Avodah Mailing List

Volume 05 : Number 086

Monday, July 17 2000

• Re: Hefker and Kiddushin
• Re: Hefker and Kiddushin
• Re: Hefker and Kiddushin
• Re: Hefker and Kiddushin
• Re: Hefker and Kiddushin
• Re: Hefker and Kiddushin
• Rashi question: Balak
• Re: Mei Merivah
• Law of Opposites
• Re: Mei Merivah
• Re: Avodah V5 #85
• Re: Custom - Origins of
• Re: Rashi question: Balak
• Re: Desperately Seeking Mareh Makom!!!
• Re: Rashi question: Balak
• Re: Rashi question: Balak
• Re: nusach of tefillah belachash

On 14 Jul 00, at 12:28, Bin613@aol.com wrote:

> RYGB writes that the Ran's hefker "can only mean a passivity in the
> ma'aseh kiddushin," which procludes the kallah's stating "ani
> mekabelles."
> 
> However, in the Ran's explanation of how the woman goes about enacting
> such a hefker state, he writes "mikaivan shehee maskemmes l'kidushei
> haish..." --only then does she assume such a state. It seems that the
> woman's saying "ani m'kabelles" could be seen according to the Ran as
> simply a verbal haskama to the kidushei haish, as opposed to the umdan
> da'as that we traditionally employ.

Go on a few more words in the Ran. If the idea is "hi mevateles 
da'ata u'rtzona," how is her saying "ani mekabeles" consistent with 
bitul daas?

-- Carl


Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for our son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.  
Thank you very much.

Carl and Adina Sherer
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

In message <4.3.2.7.0.20000713054111.00a8a2c0@casbah.it.northwestern.edu>,
Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu> writes:
>Hmmm... I am not sure why we are having this conversation if you have not 
>seen the Ran!

Unfortunately I do not have time at the moment for much learning, nor,
for that matter, can I read even a fraction of Avodah/Arevim digests,
which is why I hesitated to join this conversation. But given that a fair
few people have been posting here on the inyan without having seen the Ran
inside, and the responses did not make a lot of sense on a practical level,
it made sense to me to post.

BTW the primary reason I have not been able to read/learn/post the way I
used to is that my mother in law has been diagnosed as having pancreatic
cancer (which has metastasied) so if people could add Jeannette bat Gracia
(nobody seems to know of Hebrew names) to their tephillos we'd appreciate it.

In any event, I have now seen the Ran inside. 

For the benefit of those who have not seen the Ran inside and the sugya that
he is commenting on - let's start from the beginning:

The Mishna in Nedarim 28a-b discusses a case where a person says of certain
crops that he owns, "they shall be a korban until they have been cut down",
in which case they can never be redeemed. The Gemorra there asks whether in
fact they can really *never* be redeemed, and Bar Pada explains that if he
(the owner) redeems them, then while the money they are redeemed for does
become hekdesh (meaning that the redemption takes effect) the crops then
effectively boomerang back into hekdesh. If he redeems them again, they then
boomerang again back into hekdesh, and this continues until the crops are
actually cut down. Once they are actually cut down he redeems them once,
and that is enough ie they go out to chullin.

On 29b we pick up the thread: R' Abin and R' Yitzhac B'Rebi were sitting
before R' Yermiya who was dozing - now they said, according to Bar Pada who
understands the Mishna that the crops keep reverting to their kedusha of
hekdesh we can explain a problem of R' Hoshiya who asked - if one gives two
prutos to a woman and says to her one is for you to be mekadesh to me today
and one is to mekadesh you to me after I divorce you [is the second a valid
kiddushin? ie once she is divorced, does she boomerang and become remarried
again. From Bar Pada's halacha we can learn that the second kiddushin does
work, ie she does boomerang in this way] and is mekadesh a second time.
R Yermiya woke up and said to them do you compare redemption by himself
[ie the owner of the crops] to redemption by others? R' Yochanan said if he
redeems them [ie the crops], then the kedusha returns, if others redeem them,
the kedusha does not return [that is, if somebody else redeemed the crops from
hekdesh, then they would remain chullin despite them not having been cut down].

The implication of this being that the case of the woman who is given two
prutos does not exactly parallel the case of the crops, rather it may well
parallel the case where there is redemption of crops by others, not by
the owner.

Now the Ran's discussion is centered on the question of the parallel between
the crops and the woman - and to what extent in the case of the woman the
redemption is by "others" and not by "himself".

In the case of the woman, what happens, when she is divorced she leaves the
reshus of the husband and goes into her own reshus and is considered to have
redeemed herself (ie this parallels the case of the crops going out of hekdesh
to the reshus either of her husband or of some third party, ie hekdesh =
reshus habaal, and third party/owner = woman). Now, if when she was first
married, she started out in her own reshus, and she was the one who put herself
into the state of kiddushin, then the parallel is exact, ie woman -> baal ->
woman parallels owner -> hekdesh -> owner, ie is like he himself redeeming it,
and not redemption by others. So indeed we can explain R' Hoshiya's question,
as the two Rabbis indeed did, that the second kiddushin works.

But the reason R' Yirmiya's objection is valid, explains the Ran, is because
kiddushin works not by the woman putting herself into the reshus of the
baal, but by the baal drawing her into his rishus. On the other hand, if
she is not originally in her own rishus when the kiddushin is done, where is
she? (Assuming we are talking about an almanah or a grusha here, presumably
the Ran is not so concerned about a case of a penuya, who is in her father's
rishus in any event). So the Ran answers this question by saying she is in
nobody's rishus - she is, etzel habaal k'dvar shel hefker. that means that
it goes hefker -> baal -> woman and means it does not parallel the crop case.

On the other hand, explains the Ran, if it was a clear cut as this, then
they could explain R' Hoshiya's question in the negative, ie it would be
clear that the second kiddushin would not work (because the parallel is
now to redemption of others, and we know that in the case of redemption of
others there is no boomerang effect). But, at least according to the Ran,
the question is left open, and that is because this above discription is not
complete because the woman does indeed put herself into his rishus a little
bit and it some ways it is indeed like the owner redeeming it himself and
that is why the could not resolve R' Hoshiya's problem. [The Ran then goes
on to discuss the question of why it is not like the case of somebody saying
"if I will sell this field to you and then redeem it, this field shall be
hekdesh", but this moves away from our inyan.]

The key thing that can be seen when the whole sugya is set it out, is that
however complicated the issues involved here are, the question being discussed
is the technical question of which rishus the woman is in at what point, and
who is deemed to effect the formal mechanism that creates the change of rishus.
What the Ran is clearly not discussing is issues of activity and passivity in
performing the transfer. Ie is should not make one speck of difference whether
she says ani mekabelet or not, or whether she sticks out her finger or not.

This can be seen from the second half of the whole transfer discussion, that
of the redemption. In the case of the crops, the owner is the active party,
who acts to do the redemption, and redeems the crops into his own rishus
(that then boomerang). In the woman case, the parallel rishus into which
she ends up (before any potential boomerang) is her rishus, and yet, as we
all know (and as is clearly stated in one of the gemorras that the Ran also
discusses, that of Ketubos 59b) a woman cannot arrange for her own redemption.
That is, in the process of the giving of a get, the woman is the passive party,
and (leaving aside the takana of Rabbanu Gershom) she can be "redeemed" even
against her will and by the husband throwing the get to her. If there was any
issue of activity versus passivity, the whole analogy between the crops and
the woman breaks down and hence both the gemorra's and the Ran's whole premise.

Thus, for the Ran's (and gemorra's) logic to work, we have to be discussing
questions of rishus, not questions of activity/passivity. And what the Ran
appears to be suggesting, is that what occurs in the marriage situation,
is that the woman acts to move herself out of her rishus into a sort of no
man's land, which is, in fact, a movement towards him, but that movement
does not get her all the way. The husband then completes that movement by
bringing her in to his rishus, ie he "takes" her out of the no man's land.

By the time she says ani mekabelet (if indeed she did), it would seem that a)
she is already in his rishus, ie kiddushin has happened, and b) that while
such a statement may not have any particular meaning, it has nothing to do
with (according to the Ran) and cannot interfere with the transfer of rishus
which he has to effect.

That would seem to mean that the Ran's shitta does not in fact create a safek
on the kiddushin, whether she says ani mekabelet or not, or whether she is
in fact an adult who attitudes are known by the eidim or not (so we can go
back to worrying about R'Rackman. Because of course, the consequence of
being machmir and creating sfakos in kiddushin, is that they thereby create
kulos in gitten, or at least avoid mamzeros problems even if no get is given.
If we can argue that in fact a given woman did not have the right daas of
making herself hefker, or the right level of passivity in her kiddushin, we
may not have a problem if a dubious beis din decides she doesn't need a get,
at least vis a vis her children from another. The most serious concerns
we have about the consequences of a R' Rackman type beis din is where we
are confident about the validity of the kiddushin of the women who comes
before it - because while not everybody poskens that way, we at least have,
inter alia, Rav Moshe to rely on who states that if there was a non valid
kiddushin but which the husband believes is valid, there is no halachic
marriage, and hence no mamzerus problems).

Shavuah tov

Chana

-- 
Chana/Heather Luntz

On Thu, Jul 13, 2000 at 12:38:25AM -0500, R' Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer wrote:
>: Sof davar, I am left with my contention that the introduction of devarim
>: she'be'al peh on the Kallah's part quite likely contravene the Ran (and the
>: Or Samei'ach)'s geder of kiddushin.

On 14 Jul 00, at 13:16, Micha Berger wrote:
> Most kiddushin today involve SOME activity of kibbul on the part of the
> bride. If nothing else, she held her hand still, finger extended, for SOME
> reason. So there is some ma'aseh kibbalah which is typically toch kidei
> dibur of the "harei at", and in any case, would come closer to the nesinah
> than this kallah's "harei ani". So it's not devarim shebaleiv anyway.

I finally saw the Ran inside today. 

I read him as saying that the woman's saying something is meaningless ("ain
bi'dvareha mamash"). I'm not sure that it means that it would constitute
a psul in the Kiddushin. However, he also says "kaivan she'hi maskemes
l'kidusehi ha'ish hi mevateles da'ata u'rtzona u'mashvi atzma eitzel ha'baal
k'davar shel hefker." IOW, the only action she is supposed to take is to
be mafkir herself specifically to this man, so that this man may claim her
from hefker. She held her hand still and allowed him to put the ring on
her finger because she was mafkir herself to him. Is being mafkir herself
an affirmative act? Or is the essence of hefker a negative - removing all
restraints that would otherwise have prevented her from being miskadeshes?

-- Carl

Carl and Adina Sherer
mailto:sherer@actcom.co.il

At 12:46 AM 7/16/00 +0100, Chana/Heather Luntz wrote:
>BTW the primary reason I have not been able to read/learn/post the way I
>used to is that my mother in law has been diagnosed as having pancreatic
>cancer (which has metastasied) so if people could add Jeannette bat
>Gracia (nobody seems to know of Hebrew names) to their tephillos we'd
>appreciate it.

We are all, I am sure, very much grieved - may your MIL have a refu'ah and 
yeshu'ah.

>The key thing that can be seen when the whole sugya is set it out, is
>that however complicated the issues involved here are, the question
>being discussed is the technical question of which rishus the woman is
>in at what point, and who is deemed to effect the formal mechanism that
>creates the change of rishus.  What the Ran is clearly not discussing is
>issues of activity and passivity in performing the transfer. Ie is
>should not make one speck of difference whether she says ani mekabelet
>or not, or whether she sticks out her finger or not.

You are looking at passivity vs. activity from the perspective of the
mechanical details of the case. We are talking about passivity vs. activity
from the perspective of the abstract formulation of Kinyan Ishus. As I
explained in my last note, responding to R' Berman, and as I earlier explained
in response to my BIL, Chaim Brown's contention that the lashon of mekkabeles
in and of itself should not be problematic, and as I now will add in response
to Micha's problem with the extension of the finger, the issue is the da'as of
the kallah that is most certainly altered by changing the procedure - for,
again, if this is merely a superfluous statement, akin to reciting, say,
"I'm a little teapot", under the Chuppa, then there would be no point, correct?

(BTW, it has come to my attention that there may indeed be no point, as
the amiras ho'isha in the case in question took place after the placement
of the ring upon the finger, so that - at least according to the opinion,
that without checking IIRC is normative, toch kdei dibbur *lav* k'dibbur
dami by kiddushin - the amira is indeed halachically meaningless.)

The da'as of the Kallah has to be in line with "Kee Yikach" - not "Kee Tekach"
or "Kee See'lokach". I have already cited the Or Somei'ach and others on
this topic - including the Avnei Milu'im, who, controversially, derives from
the Ran that da'as ho'isha by kiddushin is not part of the dovor she'be'erva
and requires no eidus l'kiyum ha'dovor. Clearly, the Acharonim (including,
now, the Bigdei Shesh :-) )learn that the Ran does intend to define the
da'as ho'isha, and that is the question here: Not whether she is practically
active or passive - she can, theoretically, make dramatic gestures and long
perorations under the Chuppa - but whether in this innovation there may be
an impact upon her da'as (which is no longer devorim she'b'lev, and therefore
must be taken into account) - which contravenes Kee Yikach.

KT,
YGB

In message <4.3.2.7.0.20000715234604.00aae610@casbah.it.northwestern.edu>,
Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer <sbechhof@casbah.acns.nwu.edu> writes:
>>The key thing that can be seen when the whole sugya is set it out, is
>>that however complicated the issues involved here are, the question
>>being discussed is the technical question of which rishus the woman is
>>in at what point, and who is deemed to effect the formal mechanism that
>>creates the change of rishus.  What the Ran is clearly not discussing is
>>issues of activity and passivity in performing the transfer. Ie is
>>should not make one speck of difference whether she says ani mekabelet
>>or not, or whether she sticks out her finger or not.

>You are looking at passivity vs. activity from the perspective of the 
>mechanical details of the case. We are talking about passivity vs. activity 
>from the perspective of the abstract formulation of Kinyan Ishus.

No. I too am looking at it from the perspective of the abstract formulation of
Kinyan Ishus. The point being, however, that the Ran is basing his discussion
(as the gemorra is) on a parallel with another case, that of the crops. You
are constructing the Ran in such a way that his (and the gemorra's) parallel no
longer works. That makes no sense. My way keeps the parallel of the gemorra
and of the Ran, and likewise explains the abstract formulation of Kinyan
Ishus. The major nafka mina between your way and my way, as far as I can see
it, is in this very question - for you way, any very subtle indication by the
wife that she is not entirely passive will possul the kiddushin, according
to my way - there are only extreme cases of activity where she might be
able to do so - the classic case being if instead of him saying "harei at"
she were to say I am mekadesh you or I am effecting the kiddushin to you.
Even then it is not so clear that there would not be kiddushin if he also
did the necessary acts, it just would not work the way she intended it to,
ie she cannot complete the entering into of his rishus, he has to effect that,
ie he has to draw her in and without his actions there is nothing.

That is, your way of learning (see I am trying) it means that we have
to watch very carefully and be absolutely sure that the kala does not do
anything active (and by that I don't mean making dramatic gestures), while
my way of learning means that we do not have to be so concerned about what
the kala does (save for dash the ring on the ground and run away, which I
think everybody would agree would mean there is no kiddushin).

That, of course, gets us back into negative tradition territory. Because the
question about a negative tradition can be read both ways. Is the negative
tradition that the kala stays absolutely still and you have to watch her like
a hawk to make sure she doesn't do anything that might possul the kiddushin
(your way) or that we are not that concerned about what she does beyond the
minimum of leaving the ring on her finger and not dashing it to the ground
and running away. I would say the negative tradition is the latter, while
you seem to be saying it is the former. Your way, it seems to me, requires
a far more sophisticated teaching of kalas than has ever been the case,
ie the negative tradition actually works against you.

> As I 
>explained in my last note, responding to R' Berman, and as I earlier 
>explained in response to my BIL, Chaim Brown's contention that the lashon 
>of mekkabeles in and of itself should not be problematic, and as I now will 
>add in response to Micha's problem with the extension of the finger, the 
>issue is the da'as of the kallah that is most certainly altered by changing 
>the procedure - for, again, if this is merely a superfluous statement, akin 
>to reciting, say, "I'm a little teapot", under the Chuppa, then there would 
>be no point, correct?

I think the contention of R' Berman was that it was to a large extent the
halachic equivalent of "I'm a little teapot", but unlike "I'm a little teapot
it is a statement that has meaning for the chosson and kalla. Perhaps a better
analogy might be some English love poetry. He also did seem to feel that it
helped (to the extent that one needs this) evidence the daas of the kala.

>The da'as of the Kallah has to be in line with "Kee Yikach" - not "Kee 
>Tekach" or "Kee See'lokach".

No, the mechanism of the transfer of the reshus has to be in this format.
The daas of the kala is either a) completely irrelevant (she can think she
is a teapot or is effecting the transfer or whatever, it doesn't matter,
the Torah created the way it works) or b) needs to be there to get to the
half way point, ie out of her own rishus, just can't help with the final
completion, which has to be his, or c) for other independant reasons.

> I have already cited the Or Somei'ach and 
>others on this topic - including the Avnei Milu'im, who, controversially, 
>derives from the Ran that da'as ho'isha by kiddushin is not part of the 
>dovor she'be'erva and requires no eidus l'kiyum ha'dovor.

That reading does make sense in the context of this Ran (it is harder to square
with the thrust of the Mishna/gemorra in kiddushin), but just looking at this
Ran we are talking about mechanisms for the final transfer of reshus in which
the daas of the woman is arguably irrelevant (just as it is irrelevant at the
other end, with the redemption). That is a very different statement though
from saying that any expression of her daas possuls the kiddushin. The former
doesn't care what the woman does or does not say, the latter cares too much.

> Clearly, the 
>Acharonim (including, now, the Bigdei Shesh :-) )learn that the Ran does 
>intend to define the da'as ho'isha, and that is the question here:

That is not at all clear to me - not from the Bigdei Shesh you quoted, and not
from this Avnei Milu'im. Do you have a clearer statement? What is clear is
that her daas is not enough, and cannot be enough to effect the transition
into his reshus (unlike, for example, the giver of a gift of property, to
which one would think the woman would be analogous, ie if she owns herself,
why cannot she give herself away to her husband and he be koneh her merely by
her act - the answer being that she cannot effect this change of reshus, only
he can) (at the extreme, that can be read to say that her daas is irrelevant,
but I think the more straightforward pshat, especially given the second part
of the Ran which says "d'hai hacha haisha gum ken m'chneses atzma l'rishuso
bmikztas" is that it is necessary, it is just not enough).

Regards
Chana

-- 
Chana/Heather Luntz

At 12:17 PM 7/16/00 +0100, Chana/Heather Luntz wrote:

(deleted)

While by sheer volume you win, I disagree with your perspective on how to 
learn the Ran, and think you are not correct. Nevertheless, I think I have 
made my points sufficiently, and would just be reiterating them in response 
to your recent e-mail, so I think we are at an impasse. Ve' ha'me'ayein 
yivhchar.

KT,
YGB

Now that we all read the same parasha the same week, here's a question:

Rashi says on the posuk "hen am kelavi yakum" that Yisrael gets up in the
morning and immediately does mitzvos: puts on a talis, reads Shema, and
puts on tefilin.

Isn't the order wrong? The Midrash Tanchuma has it in the order talis,
tefilin, shema, which appears more logical. Rabbenu Bachya quotes it in
that order; why does Rashi apparently change the order?

Gershon
gershon.dubin@juno.com

Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org> wrote:
> The question of what actually went wrong at mei merivah was two tempting of
> a question for me to resist putting in my 2 cents.

My Two Lira:

Micha's Drasha was very nice but I think that some times we read too much
into things. Many Rishonim give their interpretations of the incident of
the Mei Meriva. It seems to me that when G-d tells a Tzadik the caliber
of Moshe Rabenu to do something in a specific manner, then any variation of
it qualifies as a cheit. Why then the extreme punishment? Because the Cheit
of a Tzadik is judged on a much higher level then the Cheit of Poshut. If I
(a Poshut) would have hit the rock, I may have just been fulfiling His will
thinking that this is what G-d meant. But Moshe Rabenu knew exactly what
G-d wanted. (Been there done that!) Moshe ego was so Nisbatel to G-d that
it was virtualy non-existent. So, when Israel once again complained, after
Moshe went the distance for them so many times, he got frustrated, upset,
and angry. So How does the greatest caliber of Tzadik display his anger?
In exactly the way Moshe did who "hit" the rock instead of speaking to it.
So for Moshe, this "display of anger" was out of character and a major Cheit
requiring a major punishment: The inability to see his task completed by
entering Eretz Israel.

HM

In a column last week (P' Chukas - in explanation of the Parah Adumah), I
quoted the K'li Yakar as follows (if anyone wants the full text, feel free
to e-mail me):

Parah Adumah - Balancing Act
-----------------------------
.........

K'li Yakar (Rabbi Shlomo Efrayim of Luntshitz, [5310-5379; 1550- 1619])
however, offers a brilliant explanation as to how this works. The law is
that fruits, grains, and produce can receive tum'ah (ritual defilement) only
after having coming in contact with water (or certain other liquids related to
water - see Vayikra/Leviticus 11:38, Rambam, Laws of Food-Related Defilement,
Ch. 1). If a fruit has not come into contact with water since being harvested,
it is not susceptible to tum'ah and can not be rendered impure. Isn't this
strange? We normally think of water as the source of all purity! When our
hands are impure, we wash them with water. When our bodies are tam'eh, we
immerse them in a mikvah or open body of water. Even the ashes of the Red
Heifer were ineffective until mixed with water. So how is it that contact
with water is a prerequisite to tum'ah acceptance?

This can be understood, he explains, by understanding the scientific principle
that all matter lies in a dormant state until it is "awakened" by an opposing
force. A frozen object can only be rendered molecularly active by its opposing
force - heat. A motionless object can only be jostled into movement by the
thrust of something moving. The greater the opposing force, the more powerful
the awakening becomes. This is why fruits are only susceptible to tum'ah
after contact with water: Water is indeed the source of taharah/purity.
Yet in order for tum'ah to "awaken" an object and render it impure, the
object must be its opposite; it must have first been in a state of purity
in order for the tum'ah to have its full effect.

Seen in this light, we can look at the Parah Adumah mixture as possessing
two opposite forces. The water is the source of all taharah. The ashes of
the slaughtered cow represent death, sin (of the Golden Calf - see Rashi),
and impurity. Depending on what the mixture comes into contact with, one
of the two forces will be awakened. If the mixture touches the body of one
who has been defiled, the water is awakened and counteracts the tum'ah with
its taharah, thereby rendering the person/object ritually pure. If, on the
other hand, the mixture contacts someone tahor, the ashes are awakened,
and render him impure.

                   ..................

The words the Kli Yakar uses to describe this "principle" are "She-kach hu
be-tivyius she-kol davar eino mispael elah me-hefeicho..."

MY QUESTION of the list members:

Is anyone familar with such a 'principle' in modern science? When does it
apply and when not? What is it called, and who first came up with it? Is it
an old theory that went out of vogue? etc.

Any help would be appreciated.

Eliyahu Hoffmann

On Sat, Jul 15, 2000 at 08:48:29PM -0700, Harry Maryles wrote:
: Micha's Drasha was very nice but I think that some times we read too much
: into things.

Thanks for the compliment, but you and I don't disagree.

:                 It seems to me that when G-d tells a Tzadik the caliber
: of Moshe Rabenu to do something in a specific manner, then any variation of
: it qualifies as a cheit.

Which is why I counted off divergences.

:                               So, when Israel once again complained...

thereby acting like a kahal, not an eidah...

:                                                                      after
: Moshe went the distance for them so many times, he got frustrated, upset,
: and angry. So How does the greatest caliber of Tzadik display his anger?
: In exactly the way Moshe did who "hit" the rock instead of speaking to it.

Or, hit it a second time -- al pi the ibn Ezra. Or spoke to the kahal in
anger instead of speaking to the rock -- kishitas haRambam. A point was that
all four shitos (Rashi, Ramban, Rambam and ibn Ezra) could be explained in
terms of anger.

: So for Moshe, this "display of anger" was out of character and a major Cheit
: requiring a major punishment: The inability to see his task completed by
: entering Eretz Israel.

However, that doesn't explain why Klal Yisrael deserved this onesh, or how
the onesh is midah kinegged midah. That was the second point I tried to make,
by relating lack of eidus to the ka'as to yidei Eisav, galus Edom, and the
lack of permanence of the Batei Mikdash because Moshe didn't build them.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 12-Jul-00: Revi'i, Chukas-Balak
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 35b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Yeshaiah 13

I have a question related to RYGB's mention of a source stating that to
use endowments is a lack of bitachon when money should be spent immediately.

I wish I had a source specifically for this, but I hope I may nevertheless
ask this question. If we know a method by which to ensure the sustainability
of our institutions, which involves proper stewardship of funds for a
long-term purpose, how is there any less emunah/bitachon in that? A farmer
who plants seeds in the ground, knowing his plants will produce seeds for
later generations, nevertheless must still have emunah/bitachon and daven
to HaShem for rain and a lack of pestilence so he will have success-
Shouldn't an investment banker or asset manager be just as fervent and
devoted in his davening and Avodas HaShem so that business conditions
enable his stewardship of invested endowment funds to yield the greatest
fruit (returns)?

RM Berger wrote:

> The Rabbanan sat down and contemplated what new law needs to exist. Gezeiros 
> (protective halachos) and dinim diRabbanan are new legislation. This is
> unlike p'sak, where one could be choosing between ideas that already exist -- 
> some mimetically some textually.

RD Finch wrote:

> I think we talked about this once before. One might argue that dinim 
> d'rabbanan and gezeiros are constructive and interpretive, not really 
> legislative. They more resemble the actions of courts with remedial powers 
> than they do the Sanhedrin. P'sak is also interpretive. I'd argue that minhag 
> permeates all of these processes.

R. Elchanan Wasserman discusses this in his Kuntres Divrei Sofrim in Kovetz 
Shiurim vol. 2.  He discusses it regarding the machlokes between the Rambam and 
the Ramban over whether, like the Rambam says in the Sefer HaMitzvos, rabbinic 
prohibitions fall under the biblical prohibition of "lo sasur".

REW quotes R. Chaim Soloveitchik as explaining that there are two types of 
rabbinic laws.  One is the EXTENSION of biblical laws (mishmeres), which is 
interpretative.  Chazal, in a sense, redefined the parameters of the biblical 
laws.  The other is legislation, like netilas yadayim and eiruvin which have no 
biblical basis.

Gil Student

R' Gil Student wrote:

<<The Maskil LeDavid (R. David Pardo) explains Tallis Gadol and Shema are only done in the morning while Tefillin is (or rather was) worn all day.  Rashi starts with the mitzvas of the morning and then goes to the mitzva that is performed all day.>>

         Why would Rashi use that order if the order of "hen am kelavi yakum",  describes the order in which we do the mitzvos **upon arising**,  not how long they are in effect during the day.

         FYI,  the Rabbenu Bachya brings this from a Midrash Tanchuma in the order I suggested.  Why did Rashi change?

Gershon
gdubin@loebandtroper.com
gershon.dubin@juno.com

>I remember once, years ago, having seen a statement that it is a shortcoming in
>Bitachon to set up endowment funds for yeshivos - if you have money to spend on
>Harboztas Torah, spend it today - and trust in HKB"H for tomorrow! I seem to 
>recall having seen this in the name of the Chofetz Chaim, yet three searches 
>through the CC al Ha'torah did not reveal the statement.
     
In the end of Sotah 'kol mi sheyeish lo pat besilo ve'omer mah ochal lemachar 
harei zeh miktanei amanah."

Lichora, endowment funds should be the same as life insurance which R. Moshe 
Feinstein writes in a teshuvah is an obligation.  Frankly, I don't understand 
but, alas, I am miktanei amanah.

Gil Student

On 15 Jul 2000, at 23:19, Gershon Dubin wrote:
> Rashi says on the posuk "hen am kelavi yakum" that Yisrael gets up in
> the morning and immediately does mitzvos: puts on a talis, reads
> Shema, and puts on tefilin.

> Isn't the order wrong? The Midrash Tanchuma has it in the order talis,
> tefilin, shema, which appears more logical. Rabbenu Bachya quotes it
> in that order; why does Rashi apparently change the order?

If you put on the talis katan first, and then you say the first pasuk 
of Shma as part of Birchos HaShachar, you may well do it in 
Rashi's order.

-- Carl

Please daven and learn for a Refuah Shleima for my son,
Baruch Yosef ben Adina Batya among the sick of Israel.
Thank you very much.

RG Dubin wrote:
>Isn't the order wrong? The Midrash Tanchuma has it in the order talis, 
>tefilin, shema, which appears more logical. Rabbenu Bachya quotes it in that 
>order; why does Rashi apparently change the order?

The Maskil LeDavid (R. David Pardo) explains Tallis Gadol and Shema are only 
done in the morning while Tefillin is (or rather was) worn all day.  Rashi 
starts with the mitzvas of the morning and then goes to the mitzva that is 
performed all day.

Gil Student

From: "Carl and Adina Sherer" <sherer@actcom.co.il>
>> RSZA also held that if the minhag of the shatz is to omit Baruch Hashem
>> L'olam...in maariv and the minhag of the shul is to say it, the shatz may
>> skip it if his omission won't be "nikar."  (I'm not sure how it's possible
>> for the omission not to be nikar, but....)

> Wait for the Tzibur to finish and start straight from Kaddish.
> Interesting that RSZA would mention this since I have never seen
> Baruch Hashem l'Olam said in Eretz Yisrael.

As has been already mentioned, "waiting for the Tzibur to finish and start
straight from Kaddish" is, IMHO, nikar.

>> Finally, RSZA told one person who davened nusach sefard that, if he was
>> shatz during a "haicha kedusha" (and therefore saying aloud the first three
>> brachos) in a nusach ashkenaz shul, the person should use nusach ashkenaz
>> for those parts said aloud (i.e., say L'dor v'dor instead of atah kadosh)
>> and then revert to nusach sefard for the remainder of his shemonah esrai.

> What about if you come into shul late and start Shmoneh Esrei
> with the Shatz so as to catch Kdusha? Did RSZA hold you should
> do the same thing?

As for a person who comes late and is starting shemonah esrei with the
shatz, why should he have to use the nusach of the tzibbur?  He's not the
representative of the tzibbur.

KT
Aryeh

********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]