Avodah Mailing List

Volume 06 : Number 110

Wednesday, January 24 2001

• Re: kibud av
• Taharas Hamishpacha & ksuba; kibud av (was: kibud av)
• Loud kedusha
• Re: Heicha Kedusha
• Non-Jews prohibited by rabbinic law?
• Teaching Torah to non-Jews
• Re: Tzelem Elokim
• Re: Tzelem Elokim
• Sotah 33a-b
• Re: Tzelem Elokim
• Re: Tzelem Elokim
• RHS vs RSZA & societal changes
• Re: Heicha Kedusha
• Fluorescent Lights
• Re: Teaching Torah to non-Jews
• Re: Sotah 33a-b
• Re: Dor Revi'i and TSBP

On 22 Jan 2001, at 15:43, Eli Turkel wrote:
> 2. There is a requirement to stand for one's parents. We don't do it today
>   because it is considered strange in our society....

Rav Wolbe in his book on parenting says that parents should insist that their 
children stand for them. 

-- Carl
mailto:cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

From: Eli Turkel [mailto:turkel@math.tau.ac.il]
> I went to a shiur yesterday from R. herschel schacter on kibud av....
> 1. He said that a woman loses her ketuba for not covering her hair or even
>    not keeping taharat hamishpacha only if that was understood at the time
>    of the wedding....
>           I assume that if she keeps her ketuba then there cannot be
>    a requirement to divorce her.

Why assume that? Isn't the explanation simply that the issue of loss
of ksuba is one of implied contract--that is, a man & woman contract
with each other that a woman will receive the ksuba unless she violates
certain norms. Those norms are inferred from the surroundings of the
man & woman. According to this line of reasoning, the Mishnah Ksubos 72a
(unsurprisingly) refers specifically to the norms of religious society.
However, in societies which have different norms (even if those norms
violate halacha), the terms of the implied contract between the man &
woman are different.

Therefore, in the situation of the nonreligious couple where the man
subsequently became religious, the woman's contract rights should not be
dependent upon her keeping taharas hamishpacha.  Of course, the man would be
forbidden to live with such a woman and presumably would be required to
divorce her.

> 2. There is a requirement to stand for one's parents. We don't do it today
>   because it is considered strange in our society. I got the feeling that he
>    was uncomfortable with the notion that the norms of the secular society
>    should change our behavior.

I don't understand.  He was uncomfortable with it yet he paskened that we
don't have to stand?  Or, did he equivocate on the issue?

Why shouldn't the norms of secular society change our behavior?  After all,
the issue is what constitutes kavod.  For example, today people wear
wide-brimmed hats as a side of kavod for tefillah, while in Talmudic times,
people would wear a turban.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

The latest issue of the Jewish Observer has a fairly lengthy article on
this topic.

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

On Fri, Jan 19, 2001 at 01:57:46PM +0000, sethm37@hotmail.com wrote:
:                                                       RMo' in OH 124:2 says
: that the tzibbur starts with the Shatz and davens with him the first three
: "millo b'millo." RMo' in OH 232:1, the same...
: The idea that the Shatz would start out by himself and the people would start
: davening later is not mentioned by any Rishon, not a one...

My father taught me to say the first three b'rachos along with the chazan
whenever participating in a heicher kedushah. He said besheim RYBS (heard
Tues night at the Moriah), that this is din for the very reason RSM cites:

: it doesn't make any sense: the shitta ostensibly holds that everyone davens
: together only if there is not enough time to do it the other way. Now com'on,
: guys, what is the difference in time between the two ways?

A second question. RYGB asked:
> Did someone mention that the AH holds in Heicha Kedusha you say Atah
> Kadosh, not L'Dor va'Dor?

What do you do if you're saying kedushah along with the chazon and he
says "ledor vador"? Would you say "Atah Kadosh" to yourself anyway?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Rav Gustman  (Bava Metzia 12.6) raises the question of whether rabbinic laws
apply to those not governed by Torah laws.  "The Lechem Mishna (Melachim
10:9) states that the prohibition of a non-Jew studying Torah is only
rabbinic. This means that it is possible to have a rabbinic prohibition
without the Torah obligation to listen to the rabbonim because obeying
rabbinic laws is not one of the seven mitzvos. The Mishneh Lemelech
(Melachim 10:7) in contrast says that the rabbinic laws only apply to Jews
but not to non-Jews and there are no exceptions. The Minchas Chinuch (#27)
also says that rabbinic prohibitions do not apply to non-Jews. Tosfos
(Kesubos 11a)  says that the conversion of a minor is only rabbinic. That
means that rabbinic laws can apply when there is no Torah commandment to
listen to them. Tosfos (Berachos 48) says that a child is obligated derabbon
to keep certain mitzvos even though the child has no obligation to listen
because of lo sasur. Tzorech Iyun".

This is in a discussion as to whether a blind person - who is exempt from
Torah laws - 1) can he be obligated by rabbinic law and 2) is he  still
obligated in the 7 mitzvos [Minchas Chinuch #26] or did he lose that
obligation at Sinai?

Daniel Eidensohn

From: Daniel Eidensohn <yadmoshe@bezeqint.net>
> The Chasam Sofer (Chullin 33) explains the apparent contradiction
> by saying that the Rambam holds there are two types of non Jews. A Ben
> Noach is one who has accepted not to worship idols while an Akum has
> not. The Ben Noach is allowed to keep Shabbos, study Torah and do the
> other mitzvos.

Does this mean that the Chatam Sofer thinks that Rambam says that 
even a prospective convert need not break shabbat?  The only 
dissension I have ever heard of on this point are those who hold that 
since gentiles' days begin and end at midnight, they may break 
"shabbat" on motzai shabbat.

Janet

From: "Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer" <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>
>>  If you're asking if such a thing is conceivable, it certainly is. There
>have been many philosophers that have argued that we are as deterministic
>as the path of balls on a billiard table. The deem free will to be an
>illusion.

>  And they are apikorsim. Their position is also irrational.

Speaking secularly, it's a common minority position.  There's a 
determinist philosopher named Daniel Dennett who is famous for 
announcing at cognitive science conferences that he is a zombie.  On 
a purely logical basis, there is no way to differentiate free will 
from determinism --- if we are determined, perhaps we are determined 
in such a way that we have the illusion of free will.  Kant said that 
since we have the illusion of free will, we may as well say that we 
have free will, but ultimately the question is not answerable.

Given Torah, we can say that we do have free will because 
reward/punishment presumes that --- I don't understand R Micha's 
sources in that light.  Still, I think there are apparent paradoxes 
(which I'm sure are not actually paradoxes, but I haven't learned 
about them enough).  e.g., on Rosh Hashana if it is declared 
everyone's fate, to what extent does that mean our actions are 
determined?  Likewise, the midrash that 40 days before children are 
born their bashert is determined, implies that those who G'd forbid 
do not live to marry are likewise determined.  Also, if all future 
converts stood at Sinai, is conversion an act of will, or is it 
destined and they can't do anything about it either way?  Similarly, 
how do converts have basherts?

The best I can do is to say that from G'd's time-independent view, 
these are determined, but from our time-dependent view, they are not. 
[Just as while standing on a line, you can only see the point in 
front of you, but from above the line you can see the entire thing.] 
This is only from my logic, though it is based on someone's 
discussion of free will.  Rambam's?

Janet

On Tue, Jan 23, 2001 at 01:38:57PM +0200, janet rosenbaum wrote:
: Given Torah, we can say that we do have free will because 
: reward/punishment presumes that --- I don't understand R Micha's 
: sources in that light.

Because neither are hard determinists, each says that in some aspects
of thought there is freedom. "Just" that it doesn't include that aspect
that actually is ba liydei ma'aseh.

I could also see justifying s'char va'onesh al pi kabbalah without
requiring bechirah. If a person does damage to their soul, the damage
is done, and the consequence is felt. It's irrelevent as to whether
they chose to do that damage or not.

: The best I can do is to say that from G'd's time-independent view, 
: these are determined, but from our time-dependent view, they are not. 

I would say slightly differently. From HKBH's perspective, determinism
vs non-determinism is a non-issue. There's no flow of time, so there
is no way to frame the question of whether a future action is determined
by current causes.

: This is only from my logic, though it is based on someone's 
: discussion of free will.  Rambam's?

I think the Or Samei'ach's interpretation of the Rambam's shitah suggests
somethign along these lines. The Rambam himself just says that if you
don';t know what "Thought" is for an infinite Being Who is beyond time,
how can you ask questions about that Thought? He therefore makes hakol
tzafui viharshus nesunah into a Divine mystery. The OS focuses more on
the "beyond time" aspect, noting how Hashem's yedi'ah of the past is no
different than that of the future, and therefore no more constraining.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Question re.

the gemara learns a GS re lashon ha-kodesh bet mikra bikurim and
berakhot/kellalot of Leviyim bec of "anita ve-amarta/ve-aanu ve-amru"
and learns a GS for Leviyim themselves from Shemot 19:19 bec of kol/kol.
First, the Leviyim part seems a bit just "by the way"; I wouldve expected
to see it in the "berakhot u-kelalot keitsad?" sugya on the next amud,
as every other one of the issues in the mishnah is so analyzed. Why is
it different here?

Second, what is the sevara for the aseret ha-dibrot "kol" teaching it
was said bi-leshon ha-kodesh? It seems taked for granted but no (obvious)
reasoning behind it.

Many thanks in advance,
Yisrael Dubitsky

At 07:42 PM 1/22/01 -0500, Micha Berger wrote:

>Prof Yeshaiahu Leibowitz basis his understanding of "hakol tzafui
>viharshus nesunah" on determinism. But he holds that others were choleik
>with R' Akiva. IOW, this is a very old machlokes.

PYL is a nonentity Orthodox-wise.

>What about R' Chasdai Crescas...    Joy or regret while making the choice
>is the only "softness" the OH gives his determinism. He makes a point
>of quoting R' Akiva as a ra'ayah.

>The MhS believes in a softer determinism -- that actions are deterministic,
>but decisions are not. Sechar va'onesh and teshuvah are moved from being
>about deed to about machshavah.

RCC's position is very difficult. Certainly, it implies that will is at 
best illusory. He probably actually is similar to the Ishbitzer, althought 
that is sheer ignorant conjecture on my part.

>It would seem, therefore, that will without freedom can be supported via
>reason and Torah.

Haven't seen it yet! The MhS does believe in free will, not free activity.



At 01:38 PM 1/23/01 +0200, janet rosenbaum wrote:
>Speaking secularly, it's a common minority position.  There's a 
>determinist philosopher named Daniel Dennett...
>                            Kant said that since we have the illusion of 
>free will, we may as well say that we have free will, but ultimately the 
>question is not answerable.

RSYWeinberg has a cogent argument on these lines: Bechira is not one of the 
Yud Gimmel Ikkarim because one practices it regardless of belief therein.

Same can be said of these people.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

On Tue, Jan 23, 2001 at 01:20:19PM -0600, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
: Haven't seen it yet! The MhS does believe in free will, not free activity.

The question is whether the lack of bechirah chafshi that is attributed
to nachri'im is a question of free activity or actual free will.

BTW, note also that the problem the sifrei machshavah have is in resolving
a lack of bechirah chafshi with tziduk hadin. They don't discuss the
problem that you originally raised -- denying the concept that "bechirah"
has meaning without being chafshi.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

> 1. He said that a woman loses her ketuba for not covering her hair or even
>    not keeping taharat hamishpacha only if that was understood at the time
>    of the wedding....
>           I assume that if she keeps her ketuba then there cannot be
>    a requirement to divorce her.

I assume the opposite.  His financial agreement (ksuba) was based on their
original agreement of how (ir-)religious they would live.  His religious
requirement to only live with a woman who has gone to mikva is absolute.  If
she refuses, he cannot continue their marital relationship.  Under this
circumstance, I would think divorce is required.

> 2. There is a requirement to stand for one's parents. We don't do it today
>   because it is considered strange in our society....

Note, a parent may forego receiving his honor.  Kiddushin 32a

On a different topic I saw in the name of RSZA that the Gemara's definitions
of proper behavior (derech eretz) apply today even though society's norms
have changed. The example given was eating the market place. He claimed
it was still in place even if it is common to eat there.

Did this mean what is proper behavior lchatchila or was he referring to the
psul-edus of acting in a way that shows he has no self-respect?  I would
expect a distinction between the two.

Shlomo Goldstein

At 07:24 AM 1/23/01 -0500, Micha Berger wrote:
>What do you do if you're saying kedushah along with the chazon and he
>says "ledor vador"? Would you say "Atah Kadosh" to yourself anyway?

Don't think so.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

Those who have opined that RSZA did not, c"v, understand the nature of 
fluorescent lights, should be me'ayein in the SSK 32:67 and fn 170, and in 
RSZA's addenda (vol. 3) p. 54.

KT,
YGB

ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

> Does this mean that the Chatam Sofer thinks that Rambam says that
> even a prospective convert need not break shabbat

Rabbi Bleich [Contemporary Halachic Issues vol IV Chapter 7] has a
discussion of the views of those who hold that a prospective convert is
prohibited, permitted or required to keep Shabbos

>  the gemara learns a GS re lashon ha-kodesh bet mikra bikurim and
>  berakhot/kellalot of Leviyim bec of "anita ve-amarta/ve-aanu ve-amru" and
>  learns a GS for Leviyim themselves from Shemot 19:19 bec of kol/kol.
>  First, the Leviyim part seems a bit just "by the way"; I wouldve expected
>  to see it in the "berakhot u-kelalot keitsad?" sugya on the next amud, as
>  every other one of the issues in the mishnah is so analyzed. Why is it
>  different here?

Your question is IMHO more apropriate on the Mishna itself, and the Tosfos 
Y"T asks it Al Asar, he asks on the next few cases as well, perhaps the 
answer is, that just as the first 2 cases which ask "Keitzad" which actually 
mean "Minayin" use that term because of the latter cases (see Tos. Y"T) 
likewise the whole reason the Mishna mentioned the Limud in the first 2 cases 
was just to be able to elaborate on these 2 cases as well (despite generally 
using Loshon Ktzara).
 
>  Second, what is the sevara for the aseret ha-dibrot "kol" teaching it was
>  said bi-leshon ha-kodesh? It seems taked for granted but no (obvious)
>  reasoning behind it.

As Rashi and other Mforshim explain the Torah was given in Loshon Hakodesh.

Back to lurking mode.

Kol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

On Mon, Jan 22, 2001 at 11:47:49AM -0500, David Glasner wrote:
: > Well, I have to bow the the Kesef Mishnah that 2:1 includes the resolution
: > of machlokesin, rather than only the discovery of new dinim. IOW, that the
: > rule that we do not reopen machlokesin of earlier eras is convention, not
: > mandatory. (Unless we should be exploring minhag Yisrael k'din on this.)

: minhog Yisroel k'din not k'takana or k'g'zeirah.  Sanhedrin rules.

But I'm not talking about whether or not minhag Yisrael created the takanah,
but rather whether there is a minhag Yisrael not to reopen earlier piskei
halachah even when halachically allowed. IOW, apparantly poskim have a minhag
not to use all the power at their disposal.

:> Second, I think that takanos include the rest of dinim diRabbanan, because
:> the taxonomy in Seifer haMitzvos only has the two catagories. According
:> to the Rambam, every diRabbanan is either a din or a gezeirah.

: Well, to revert to halakhah l'ma'asseh, even you will acknowledge, I
: think, that poskim today have some leeway in revisiting dinei d'rabban
: that were paskened one way in an earlier generation...

Yes, but only "some". And not if the generation is early enough that we
assume gadol mimenu bichachmah. With a few exceptions who some would follow
despite the disagreement with those of an earlier era.

:                                                             So there
: are obviously gray areas where we know (or think we know) that the din
: d'rabbanan can change despite the rather categorical words of the Rambam.

Now it's my turn to be confused. The KM puts piskei halachah into
2:1. That means that lima'aseh, we can change a p'sak in a din even if
we can't overturn the din ligamrei. We can reinterpret the law but we
can't repeal it.

The power the poseik of today assumes now in relation to earlier poskim
fits 2:1 -- it still parallels that of one Sanhedrin in relation to
earlier ones.

: And some people, as you know, reject such revisions, for example all
: those who reject the "kula" of R. Moshe Feinstein on non-Jewish milk.

First, we don't know if we hold like the Rambam lima'aseh. Or even how
far one can take the parallel between batei din and poskim.

Second, I'm not sure that's because of an ideological problem with
revisions, a disagreement over where in the taxonomy the original
din of chalav Yisrael resides, or a simple dispute as to whether
the original takanah had an implied t'nai because the reason behind
the takanah was included in its wording.

: > Haven't we discussed this before -- albeit not from this angle? RYBS
: > would say that they couldn't. Apparantly the Gra and R' Kook would say
: > that it could only override such a p'sak lehachmir...

: No, no, no.  They were all talking about how individual morei ho-ra'ah may
: pasken, not about what a Sanhedrin could do.

But Hil Mamrim has no halachah lima'aseh whatsoever without assuming that
the authority of one derives from the other.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

*********************


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