Avodah Mailing List

Volume 06 : Number 094

Friday, January 5 2001

• Fwd: RAV -03: The Community
• Re: taleissim and atifas Yishmoelim (2)
• Re: Fwd: RAV -03: The Community
• RE: Women Davening
• women davening
• Davening
• Re: Dor Revi'i and TSBP
• Re: hair covering as a das yehudis or a das moshe
• Re: Das Yehudis and SA
• RE: Some Thoughts on Limud Zechut
• RE: Some Thoughts on Limud Zechut
• Re: Aveira Lishma - dafyomi/parsha
• Re: Aveira Lishma, was re: Topical Daf Yomi
• Neis Hanukkah
• Yigdal, Hino Adon Olam Redux
• Baal nefesh
• Women's education - Vayoel Moshe

[From the contributor:

Micha-As per my emails with the VBM and you, I am forwarding this segment of 
this excellent shiur.  Steve Brizel]

YESHIVAT HAR ETZION
ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RAV SOLOVEITCHIK
by Rav Ronnie Ziegler

LECTURE #3: The Community
Part 1 of 2

Before delving into Rav Soloveitchik's difficult (but rewarding!) major
treatises, we will first examine three of his shorter and more readily
comprehensible essays. These three essays - "The Community," "Majesty
and Humility" and "Catharsis" - were published in the journal of the
Rabbincal Council of America, Tradition, vol. 17:2 (Spring 1978). [They
are currently available only in back issues of Tradition, but will
hopefully be republished as part of a book in the near future.] Although
written at different times (1976, 1973 and 1962, respectively), the
arrangement of the essays in Tradition 1978 is intentional, and they
are meant to be read together. I believe that these essays serve as a
good introduction to Rav Soloveitchik's religious thought in general.
We will commence this week with "The Community."

INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY

Even a glance at the titles of Rav Soloveitchik's works - "Halakhic Man,"
"The Man of God" (the original title of "U-vikkashtem Mi-sham"), "The
Lonely Man of Faith," etc. - suffices to reveal that the Rav focuses his
thought primarily on the individual, on his struggles and redemption. The
Rav is less concerned with grand movements in history, or with questions
of nationalism and collective groupings. Rather, he deals mainly with
the lonely man or woman, searching for meaning and self- transcendence,
seeking an anchor in a seemingly cold and indifferent world.

However, this should not lead us to think that the Rav ignores the
communal side of man's existence. Such a perspective would be almost
impossible for someone as rooted as Rav Soloveitchik in halakhic
existence. One cannot understand man as a lone being; he must also be
seen as part of a community. Existence in community is one of man's
basic needs, and therefore if one wants to understand a type of person,
one must also examine the type of community he forms. Indeed, this is
what the Rav repeatedly does in his writings. For example, in "The Lonely
Man of Faith," after describing the two types of man (Adam I and Adam II)
delineated by the Bible's two accounts of creation, the Rav then proceeds
to explore the communities each one of them forms.

A word about the Rav's methodology is in order here. Much of Rav
Soloveitchik's philosophy can be described as "philosophic anthropology"
- the description of different ideal types of personalities. (They are
ideal in the sense of being pure abstract types, not in the sense of
being the best types.) Any specific real person can contain within him a
conglomeration of various types. But the point of separating an individual
into his component parts is to demonstrate the internal coherence of
each position, and thus to better understand the nature of the complex
hybrid produced by the coexistence of the various types. For example,
every person is expected to embody the positions of both Adam I and
Adam II, but in order to negotiate this dialectic successfully, he must
understand each component by itself. We will discuss this methodology
(and its philosophic underpinnings in the study of the humanities) more
extensively when we examine "Halakhic Man," where it is more pronounced
than in "The Community."

FORMULATING THE QUESTION

The Rav begins "The Community" with the philosophical and political
debate between collectivism and individualism, represented in his day
by the conflict between the communist East and the liberal West. He then
posits that:

    "Judaism rejects both alternatives ... Both experiences, that of
    aloneness, as well as that of togetherness, are inseparable basic
    elements of the I-awareness." (p. 7)

However, as he himself indicates later, this answer does not exactly
respond to the question. The Rav does not wish to deal with a political
or socio-economic question, but rather with an "existential-metaphysical"
one:
    "In retreat or in togetherness - where does man find his true
    self?" (p. 9)

The latter formulation of the essay's central question reveals Rav
Soloveitchik's true orientation. He is treating the entire question of
community vs. individual from the individual's point of view - where
does the INDIVIDUAL find his fulfillment, by himself or as part of a
group? Thus, true collectivism, an ideology which regards the individual
as subservient to the whole and deriving his rights and identity from
the collective, is not even an option for the Rav.

CREATION OF MAN

As the Rav so often does when seeking to determine the fundamental nature
of mankind, he turns here to the biblical account of the creation of man
for an answer. (For other examples, see "Confrontation," "The Lonely
Man of Faith," and "Majesty and Humility.") Bear in mind, of course,
that the creation story is of universal import; Adam and Eve are the
progenitors of all mankind, not just of the Jewish People. Thus, what the
Rav has to say here, as well as in the above-mentioned essays about Eden,
is of significance not only for Jews, but for all human beings. However,
as a rabbi, his primary interest is in spelling out the implications
of this narrative for the Jewish People and in finding expressions of
these universal themes within Jewish Law.

On the one hand, the Bible describes God creating man as a solitary
individual ("Then the Lord God formed man..." - Bereishit 2:7); on the
other hand, God declares, "It is not good that the man should be alone"
(ibid. 2:18), and therefore He creates the woman and brings the two
together. Since God creates man and woman as solitary beings but also
unites them into a community, it follows that Judaism affirms the need
for both positions, the community-related individual and the lonely
individual.

    "The answer to the problem is rather a dialectical one, namely,
    man is both... In fact, the greatness of man manifests itself in his
    inner contradiction, in his dialectical nature, in his being single
    and unrelated to anyone, as well as in his being thou- related and
    belonging to a community structure." (p. 8)

The Rav's choice of biblical verses to support the two positions is
an interesting one. He makes reference to two verses from Bereishit
(Genesis) chapter 2, one describing man's creation and the other his
"marriage." It would seem that a more likely source for the doctrines of
aloneness and togetherness would be to contrast Bereishit chapter 1 with
chapter 2. In chapter 1, man and woman are created together ("...male
and female He created them," 1:27), while in chapter 2 man is created
alone and woman appears only later.

However, I believe the Rav's choice of verses is deliberate. In "The
Lonely Man of Faith," Rav Soloveitchik describes the community formed by
man of chapter 1 as a functional-utilitarian one, where people merely
work together for mutual benefit. Man of chapter 2, on the other hand,
feels incomplete without companionship; existentially, it is not good
for him to be alone. He is not satisfied with merely entering into a
working relationship with someone else - he must form a depth connection;
he builds a "community of commitment." This community is not merely a
pragmatic device, but rather is part of his definition as a person.

"The Community" which the Rav discusses in our essay is clearly of
the latter kind; as a "prayerful, charitable, teaching community," it
is obviously far more than a functional collective. Therefore, it is
eminently sensible for the Rav to examine chapter 2 here, not chapter
1. His point is that, within thedepth-dimension of human existence,
we must realize the value of both aloneness and togetherness.

[Methodological aside: The Rav would frequently draw different conclusions
from the same story each time he studied it, just as he would examine
a Talmudic passage afresh and explain it differently each time he
encountered it; therefore, we do not always have to read his essays in
light of each other. In this case, however, I believe it is clear that
we should correlate the two essays. "The Community" of our title is,
in the terms of "The Lonely Man of Faith," an Adam II community, a
"covenantal faith community."]

Thus, rather than being a national-political grouping, the community
here is a series of interconnecting personal relationships. Although the
Rav extols the value of community, he takes care to emphasize that this
should not come at the expense of one's individuality; no one should
submerge his identity into that of the collective. In fact, ultimately,
the community which Rav Soloveitchik values so highly is itself based on
the individuality of each member. Each person adds something unique to
the community, and each therefore complements the rest of the community
and hence is irreplaceable. In this sense, the larger community, in our
case Knesset Yisrael (the Congregation of Israel), is like the smaller
marriage community:

    "Woman and man complement each other existentially; together
    they form, not a partnership, but an individuality, a persona.
    The marriage community is like the general community; its strength
    lies, not in that which is common to the participants, but in their
    singularity and singleness." (p. 11)

THE UNITY OF KNESSET YISRAEL

As indicated in the previous quote, the conglomerate of unique
individuals unites somewhat paradoxically to form a single entity. In
contemporary secular law, a corporation constitutes an autonomous legal
personality; a company's assets are owned not by its president nor even
by its shareholders, but by the "corporation" itself. Similarly, Knesset
Yisrael is a legal personality which, for example, lays claim to the Land
of Israel and is invested with the power to control the Jewish calendar.

However, Knesset Yisrael is more than just the subject of legal rights;
it is a timeless metaphysical entity which has entered into a covenant
with God and which, to an extent, mediates each Jew's relationship with
God. For example, on Yom Kippur every Jew must strive to attain atonement
both on an individual level and as part of the People of Israel. This is
reflected, among other places, in the dual viddui (confession) which we
recite - first as individuals, during the silent Amida, and then as a
congregation, during the repetition of the Amida. In the first, man is
judged purely on his individual merits; therefore, without prologue, he
immediately launches into a recitation of his sins, and ends by begging
for forgiveness. As an individual, one has no right to demand that God
grant atonement, and therefore, as the Rav puts it, the mood of this
confession is one of insecurity.

However, communal viddui is of an entirely different nature. Because
God has made an eternal covenant with Knesset Yisrael (expressed in
the "Thirteen Attributes of Mercy" - see Shemot 33-34), the Jews are
guaranteed forgiveness as a people; God will never entirely destroy us,
nor will He exchange us for another nation. We preface the viddui by
reminding God of the covenant (through reciting the Thirteen Attributes)
and of the love between Him and His people (as expressed in such piyyutim
as "Ki Anu Amekha" - "We are Your people and You are our God; we are
Your children and You are our father ... We are Your faithful and You
are our beloved; we are Your chosen, and You are our friend"). After
confessing our sins, we request and even demand atonement for Knesset
Yisrael, to whom forgiveness has been promised. The entire mood of this
confession is one of security and even joy.

[We will return to the theme of communal atonement at the end of the next
lecture. For those who are interested in pursuing the theme of individual
vs. communal atonement, which the Rav discusses in the context of the
ancient ritual of the scapegoat, the prayers of Rosh Ha-shana and Yom
Kippur, and the laws of shofar blowing, sources are provided below.]

The Rav does not ignore the national-political side of Jewish identity;
we shall further explore his concept of Jewish nationhood when we study
"Kol Dodi Dofek" ("The Voice of My Beloved which Knocketh"), an address
on Israeli Independence Day. It is particularly interesting to contrast
the Rav's view to Rav Kook's; as we will see, their differences lead
to different assessments of the past, present, and future of the Jewish
People. But since we are just beginning our study of Rav Soloveitchik,
we will leave comparisons aside until we are more familiar with his
philosophy. Next week, we will study the conclusion of "The Community,"
where the Rav explains why both aloneness and togetherness are necessary,
and how a community is formed.

FOR FURTHER REFERENCE:

1. Knesset Yisrael in Halakha -
      a) Kiddush Ha-chodesh: see Kovetz Chiddushei Torah, "Kevi'at
      Mo'adim al Pi Ha-re'iya ve-al Pi Ha-cheshbon," pp. 47-65;
      b) Yom Kippur and the Scapegoat: see "On Repentance," section
      entitled "The Individual and the Community," pp. 107-137;
      c) Shofar: see Messorah, vols. 1, 2 and 7, and B.D. Schreiber,
      "Nora'ot Ha-rav," vol. 1, 1996.

2. For a composite portrait of the Rav's writings on Jewish nationhood,
see G. Blidstein, "On the Jewish People in the Writings of Rabbi Joseph
B. Soloveitchik," Tradition 24:3, Spring 1989, pp. 21-43; reprinted in
M. Angel, ed., Exploring the Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik
[Hoboken, 1997].

On Thu, Jan 04, 2001 at 04:16:00AM +1100, SBA wrote:
:>     it means they spoke Yiddish. Similarly "Shabbosim".

: I'll have to do a search on that a well...

This doesn't require a fancy CD search, just look at tephillah:
"Shabbasos limnuchah".

OTOH, "Shabbos kodesh". The word itself is zachar, it just takes a "-os"
in lashon rabbim.

-mi

> These three essays - "The Community," "Majesty and Humility" and "Catharsis" -
> were published in the journal of the Rabbincal Council of America, Tradition, 
> vol. 17:2 (Spring 1978). [They are currently available only in back issues of 
> Tradition, but will hopefully be republished as part of a book in the near 
> future.] 

These essays are also available in Hebrew in Divrei Hagut Veha'arachah.

Gil Student

I wrote:
> then, some will still pasken like the minhag. Consider the case of "kashering"
> flatware by sticking them in dirt for three days.
     
Akiva Atwood wrote:
> Are you commenting on Ne'itzah in general, or this specific method?
     
> For sources on Ne'itzah i general, R' Forst's sefer on kashrut lists YD 
> 121:7, tosfos on Avoda Zara 76b, Shach 89:22 as textual sources.
     
This specific method.  Ne'itzah only works in a very specific case.

Gil Student

> I happen to think that the sevara for women not having to daven is
> fairly plausible as well.

Just to clarify why many think it implausible-
1) It is only aliba the Rambam that it can work, and most Rishonim
(Ramban, Rashi, Tos.) are against the rambam.
2) Even within the Rambam you have to assume that it is sufficient for
a woman to be yotzei tefilah d'oraysa and ignore the derabbanan (makor?)
3) Even if you assume the d'oraysa is sufficient, many Achronim hold
that the formula of shevach- bakasha- hoda'ah is d'oraysa and a bakasha
alone is insufficient
4) m'tzad mussar (or perhaps it is m'dina) see R' Yona in Iggeres
HaTshuvah #79.

Also, even if you choose to pasken like the MG"A, you end up with two
chumros - 1)m'doraysa mitzvos tzrichos kavanah, hence acc. to rambam you
need kavanah (and I doubt just being aware that you are davening covers
this) 2) Shabbos morning a man may have coffee/water before davening as
his chiyuv kiddush is not chal, but a women may not as she has already
been yotzei her minimal chiyuv tefillah by saying berachos.

"Wolpoe, Richard" <richard_wolpoe@ibi.com> writes:
>Re: Chazaras Hashatz vs. a "heicha kedusha" for mincha:
>The black letter of the law is to do CH
>But
>a lot of Rabbonim would pasken that a Heicha Kedusha is OK under many
>conditions - e.g. at work.

That is precisely my point "under many conditions".  Chazaras HaShatz is the 
ideal. In extenuating circumstances, you do not always do the ideal, 
especially when you have to balance off other competing obligations, 
especially halachic obligations.  In the case of work, there is the *halachic* 
obligation that an employee has to an employer.  While we do not posken 
halacha l'ma'ase that an employee should say a shorter form of birchas hamazon 
because he should not be taking that time away from his employer, it is a 
position that is considered seriously in the gemorra.  It is therefore not 
inappropriate to take the obligations of employees to their employers into 
account when considering other personal obligations.  What that means is, vis 
a vis davening, you do not have an ideal davening situation (nor, for that 
matter, do you have an ideal situation in which an employee can fulfil his/her 
halachic obligations to his/her employer - something you may have in summer, 
when the davenning of mincha can be done after working hours).

>IOW, a lot of Rabbanim look to common mimetics despite the texts.

I have not thoroughly been through the sources for hecha kiddusha to see to 
what extent it actually contradicts the texts, rather than being accepted, 
textually, as the appropriate course of action in non ideal situations.  The 
two situations are quite different.  Think, for example, of the person who 
comes late to the shachris minyan in the morning.  That is clearly not the 
ideal, but there is a fair bit of textual halacha about what such a person 
should do (ie say and not say)to catch up, including possibly skipping varous 
portions of the davening.  There is also a fair bit of textual halacha as to 
when a person has to repeat eg the Amidah, when he/she forgot some the 
additions appropriate to the day.  That again is poskening textually based on 
a non ideal situation.  So, in a certain way, is holding a bris on shabbas, if 
the baby had arrived more conveniently the compromises of kedusha shabbas 
would not be necessary.

What you may also be saying is that, while hecha kiddusha has its place, the 
extent to which it is relied on goes well beyond the text.  I have certainly 
heard criticism about some of the places where hecha kiddusha is used, but is 
this really "against the text but based on mimetics" or is it closer to "being 
machmir on pikuach nefesh rather than meikil on yom kippur"?

Shabbat Shalom
Chana

FWIW, the Sefer HaIkkarim 3:23 says on his own (although he tends to be
eclectic without citing sources) exactly what Micha and I believe the
Rambam said in Hilchos Mamrim 2:1.

Gil Student

"Shoshanah M. & Yosef G. Bechhofer"
> Where in SA EH 21 does it say this is relativistic.

It doesn't. The Harchokos mentioned in 21 are not categorized as either
Das Yehudis or Daas Moshe. It is therefore, not possible to determine
IIUC, from this Siman what is relativistic and what is not. The SA is just
telling us how to behave, in a "lump sum" fashion, without refference
as to the level of Issur. The tone of the Siman is more in the area of
"run away from Hirur" and this is the extent that one should go (or not
go) in order to accomplish it.

My point was simply that it can be understood from 115:4 that Das Yehudis
is a Tznius (beyond Issurei Erva) issue which has always been relative to
one's environment. By definition, Tznius is what is communally perceived
as such so that... in Teheran, for example, women who do not dress in
accordance with that community's standards are not acting in accordance
with THAT society's Tznius standards.

I beleive this to be a culturally determined mindset. If one becomes
accustomed to never seeing anything but the eyes of a woman (as is
the case in Iran) then exposure of other parts of the body which are
acceptable by western standards of Tznius (the rest of the face), are
never-the-less titilating in Teheran. So dressing the way most Tznius
women do in western culture would not be Tzniusdik in Iran.

I think it is plausible to say that the SA (especially in it's phrasing)
in categorizing uncovered hair as a violation of Daas Yehudis and
characterizing Daas Yehudis as a Minhag Tznius, it concedes the
possibility that in another time and another place, uncovering hair
would not be a a violation of Daas Yehudis.

HM

"S. Goldstein" <goldstin@netvision.net.il> wrote:
> In fact, SA writes "even though there is a scarf". "Even though" is always
> true.  "Even if" means it can be true or false.

Eventhough she wears a scarf, stating IOW that even WITH this scarf it
is STILL a violation of Daas Yehudis. This does not remove his original
construction of his words "if her head is uncovered". Had he not put
Uncovered hair in the category of Daas Yehudis, he should have simply
said that, "going outside with he hair partially uncovered as in a small
hat or even a scarf" without mentioning "uncovered head" at all since we
automatically know this. Instead he says "uncovered head" that is without
a Redid (small hat) He then goes further and says and Af Al Pi (even
though) she covers it with a scarf, it is a violation of Daas Yehudis.

HM

At 04:03 PM 1/3/01 -0500, Michael J Broyde wrote:
>> Let me start by noting the obvious. The vast overwhelming majority of
>> contemporary poskim who address the issue of hair covering rule the
>> obligation to cover to be a torah violation...
>>                               Either one has to have an exceptionally
>> clear minhag ha-Avos or be pretty foolish to defy the consensus.

From: Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer
> But if one had a "minhag avos"?

> If the vast, overwhelming, consensus of poskim stands in direct 
> contradiction to that "minhag avos", is it not high time to dismiss that 
> minhag as minhag ta'us?

Not necessarily.  Poskim nowadays give little deference to minhag avos, so
not surprisingly they favor "black-letter" halacha.  Poskim until the time
of the Aruch Hashulchan gave much more deference to minhag avos (e.g.,
Tosfos noting that we no longer do mayim achronim, though the reason they
give contradicts the general rule that we do not undo halachos written in
the gemara simply because their reason no longer applies).  The question is:
would the same number of poskim have dismissed this minhag avos had the
issue cropped up 150 years ago?  (See generally Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik's
articles on mimeticism, etc.)

>> Similar such sentiments are taken by Rabbi Yosef Masas in Mayim Chaim
>> 2:110 (and Otzar Michtavim #1884), and by Rabbi Moshe Malka (Vehashiv
>> moshe 34). This rationale appears to have been accepted, at least in
>> theory, by the Machatzitz Hashekel (commenting on Even Haezer 21:5)
>> when he states that the reason single women do not cover their hair
>> is because the standards of observant women in society determine the
>> permissibility of uncovering. He states this is so even according to
>> those authorities who consider it a biblical obligation for single women
>> to uncover their hair.

> What? 1. Where is the MH? 2. What does that last sentence mean?

2.  That the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch do not distinguish between single and
married women with regard to the obligation of kisui rosh.  Consequently,
any argument advanced to justify the current custom of single women walking
around with their hair uncovered could be applied to married women as well.

>> who permit this (he claimed). I observed that I can find more published
>> teshuvot permitting married women not to cover their hair than I can find
>> written teshuvot permitting cheating on Israeli income tax according to
>> Jewish law! To my surprise, this statement deeply bothered people...

> Can you please explain this interesting "balance beam" to me? Is this not 
> the classic case of "two wrongs do not make a right"? You seem to be saying 
> "well, better to be machmir on taxes than on hair": Firstly, mei'heichei 
> tesei, but, far more importantly, how do you come to set up this artificial 
> see-saw - one must be machmir on both!

I don't think that was his point.  His point is that we should recognize
that the issue of kisui rosh is not merely a strictly halachic one; instead,
it has sociological and psychological overtones.  That does not argue for
kulah, but does indicate that we perhaps unfairly stigmatize women who do
not cover their hair.

Kol tuv,
Moshe

At 08:17 PM 1/4/01 -0500, Feldman, Mark wrote:
>Not necessarily.  Poskim nowadays give little deference to minhag avos, so
>not surprisingly they favor "black-letter" halacha.  Poskim until the time
>of the Aruch Hashulchan gave much more deference to minhag avos (e.g.,
>Tosfos noting that we no longer do mayim achronim, though the reason they
>give contradicts the general rule that we do not undo halachos written in
>the gemara simply because their reason no longer applies).  The question is:
>would the same number of poskim have dismissed this minhag avos had the
>issue cropped up 150 years ago?  (See generally Dr. Chaim Soloveitchik's
>articles on mimeticism, etc.)

I do not think that your first premise is demonstrable.

But, re Tosafos and Mayim Acharonim, it is the case that Tosafos does not 
hold of the general rule you cite - that rule is the one cited by the Gro 
in his argument against Tosafos.

The absolute nil number of Poskim justifying uncovered hair in the mekomos 
ha'perutzim, and the fact that the great Melamed Zechus the AH could only 
argue about Shma in their presence, not about the actual practice, answers 
your last question.

I must add that only as time goes by do I realize how devastating the 
impact of DCS's essay.

>    That the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch do not distinguish between single and
>married women with regard to the obligation of kisui rosh.  Consequently,
>any argument advanced to justify the current custom of single women walking
>around with their hair uncovered could be applied to married women as well.

I am still at a loss. The Nos'ei Keilim do make that distinction. To ignore 
that is playing halachic ostrich.

>I don't think that was his point.  His point is that we should recognize
>that the issue of kisui rosh is not merely a strictly halachic one; instead,
>it has sociological and psychological overtones.  That does not argue for
>kulah, but does indicate that we perhaps unfairly stigmatize women who do
>not cover their hair.

Never stigmatize anybody!

But overtones to SA EH 21 are hitherto unproven.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

Eisav was trying to steal land and violated gezel (ben noach). The
places where we say aveira lishma, Ya'el, marrying sisters, the issur was
unavoidable to obtain the greater good - here they could have waited for
Naftali. My answer's also not great bec. the mashma'us is that Chushim
killed Eisav to avoid Ya'akov's bizayon, not bec. of gezel and I'm also
not sure how/whether to apply karka aina nigzeles to gezel akum.

On a different note - that gemara seems to indicate that Ya'akov's claim
to me'aras hamachpeila was because of the bechora. Rashi 46:6 in this
week's parsha says otherwise. Any ideas?

At 11:01 AM 1/4/01 -0500, Gershon Dubin wrote:
>> Aveira Lishma may legitimately cover that: "Ha'k'zona etc." is a Chillul
>> Hashem/Kiddush Hashem justification, not an Halachic one

>         I am not clear on why Chillul Hashem/Kiddush Hashem is not
>halachic justification,  but aveira lishma.

After MT you cannot do things based on CH/KH considerations in and of 
themselves.

KT,
YGB
ygb@aishdas.org      http://www.aishdas.org/rygb

RRW wrote
> 2) Anyone who says there was a Hanukkah as described by Al
> Hanissim but the miracle of the oil never really happened, might be
> mistaken, but he is not a Kofer.

SBA
> BTW see the Ramban al Hatorah at the beginning of Behalos'cho, where
> (thru Midroshim) he connects it to the Neros Chanukah.

Permit me one BIG caveat re: kabbalists

If I could PROVE that the neis Hannukah was made up 500 years later
to explain Hanukkah it would not matter a wit. Because on a mystical
time-line, it was ALWAYS basehrt that the later explanation would arise.

So if RSBY learned peshat by looking at a passuk penned by Moshe Rabbeinu,
it was bashert that he would figure it out nad from a mystical pesrpective
was planted ther all along by HKBH

This is how I can use a halachically correct sefer Torah to find out
mystical combinations of letters even though I MIGHT be able to prove
that Sifre Torah's 2000 years ago had slight variations (e.g. Rashi
on Chanichov!)

This is because I can say that the Torah as it exists now was BASHERT
that way from the beginning.

I have no problem with Ramban or others retrofitting explanations
or insights even though they are not chornologically correct. I jsut
would not do that in the realm of peshat and probably not in the realm
of Halacha

I attend a Kabblistically oriented shiur on Chumash and Rashi in
Englewood, NJ. The maggid shiur darshens the PRAKIM! Now I can show you
historically that Xtians set up the chapter divisions. Not only that,
the maggid shiur himself mused aloud "I don't even know who set this
stuff up!" IOW he himself will tell you that prakim are not necessarily
literally misiani. BUT he darshens them anyway. AIUI, the fact that
perek Nun is in vayechi doesn't matter HOW it got there, the Nun still
describes that Perek somehow because it was fate/destiny/kismet that
this would eventually take place.

Shalom
Rich wolpoe 

I recently saw a 1924 Hebrew Publishing Company edition of the British
Adler/Singer Siddur and here is their take (from memory) on Hino Adon
Olam....

Hino Adon Olam!  (Behold, He is the master of the world!)
Lechol notzar yoreh geduloso umlachuso (To/Towards every creature He
will show His greatness and His sovereignty).

The Ikkar of making Hashem "levado rauy lehispallel" has been obscured
a bit.

Note that gives us now a 3rd way (so far) of parsing this verse:

1) Hino Adon Olam Lechol notzar. Yoreh...
2) Hino Adon Olam! V'chol notzar yoreh...
3) Hino Adon Olam! Lechol notzar yoreh...	

Shalom and Regards,
Rich Wolpoe
Richard_Wolpoe@ibi.com

From: Harry Maryles <hmaryles@yahoo.com>
> Baal Nefesh?   Owner of your soul! (and therefore protect it to the max.)

Our Rov - a strong promoter of the Baal Nefesh line - refers us to the
Yismach Moshe (Parshas Lech Lecho- bottom of page 33) where he describes
a BN as a person for whom 'soul matters' are of highest importance -
unlike the 'hamon' who are 'baalei chomer'...ayin shom

SBA

I am still catching up on Avodah's but have noticed some shakla vetarya
on the topic of teaching women Torah.

I am surprised that no one has mentioned that the 3rd section of Vayoel
Moshe is a comprehensive birur of this matter.

It is actually a Tshuva that the Satmar Rebbe z'l wrote to Rav Pinchos
Hirschprung z'l in Montreal. It runs 50 pages - and is the shortest of
the 3 maamorim in VM.

(RPH was very proud of the fact that his was the only name of a "lebedige'
mentioned in the entire VM.)

SBA

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