Avodah Mailing List

Volume 06 : Number 121

Wednesday, February 7 2001

• P' B'shalach d'var Torah for g'matri-ah aficionados
• Re: Avodah V6 #120
• Re: Rashi question
• Re: rashi question
• Re: Avodah V6 #119
• shibbolei haleket
• Gito v'Yado
• Re: Gito v'Yado
• Re: shibbole haleket
• Maaser Ani
• [none]
• Hakaras haTov
• Re: seder tu b'shvat
• RYBS on Piutim of RH and YK (from CCA Conference)
• Re: Fwd: RAV -05: "Majesty and Humility"
• Re: Dor Revi'i and TSBP

From a recent issue of the bi-weekly newsletter printed by the "Breuer's"
k'hillo:
    Rabbi Yaron Halbertal, a Rebbi in Yeshivas Darkei Torah of Far
    Rockaway, has a penchant for gematrios. During his Simchas Torah
    stay in the Heights, Rabbi Halbertal shared the following with
    his father-in-law. In Hallel we say, "HaYardain tissov l'achor"
    which our Chachomim explain that the Yardain River turned back
    when it saw the Aron of Yosaif. The question is how do we see this
    in the posuk? He answered that if you take the word "HaYardain"
    [spelled haih-yud-raish- daled-nun --MP] and turn it back ("tissov
    l'achor") so that you look at each previous letter, it will spell
    daled-tes-kuf-gimel-mem. The numerical value of those 5 letters
    is 156.  The numerical total of "Yosaif" is also 156!
---------------
Quoted from the "KAJ Newsletter" V31 #3 [01Nov2000] issue
((C) Copyright 2000 K'hal Adath Jeshurun, reprinted with permission).

From: Gershon Dubin <gershon.dubin@juno.com>
> On the posuk  "timla'emo nafshi" Rashi explains at length that this is a
> composite word,  made up of  "timaleh osam". 
>  Why didn't Rashi explain this earlier,  at "yechasyumu"?

Yechasumu is only one word as Rashi explains there.

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

On Tue, Feb 06, 2001 at 11:18:59AM -0500, Gershon Dubin wrote:
: On the posuk  "timla'emo nafshi" Rashi explains at length that this is a
: composite word,  made up of  "timaleh osam". 
: Why didn't Rashi explain this earlier,  at "yechasyumu?

Rashi's comment is with the "-mo" suffix in particular.

I have yet to understand when the pasuk uses "-mo" and when "-hem". For
example, "E-lokeimo" vs the more common "E-lokeihem".

-mi

In a message dated 2/5/01 9:53:45 AM Eastern Standard Time, C1A1Brown writes:
> Does anyone have a pshat in rashi (12:15) that there is a ptur anus for
> eating chametz - why do you need a specific ptur for chametz when there
> is a ptur anus in kol hatorah kulah?

The Limud of the word "Hahu/Hahee" is used in many Psukim.

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

>  Neither book mentions the case of an area that is less than 4 tefochim on
>  one dimension and greater than 4 tefochim in the other dimension.

See S"A Horav O"C 345:27 (if it is not 4x4 T. i.e. 3 1/2 T. by 1000 Amoh long 
it is Mokom Ptur)

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

Mr. Shinnar's observation on the "ma'aseh b'lothir" is discussed in the book
"Minhag Ashkenaz Hakadmon" (by Prof. Ta-Shma) on page 203. Thank-you, Stuart
Fischman

According to Rav Amiel, which I believe is amita shel torah, usually
when halacha requires a cause and effect (or a sibah and mesovev)
it is required that they occur synchronously - they cannot occur
simultaneously. For example, the ktsos raises a question on whether Reuven
can transfer a chatser to Shimon via a shtar kinyan but the shtar is not
transferred directly to shimon's hand - it is inside the chatser and can
only be transferred via kinyan chatser. Do we say shtaro ve'chatsero baeen
ke-echad? R. Amiel says impossible - Reuven must first have ownership
of the shtar before he can acquire the chatser. The chatser can not work
on his behalf before he owns it!

However, sometimes there is a circumstance that prevents a kinyan from
occurring (a davar ha-moneah). The eved normally has a yad and should be
able to acquire things for himself - what prevents this from occurring
is the klal - mah sh-kana eved kanah rabbo. When the eved receives his
get, the master does not transfer or create a yad for him. Rather, he
removes the davar ha-moneah and takes away his (the adon's) ability of
acquiring on his servant's behalf. The klal of gito ve-yado teaches us
that the removal of the davar ha-moneah CAN occur simultaneously to the
event that removes it. It does not occur sequentially. Therefore the eved
can acquire a get and the same precise instant in time his yad works on
his own behalf. Similarly, a get thrown into the woman's chatser works
on her behalf since the get removes the klal of - mah sh-kansah ishah
kansah baalah.

With this he also explains an amazing Rashba in Bava Kama. The gemara
in merubeh says that a ganav can be makdish something after yeush. This
is yeush ve-shinui reshus. The question is - how can he be makdish it -
at the time he was makdish it, he does not own it? The hekdesh should
not be chal! The Rashba says no problem - hekdesho ve-kinyano baeen
ke'echad! The Rashba's reasoning is that the sole reason that yeush
does not work for a ganav (unlike metsiah) is because he has a mitzva
of hashava. One cannot own something that he is required to return. Had
it not been for the mitzva of hashava, the ganav would own the stolen
object from the time of yeush. Therefore, his act of makdish REMOVES
the mitzva of hashava simultaneous to his hekdesh. The hekdesh does not
give him ownership - it takes away the thing that was preventing his
ownership from being chal earlier. This can happen simultaneously.

Ralph

On Fri, Feb 02, 2001 at 04:22:25PM -0500, Ralph Frankel wrote:
: According to Rav Amiel...
: when halacha requires a cause and effect (or a sibah and mesovev)
: it is required that they occur synchronously - they cannot occur
: simultaneously....                 The klal of gito ve-yado teaches us
: that the removal of the davar ha-moneah CAN occur simultaneously to the
: event that removes it. It does not occur sequentially....

I don't see why this is so. Isn't the removal of a monei'ah itself
a sibah, and therefore should require the same chronological (or
is that chrono-logical?) rules?

Also, what about actions where the chalos is limafrei'a -- aren't they
cases where the sibah is /after/ the misoveiv?

-mi

"Shinnar, Meir" wrote:
> In Leon Wieseltier's book Kaddish, he ...              brings down in the
> name of the Shibbole Haleket, that in Lorraine, it once arose that yom
> kippur was motze shabbat, and they bekoshi allowed to eat then after mincha
> on shabbat.
> As in our calendar yom kipppur can't occur motze shabbat, either the
> shibbole haleket was misquoted by WIeselteir or there was something
> interesting with the Jewish calendar in Lorraine...

The Shibbole haleqet is cited correctly.  He claims he's citing a tshuva of
Rabbeinu Tam against (neged!)  Rabbeinu Meshullam.  See Shut Sefer Hayashar,
ed.Rosenthal, #46:6.  The text there implies that the Shibbole HaLeqet has
conflated two separate incidents.  Rosenthal in his notes points to Pesahim
105a Tos. s.v. VHN"M, Rosh and Mordecai ad. loc. (which I didn't take the time
to look up), and Tshuvoth Maharam BB ed. Prague #10-11 (which I don't own).
Buber (surprisingly) has no useful notes in his edition of SHL.

Have fun.

David Riceman

Is Maaser Ani in effect these days in EY?  If so, how is it done?

Thanks,
Eric

+----------------------------------------------------------+
| Eric Simon     | erics@radix.net                         |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
| proud daddy to Joshua (4/18/93) and Eliana (3/12/95)     |
+----------------------------------------------------------+

Why,  when the zekenim of Luz got tired of living and left the city,  was
that not considered suicide?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

Hakaras hatov is an interesting mitzvah. We note in all bein adam
lachaveiro's the effect on the doer is at least as significant as the
effect on the recipient. After all, his matzav is dependent upon HKBH. If
you're not the vehicle, something else will be -- "revach vehatzalah
yavo laYhudim mimakom acheir". So we find the Rambam telling us that
many acts of giving a little are better than one act of giving a lot of
tzedakah. Because many acts translates to many reshimos on oneself.

However, the recipient still counts. There is no mitzvah to give
tzedakah to someone who doesn't need it.

Hakaras hatov, however, does apply to objects that don't care whether
or not we are makir. For example, the association between covering
chalah for kiddush and the kavod one should show something that provides
life. Or the makkos initiated by Aharon because Moshe couldn't
afflict the sand and sea which saved him. Apparantly the recipient need
not have benefit in order to for hakaras hatov to apply.

It's seems that while there is a din in chessed in allowing the person
to be appreciated, that's not the din of hakaras hatov. It's not about
the one being thanked. It's about being makir that one recieved and that
one needs to be a reciever in order to survive. C.f. R' Dessler's essays
on chessed and ahavah.

I would therefore argue that this mitzvah is an expression of tif'eres,
not rachamim (c.f. <http://www.aishdas.org/rygb/birnbaum.htm>); or, in
mussar-ese, it's bein adam li'atzmo (BAlA), not bein adam lachacveiro
(BALC).

As said above, there is often a BAlC component, but that's a kiyum of
a second mitzvah.


-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

From: ben waxman <benwaxman55@yahoo.com>
> Does anyone know of sources which describe the origin of the seder tu
> b'shavat? (i.e. is it sabbatien or is it from the Ari z"l?)

In a booklet published by Rav Shmu'el Ben Eliyahu (with the Haskama of
Rav Mordechai Eliyahu) the source of the Seder is supposed to be from
the Kabbala.  Apparently it was a custom of Mekubalim and Anshei
Yerushalayim to study the book Pri Etz Hadar and other kabbala books
and Zohar on this night.

Rabbi Chaim Vital is the source of the 30 fruit to be eaten against
the 30 Midot Elyonot.

Shoshana L. Boublil

RRW and I attended the Cantors Council of America Midwinter Conference
in Teaneck this past Sunday, where we heard some really impressive 
presentations.  This one was best suited to a text medium (no dependence
on musical examples).

Jonathan Baker
jjbaker@panix.com

==========================================================================

              CCA Midwinter Conference, 4 Feb 2001:
  The Piyyutim of Yamim Noraim - How They Amplify the Themes of the
  Text as Interpreted by the Rav (Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik zt"l)

                       R' Yosef Adler,
              Cong. Rinat Yisrael, Teaneck, NJ
                 Summary by Jonathan Baker

R' Adler explained one piut and set the Kol Nidre prayer in context.

The piut is the first one in the Chazan's repetition of Musaf on
the first day of Rosh Hashanah.  Most of us just mumble through it,
with the chazan coming in on the last two lines.  But if you actually
study it, you see that it serves as an introduction to, and brings
out the theme of, the Zichronot section of the Musaf.

R' Adler went through it line by line:

Upad me'az l'shefet hayom

What is upad?  It reminds us of the ephod, the garment of the Kohen
Gadol.  The verb form appears twice, in Ex. 29:5 and Lv 8:7 - girding
on the ephod.  God is upad me'az, already wearing His mantle of judgement.
When we appear in a normal court, we have arguments we can use, we don't
know if we will be found guilty or innocent, but when we appear in God's
court, we *know* already that we cannot but be found guilty.  Thus
l'shefet, for judgment, not for working out guilt or innocence - God
will judge us by what we did.

B'chon maaseh chol yom

Contrast "chol yom" every day here, with "hayom" today above - everything
we did comes down to today.  God probes all our deeds, chon maaseh, from
all our days, chol yom.

Gishat yekumim pnei ayom
Dinam bo lefaless lefidyom

We come to plead before God - we know we're guilty, but what can we do
to make up for it?  to give You reason to be merciful?  To act as a
pidyom, a ransom, for our evil deeds?

Harishon adam bo notzar

On the first, rishon, of Tishri, was Adam notzar, created.  The first
day of creation was on the 25th of Elul, and Adam was created on the
sixth day, which fell out on Rosh Hashanah, 1 Tishri.  According to
the midrash, Adam was created, he sinned, and by 11 AM, was booted out
of Eden.

v'tzuvah chok v'lo natzar

God gave Adam *one* mitzva, but he wasn't able to keep even that one
mitzva, he couldn't constrain himself from violating the only mitzva
he had.

Zeh meilitz c'hirchiv batzar

We know that the punishment for sin is death, unless we have something
to defend ourselves with. *Something* acted as a defense, a meilitz for
Adam.

Chakako lamishpat v'ladorot m'nutzar

In fact, this *something* which acted as a defense for Adam, can also
be a defense for us today, and through all the generations, ledorot.
It was established then, chakako lamishpat, and contiues for us today.
What is it?

Ti`at chotzev g'va`ot v'tzurim

The maker of hills and rocks (stable things) *planted* the seeds of
the defense with Adam.

Yuldu vo meirosh tzurim

Initiated on this day from the beginning, were the archetypes: the 
Avot, the patriarchs.

C'yoshvei n'ta`im heimah hayotzrim, 
lelamed bo tzedek la`atzurim

They planted the seeds, they were the formation of merit, of the
defense which can be used by all in difficult times.

God looked down the generations and found that the Avot were one
day to spring forth from Adam.  The merit of the Avot then served
as the ransom for Adam's life, and Adam's life was spared.  This
merit, the seeds of which were planted and used in Adam's time,
works for us today.  And this is the message of zichronot: remember
the merit of the fathers, the zechut avot, and in that merit may we
be redeemed from punishment.

==========================================================================

R' Adler then went on to explain the reason for Kol Nidrei.

Why do we say Kol Nidre?  If you look in the Rosh on Nedarim (23b?),
he posits that it's about hatarat nedarim (release from past vows).
He goes through about 5 reasons why it can't be that: there's no bet
din (court), there's no regret of the vow, the language seems wrong, etc.

He brings Rabbenu Tam's proposed solution, that it's a pre-declaration 
that any future vows will not be efficacious, such that if one wanted
a vow to work, he would explicitly have to waive the nullification he
had made in Kol Nidre.  In line with this opinion, the wording of
Kol Nidre was changed from past-tense to future. But even this doesn't
really explain Kol Nidre, because
  a) the rest of the language of Kol Nidre would have to change, not 
just the one phrase "from this Yom Kipur to next"; and
  b) what are we to make of the extra verses we say afterwards?

Let's consider the context in which we say Kol Nidre.  The chazan
is flanked by the two greatest members of the community.  Those three
are wearing tallitot, if no-one else is.  They are holding 2 sifrei 
Torah.  What does this suggest?

The three men standing, the chazan and the two flankers, can be seen
as constituting a bet din.  The tallitot can be seen as protection.
How?  We use tallitot as protection from revelations of the Divine
presence.  We use tallitot as protection over the Kohen's hands during
the duchening.  Among Sephardim, the Tokea covers himself and the shofar
with his tallit. A Bet Din sitting in judgement is in place of God's
judgement, and there was a gilui shechina (revelation of the Presence)
when the High Court sat.

This bet din makes two decisions, court orders, psakim.  The first psak
is the introduction: Biyeshiva shel maala...anu matirin lehitpallel im
avaryanim.  In the High and low courts, with the consent of the Presence
and of the people, we permit to pray with sinners.  At first blush,
this looks odd - aren't we all sinners?  Rather, it permits nichramim,
those who have been excommunicated, to pray with the community. The bet
din lifts, or at least suspends, the cherem against anyone who has been
muchram, so that they can pray with the community (normal cherem forbids
one to pray with the community), in the hope that the excommunicated will
do teshuvah.

The second psak is introduced by Kol Nidre, and is addressed to God: 
Forgive this congregation.  

Huh?  How does this work?

Consider the idea of hatarat nedarim.  Someone makes a vow, say, swearing
off meat for a year.  3 months later, his daughter gets engaged, and in 
order to eat at the wedding feast, he needs to get the vow nullified.  So
he goes to the bet din, and tells them about the vow, and they ask him,
"why should we do this?"  He tells them that *if* he had known that his
daughter was going to get engaged, he *never* would have taken the vow.
Because he could not foresee the consequences of his action in taking the
vow, the vow is nullified.  It's not just that he's sorry he took the vow,
but that he didn't understand the consequences.  It's a strange and
flimsy-sounding mechanism, but it was created by God, and so we can use
it.

So the court takes as a *precedent* this institution of hatarat nedarim
in issuing its second psak.  Consider, each of us, had we truly known 
and understood the consequences of sins, the consequences of our actions,
we would never have done the sins in the first place.  We have essentially
done the sins beshogeg, unintentionally.  To truly do a sin bemeizid, 
intentionally, we would have to internalize the understanding of the 
consequences of the sin, and still say, "I'm going to do it anyway."

[There was something about the Rambam in ch. 7 of Laws of Repentance
saying that we are all considered unintentional sinners today, but I
couldn't find it when I looked in the text - jjb]

The court is not actually doing hatarat nedarim, but is instead reminding
God that *HE* created this mechanism of releasing vows, and *on that basis*
he should forgive Israel.

We see this from the verses which follow Kol Nidre:

venislach lechol adat b'nei ysrael
v'lager hagar btocham
ki l'chol ha`am *BISHEGAGAH*.

And we forgive this whole congregation of the sons of Israel
and the stranger who dwells in their midst,
for all of the people acted unintentionally.

We are ALL beshogeg.  Therefore, God, since you created this mechanism
of releasing people from responsibility for actions whose consequences
they did not truly understand, you must use it on the members of this
(and all) congregations, because the are all beshogegin.

Then, the chazan, in his role as the av-bet-din, the chief of the court,
orders:

slach na la`avon ha`am hazeh kegodel chasdecha, v'cha'asher 
nasata la`am hazeh mimitzrayim v`ad heinah, v'sham ne'emar:

Please forgive the iniquity of this nation in the magnitude of Your favor,
as you bore the burden of this nation since its time in Egypt until the
present day, and there it is said...

Cong. and Reader 3 times:

Vayomer H' salachti kid'varecha!

And God said, "I have forgiven them as you have said."

GOD ACQUIESCES TO ORDER OF THE COURT!

And then we say shehechianu.  Now, much of the prayer is in minor key,
we're always crying out the prayers, but here, it's in major indicating
happiness.  We say shehechiyanu on happy occasions, and what could be 
happier than hearing that God has forgiven us?  We resoundingly express
our joy at hearing God's acquiescence to the Court Order.

Another observation: why do the men to the sides of the chazan hold
sifrei Torah?  It indicates a unification of Israel.  We're not just
ordering the forgiveness of the paid members of this shul, we the court
stand in unity with courts all over the world, among all the congregations,
and standing together, chazanim and clal Yisrael, all of Israel, we ask
and order forgiveness for all of Israel.

==========================================================================

In conclusion, not only is it important to understand and interpret the
words that one is saying, one also needs to broaden one's horizons, and
the horizons of the congregation, to the wider meaning of what one is
praying.  It would be worth going through the Rosh on this (see top).

In lecture 5 of his series on RYBS's philosophy, (posted within v6n105),
R' Ronnie Ziegler writes:
:     "Judaic dialectic, unlike the Hegelian, is irreconcilable and hence
:     interminable..."
:                                                     While "Majesty and and
: "The Lonely Man of Faith" present irreconcilable dialectics, it seems that
: some of the Rav's other writings, such as "Halakhic Man" and "U-vikkashtem
: Mi-sham," present more harmonious portraits of personalities who have found
: a synthesis.

I wouldn't have said that the Ish haHalachah is a synthesis as much as
someone who has learned how to live within the dialectics. IOW, since
the Kierkegaardian dialectic is reflected in the Brisker tzvei dinim,
we aren't resolving the dialectic as much as learning how to live with
both tzedadim.

I noted before that RRZ's presentation of RYBS's dialectics make them sound
like the overwhelming majority are variations on the same theme. For example,
in lecture 6 (v6n117):
: Cosmic man is characterized by a sense of expansiveness, questing for
: vastness in all areas of endeavor. Intellectually, his curiosity is of
: universal dimensions; he believes nothing is beyond the grasp of his
: mind. Experientially, he wishes to be everywhere, to leave his familiar
: environs and experience the unknown. ...

: On the other hand, man was also created from the dust of a single spot.
: As origin-questing man, he is rooted in a particular place and looks not
: outward toward the uncharted vastness, but rather inward to the source
: of his being. No matter how far he travels, he is attached to his origin
: and strives to return to it.

The similarity between this dialectic and that of the Lonely Man of Faith
is quite strong. Adam I, like Cosmic Man, is out to "fill the universe
and subdue it". Adam II is on a lifelong quest for redemption.

We will also see something similar in the two types of community, but
as that essay is less-well-known, I will withhold the comparison for
now.

:        Cosmic man, in his feverish haste to leave home, quests for God
: within the vastness of the cosmic drama....

Compare to Adam I -- the pinacle of creation.

:                                                    Origin-conscious man,
: in his yearning to return home, quests for God within the narrowness of
: finitude, within the roots of his very being. In times of crisis and
: suffering, he senses God not in His infinite vastness and distance,
: but rather in His nearness and relatedness...

Adam II -- a covenental partner, and therefore "near and related" to G-d.

: Perceiving God's majesty and kingship, cosmic man seeks to embody these
: qualities as well, therefore formulating an ethic of victory. He is a
: creator, a conqueror, who seeks to subjugate the forces of nature to his
: own needs....

Adam I -- vikivshuha.

This brings in a similarity to a major feature in R' Aharon Soloveitchik's
thought; the contrast between kibbush and yishuv. (It figures in his approach
to bayis rishon vs bayis sheini -- Yehoshua was koveish, Ezra and Nechemia
established an observant community -- in his concept of gender roles, and
elsewhere.)

What I see here is that Cosmic Man is motivated by kibbush.

: However, when man experiences humilitas Dei, he formulates not an ethic
: of triumph but one of retreat, sacrifice and humility. He imitates
: the divine act of tzimtzum, of self-contraction by which the Infinite
: "makes room" for a finite world or is "contained" within the precincts of
: a temple or a supplicant's small room.

IOW, yishuv.

Also, I note in YHE's parsha email list for Bo, the contrast is made
between the olah (of which the mincha is portrayed as a sub-type) and
the shelamim. The olah is a universal korban dating back to Noach, and is
kulo Lashem -- taken to represent awe, distance from HKBH. Shelamim, love.

It would therefore seem that Cosmic Man would bring an olah,
Origin-Conscious man the shelamim.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Mon, Jan 29, 2001 at 12:06:44PM -0500, David Glasner wrote:
: Again I say: Mamrim is not halakhah l'ma'aseh.  The question is how do we
: explain the difference between halakhah l'ma'aseh and the p'sak of the 
: Rambam.  See the Dor Revi'i.

Micha Berger (6:118) wrote:
> Yes, this has been the question since day 1. To recap:
[snip]
> I therefore suggested that perhaps not claiming the right to argue with
> poskim of earlier eras started out being voluntary, but by today it could
> be minhag Yisrael. And therefore a contemporary poseik isn't permitted
> to argue with a rishon. This would seem to be the shitah of the CI, albeit
> he might hold it's still voluntary.

> A second possibility is that they actually have parallel issues to those
> between different generations' Sanhedrin, but we don't hold like Hil
> Mamrim 2:1-3. The Tif'eres Yisrael is choleik with the Rambam. (Can
> he? <grin> Self-reference games aside, I assume the TY has his makor
> as well.)

Since Mamrim 2:1-3 is halakhah but not halakhah l'ma'aseh, it is difficult
to attach any meaning to the phrase "we don't hold like Hil Mamrim 2:1-3."
If the Tiferet Yisrael wants to disagree with the Rambam he is entitled to
his opinion. But certainly Mamrim 2:1-3 provides the conceptual framework
for discussion.

> A third possibility is that machlokesin between poskim does NOT parallel
> that between Sanhedrinin. This would be choleik with the Maharetz Chayos,
> who uses the concept of Sanhedrin to define era borders.

What you are leaving out of the discussion is that the Mishnah and the
Gemara have become a sort of ersatz Sanhedrin, which means that subsequent
poskim are only entitled (though there may always be some exceptions)
to work with opinions that have been recorded in the Talmud. That gives
the Talmudic sources an authority over and above their mere antiquity
(in contrast say to the Zohar, though that is a problematic example
from many points of view). That Aharonim don't argue iwth Rishonim is
a matter of deference whereas that they don't argue with the Talmud is
a matter of halakhah. That seems to me how the Dor Revi'i would put it.

> We should also review the similar conversation in v1n51 - v2n21
> ("authority of the Mishnah" and "revising the Dor Revi'i" and many other
> subject lines) or so, involving when the mishnah was physically written
> down and if that would affect the DR's shitah.

My view is that it would not.

> Back then it was suggested (I thought besheim the DR, but I can't find
> it in the archive) that the authority of Sanhedrin derives from the
> consensus of the kahal. That the Sanhedrin's role WRT din is the same
> as their role WRT purchasing korbanos hatzibbur or kiddush levanah --
> they are acting as representatives of the kahal.

I think that was somebody speculating about the Dor Revi'i.  It seems to
me like quite a stretch.

> I would like to add now that this would imply that without a Sanhedrin
> the matter devolves back to the tzibbur, and that a p'sak backed by
> consensus DOES have the same authority of that made by a Sanhedrin.

Again a stretch. The idea of makom hinihu li avotai l'hitgadeir bo
certainly seems to run counter to the idea that a consensus not backed by
an explicit halakhic decision by an authoritative body (i.e., Sanhedrin
or the Talmud) is irrevocable.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

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