Avodah Mailing List

Volume 06 : Number 078

Friday, December 22 2000

• ashrei
• Pirke d'Rabbenu Hakadosh
• Re: Pirke d'Rabbenu Hakadosh
• Re: Seasons Greetings
• Das Yehudis
• Uncovered Hair
• Mixed dancing
• Re: Rashi question
• Re: Avraham and Kiruv
• RE: Avraham and Kiruv
• Re: Dor Revi'i and the TSBP
• RE: missing letters
• Re: Hasakamot
• re: Pirke d'Rabbenu Hakadosh
• 'HaMakom'
• Re: Dor Revi'i and TSBP
• Re: Dor Revi'i and TSBP

See Peirush HaAgadoth l'rebi Azriel and
Professor Tishbi's note (on Brachoth 4b).

david Riceman

From: Eric Simon <erics@radix.net>
> IIRC, doesn't Gemara tell us (Megilla 17a?)  that Yaakov's punishment of 22
> years was because Yaakov was away from _his_ father for 22 years?)

	You are absolutely correct.  There are ayin ponim (seventy facets) to
the Torah, and multiple insights,  from reliable sources (hence my question)
are all correct.

> Also, isn't there another line of thought that Yaakov _never_ thought Yosef
> was dead?  (In part because he accomanied Yosef as he left for Sh'chem?)

	Now you've got me. As we say here on Areivim:  source?  (you can just
ignore that and wait for someone else to answer it <g>.

Gershon
gdubin@loebandtroper.com
gershon.dubin@juno.com

From: Eric Simon <erics@radix.net>
> IIRC, doesn't Gemara tell us (Megilla 17a?)  that Yaakov's punishment of 22
> years was because Yaakov was away from _his_ father for 22 years?

This is brought also in Rashi Breishis 28:9, there are many times that there 
are different Midrashim (and they can both be true).

Yimei Chanuka Mei'irim, vKol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

Harry Maryles wrote:

> But during one of our DafYomi shiurim in I believe Meseches Avodah Zarah, it 
> was pointed out by our Magid Shiur, RYGB, that it does have significance in 
> that it enhances their enjoyment of their Chag which is Assur. But I don't 
> recall if the Issur of enhancement applies to the Avodah Zarah aspect itself 
> or to any enhancement, even indirectly associated with their Avodah Zarah.

I am not holding from this sugya too much either, but IIRC the issur to enhance 
their enjoyment of their holiday is because of azil umodeh - they will thank 
their avodah zarah for their extra enjoyment.

In this respect, particularly regarding the upcoming holiday, I see the gemara 
in Chullin 13b as being very descriptive of the contemporary condition.  The 
gemara says that gentiles outside of Eretz Yisrael are not idolaters rather they
follow their ancestral customs.  In today's world, most of the people who 
celebrate Xmas do not go to church and, if they do, do not pay attention.  The 
overwhelming majority of people are not going to be azil umodeh.  Therefore, it 
would seem to me (and I'm not a rabbi) that there should not be any problem of 
adding to gentiles' enjoyment of their holiday UNLESS you know that this 
particular gentile is very religious and will thank his/her god for receiving a 
season's greeting from a Jew.

IIRC, based on the above sevara, the Rema permits bish'as hadechak attending a 
Xmas party and even giving a gentile a present on Xmas.  That was in Catholic 
Poland.  Kal vechomer in secular America.

Gil Student

Michael J Broyde <mbroyde@emory.edu> wrote:
> One student ask RJBSolociechik if what he had heard in the name of
> Rav Moshe Soloveitchik was correct that that which is found in ketubot 72a
> that "rosho paru deorayta" does not mean that it really is a torah
> prohibition, but rather only a rabbinic prohibition [note by mjb: rabbinic
> prohibition means dat yehudit, which means time and place bound.]. 

It is interesting to see R. Broyde equate the law of a Jewess
(Daas Yehudis, or Dat Yehudit, for all you Sefardim out there) with
"D'Rabbonan's. AFAIK, the term Das Yehudis is only used one time and it
is the the context of covering the hair. To me, this indicates a category
heretofore unexpressed and therefore undefined Halachicly. This is why
I reffered to it as amorphous. The question is, how does R. Broyde know
to make the equation? Perhaps Das Yehudis is a stand alone category like
Minhag, which is somewhat less binding then an actual G'zeirah D'Rabbonan.
Perhaps it is more binding. Perhaps somwhere inbetween. I don't know.
I am totally ignorant on the subject of Daas Yehudis. Are thefe any
sources that define it?

HM

RSBA wrote:
> 10 poskim who OK'd  uncovered hair?
> Any that are known to us?

The only I've seen is the Maharatz Chajes who actually forbade uncovered hair.  
However, he clearly stated that in a place where most women do not cover their 
hair, it would be mutar (and quoted some rishonim to back himself up).

However, I don't think that applies to certain areas of Brooklyn, Lakewood, 
Monsey, Yerushalayim, or Bnei Brak where most frum women cover their hair.  In 
those places the Maharatz Chajes would obligate women to cover their hair.  
Also, in those places R. Moshe Feinstein and the Aruch HaShulchan would forbid 
saying a beracha in front of uncovered hair.

Gil Student

In this case, there is a variety of halachic literature that deals with
mixed dancing, and none seem to be concerned with the issue that RYGB
raises, and indeed suggests fairly explicitly, by allowing some types
of mixed dancing, that they are not worried about causing hirhurim.

The tshuva from RYY Henkin about mixed dancing deals extensively with this
issue.  Even if one does not accept the conclusions, one would have thought
that one should at least address the source material brought.

Thus, there is a variety of material, especially  from the Italian and
Turkish communities about mixed dancing:  Just to bring some

1)  In the Takkanot of Chachme Padua from 1507
We aslo decreed that there should not dance with the married woman any male
with a married female except on Purim, however, with the pnuyot they may
dance on condition that the males will wear a garment coveirng ...
This is signed by Mahari Mintz and 30 colleagues (from memory, when I cited
it earlier, I ascribed it to the Maharam MiPadua, and I apologize for the
error)

2) In the kolbo 66, in the name of the maharam mirottenburg, they put a
herem that men and women should not dance together in dance, and were doresh
yad leyad lo yenake ra, and I said that rachmanal litzlatn it isn't about
this but for evil because they are not reshaim to do so in pharhesya and
brought a proof from the kohen gadol about sota that thakes the mincha from
his hand to hers and he was mattir thsi to all his sons

3)   The Yosef Ometz (from the Hida) siman 103, brings a she'ela from a
community that had an ancient agreement with a herem hamur not to dance men
with women except a man with his wife a brother with his sister and
similarly, and then some 15 youths asked that the heskem be nullified, and
that there were indeed youths who were dancing with nochriyot and forbidden
women.  The hida discusses the problem, and is concerned about negia between
arayot.  However, he never raises an issue about the original takkana, or
any concern about a man and his wife dancing.

4) The Radach (16 century Greece) 12, about a community that instituted a
takana because of the devarim mechuarim that would happen daily in dance,
that they instituted with a herem gadol that a man should not dance except
with his wife and his daughter and a mother with her son and a brother with
his sister, and then people tried to object and allow more mixed dancing -
again, not a hint raised about any issue about a man and a wife.

5) A source cited by RYGB - Ohr Yisrael - raises that the problem with mixed
dancing is negia, and that therefore it is assur.  Not a hint that there is
any problem for the onlookers.

Again, one can argue that the nature of mixed dancing may have changed.
However, the issur cited by RYGB is very extensive.  To cite him, 

"there is no difference whether the lady is dressed "tzeni'usdick" or 
dancing "tzeni'usdick" (oxymoron alert)"

How can this be viewed as a universal opinion in view of all the rabbanim
who have dealt with the issue, and have been mattir it, or, even in assuring
certain forms of mixed dancing, never even considered this zad l'issur?  All
of the halachic discussion prior to roughly 1950 focuses on the issue of
mixing and contact between potential erva, not that viewing permitted
dancing causes hirhurim in others.

Again, the issue is not whether we want to allow or permit mixed dancing.
The issue is whether, if we assur, the nature of the issur - is it a
fundamental din of erva (which means that we expect everyone to honor it) or
a reaction to contemporary mores ( where different communities and poskim
can differ).   Unforthunately, we have only heard a yaakov's hat type of
rationale - how could any yere shamaim possibly allow it.  


Lastly,the view promoted by RYGB suggests something about the nature of
education and our relation to society at large.  If the result of our
education is that we think that viewing a couple holding hands or dancing
causes hirhurim, it suggests that our education was not very effective.
Furthermore, it means that we can not participate at all in the society
around us, as merely walking in Manhattan or on the subway, one is exposed
to far more pritzut.  

I think that that is one reason why this issue is important (not that mixed
dancing is important) - because the issues raised and the view of human
nature presupposed ultimately relates to our ability and desire  to function
and work in the society around us, one of the fault lines between RW and LW.

Meir Shinnar

From: MPoppers@kayescholer.com
> I think the key to the answer is at the end of that second comment by
> RaShY: "...c'mo 'S'u es rosh...' - lashon minyan." He's setting forth
> a rule ("lisa es rosh" means "to count" or "to consider as part of a
> group") and he does refer to it in a number of places (much as he does
> with other k'lalim, e.g. haih basof = lamed bat'chila). (NB that the
> phrase in 40:19 is _not_ the same type of phrase, although the similarity
> is intentionally striking.)

The question remains why he doesn't set this rule the first time around, 
however as I wrote because between the first one and this one there is one 
that doesn't fit this rule.

Yimei Chanuka Mei'irim, vKol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
>  It would seem that the Rambam is choleik with Reish Lakish. "Vayita
>  eishel biV'eir Shava, vayikra sham bisheim Hashem..." (Ber' 21:33).
>  Reish Lakish (Sotah 10b) pulls an al tikri to change this to "vayakri".
>  That Avraham's eishel, be it an orchard or a hotel, was such a chessed
>  that it caused others to call out bishem Hashem.

See Rashi there. he was proactive in Kiruv, and see Rashi Bresihis 12:5 D"H 
Vihanefesh Asher Osu Vcharan, (this was before he even left Charan).

The whole point over there is that the reason he planted the Eishel was in 
order that he should be able to be Mkareiv them, IOW he did open up a point 
of attrection to *attract* people, to be able to spread the knowledge of G-d 
(and he rengaged them verbaly not just by example) note the Diuk in Loshon 
Horambam after he brings the Posuk of Vayikra Sham he writes "Kivon Shehayu 
Ha'am *Miskabtzin Eilov*.

Yimei Chanuka Mei'irim, vKol Tuv, 
Yitzchok Zirkind

Akiva Atwood
>>: Avroham Avinu ... sure went around doing Kiruv.

>> Actually, we don't know that.

> We *do* know that he was sitting out looking for guests after his bris when
> the three malachim came.

It is clear that regardless of how much Avraham physically went about
"doing" kiruv, his Kavvannah - whether being in an active mode or passive
mode - was one of Kiruv.

Perhaps when he was younger he was more actively out ther making
"nefashos" in Charan. And as a more aged senior with an established
reputation (n'si Elokim) he might not have had to do outreach, that
merely opening his tent was sufficient.

Just a thought

Good Hanukkah
Rich Wolpoe 

Gil Student wrote:
>> I'm sorry I don't understand what you mean by a "new halachah."
>> If you look up the Rambam you will see that he is quite explicit that the 
>> p'sak of a previous Sanhedrin can be overruled by the current one based on a 
>> different interpretation of the relevant Scriptual text. The gadol behokhma 
>> u'v'minyan restriction does not apply here either...

> According to just about everyone except for the Dor Revi'i, there are
> different types of halachos. There are halachos leMoshe miSinai, some
> of which were later "found" in the Torah through hermeneutics, others
> which remained detached from the text. 

I'm not following. If you are using the Rambam's classifactory system,
which you seem to be doing, halakhot l'Moshe mi-Sinai refer specifically
to those laws for which there is no Scriptural source at all. That is
why the Gemara says "hilkhita g'miri lan" when it is unable to find a
Scriptural source for a halakhah of long-standing and undoubted validity.
The Rambam postulates in some places the existence of certain mi-pi
ha-Shemua laws that could be proved using the hermeneutic rules, but
for which there is a Sinaitic tradition controlling the intepretation.
He cites such examples as the interpretation of pri eitz hadar and
ayin tahat ayin. In the hakdamah, the Dor Revi'i takes issue with
the Rambam on ayin tahat ayin. He proves conclusively (though you may
differ of course) that on the Rambam's own criterion of a mi-pi ha-sh'mua
interpretation, ayin tahat ayin does not qualify because there clearly
were Talmudic disputes concerning the interpretation of ayin tahat ayin
which the Rambam maintains never happened in the case of a mi-pi ha-Shemua
law. On all this see siman 192 in Havot Yair who provides example after
example of arguments, which according to the Rambam never took place,
concerning halakhot l'Moshe mi-Sinai and mi-pi ha-Shemua interpretations.
It is not clear to me whether the Dor Revi'i meant to deny that there
were any mi-pi ha-Shemua interpretations or, if there were, whether a
Sanhedrin would be allowed to change such an interpretation. He clearly
believed that there was no basis for saying that ayin tahat ayin was a
mi-pi ha-Shemua interpretation rather than a member of your next category.

> Then there are halachos which are DERIVED through hermeneutics, i.e. using
> the 13 midos to learn from one place to another.

Certainly the majority of TSBP is concerned with the explication
of these halakhot often based on conflicting interpretations of the
relevant Scriptural sources. This is clearly what the Rambam had in
mind in Mamrim 2:1. And certainly, the Sanhedrin could change the p'sak
halakhah of a previous Sanhedrin based on a change in its application
of the relevant hermeneutic rules. Clearly, there are many (I don't
say infinite) degrees of freedom in the application of these rules.

> All of the above are de'oraisa. Then there are dinim derabbanan, such
> as gezeiros and takanos.

> The Rambam in hilchos mamrim 2:1 is referring to halachos that are DERIVED
> through hermeneutics. A later beis din can change that. The first type
> of halachah, such as the 39 melachos of Shabbos, is unchangeable.

Oh really, then how do you explain the existence of perek clal gadol in
masekhet Shabbat?  There were obviously extensive disputes 
concerning the definition of the avot m'lakhot and the conditions for
incurring liability for violating them.  According to you such disagreements
should never have existed.

> In hilchos mamrim 2:2, that Rambam is discussing dinim derabbanan.
> This all seems very clear to me.

Mamrim 2:2 is not, as Rabbi B. would say, nidon didan

> This is all stated very eloquently by R. Aryeh Kaplan in his Handbook
> of Jewish Thought, which I came very close to plagiarizing in
> http://www.angelfire.com/mt/talmud/whatis.html.

I don't want to be overly critical, but your citation of the verse
v'zavakhta mi-tzonkha u-mi-b'karkha ka'asher tzivitikha provides much less
support for your position than you think. The halakha l'Moshe mi-Sinai
that you are referring to is to the specific requirement that shehitah
sever two simanim in cattle and one in foul. But all this is itself a
matter of extensive dispute in Hulin. According to the way Rashi and
all other m'forshim understand the verse, i.e., according to the opinion
of R. Yishmael who held that b'sar ta'avah was prohibited in the desert,
the interpretation of ka'asher tsivitikha is not a reference to a halakha
l'Moshe mi-Sinai but a reference to the commandment of sh'hitat kodshim,
because the whole point in D'varim is to permit the consumption of
hulin after shehitah is performed as it had been performed on kodshim.
The existence of the halakha l'Moshe mi-Sinai is postulated by Rebi
in a baraita, but Rebi follows the opinion, not of R. Yishmael, but of
R. Akiva, who holds that b'sar ta'avah had been permitted in the desert,
but that sh'hitah had been reserved for kodshim and n'hirah had been the
method of slaughter for hulin. The verse in D'varim did not come to
permit b'sar ta'avah, as every yeshivah bahur thinks he knows, but to
impose the obligation of sh'hitah on hulin and to invalidate n'hirah.
How do we know that Rebi was in accord with R. Akiva? Because his
beraita is cited in response to the question: who is the tanna that
holds that there is a biblical obligation to perform shehitah on foul?
Well, such a question makes no sense according to R. Yishmael, because
how could one eat foul according to R. Yishmael without shehitah. It is
only according to R. Akiva who postulates the existence of an alternative
method of slaughter, n'hirah, that such a question could even be raised.
Thus, the verse that you cite for the undoubted existence of an extensive
oral interpretation of the written law transmitted to Moshe with the
written law actually shows how precarious the basis in our own sources
is for the existence of such an extensive oral interpretation.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

David Bannett
> As long as we are investigating the missing nun in Ashrei and nafal or
> ne'eman, I think it would be interesting to see a comment on the missing
> vav from the alef-bet of the pesukim in L'David, b'shanoto et ta'amo
> lifnei Avimelekh. Who has some knowledge on this missing letter?

2 quick points

1) I heard at YU - I think at the Cantoral Institute - that the Peh in
Podeh was in lieu of the missing vav. Peh can be exchanged for vav.
Why is it at the end? - Because it's not a *real* vav.

2) Artsroll (p. 376 in the RCA edition) cleverly divides the Heh passuk
(hibitu) thereby engineering u'fneihem as the Vav.

Good Hanukkah
Rich Wolpoe

A few weeks ago, we were talking about learning Greek wisdom.  R. Aharon 
Lichtenstein has something about that on VBM.  
http://www.vbm-torah.org/chanuka/chan60ral.htm

Gil Student

RGD writes:
> Does anyone know what this sefer is?
> The Chabad weekly magazine quotes it in comparing Yosef's leshon hara
> with Yaakov's kabolas L"H.  Yosef was punished with 12 years in prison,
> while Yaakov was punished with 22 years of thinking that Yosef was
> dead.
> Nice vort, but I'd be interested in who the source is;  it is quoted in
> language which sounds like a Midrash.         

To which RYZ responds:
> In the "Otzar Midroshos" there are 3 similar Midroshos Miuchos to
> Rabbeinu Hakodosh "Chupas E-l-i-yohu" "Maseh Torah" and "Pirkei Rabbenu
> Hakadosh" (they are all based on Mamorei Chaza"l that start with a
> number), many of the Mamorim attributed to the latter 2 are actualy
> found in the Chupas E. the one quoted above is in the C"E second Perek
> (Mamorim on the number 4) Ois 35.

In addition to the different versions of the midrash that RYZ notes, 
it has also appeared under the names: Sheva` .Hupot; .Hupat Eliyahu
Rabbah and HE Zuta; Midrash sheloshah ve-arba`ah (or Midrash shel 3
devarim and Midrash shel 4 devarim). See, for example, Tosfot on Berakhot
8b s.v. Yashlim [IMHO, the Ba"h's hasagah there is unnecessary, given that
we now know the exact "midrash" Tos was referring to] as well as Tos on
Avodah Zara 17a s.v. la-alukah. AFAIK, the best edition of the version
known as *Pirkei Rabbenu ha-Kadosh* is by M. Higger, to be found in
*.Horev* 6 (1941) pp. 115-149.

In each of the different versions, the perakim are arranged by numbers,
along the lines of the 5th perek in Avot. The different versions vary as
to the numbers they include, but they range from the numbers 3 through 24.
As might be expected, the number with the most quotations is 3. As RYZ has
mentioned, the midrash  RGD refers to appears under the perek for 4 as in:
"4 avakot [sp?] hen: avak ribit; avak AZ; avak lashon ha-ra; avak
ha-reshut." I am not sure which words exactly RGD [or the Habad source] is
translating, but the words in my edition of HE [Higger's ed of PRH does 
not have this particular maamar] has: "...mi-kan amru z"l shenei tsadikim
laku zeh mi-zeh....ve-Yaakov, she-kiblo, nistalkah mi-menu Shekhinah 22
shanah." Nothing about 22 years of thinking that Yosef was dead.

BTW, in the edition I am using, there is a footnote at the relevant maamar
which cites the text of another version: "ha limadta she-kol ha-mesaper LH
lokeh pa`am a.hat veha-mekablo shetayim...." [true 22 does not equal 12 x
2 but it's close..:)]. 

As to RES' question regarding 

> Oy! I (a publically admitted rookie) heard something else completely.
> IIRC, doesn't Gemara tell us (Megilla 17a?)  that Yaakov's punishment of
> 22 years was because Yaakov was away from _his_ father for 22 years?

In the edition of HE that I am using (in Menorat ha-Ma'or, ed. Enelow),
the editor footnotes that he has no idea of the source in .Hazal of the
midrash regarding Yosef serving 12 years in prison (or is it on the whole
ma'amar of the 12 vs 22 ?). I believe it is to be found in Seder Olam ch.
2 (I realize some of you may have different numbers, depending on your
edition of SO; I am using the Milikowsky, 1999 ed.); compare also Radak at
Bereshit 37:34. 

My point, in other words, is that yes, Yaakov may have been punished by
being away from Yosef 22 years but Yosef may have been in *prison* 12
years and then spent another 10 years before he saw his father (see SO
there for details) and the two reasons [HE vs. Meg 17a] are not mutually
exclusive.

A gutten Shabbes and a freilichen Hanukkah,

Ha-Matir asurim ve-ha-Me'ir la-olam kulo yatir asureinu me-rugzo shel zeh
vi-yiniheinu le-shev be-shalvah be-yamim she-kulam ke-Shabbat Hanukkah,

Yisrael Dubitsky

I wrote the following for scjm, so the normal disclaimer about being
written for a relatively uneducated audience applies. Please feel free
to hastily post comments and corrections, as I would have to mislead
the masses.

The discussion started when someone frum made the comment:
: 'Ha Makom', a Hebrew term literally meaning 'The Place' which is used to
: refer to G-d, signifies G-d's omminipresence. A rebbe of mine once explained
: this as being that G-d is _THE_ Place: Kind of like it's not really that G-d
: is everywhere, but rather that everywhere is G-d.

To which I replied:
: Your rebbe is a panentheist. (To revive an old thread.)

And he asked:
: Define the term and explain what you mean please.

Now, for my post.

Panentheism is the belief that G-d includes, but is more than, the
universe. (As opposed to pantheism, the belief that god is the universe.)

Chassidus is panentheistic. It provides a resolution to transendence vs
immanence. G-d is transcendent, greater than the universe, but since He
includes the universe, it is also true to say that He is everywhere.

The flaw with panentheism is that it complicates the notion of the unity
of G-d. Since the universe clearly has parts, and G-d doesn't, how can G-d
include the universe? One could argue that all plurality is an illusion,
necessary to have a notion of personal identity, part of the gift of
free will. R' Kook does argue that all divisions are illusory, and the
process of redemption is one of unification of these dualities. In the
little I've read of R' Kook's I have not seen him use that idea in this
context, though. And, how do you avoid the implication that free will
is only an illusion?

This is actually an aspect of the problem of tzimtzum (contraction).
Kabbalah teaches that G-d "contracted" to make "room" for the universe.
How can G-d contract? Chabad Chassidus argues that tzimtzum is illusory.
IOW, the universe can exist because G-d created a "place" where is
presence can't be percieved. But of course He really is there.

Again, R' Kook takes this approach. In fact, the use of "Orot" (lights) in
the titles of his writings is about the holy places, times, objects and
people, that let the divine light through this curtain, so that we can
see the kudshah ila'a (the supernal holiness) that lies even in things
we'd consider mundane.

In the Maharal's thought (see Gevuros Hashem, roughly chap 46), this is
the idea of the number 7. Space has six directions. Three dimensions, each
of which extend in two directions. Six, like the six days of creation,
is therefore the physical existance around us. And, like the six faces
of a cube, there is within an unreachable central point, the seventh.
We know it's there, even though we could never percieve it. The seventh
item is therefore the holiness inherent in all of existance.

The number eight is therefor beyond the physical, as Hirsch puts it,
"the special calling of the Jew... the eighth day of the b'ris".

And with that thought, let me with everyone a good Shabbos on this,
the seventh day of the week, and a great eight days of Chanukah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Micha Berger wrote:
> What about a p'sak halachah? What if one BD resolved a machlokes
> according to one shitah, and another BD chose the other shitah --
> where both shitos predate even the first BD?

> Sanhedrin not only legislates, it also interprets existing dinim.

Yes, and Sanhedrin is not bound by the drashot of an earlier Sanhedrin
and is authorized to change the halakhah by changing the relevant
drashah.  Isn't that what happened when Ruth was allowed to marry
Boaz based on Moavi, v'lo Moavit?
 
>: Well, now I'm thoroughly confused, because the whole point of the Dor
>: Revi'i was to contrast the ideal halakhic system when there is a 
>: Sanhedrin with the new system that resulted from the redaction of the 
>: Mishnah...

> Yes, but you had asked how one would understand the Rambam without the
> dor Revi'i. 

My confusion deepens. Gil started this discussion off by asking how
to make sense of the Dor Revi'i. I was trying to show him that the Dor
Revi'i is easily reconciled, on this point at any rate, with the Rambam.
In fact his whole shita flows from Mamrim 2:1. I never asked how one
could understand the Rambam without the Dor Revi'i. But come to think
of it, that's not such a bad question. I'll have to give it some thought.

> So of course the answer won't fit his shitah. RGS and I argue
> that the Rambam is dealing with the ideal system only, not the new one. 

What is it that you are calling the ideal system and what are you
calling the new one?  If you are calling the ideal system one in which
there is a Sanhedrin with smiha and the new system one in which there
is no such institution, so that we are therefore bound by the decisions of 
earlier Sanhedrins and the drashot and halakhot as redacted in the
Talmud, we are using terms in the same way.  If not, could you please
explain.

>: Excuse me, are you saying that a Sanhedrin that could ignore a bat kol 
>: transmitting an explicit directive from the RShO could not ignore the
>: precedent of an earlier Sanhedrin?

> Yes (assuming that the tanur shel achnai story is the norm). Lo bashamayim
> hi rules out listening to shamayim.

So are you telling me that R. Yehoshua really wanted to listen to the bat kol,
and was all set to reverse the p'sak, but then suddenly remembered the
pasuk lo ba-shamayim hi, and had no choice but to retract his concession?  
Gevalt.  This was not a technical dispute about the fine points of how to 
interpret some legal document, it was a dispute about basic principles.  The 
pasuk lo ba-shamayim hi isn't even remotely connected al pi p'shat with the 
authority of a bat kol.  However, R. Yehoshua had the presence of mind to 
be able to quote the RshO's own words back at Him in support of his own 
philsophical position that the Sanhedrin had to be the Supreme Halakhic 
Authority.  When the RShO heard His own words used against Him, He 
realized that R. Yehoshua v'siyato could not be budged, and admitted defeat.

> It doesn't mean that one isn't supposed to listen lihefech. 

Sorry, can't follow this.

> As R' Gil wrote, the halachic process was given to us
> to create halachah with. If that process includes the power of precedent,
> then we have to follow precedent in some cases.

Fine, but the halakhic system that you are talking about also tells us to
listen to the shofeit that will be in your days.  Yiftah b'doro k'Shmuel b'doro.
That is much better justification for defying precedent than lo ba-shamayim
hi is for defying the RShO.

David Glasner
dglasner@ftc.gov

On Fri, Dec 22, 2000 at 01:40:23PM -0500, David Glasner wrote:
:> Sanhedrin not only legislates, it also interprets existing dinim.

: Yes, and Sanhedrin is not bound by the drashot of an earlier Sanhedrin
: and is authorized to change the halakhah by changing the relevant
: drashah.  Isn't that what happened when Ruth was allowed to marry
: Boaz based on Moavi, v'lo Moavit?

Actually, it's quite likely there was no p'sak on Moavis until Boaz's
day. It would only come up if one of them wanted to convert. Or, they
were omeid bisafeik and refrained from accepting a Moavis conver our
of safeik, not p'sak. Or...

This is no ra'ayah to the Rambam.

However, I was talking about the resolution of machlokes without the
use of pesukim. Like the way a poseik today uses sevarah to side like
the Raavad instead of the Rambam. Or Rashi vs R' Tam tefillin.

: My confusion deepens. Gil started this discussion off by asking how
: to make sense of the Dor Revi'i. I was trying to show him that the Dor
: Revi'i is easily reconciled, on this point at any rate, with the Rambam.
: In fact his whole shita flows from Mamrim 2:1. I never asked how one
: could understand the Rambam without the Dor Revi'i. But come to think
: of it, that's not such a bad question. I'll have to give it some thought.

Actually, your words were "Rather than try to defend the Dor Revi'i,
let me just ask you how you would explain the Rambam in Mamrim 2:1".
I took that to mean that you felt the DR's stance shtims with the Rambam,
and therefore needed to know how else to understand the Rambam.

Saying "his whole shitah flows from [Hil.] Mamrim 2:1" implies that this
is the most logical way to understand the Rambam. So, I offered another,
at least equally logical (LAD) one. That the Rambam is talking about
resolving derashah in particular, which wouldn't apply to the majority
of takanos nor piskei halachah. To my mind, this makes 2:1 fit with 2:2
and 2:3 far better.

: > So of course the answer won't fit his shitah. RGS and I argue
: > that the Rambam is dealing with the ideal system only, not the new one. 

: What is it that you are calling the ideal system and what are you
: calling the new one?

The ideal - Sanhedrin. The reality - no semichah, no Sanhedrin, a
dependence on texts. So yes, we are using our terms in the same way.

:>: Excuse me, are you saying that a Sanhedrin that could ignore a bat kol 
:>: transmitting an explicit directive from the RShO could not ignore the
:>: precedent of an earlier Sanhedrin?

:> Yes (assuming that the tanur shel achnai story is the norm). Lo bashamayim
:> hi rules out listening to shamayim.

: So are you telling me that R. Yehoshua really wanted to listen to the bat kol,
: and was all set to reverse the p'sak, but then suddenly remembered the

R' Yehoshua paskened l'fi his sevarah. Clearly also he believed on could
rely on bas kol, because he asked for nissim to prove his point. But
I don't think he "suddenly remembered". Rather the chachamim paskened
like the rov on two issues -- the tanur, and whether or not to follow
the bas kol. Until RY heard "nitzchuni banai", after the vote and the
p'sak, he may have been convinced he was right.

:> As R' Gil wrote, the halachic process was given to us
:> to create halachah with. If that process includes the power of precedent,
:> then we have to follow precedent in some cases.

: Fine, but the halakhic system that you are talking about also tells us to
: listen to the shofeit that will be in your days.  Yiftah b'doro k'Shmuel
: b'doro.

Lakol z'man va'eis. One must listen to the shofeit -- who in turn can only
pasken according to the rules. Halachah kibasra'i also implies you point --
if you don't take it to mean that the basra'i has a more limited range of
things that he could pasken about, and in those cases, you can follow him.

Vehara'ayah, most issues fall under Mamarim 2:2 and 2:3. If Yiftach
bidoro means what you're saying, how come Yiftach couldn't overrule
Sh'mu'el when it came to takanos?

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halberstam of Klausenberg zt"l

********************


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