Avodah Mailing List

Volume 05 : Number 101

Thursday, August 10 2000

• Re: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?
• Re: Hashgacha and bitachon
• Re: Shamai
• Rav Ovadia's idea of Gilgul
• Re: Rav Ovadia's idea of Gilgul
• Re: Rav Ovadia's idea of Gilgul
• Re: Rav Ovadia statement
• Re: Rav Ovadia's idea of Gilgul
• Re: Rav Ovadia's idea of Gilgul
• Re: Rav Ovadia's idea of Gilgul
• Re: Rav Ovadia's idea of Gilgul
• Gilgul, Neshama and Guf.
• Re: Rav Ovadia's idea of Gilgul
• Re: The Holocaust: Divine Retribution?
• RE: Seride Esh on tnai
• re:learning on tisha bav
• V'atoh Kodosh

On Fri, Jul 28 2000 (v5n96), Harry Maryles quoted me and wrote:
:> For example, would a proof that Hashem exists imply that He is part of teva?

: I do not think it is possible to prove the existence of G-d.

But the Rambam did. So, to reiterate my question: Would the Rambam believe
that his proof implies that Hashem is part of teva?

Clearly not.

So, I object to the last clause of your earlier statement (Thu, Jul 27 2000;
v5n95) that:
>                                                                   Teva is
> that which can be perceived by the five senses, directly or indirectly, or
> can be proven imperically, through the use of the scientific method, or can
> be deduced logically.

Because at least in a discussion of shitas haRambam, being "deduced logically"
doesn't make something teva.

-mi

On Fri, Jul 28 2000 (v5n06) Mark Feldman wrote:
: Various sources on the issue of bitachon ... state that one need not worry
: with regard to material needs if one has bitachon in Hashem, since Hashem
: will provide your material needs based on the extent to which you merit them
: (provided you do the requisite hishatadlus... ).

: Would the Rambam agree with this approach? After all, according to the Rambam,
: to the extent that one is not close to Hashem one is left to the results of
: nature. If so, can the average individual have bitachon in Hashem according
: to the Rambam?

(As an aside: I like your summary of the Rambam's shitah (Moreh 3:17)
in the 2nd sentence of the 2nd paragraph quoted. It captures the relative
nature of the Rambam's shitah, that it's more hashgachah p'ratis vs less,
not gets hashgachah vs doesn't get any. It is unclear if the Rambam holds
that any human being is at the absolute 0 of that spectrum. Second, you
also capture the Rambam's opinion that teva is a "thing", not a tendency
or a principle. Lishitaso, teva is an alternative to hashgachah, not an
attribute that hashgachah may or may not have. Bi'avonosai harabim, I've been
frustrated with chaveirim who have been missing these two points despite my
repeated attempts to make both issues explicit.)

I suggested that the Rambam's approach is similar, but different.

To him, earning more hashgachah peratis is based on having greater yedi'ah,
which is a more cerebral and philosophical state than bitachon. However,
given that difference, the extra hashgachah should translate to less need
for hishtadlus, as per REED and the Chazon Ish.

The "only" difference is how one achieves the necessary deveikus to merit
needing less hishtadlus: the Rambam says it's intellectually, and the others
are saying it's through trust.

: (And, if the answer is no, can the average individual who believes in the
: Michtav Me'eliyahu's approach truly have bitachon; won't he have the nagging
: doubt that maybe the Rambam is correct?)

Unless he strives to do both: to trust in Hashem and to try to understand
Him to whatever extent one can. In which case, one can have *bitachon* that
if the Rambam is correct, one will get the hashgachah anyway.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Wed, Aug 02 2000 (v5n99) Aaron Rubinson <Tobrr111@aol.com> wrote:
:> Why is this (and tomorrow's) a quote of Shammai, the Av Beis Din and
:> representative of middas hadin?

: Good point. Rav Chaim Pinchos Scheinberg made this very point to me. I
: pointed out to him that Rav Yochanan Ben Zakai was makdim Shalom Lichal Adam
: even a Nochri Bishuk. And Yet, it was this very Rav Yochanan Ben Zakai who
: "Maolam Lo Sach Sicha Bitaila." We see that greeting even a non-Jew is not
: Sicha Bitaila. Rav Scheinberg then responded that we find a similar thing
: with Shamai who was a "Kapdan" when it came to Halacha, but pleasant in his
: interpersonal relationships.

I'm not sure why one would think that middas hadin has anything to do with
being unpleasant. Din is giving each person their due -- neither more or less.
(Chessed is about giving more.) Clearly people are due a pleasant greeting.

I was asking about "havei mekabeil kol adam" in light of the Maharal. Here's
the summary (and my 2 cents) I gave scj on the Maharal in question
(translations removed):
> Interesting point made by the Maharal on Avos ch. 1. There are a sequence
> of quotes that follow the last five zugos. Each of the zugos was composed
> of the nasi and the av beis din. Consistantly, the nasi's quote reflects
> chessed and the av beis din's reflects din.

> The last of these zugos is Shamai and Hillel. Shammai was the ABD, Hillel the
> Nasi (note Avos 1:12 - 1:15). In other words, it was Shammai's job to be the
> issuer of communal justice, and Hillel's job to be the organizer of communal
> kindness and charity.

> The Gemara, as I've written ad bordum before on scj, attributes the
> numerous arguments between the students of the two schools they founded on
> the fact that "they didn't sufficiently serve their masters". The Maharal
> explains that since they didn't get that level of personal contact, they saw
> the roles, not the people. So Hillel's School, founded by the dispenser of
> chessed, developed a chessed-centric view of the Torah, whereas Shammai's
> school ended up more din oriented.

My 2 cents:
> Note that the Zohar says that Beis Hillel is rooted in the sephirah of chessed
> and Beis Shammai in that of gevurah (strength, restraint).

Which is why I found it interesting that to the Maharal, this is an example
of din and gevurah, not chessed.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Klausenberg zt"l

The problem that I have with this philosophy is the following:  The
Torah seems to contradict itself, saying in one place that children will
not be punished for their parents' averot (as many as 3 generations
later), and saying the opposite in another place.

The Gemara (Brachot 7a, Sanhedrin 27b) explains that children are
punished for their parents' averot only if they continue along the same
evil path.  But if they are different from their parents, they are not
punished for their parents' and ancestors averot.

Rav Yaakov Berav's position (quoted by Rav Ovadia) is that  Iyov was a
tzadik but had to suffer because he was a gilgul of Terach.  This  is
contrary to the position accepted by the Rambam, that Iyov never existed
but is just a mashal.  But let's suppose that he did exist.  How could
he be punished on account of Terach's behavior if he himself was a
Tzaddik?  And how can we say that the victims of the Shoah suffered to
effect a tikkun for someone they never knew even existed?   Rav Ovadia
quotes the story of Asara Harugei Malchut.  This also seems to violate
the gemara's klal--how could tzadikim be punished for the averot of
Yosef's brothers?
I can ask an even better question: Why say that the land was destroyed
because they didn't say Birkat Hatorah? (Bava Metzia 85a-b) The Gemara
should just say that it was because of a gilgul.
Is gilgul is an innovation that the gemara did not recognize?  Perhaps
someone knows definitively.

Daniel

In a message dated 8/8/00 5:06:31pm CST, das54@columbia.edu writes:
> Rav Yaakov Berav's position (quoted by Rav Ovadia) is that  Iyov was a
> tzadik but had to suffer because he was a gilgul of Terach.  This  is
> contrary to the position accepted by the Rambam, that Iyov never existed
> but is just a mashal.

It's also contrary to simple peshat. The whole point of Iyov is that he
suffered as a Divine experiment -- an object lesson for those who would
presume to assert that suffering can truly be explained and objectified by
the human mind. (Since we generally believe that HaShem would not conduct
such an experiment on one of his most pious children, it is easiest to think
of Iyov as a mashal, as the Rambam did.) Most of the text of the Book of
Iyov would be pure gibberish if Iyov had to suffer because he was a gilgul.

David Finch

I tried this before to embellish on the Chazon Ish (I wouldn't claim it was
his intent), but here we're talking mekuballim, so maybe RYGB will accept
the notion. I want to suggest that the terminology is being used in a very
technical sense.

Notice the expression is "gilgul *neshamos*", not ruchos or nefashos.
Conscious thought, the self, the decisor who holds bechirah chafshi, is not
an function of the neshamah. The Gaon and Maharal place it in the ruach,
the Ramchal and Besht in the nefesh, but I know of noone who holds that
conscious thought is a function of the neshamah.

(For that matter, it's not always a full neshamah that is said to be
nisgalgeil, "just" nitzotzos of one or more.)

IOW, what is nisgalgeil is not the meis's "self".

This would answer how believers in gilgul still make sense of Sha"s which
only discusses sechar va'onesh after misah in terms of gan eden vs. gehennom
and the ultimate techiyas hameisim. All that occurs to the actual "I",
on a different level of naran than gilgul operates on.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On Mon, Aug 07, 2000 at 01:38:50PM -0400, MPoppers@kayescholer.com wrote:
:                               I was not aware that a n'shomo might return
: in order to be affected by y'surin -- what say y'all?

There is a distinction I'd like to make between cause, blame and purpose.

First, to state something obvious that we tend to ignore, all events have
numerous causes, some important, others not. Saying that XYZ was a cause
does not imply that the yitzrei hara of the Nazis were not causes.

Second, not all causes have blame associated with them. For example, a factor
in the Holocaust occuring is that a millenim earlier Ashkenazi Jewry moved
to Germany. While this is a cause, no one would argue that those who moved
were to blame.

Third is the difference between cause and purpose (telos). As RMP's wording
shows, we are speaking about "lima'an", "in order to" -- *a* purpose. Not
"ki", beCAUSE. for the Sho'ah. While blame can only be associated with
some causes, a search for meaning is associated with purposes.

Saying that the Holocaust effected a tikkun neshamos doesn't mean that the
pegamos that cheit caused in those neshamos was a cause for the Sho'ah,
that the chata'im mean that the posessors of those neshamos are to share
blame for the Sho'ah, or that anyone else was NOT the cause or the primary
focus of blame (although all those who were omdim al hadam are blamable too)
for the Sho'ah.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Klausenberg zt"l

RD Schiffman wrote:

> Rav Yaakov Berav's position (quoted by Rav Ovadia) is that  Iyov was a 
> tzadik but had to suffer because he was a gilgul of Terach.  This  is
> contrary to the position accepted by the Rambam, that Iyov never existed 
> but is just a mashal.
     
RD Finch wrote:

> It's also contrary to simple peshat. The whole point of Iyov is that he 
> suffered as a Divine experiment -- an object lesson for those who would 
> presume to assert that suffering can truly be explained and objectified by the
> human mind. (Since we generally believe that HaShem would not conduct such an 
> experiment on one of his most pious children, it is easiest to think of Iyov 
> as a mashal, as the Rambam did.) Most of the text of the Book of Iyov would be
> pure gibberish if Iyov had to suffer because he was a gilgul.
     
There is a big machlokes among the meforshim of Iyov over whether he sinned or 
not.  Just open up a mikre'os gedolos on the first two perakim and you'll find 
the machlokes.  Look also in the Malbim and the Ramban.  The Ramban in two 
places hints that Iyov sinned in a previous gilgul.  See the end of his hakdamah
with Chavel's footnotes.  It may be contrary to the Rambam but that doesn't seem
to bother the Ramban.

Gil Student

I am certainly not an expert on gilgulim, but the gilgul concept is meant 
to answer theodicy questions. Thus:

At 06:27 PM 8/8/00 -0400, you wrote:
>The problem that I have with this philosophy is the following:  The
>Torah seems to contradict itself, saying in one place that children will
>not be punished for their parents' averot (as many as 3 generations
>later), and saying the opposite in another place.

That is assuming that the children are not gilgulim of prior generations.

>Rav Yaakov Berav's position (quoted by Rav Ovadia) is that  Iyov was a
>tzadik but had to suffer because he was a gilgul of Terach.  This  is
>contrary to the position accepted by the Rambam, that Iyov never existed
>but is just a mashal.  But let's suppose that he did exist.  How could


Most of the opinions in the Bavli and Yerushalmi are that he did exist.

>he be punished on account of Terach's behavior if he himself was a
>Tzaddik?  And how can we say that the victims of the Shoah suffered to
>effect a tikkun for someone they never knew even existed?   Rav Ovadia
>quotes the story of Asara Harugei Malchut.  This also seems to violate
>the gemara's klal--how could tzadikim be punished for the averot of
>Yosef's brothers?

Again, Gilgul justifies suffering based on prior existences. You might be a 
tzaddik, but need kapporo for some reason that may stem from a prior gilgul.

>I can ask an even better question: Why say that the land was destroyed
>because they didn't say Birkat Hatorah? (Bava Metzia 85a-b) The Gemara
>should just say that it was because of a gilgul.

Aderaba, a gilgulist might say that the punishment being so out of 
proportion to the relatively minor sin of not making Birkas Ha'Torah, one 
might say that was a catalyst (an immediate precipitant) but the true 
reason was gilgul problems.

KT,
YGB

At 06:39 AM 8/9/00 -0500, you wrote:
>I tried this before to embellish on the Chazon Ish (I wouldn't claim it was
>his intent), but here we're talking mekuballim, so maybe RYGB will accept
>the notion. I want to suggest that the terminology is being used in a very
>technical sense.

I do not like it here either, sorry.

I do know this: Gilgul assumes neshamos can be subdivided, therefore, once 
a gilgul occurs, the neshomo is considered to be shared among the multiple 
personalities, all of which rise to Techiyas Ha'Meisim. This would seem to 
indicate that the gilgul occurs either at lower levels of neshomo, or in ruach.

KT,
YGB

On Wed, Aug 09, 2000 at 09:31:20AM -0400, Gil.Student@citicorp.com wrote:
:>                                Most of the text of the Book of Iyov would be
:> pure gibberish if Iyov had to suffer because he was a gilgul.

: There is a big machlokes among the meforshim of Iyov over whether he sinned or
: not. ...

This is, to my mind, a question -- not an answer. How can you search for the
reason for Iyov's suffering when the book concludes with Hashem telling Iyov
(perakim 40-42) that he ought not try to do that very thing? 

:                       It may be contrary to the Rambam but that doesn't seem
: to bother the Ramban.

Another example, BTW, that "halachah kirabbim" really means davka halachah.
The Rambam had no problem holding like the da'as yachid amongst the tana'im
as to who Iyov was or wasn't.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Klausenberg zt"l

On the subject of gilgul, does the question of whether l'osid Lavo there
will only be a neshama, or whether the "unit" for gemul l'osid lavo will
be the neshama together with the guf relate to the discussion on gilgul?
It would seem to me that (at least superficially) these two opinions would
directly relate to whether like Rav Sadia Gaon and the Sefer Ha'Ikrim you
do not hold of gilgul (or not).

If you hold of gilgul, and a neshama can don and dof more than one guf,
then it seems more likely that one would hold that only the neshama returns
sans guf, as which guf would you pick to return? OTOH, if you hold that the
neshama and the guf return together l'osid lavo, then there is some sort of
everlasting connection between neshama and guf, it would be simpler not to
accept the concept of gilgul (which seems at the very least seems to allow
multiple bodies to one neshama) as did Rav Sadia Gaon.

Does anybody know if the logic above is consistent with the actual positions
of Rav Sadia Gaon and the Sefer Ha'Ikrim on whether neshama and guf return
together l'osid lavo or not? Is this logic above, consistent with the
positions of the camp accepting the concept of gilgul as well?

Kol tuv

Chaim Manaster
Montreal, Canada

Me:
> I tried this before to embellish on the Chazon Ish (I wouldn't claim it was
> his intent), but here we're talking mekuballim, so maybe RYGB will accept
> the notion. I want to suggest that the terminology is being used in a very
> technical sense.

On Wed, Aug 09 2000, RYGB wrote:
: I do not like it here either, sorry.

I'm not sure why, as what I said dovetails well with your next paragraph --
until the last line.

: I do know this: Gilgul assumes neshamos can be subdivided, therefore, once 
: a gilgul occurs, the neshomo is considered to be shared among the multiple 
: personalities, all of which rise to Techiyas Ha'Meisim. This would seem to 
: indicate that the gilgul occurs either at lower levels of neshomo, or in
: ruach.

I would disagree, as it would show that the nisgalgeil, whatever it is, isn't
the personality -- otherwise, how could *one* be shared amongst *multiple*
personalities? As personality is either ruach or nefesh, all your statement
requires is that one of the lower levels NOT be involved in gilgul.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger                 When you come to a place of darkness,
micha@aishdas.org            you do not chase out the darkness with a broom.
http://www.aishdas.org       You light a candle.
(973) 916-0287                  - R' Yekusiel Halbserstam of Klausenberg zt"l

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
>>                                                                    Teva is
>> that which can be perceived by the five senses, directly or indirectly, or
>> can be proven imperically, through the use of the scientific method, or can
>> be deduced logically.

> Because at least in a discussion of shitas haRambam, being "deduced logically"
> doesn't make something teva.

The Rambam's proof of the existence of G-d is logic based and is the same
as Aristotle's with the difference being whether or not G-d is active or
inactive. So, I correct myself when I say G-d can't be proven. What I should
have said is that G-d cannot (or will not allow Himself) be experienced with
any of the five senses.

Also, I never said logic can't be used to prove abstracts. Abstract reasoning
is the essence of logic. This is what mathematics is all about. All I said
is that Teva CAN be proven by logic. But logic is not exclusive to Teva.

HM

RYGB wrote in response to my posting:
>My impression is confirmed: The SE was proposing that the issue be re-examined,
>not endorsing tna'im.

>Moreover, it is clear that the SE was advocating reconsideration of the issue
>because of the vast number of halachically performed marriages that terminate,
>because the couples involved are not shomrei Torah u'Mitzvos, in non-halachic
>divorce only. The SE was clearly saying: Maybe a tnai is not 100% halachically
>sound, but perhaps it would add a level of heter in mamzerus cases. He is
>clearly not advocating use of the tnai in marriages of Shlomei Emunei Yisroel.

WADR, I think that this is not what the Seride Esh meant.

To recapitulate, when it was mentioned that some rabbanim are considering
tnai as a possible solution to the aguna problem, the following objections
were raised

1)  The technical details of a halachically valid tnai are so cumbersome
that it is not feasible as a general solution.

2)  Regardless of past discussions of tnai, gdole haposkim of a few
generations tnai universally forbade tnai (as summarized in ein tnai
benissuin)

3)  As gdole haposkim have been dealing with agunot for many years, and have
not found a solution, any new solution developed today must be passul

Therefore, anyone who suggests a tnai today as a possible solution is guilty
of both ignorance and hubris.

The SE says, answering all of these objections.

1)  The technical details can be worked out.  While he does not in the
letter specifically endorse R Berkovits's formulation of tnai, he views it
as at least worthy of discussion.  His main issue is really a public policy
one (see below) Therefore, the various positions cited by posters which were
clearly known to the SE (he mentions the Noda biYehuda and others) are not
seen by him as a fundamental obstacle.
There is not even a suggestion by the SE that the tnai if instituted would
not be 100% halachically sound. (I think that I read (learn :):) )the SE
differently)

2)  The issur of ein tnai benissuin was not a general issur, but rather in
response to a specific proposal, and was based on public policy issues,
which is therefore open to discussion by every generation which has
different public policy problems.

3)  The aguna problem of today (1950s -1960s) is fundamentally different
than that faced by previous generations, which mandate new approaches, and
the gdole haposkim of previous generations would have also taken different
approaches if faced with today's problems.

Therefore, what was pashut to many of the talmide chachamim here was not so
pashut to the Seride Esh.  I would add that the SE is one of those gdolim
who, even if he says that he did not have the energy to evaluate the full
literature, that his sense that something is assur or muttar has a great
deal of weight, as his unenergetic evaluation is probably more than most
energetic evaluations..

However, there are still public policy issues with tnai, as it undermines
the entire institution of marriage.  For the SE, the major aguna problem was
not in the haredi community (while he mentions mesarve get, it seems that it
wasn't yet a problem for shlome emune yisrael).  Clearly tnai, as a major
change, should only be instituted where it is needed, and in his time, it
wasn't needed for shlome emune yisrael (not that if instituted, it wouldn't
work).  However, if tnai becomes accepted by a large segment of the
community, it would affect the nature of marriage even in the haredi
community, and that public policy issue needed to be addressed communally.

I would say that the SE hit one of the major fault lines within the Orthodox
community - the extent to which halachic public policy should be geared to
maximize the kedusha of shlome emune yisrael, or geared to maximize the
kedusha and observance of the entire Jewish community, even at the cost of
our own kedusha.  Therefore, it is not surprising that this proposal was
rejected in its time by the haredi community.

Meir Shinnar

Is it lchatchila better not to learn on tisha bav and the suggested topics 
are just bdieved?  If not, what if one knows that one will feel simcha from 
learning even hilchot aveilut or one of the other permitted topics; can one 
learn them anyway? If so, why?

Also it seems that we are noheig to begin some of the prohibitions (at least 
partially) after chatzot on erev tisha bav but not others, any ideas on why 
the early start and why only some?

Have a meaningful and easy fast

Joel Rich

It is interesting to note that only on Tisha B'Ov night
following Kinos and Purim nightfollowing the Megilla - we say
V'Atoh Kodosh and Kaddish Sholom without Tiskabel.

Any theories?

Uvo L'Tzion Goel...

SBA

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