Avodah Mailing List

Volume 06 : Number 109

Monday, January 22 2001

• Re: Fluorescent lights
• Re: Avodah V6 #107
• Re: elevators
• shabbat elevators
• Re: Elevators
• Re: Elevators
• Re: Life span
• kibud av
• uva- or veha-sh'vi'i
• Re: Tzelem Elokim
• Re: Tzelem Elokim
• Re: Tzelem Elokim
• Re: Tzelem Elokim
• Re: Dor Revi'i and TSBP
• Re: Teaching Torah to Gentiles in an Academic Setting
• RE: Teaching Torah to non-Jews
• b'midbar vs bamidbar (was: parsha question)
• Bamidbar
• Re: kibud av
• RE: Parasha question
• Re: b'midbar vs bamidbar (was: parsha question)

On Sat, Jan 20, 2001 at 10:57:33PM -0500, jjbaker@panix.com wrote:
: I have another question.  Where does this idea of Micha's about cooking
: metal come from?  IIRC, the Rambam/Raavad speak of cooking metal davka
: when it has been heated to glowing.  They don't mention yad soledes bo
: as a criterion for cooking *metal*.

They implicitly did when they talk about "heating". What if I got metal to
glow without raising its temperature? Or by raising it's temperature, but not
to yad soledes? I'm trying to short-circuit that whole line of inquiry by
saying that yes, it is "hot" al pi halachah.

: Now, if the filament actually glows in heating the mercury, then
: we have a real problem.

I have since learned that it definitely does. Aside from that, we aren't
heating the mercury, we're boiling it. If heating metal until it glows is
bishul because of the change it makes in the structure of the metal, then
this would be lo kol shekein.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

>  Could we call it cooking at less than yad soledes bo?
>  Is it cooking when you open a container of liquid nitrogen or dry ice
>  on shabbos (dry ice is different since it sublimates, maybe that is
>  burning!)?

I don't see how this is different from melting stam ice;  even the 
Sefer Hatruma (who prohibits because of nolad) allows ice melting in 
water since it is mevatel, and likewise presumably he wouldn't have a 
problem with liquid N2 or solid CO2 since these mix in with the 
atmospheric air.

On the mercury question, if it really is bishul, that would imply 
that you couldn't put a fluorescent light on a timer (since the 
mercury goes back to normal while the light is off and then gets 
reboiled), while you could put an incandescent light on a timer.  For 
that matter, the same would apply to an oil-filled space heater 
versus the coil type.

Janet

Still waitng for RDB...

This is not a sufficient summarry, it does not even begin to discuss the
issue of the realtionship of the elevator with the household grid.

On Wed, 17 Jan 2001, Amihai & Tamara Bannett wrote:
> my sabba is mentioned in this article:
> http://www.ohr.org.il/ask/ask039.htm
...
> [Here's the meat of the article, written by R' Moshe Lazerus, R' Reuven
> Subar, R' Avrohom Lefkowitz, "and other Rabbis at Ohr Somayach". -mi]
...

KT,
YGB
Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

I think someone asked about the Journal of Halacha article.  It's in the 
Spring 1995 edition.   BTW does anyone hold that the issue of extra energy 
expended would preclude you from getting on a bus (forget about the not 
paying and the amira laakum and nonshabbosdik issues)

KT
Joel

R'MosheFeldman wrote:
> read the RJJ article.  Which assumptions do you disagree with?

I did not disagree with any assumptions. I wrote that some aspects of
elevator operation were misunderstood. The errors were in things stated
as physical facts. I have no argument with the excellent summary of
different halakhic sources and views. I question only those views or
halakhic decisions that stem from incorrect data.

It was a number of years ago and I don't remember many details. Here
are a few examples that remain in my memory:

If it is stated in the article that something causes a decrease in current
and the truth is that it causes an increase in current, the halakhic
decision the authors base on that incorrect understanding is at least
suspect. IIRC, that error was because they did not seem to understand
the characteristics of an electric motor and how, all on its own, it
becomes a generator as its speed is changed.

I also remember their claim that an escalator is completely different
from an elevator and presents no halakhic problem. The truth is that the
operation of an escalator is basically no different from an elevator and
the halakhic questions are exactly the same. The practical difference
is that no issurim appear in escalators unless they are loaded with
more than approximately half of the maximum loading. I cannot be more
accurate than "approximately" because measurements have been made on only
a small number of escalators. I do not believe, however, that there will
be significant differences on other escalators.

RYGB wrote:
> what locations actually have the "right" kind of Shabbos elevators
> ... Might you please instruct us over the course of several posts?

Engineers are not qualified to decide what is the "right" kind. My
personal habit, one that has no halakhic significance for others, is that
I do not use any elevator not approved or that would not be approved by
the Institute for Science and Halakha in Jerusalem.

As I wrote, any decent explanation would take me a lot of time,
something I'm a bit short.. Right now I am super-busy with three 30+
floor, hi-speed elevators in Brazil and Panama of new types and with
new problems. To make it worse. I had a serious problem dumped on me
this week concerning six elevators in Jerusalem for chareidim.

I still recommend that RYGB, and/or others, get the booklet as a starting
point and then ask questions as necessary via Avodah

>Please?
 
Was that pretty please?  Okay. Questions I will try to answer, IY"H.



To add to what R' Micha wrote concerning bishul of mercury and glow of
ionized gas. Even if the filaments are no longer heated, the electrodes
are heated by the bombardment of the positive ions and the electrons
of the ionized gas to a temperature where they become white hot. Almost
thirty years ago, I obtained a gas filled bulb in which the fluorescent
coating had not been applied to the tube so that the rabbis at the
Institute for Science and Halakha could see the bright white light
emitted by the electrodes. Gahelet shel matekhet without question. (If
you try it, beware of ultraviolet radiation from the mercury gas. View
through thick glass.

Rabbi Halperin was asked by one who had to light a lamp on Shabbat
whether he should light a fluorescent ("cold" light is not eish) or
an incandescent. R' Halperin told him to choose the incandescent which
has only one gahelet shel matekhet rather than the fluorescent that has
two separate sources of gahelet shel matekhet in addition to the "cold"
fluorescent light along the tube.

David

I haven't gotten mail for a few days. I just pulled this posting,
written this morning, from the Outgoing Mail box because a neighbor,
a lurker on the list, told me at ma'ariv that there have been a number
of postings questioning whether there was bishul in the evaporation of
mercury. My above posting should make the bishul question incidental to
the thousand degree C range of the two brightly incandescent electrodes
of the fluorescent. So, please go from M"T Hil. Shab. perek 9,6 - bishul
to perek 12,1 - mav'ir.

I just thought of an interesting side point. Bishul of metal is about
changing a solid into a liquid. In the fluorescent there is a change
of a liquid metal into a gas. Can we assume the equivalence of liquid
metal and water?

All Good (A"G = K"T),
David

[To be fair, Amihai posted a URL, to an "Ask the Rabbi" from Or Samayach.
As I tried to make clear in an inserted comment, it was I who added to
introductory material and a closing joke.

[Note that this also means the paragraph numbers are OS's not
Amihai's. -mi]

My grandson has caused me problems by posting a summary of an article from
Ohr Sameach on elevators. I never saw the article before. Unfortunately,
from his summary, I see that the article has many inaccuracies despite
the fact that in many places it quotes, word for word, from what I
wrote. Using Amihai's paragraph numbers.

.2. The pulley raises or lowers the car by using a motor, and stops by
   using a mechanical brake; 

In the past,simple, low speed elevators used a mechanical brake to stop.
More "elegant" elevators in the past and, today, all new elevators slow
down and stop by electronic means, often by generating power that is
fed into the electric lines to light the neighbor's lights.

.4. The weight is equal to half capacity of the car, thus the motor
   operates to counteract the pull of the weight when the elevator is
   less than half full, and does not operate when the elevator is more
   than half full, when the car is descending.

The counterweight is equal to the weight of the empty car plus half the
load capacity. The motor operates all the time the car is traveling. The
half loaded car is equal in weight to the counterweight. How could it
move without a motor? At 70 or 80 percent load, the loaded car weight may
become sufficient to overcome friction and cause downward motion. Even
then,the motor remains connected to prevent the car from free fall,
faster and faster.

. Activating the system (resistance sensitive pads, photoelectric device,
  or proximity detector) that opens the elevator doors.

The door is opened by a motor not by the devices listed in the parentheses.

.Sources: 

The first source listed is the booklet I recommended. I hope it doesn't
have inaccuracies. The second source should be Rabbi L"Y Halperin's book
"Maaliot Shabbat" and not the book mentioned.

Amihai: Rachmanut 'al Sabba. Next time, ask me before you write something
that will cause me work commenting on it. :-).

All best (A"B=A"G=K"T),
Sabba David

Prof. Natan Aviezer has written an article concerning life span in Bresishit.

He suggests that originally there was no gene that caused aging. If one
takes the death rate of people aged say 10 to 20 years and then assumes
that same death rate at all ages, the life span would be about 1000 years.

As gene mutations occurred, aging became more and more common and life
span decreased gradually.

Interesting idea? Actuaries and biologists on the list can comment.

KT, 
David

   I went to a shiur yesterday from R. herschel schacter on kibud av.
Some interesting points

1. He said that a woman loses her ketuba for not covering her hair or even
   not keeping taharat hamishpacha only if that was understood at the time
   of the wedding. However, if the couple was not religious and the husband
   became religious while the wife refuses to keep hilchot nidah she
   is entitled to her ketuba.
   He did not discuss the question whether he is required to divorce the
   woman. I assume that if she keeps her ketuba then there cannot be
   a requirement to divorce her.

2. There is a requirement to stand for one's parents. We don't do it today
  because it is considered strange in our society. I got the feeling that he
   was uncomfortable with the notion that the norms of the secular society
   should change our behavior.

On a different topic I saw in the name of RSZA that the Gemara's definitions
of proper behavior (derech eretz) apply today even though society's norms
have changed. The example given was eating the market place. He claimed
it was still in place even if it is common to eat there.

Is there a conflict between these opinions?

kol tuv,
Eli Turkel

> <1818 Roedelheim "M'or 'Einayim" chumash has uva-. Are your chumashim
> older or younger?

RRichW wrote:
> AFAIK newer and probably influenced by Seligman Baer.

Influenced isn't the word. Seligmann Baer's Siddur Avodat Yisrael was
printed originally in Roedelheim. Your chumash probably just has S-B's
siddur and not Heidenheim's in the back.

David

On Sat, 20 Jan 2001, Micha Berger wrote:
> Bechirah chafshi requires *free* will...
>                 Perhaps they have will, but it's deterministic and
> causal....

How is there such a thing as an act of will that is not free?!

KT,
YGB
Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
ygb@aishdas.org, http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

On Sun, Jan 21, 2001 at 02:27:33PM -0600, Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. Bechhofer wrote:
: How is there such a thing as an act of will that is not free?!

If you're asking if such a thing is conceivable, it certainly is. There
have been many philosophers that have argued that we are as deterministic
as the path of balls on a billiard table. The deem free will to be an
illusion.

Also, what about animals? Can we agree that Koko, who can phrase requests
in American Sign Language words (albeit without grammar) seems to have
an idea of "self", but yet lacks bechirah chafshi?

Third, I don't see how to resolve this shitah with the laudable things
Chazal say about geirim. If the person lacks bechirah chafshi until the
moment of geirus, then he didn't choose to be megayeir -- it was min
Hashamayim? How is it to his zechus? Also, how did he not notice this
huge change in himself? Wouldn't a geir remember having once been very
different?

And what about a geir katan the choice made upon becoming a gadol determines
whether or not he had choice? When he's 10, does he have bechirah or not?
When he is mekabeil ol mitzvos, does he have the bechirah to be mekabeil it
or not? Is it actually that either he chooses to be mekabeil ol mitzvos or
HKBH makes him not be mekabeil it? (Since in the latter case he never had
bechirah?)

Li nir'eh, therefore, that this shitah is only consistant with "lack of
Bechirah Chafshi" in the Or Samayach's sense -- they have choice in potentia,
but without the connection to olamos ha'elyonim, they lack the full options
of tov and ra to excercise that potential on.

In which case, we're left with only one question -- that of the fact
that they are b'nei Adam, children of the couple who ate from the eitz
hada'as. How then do they have less of a connection to da'as tov vara
than we do?

It's hard enough just defining what "free will" is: we're discussing
something that is both non-deterministic and yet also not random. IOW,
if your behavior can be fully explained as a result of your experiences,
than you're not "free". OTOH, if it can't be, how does it differ from
a coin toss, how is it "will"?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

At 09:13 AM 1/22/01 -0500, Micha Berger wrote:
>On Sun, Jan 21, 2001 at 02:27:33PM -0600, Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. 
>Bechhofer wrote:
>: How is there such a thing as an act of will that is not free?!
>
>If you're asking if such a thing is conceivable, it certainly is. There
>have been many philosophers that have argued that we are as deterministic
>as the path of balls on a billiard table. The deem free will to be an
>illusion.

And they are apikorsim. Their position is also irrational.

>Also, what about animals? Can we agree that Koko, who can phrase requests
>in American Sign Language words (albeit without grammar) seems to have
>an idea of "self", but yet lacks bechirah chafshi?

He has no concept of will.


KT,
YGB

ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

On Mon, Jan 22, 2001 at 08:51:57AM -0600, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
: >If you're asking if such a thing is conceivable, it certainly is. There
: >have been many philosophers that have argued that we are as deterministic
: >as the path of balls on a billiard table. The deem free will to be an
: >illusion.

: And they are apikorsim. Their position is also irrational.

Prof Yeshaiahu Leibowitz basis his understanding of "hakol tzafui
viharshus nesunah" on determinism. But he holds that others were choleik
with R' Akiva. IOW, this is a very old machlokes.

What about R' Chasdai Crescas, who supports determinism in Or Hashem
3:2:2 ch 1,2? (OH is basically a polemic against using Aristotle for
hashkafah in general, and against the Moreh in particular.) He considers
even teshuvah to be min haShamayim. Joy or regret while making the choice
is the only "softness" the OH gives his determinism. He makes a point
of quoting R' Akiva as a ra'ayah.

R' Mordechai Yosef of Izhbitz's shitah in Mei haShilo'ach (1:4b,
1:14a). He even writes "hakol biydei Shamayim AFILU yir'as Shamayim"!
The MhS believes in a softer determinism -- that actions are deterministic,
but decisions are not. Sechar va'onesh and teshuvah are moved from being
about deed to about machshavah.

It would seem, therefore, that will without freedom can be supported via
reason and Torah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Micha Berger wrote:
>: I was just observing that Mamrim 2:1 may also apply to dinei d'rabbanan
>: insofar as those dinei d'rabbanan are properly subsumed under the 
>: category of divrei soferim rather than takanot, g'zeirot or s'yagim.

> Well, I have to bow the the Kesef Mishnah that 2:1 includes the resolution
> of machlokesin, rather than only the discovery of new dinim. IOW, that the
> rule that we do not reopen machlokesin of earlier eras is convention, not
> mandatory. (Unless we should be exploring minhag Yisrael k'din on this.)

minhog Yisroel k'din not k'takana or k'g'zeirah.  Sanhedrin rules.

> First, I don't think there is a difference between a gezeirah and a s'yag.
> They are both words that literally mean "fence" or "border".

Just allowing for the Rambam's distinction between Mamrim 2:2 and 2:3,
v'ayein sham.

> Second, I think that takanos include the rest of dinim diRabbanan, because
> the taxonomy in Seifer haMitzvos only has the two catagories. According
> to the Rambam, every diRabbanan is either a din or a gezeirah.

Well, to revert to halakhah l'ma'asseh, even you will acknowledge, I
think, that poskim today have some leeway in revisiting dinei d'rabban
that were paskened one way in an earlier generation and, in light of some
new circumstance, changing what had been an accepted p'sak. So there
are obviously gray areas where we know (or think we know) that the din
d'rabbanan can change despite the rather categorical words of the Rambam.
And some people, as you know, reject such revisions, for example all
those who reject the "kula" of R. Moshe Feinstein on non-Jewish milk.
The issue becomes how to interpret what is s'yag or takanah or g'zeirah
and what is the din that follows. Does every p'sak based on a rabbinic
source have the status of takanah under Mamrim 2:2-3, or does takanah
refer only to certain basic rules with the application of those rules
left to the discretion of subsequent authorities?

>:> 1 and 2 are dinim gotten from mesorah; 3 are things known to be from
>:> derashah or sevarah. When in doubt whether a derashah or a sevara
>:> is the origin of a din or a post-facto explanation/mnemonic, safeik
>:> di'Oraisa. How is there a problem?

>: I have trouble with the notion that the Sanhedrin whose function is
>: to resolve s'feikot would use safeik as a basis for deciding what the
>: halakhah is.

> You and I must have different expectations of a resolution. I'm happy
> with a p'sak -- you want the safeik to be eliminated.

Well, I would put it a little bit differently. I want a p'sak from the
Sanhedrin in my own generation, as the Torah commands al pi ha-torah
asher yorukha not the p'sak imposed on it by an earlier Sanhedrin that
has not the power to bind the Sanhedrin in my own generation (may it be
speedily restored, amein).

>: a mahloket between Rav Yoseiph and Abaye (I'm writing from memory now,
>: so I may not have the names of the Amoraim correct) about whether lice
>: procreate or not.  Under what theory of the power of Sanhedrin, would it
>: be prohibited for a new Sanhedrin to change the halakhah and pasken either 
>: like ... Abaye against R. Yoseiph (... being a mahloket in m'tziut)?

> Haven't we discussed this before -- albeit not from this angle? RYBS
> would say that they couldn't. Apparantly the Gra and R' Kook would say
> that it could only override such a p'sak lehachmir, because to remove a
> heter only requires doubting one of its causes, while removing a chumrah
> requires knowing all of them. They might argue that repealing a kulah
> isn't a violation of the Rambam.

No, no, no.  They were all talking about how individual morei ho-ra'ah may
pasken, not about what a Sanhedrin could do.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

I appreciate the responses to my question. I just wanted to add what I
have subsequently found.

The Margoliyos HaYam to Sanhedrin 59a, 3 and the Shea'rim Metzuyan
BaHalachah there sv. akum approvingly quote sources that hold that the
prohibition is only on teaching the lomdus (or pilpul or sodos) of Torah.
The gemara says that a gentile who is "osek" in Torah is chayav misah.
"Osek" seems to imply more than just learning halachos. I'm not quite
sure what they do with the pasuk "umishpatim bal yeda'um". Mishpatim does
not seem to imply lomdus. Rav Ovadiah Yosef in Yabia Omer vol. 2 YD 17
asks other kashyas on this shitah. I'm not sure that my or his kashyas
are unanswerable. RAY's teshuvah in general is encyclopedic in nature
(kedarko bakodesh) and he paskens lechumra on this issue.

Daniel Eidensohn wrote:
> Also of relevance is the extensive discussion in Rav Dovid Yosef's edition of 
> the Rambam's tshuvos #50.

Pe'er HaDor, for those interested in looking it up. Interestingly,
almost all of his mareh mekomos can be found in his father's teshuvah.
The younger Rav Yosef struggled to understand the Rambam's shitah and
noted that it was ignored by all of the acharonim, many of whom claimed
that the Rambam held that it was mutar to teach Torah to gentiles.

> He [Chasam Sofer] also notes that whether it is permitted for a nonJew to 
> learn Torah is apparently a dispute in the gemora itself... and that the 
> Rambam rules according to the lenient opinion... 

Case in point.

Gil Student

Daniel Eidensohn:
>  The Chasam Sofer (Chullin 33) explains the apparent contradiction
> by saying that the Rambam holds there are two types of non Jews. A Ben
> Noach is one who has accepted not to worship idols while an Akum has
> not. The Ben Noach is allowed to keep Shabbos, study Torah and do the
> other mitzvos...

On a lighter note, it is interesting to see the Chasam Sofer using
Brisker style to answer a shver Rambam by noting there are two kinds of
Goyim! <smile>

I heard a similar distinction - iirc based upon a Rambam - between a
stam ben Noach and a Ger Toshav. (IIRC it was on this very list)

While every Ben Noach is chayav in 7 mitzvos, a Ger Toshav goes beyond
that and makes a declaration of intent to observe the 7 mitzvos, etc.

Shalom
Rich Wolpoe

I asked
> First we must ask why and how b'midbar became bAmidbar to begin
> with. Then we can ask whether that logic applies to Sh'mos.

R' Micha Berger answered
> Bemidbar and Shemos are both semichut forms, meaning "in [the] desert of
> ...." and "names of ...". Semichut can only make sense with a following
> word for them to be connected to. Bemidbar Sinai became Bamidbar, but
> Sh'mos B'nei Yisrael didn't become Sheimos.

I had thought of this, and R' Micha's use of brackets highlights my point:
What happens to the definite article when the semichut form is used? Does
"B'Midbar Sinai" (with the sh'va) mean "In *the* Sinai Desert", or does it
mean a more indefinite "In *a* Sinai desert"? If the former, then there is
no change of meaning when we say "Bamidbar", but if the latter then there is
a change of meaning.

I will admit that the phrase "In a Sinai desert" sounds odd. We are
accustomed to the idea that a specific place name either never uses the
definite article ("in Israel", "in America") or always uses the definite
article ("in the Hague", "in the Bronx").

But perhaps "midbar sinai" is not neccesarily a specific place name, but
might be descriptive. For example, one would use the phrase "the Mississippi
River" to identify the one river known by that specific name. But if we
leave out the definite article, then we are talking about "a Mississippi
river", one unspecified river from among the many which are in Mississippi.

Do any of the meforshim suggest whether "B'Midbar Sinai" means "In the
desert which is known by the name 'Sinai Desert'", or whether it means "In
one of the deserts in the Sinai region"?

PS: It is interesting to note that in the Stone Chumash (I don't remember
about Artscroll's other publications), the parsha is titled "Parshas
Bemidbar", with an "e" for the sh'va.

Akiva Miller

From: Kenneth Miller <kennethgmiller@juno.com>
> First we must ask why and how b'midbar became bAmidbar to begin with. Then
> we can ask whether that logic applies to Sh'mos.

My sevara is, that since Sefer Bemidbar is talking about the time Bnei
Yisrael spent in the desert, the name of the sefer more easily became
Bamidbar. But sefer Shmot just starts with names, just as sefer Vayikra
starts with a call, there was no reason to call it Shemot.

Just my 2 cents,
Amihai.

Eli Turkel wrote:
> He did not discuss the question whether he is required to divorce the woman. I
> assume that if she keeps her ketuba then there cannot be a requirement to 
> divorce her.

That is not necessarily a correct assumption.  There are plenty of cases where 
the husband must divorce his wife and still pay her kesuva.  See the mishnayos 
in Kesuvos ch. 7.
     
> 2. There is a requirement to stand for one's parents. We don't do it today
> because it is considered strange in our society. I got the feeling that he
> was uncomfortable with the notion that the norms of the secular society 
> should change our behavior.

I assumed, perhaps incorrectly, that there is a presumption that parents are 
mochel.  I think it is the norms of our society that determines this, not 
secular society.

Gil Student

Micha Berger:
> FWIW, it's probably something folksey, like "sheimos" means the remnants
> of sefarim to too many people for it to have caught on as the name of
> the seifer in chumash.

FWIW the end of Ne'ilah, i.e. Shma, Baruch, Hashem are referred to as
Sheimos by the German community.

Shalom
Rich Wolpoe

On Mon, Jan 22, 2001 at 09:45:09AM -0500, Kenneth Miller wrote:
:> Bemidbar and Shemos are both semichut forms, meaning "in [the] desert of
:> ...." and "names of ...". Semichut can only make sense with a following
:> word for them to be connected to. Bemidbar Sinai became Bamidbar, but
:> Sh'mos B'nei Yisrael didn't become Sheimos.

: I had thought of this, and R' Micha's use of brackets highlights my point:
: What happens to the definite article when the semichut form is used? Does
: "B'Midbar Sinai" (with the sh'va) mean "In *the* Sinai Desert", or does it
: mean a more indefinite "In *a* Sinai desert"? If the former, then there is
: no change of meaning when we say "Bamidbar", but if the latter then there is
: a change of meaning.

I think neither. Does saying "Akiva Miller and I had a conversation"
mean that I conversed with "the Akiva Miller" or "an Akiva Miller"? It's
an English oddity, and not a Jewish one, that proper names that can be
mistaken as descriptions take a definite article.

I don't think there is much to wonder about that Lashon haKodesh doesn't
use a definite article when naming something, unless you can show places
where it sometimes does.

: But perhaps "midbar sinai" is not neccesarily a specific place name, but
: might be descriptive. For example, one would use the phrase "the Mississippi
: River" to identify the one river known by that specific name.

What about Eretz Yisrael -- is it a land that is Israel, or the land?

: Do any of the meforshim suggest whether "B'Midbar Sinai" means "In the
: desert which is known by the name 'Sinai Desert'", or whether it means "In
: one of the deserts in the Sinai region"?

Actually, we traveled through more then one desert during the course of
seifer Bamidbar. Unless you consider Sinai and Sin to be the same.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

*********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]