the amora Shemuel was also
"vinegar, the son of wine" concerning his father's custom of checking on
his fields twice every day, while he himself would go walking through the
fields only once a day. Is the intention of the gemara here to teach us
something about agriculture? Obviously not -- it is simply demonstrating
that not everything that a father does should necessarily be done by
his son.

Rabbi Menachem Mendel of Vitebsk used to teach that alien thoughts enter a
person's mind during his prayers because he is trying to attain levels of
prayer that are beyond him. Proof of this is the fact that when a person
speaks to his friend, strange thoughts never interrupt his conversation --
because his speech is natural, and therefore he is able to concentrate
properly. When a person addresses his Creator and tries to reach levels
that are more elevated than his own, then his speech is no longer natural
and cannot be fluent, and therefore strange thoughts come and disturb him.

- - -

RYA raises an issue, but I think there could be a second side to this
dialectic. Isn't there importance to those very mitzvos that do *not* come
naturally? Don't they represent things that we need more work on?
Perhaps then they require /more/ of our lifnim mishuras hadin efforts, rather
than dismissing them as unnatural.

What do you think?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

*********************


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