Avodah Mailing List

Volume 05 : Number 103

Wednesday, August 16 2000

• Re: Abortion less than forty days
• Abortion before forty days
• Re: Abortion less than forty days
• Re: Trop 35, 5.
• Was re: Humorous aside, Now re: Defining Orthodoxya
• Combing hair on shabbos
• Re: Combing hair on shabbos
• Re: Orthodox definition
• RE: learning on tisha bav
• Anshei Sedom' s Procrustean Bed
• Women Covering Their Hair
• post-churban
• Re: Hair
• Rav Tendler's position on Moser in America
• Tikkun Olam in America--Lieberman
• Re: What is neis?
• Tikkun Olam in America--Lieberman
• Re: Boneh/Boney Yerushalaim

>Just for arguments sake at 20 days a Shabbos we may be Michaleiel Shabbos in
>order that YIshmor Shabosois Harbeh, yet tommorrow we can abort it, and it
>will not be Shomeir even one Shabbos.

Surely not the only paradox you can find in Halacha :-).

KT,
YGB

> Without looking at RMF inside, for now, the reason why we are Mechallel
> Shabbos for Hatzolas Nefashos is because: "Challel alav Shabbos achas kdei
> she'yishmor Shabbosos harbei" - so it does make sense to say that it is not
> retzicha if you abort it, yet it is still permitted to save it on Shabbos.
> Perhaps I am remembering the TE's refutation of RMF.

Aside from the point made by RYZ, I would like to note that "Challel alav
Shabbos achas kdei she'yishmor Shabbosos harbei" is NOT at all the reason we
are Mechallel Shabbos for Hatzolas Nefashos. As the Biur Halacha forcefully
points out (329:4) this reason is "not at all" the reason for saving on
Shabbos, but rather that all the Mitzvot are suspended for the LIFE of a
Jew. See the biur Halacha where he forcefully and eloquently argues this
point and brings many "nafka mina's" lihalacha. According to this if before
forty days it is not a life then it should not be permissible to save,
as Rav Moshe points out.

Aaron Rubinson.

At 07:05 PM 8/13/00 -0400, Tobrr111@aol.com wrote:
>                                             As the Biur Halacha forcefully
>points out (329:4) this reason is "not at all" for saving on Shabbos, but
>rather all the Mitzvot are suspended for the LIFE of a Jew. ...

It is NOT the reason we are Mechallel Shabbos for a Gosses, the topic
of the BH there, but it IS the reason we are Mechallel Shabbos to save
an Ubbar, particularly one under forty days old.This is explicit in the
Ramban (practically a verbatim translation), the source of Hatzolos Ubbar
under forty days old, Toras Ho'Odom (R' Chavel ed. p. 29, middle of d.h.
"U'b'Halachos Gedolos". Ayain sham heiteiv. See Sha'ar HaTziyun 617:1 for
an interesting Tzorich Iyun.

KT,
YGB

Continuing R' mi-'s comment on what R'EC called "two consecutive unusual
trop": I quote (b'erekh) Rabbenu Tam who states in paragraph 4 of his shir
on the ta'amim that the karnei parah is always preceded by its mesharet the
first-day moon (yareach ben yomo) and appears 16 times in the 21 books of
the Tanakh. When it has a second mesharet that mesharet is a munach.

In other words, while 16 times is rare, it isn't really that unusual. It is
just ignoramuses like me, who know chumash but not much nakh, think it is.

Just as other ta'amim mafsikim can be preceded only by certain specific
mesharetim, so too the karnei parah has its own specific preceder. So,
there are not two consecutive separate ta'amim to be explained and there is
no coincidence, but one married couple, a single unit.

K"T,
David

Rabbosai, a "Kol Koreh" first:

If we might try to keep intellectual issues, of which B"H we have many, and
which are the ikkar of our lists, on Avodah, those subscribed only to
Avodah would, I think, be much obliged.

>Plenty of conservative women observe Shabbos, kashrus, etc. -- so where do
>you draw the line between them?

>It does no good to accept 612 miztvot and reject one -- that doesn't make
>you orthodox, nomatter who meticulous you are in those 612.

L'gufo shel inyan: According to the Rambam, and probably most other
thinkers, Orthodoxy is not defined by the proper keeping of the Taryag
Mitzvos, but rather subscription to the Yud Gimmel Ikkarim (plus the
mitzvos essential to that belief, such as Shabbos). Aderaba, if one kept
all Taryag but lacked Emunah, one might be Orthoprax, but not Orthodox.

In practical terms, for conversion purposes and the like, most Poskim
define minimal Orthodox behavior as Shabbos, Kashrus, Taharas ha'Mishpocho.

KT,
YGB

The following was posted (in another context) on Areivim:
> whether or not Modern Orthodox Jews comb there hair on Shabbos is none of
> my business, but if they claim that it is Muttar to do so that is simply
> wrong.

The Mechaber (I believe at OC siman 303) is clear that combing hair on
shabbos is assur because of a psik reisha (PR) or kaov l'psik reisha that
hairs will be removed (melechet gozez).  It seems to me that today (at least
for men with shorter hair) there is no PR when men comb their hair.
Moreover, in the third volume of Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasa, on the
discussion of PR, RSZA z"l is quoted as holding that where individual acts
are part of a series of acts, you "test" for PR based on the individual acts
that comprise the series, and not the series in total.   Thus, for example,
one may walk across a lawn even though inevitably over the entire trek one
will remove grasses, since it is not inevitable that each individual step
will remove grasses.  The same I would suggest ought to apply to combing
hair.  Even if the cumulative strokes will inevitably remove hair, each
individual stroke is not a PR.

I have searched in print for corroboration.  Any thoughts?

AIsaacson wrote:

> The Mechaber (I believe at OC siman 303) is clear that combing hair on 
> shabbos is assur because of a psik reisha (PR) or kaov l'psik reisha that 
> hairs will be removed (melechet gozez).  It seems to me that today (at 
> least for men with shorter hair) there is no PR when men comb their hair. 

Those of us who are balding might disagree with that statement.  My daughter 
with her very, very curly hair would also disagree.

> Moreover, in the third volume of Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasa, on the 
> discussion of PR, RSZA z"l is quoted as holding that where individual acts 
> are part of a series of acts, you "test" for PR based on the individual 
> acts that comprise the series, and not the series in total.   

I think R. Moshe Shternbuch is lenient regarding combing one's peyus for 
this reason.  The teshuvah is in one of the first two volumes of Teshuvos 
VeHanhagos.

Gil Student

On Sun, Aug 13, 2000 at 07:58:16PM -0400, Aaron Rubinson
<Tobrr111@aol.com> wrote to Areivim:
:> In practical terms, for conversion purposes and the like, most Poskim 
:> define minimal Orthodox behavior as Shabbos, Kashrus, Taharas ha'Mishpocho.

: I agree with this, however, R. Akiva said that if you keep 612 Mitzvot and 
: REJECT one you are not "Orthodox." On this point he is certainly correct.
: You may not have to keep all of them but if you reject any of them by
: definition you do not have correct Emunah and according to any definition
: cannot be considered Orthodox.

What I think you're saying is that you'd consider a non-min to be someone
who: 1- believes in the ikkarei emunah, 2- aspires to keep all of halachah,
and 3- actually does observe to some extent (what extent?) Shabbos, keshrus,
and ThM.

The modifications I made to your wording are:
- O isn't a halachic concept, so I used "non-min"
- I reintroduced chovos halvavos in #1
- The number of mitzvos is 620, not 613; but nobody qualifies to perform
  all of them (e.g. a kohein does avodah, but can't do pidyon haben).
- I don't think you meant to exclude someone who is medakdeik in hilchos
  Shabbos with the exception of using a solid deoderant (or some other
  subtlety).

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Klausenberg zt"l

From: Joelirich@aol.com
> Is it lchatchila better not to learn on tisha bav and the suggested topics 
> are just bdieved? 

R' SZ Auerbach (Halichos Shlomo; sorry, I don't have the exact mareh makom
right now) holds that the inyan of learning the permitted topics (during
shiva and on Tisha B'Av) is a heter, not a chiyuv.  He brings proof from a
Ritva.  If anyone wishes to know more details, let me know and I will be
happy to look it up.)

Is "heter v. chiyuv" the same thing as "lchatchila v. bdieved"?  I don't
know.


KT,
Aryeh

Chazal's aggadatah regarding Anshe Sedom's cruelly forcing travellers to
physically conform to the dimensions of a one-size-fits-all (or else) bed
closely parallels the Greek myth of a robber named Procrusteus, as is well
known.

While it is quite simple for the academic school to say that Chazal borrowed
the story from the Greeks and just as simple for the yeshiva school to say
that the Greeks stole it from Chazal, does anyone know of any significant
Rabbinic opinions that addressed the parallels between certain aggadic
statements and non-Jewish myths and stated whether or not we are compelled
to disbelieve the possibility that Chazal sometimes "borrowed" from other
cultures' myths?

I imagine that it would be important to distinguish between things that
appear in Chazal (eg: Gemara, midrashim,etc) and those that have crept into
later literature (such as the Tifferet Yisroel's story about the painting of
Moshe Rabbeinu that was analyzed by the physionomists).

David Hojda
Kiryat Sefer
Israel

In a follow-up to a discussion on Areivim, I searched for R. Michael
Broyde's article on the internet and found his post to Mail Jewish at
<http://www.ottmall.com/mj_ht_arch/v24/mj_v24i87.html#CACE> where he lists
a number of poskim who permit married women to not cover their hair.

His concluding remark is that "It is important to note that the vast majority
of halachic authorities of the last generation clearly reject the psak of
any of these poskim."

Gil Student

i wonder if anyone has a source that would list when various mitzvot that
were in some way talui bamikdash went by the wayside.

for example, in the year 70 CE in the late summer i am sure people were
already looking forward to be oleh regel for sukot. many had korbanot ,
charamot, to bring up. many had been tmeei met/zavim/ nazirim/ tzaraat etc.

no doubt the chachamim had to decide how to deal with each of these
situations. i wonder if anyone knows of a source, or would care to do an
exercise on when these mitzvot changed....

2) It was quite common in many even rabbinic circles in the 1930s to 1960s
(and some places even later) for women not to cover their hair. This includes
rashe yeshiva (RYB Soloveichik's wife was well known for not covering her
hair, as was Rabbanit Ruderman).

Is it a fact that Rabanit Ruderman did not cover her hair? Did RYBS ever
explain the reason for not covering the hair? I know what it says in Nefesh
Harav that RYBS said that a lady should cover her hair. My question is did
RYBS really hold [and for that matter R Ruderman] that a woman must cover
her hair but for reasons of Sholom Bais did not force his wife to do so,
or he held that nowadays woman are not required to cover their hair as
many claim he held and bring proof from his wifes actions? If anyone heard
something from RYBS on this matter please post it.

In a celebrated case, Rav Moshe Tendler informed the authorities with
respect to a congregant of his who (as I recall) murdered his wife.  Rav
Tendler claimed (I believe) that the issur of m'seirah doesn't apply in the
United States, which is not an anti-Semitic government.  Can anyone explain
his reasoning?

Kol tuv,
Moshe


_______________________________________________________________________
This e-mail, including any attachments, may contain information that is
protected by law as privileged and confidential, and is transmitted for
the sole use of the intended recipient.  If you are not the intended
recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, copying
or retention of this e-mail or the information contained herein is
strictly prohibited.  If you have received this e-mail in error, please
immediately notify the sender by telephone or reply e-mail, and
permanently delete this e-mail from your computer system.  Thank you.

In the paragraph after Aleinu, we recite our hope and belief that Hashem
will be m'takein olam with His kingdom (in the time of Moshiach).  Many have
written about tikkun olam in the context of Eretz Yisrael even prior to
Moshiach (to create a just society there).     Can anyone recommend sources
with regard to being m'taken olam outside of Eretz Yisrael?  Did Rav
Soloveitchik write about this (or are there any articles or internet divrei
torah about his views)?

I plan to speak about this (and related topics) this Shabbos.

Kol tuv,
Moshe


_______________________________________________________________________
This e-mail, including any attachments, may contain information that is
protected by law as privileged and confidential, and is transmitted for
the sole use of the intended recipient.  If you are not the intended
recipient, you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, copying
or retention of this e-mail or the information contained herein is
strictly prohibited.  If you have received this e-mail in error, please
immediately notify the sender by telephone or reply e-mail, and
permanently delete this e-mail from your computer system.  Thank you.

To sum up, I think we've given four shitos (or three shitos, one of which has
two variants) about the nature of "neis":

1- Minimalist: If we truly understood what happened, and truly understood the
   laws, the event would fit nature -- unlikely, but natural. The key feature
   of a neis would be the timing, that it happened just when necessary.

2- Ramban: Nissim are unique points in the laws of nature, but are part of the
   laws. Unlike the minimalist position, we are saying that nissim are too
   unique to be explainable by theories formed without them. However, they are
   products of the actual laws the theories approximate.

3- REED: Teva is predictable only to support bechirah. Deep down, it's all
   "neis". The difference between this and the Ramban is perspective, and
   not necessarily substance. (Which is why I called it 4 or three shitos.)
   Both are saying that what underlies nissim and teva is the same. One says
   it's all really teva and the other says it's all really neis.

4- Rambam: Teva is a beryah, something Hashem created to run the universe.
   Nissim are when Hashem intervenes, nothing like teva is involved in their
   cause.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Klausenberg zt"l

From: "Feldman, Mark" <MFeldman@CM-P.COM>
> Can anyone recommend sources with regard to being m'taken olam outside of
> Eretz Yisrael?

	Since this is such a popular slogan of late, perhaps you should ask as
well, if there is any chiyuv at all to do things (which are not otherwise
mitzvos) in the interest of tikun olam.

	After all, your quote from alenu states quite clearly that we
hope/await (nekaveh) that Hashem will do so. I don't see how people proceed
from there to a chiyuv on any human person or community.

Gershon
gdubin@loebandtroper.com
gershon.dubin@juno.com

I commented a while back that I'm not sure that parts of speech are as distinct
in lashon hakodesh as they are in English. The example I gave was "haKel
haGadol haGibor vihaNorah" which the Vilna Gaon takes to be four nouns, while
others seem to assume haKel is a noun and the other three are its adjectives.
My suggestion was that Hebrew is intentionally ambiguous on this point.

There is a debate between Aristotle and Plato on the subject of definitions.
According to the former, when you call something a "horse" you are really
*describing* the object, saying that it shares a list of properties with other
"horses". A word that we consider a noun, therefore, is merely shorthand
for a list of adjectives.

Kantians would discuss whether a noun refers to the thing itself or our
perceptions of it. If the latter, then it really is a collection of
adjectives.

I'm suggesting that this ambiguity between noun and adjective in lashon
hakodesh is because it is using nouns in the Aristotilian or Kantian-perception
sense.


I would like to add that the same motivation (if real) would apply to
the ambiguity between "boneh" as a noun (builder) and as a verb (hu boneh
achshav). The issue comes up in "boneh Y'laim" vs "boneih Y'laim", something
some of us are discussing off the list. The former uses "boneh" as a verb,
the latter uses it as a noun and then reconjugates it with a tzeirei to
make it "the Builder of". But without that semichut to mean "of", there
is an underlying ambiguity causing that machlokes.

Lashon hoveh and adjectives are *supposed* to be one notion. "A is building B"
and "A is the builder of B" both state the same relationship between A and
B. English has two terms, but since Hebrew is describing the relationship
and not the pair of objects it only requires one.

It's a fundamentally different perception of reality.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Klausenberg zt"l

*********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]