Avodah Mailing List

Volume 05 : Number 084

Friday, July 14 2000

• Re: Custom - Origins of
• nusach
• Re: nusach of Heiche Kedusha
• Nusach of tefilla betzibbur
• Re: Custom - Origins of
• Mei Merivah
• Jan Karski o.b.m.
• Re: Hefker and Kiddushin
• Re: More on Kol Kallah
• nusach of tefillah belachash
• Re: Hefker and Kiddushin
• Tefillin Strap
• More on the nature of the yeitzer hara
• Re: Definition of Self (Fwd: JerusalemViews - Parshas Chukas)
• Ta'amei haMitzvos
• Re: More on the nature of the yeitzer hara

On Thu, Jul 13, 2000 at 07:36:43PM -0400, DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
: If I understand you, you're saying that dinim d'rabbonim and takkonos are
: not mimetic and are derived by definition by textualism...

Not quite. I think I may have implied that, but I didn't mean to. I'm saying
that things created diRabbanan are created for basically textual reasons. The
Rabbanan sat down and contemplated what new law needs to exist. Gezeiros
(protective halachos) and dinim diRabbanan are new legislation. This is
unlike p'sak, where one could be choosing between ideas that already exist --
some mimetically some textually.

:                                       Where, for example, does Midrash fit
: into the scheme, to the extent it reveals what Jews did or didn't do to try to
: actualize halacha in ancient times?
...
: And where do you put Kabbalah? Kabbalistic texts reflect logical processes
: that are neither textual nor mimetic. The evolution of kabbalistic learning
: is even more obtuse.

Both are textual. Mimeticism is the unconscious propogation of halachah
through culture. As actual "Orach Chaim". When someone wants to restore an
old minhag basedon medrash or create a hanhagah tovah because of something
in the Zohar he is using book-knowledge, not culture.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 12-Jul-00: Revi'i, Chukas-Balak
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 35b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Yeshaiah 13

RYBS held that the Tefiloh of the Shliach Tzibbur is a Tefilas Hatsibur and 
a seperate kiyum. He even had a chumra to stand during tefilas hashatz. This 
may be the reason that the Chazan should daven the nusach of the kahal.

[Micha's 2 cents: This is R' Chaim's chiddush originally. -mi]

On 13 Jul 00, at 12:49, Stein, Aryeh E. wrote:
> Finally, RSZA told one person who davened nusach sefard that, if he was
> shatz during a "haicha kedusha" (and therefore saying aloud the first three
> brachos) in a nusach ashkenaz shul, the person should use nusach ashkenaz
> for those parts said aloud (i.e., say L'dor v'dor instead of atah kadosh)
> and then revert to nusach sefard for the remainder of his shemonah esrai.

The AH holds you always say Atah Kadosh (not L'Dor Va'Dor) in Heiche 
Kedusha, as this not a Chazzoras Ha'Shatz. That's what I did last time I 
led a Heiche Kedusha.

KT,
YGB

Most of the discussions of this issue refer to the chazan. I have a different
question which is probably more prelevant in Israel.

How about a private person saying kadish. There is the small difference
between ashkenaz and sefard (chassidic) of veyazmach perkunai. However,
there are much larger difference between edot mizrach sefard
and ashkenaz.
The usual minhag is for each person to say his personal version. Since usually
everyone says kaddish together (semi in unison) this creates a mishmash
and confusion.
It gets even worse with regard to a shaliach tzibbur.
Any suggestions?

Eli Turkel

In a message dated 7/14/00 6:43:35 AM US Central Standard Time, 
micha@aishdas.org writes:
> The Rabbanan sat down and contemplated what new law needs to exist. Gezeiros
> (protective halachos) and dinim diRabbanan are new legislation. This is
> unlike p'sak, where one could be choosing between ideas that already exist --
> some mimetically some textually.

I think we talked about this once before. One might argue that dinim 
d'rabbanan and gezeiros are constructive and interpretive, not really 
legislative. They more resemble the actions of courts with remedial powers 
than they do the Sanhedrin. P'sak is also interpretive. I'd argue that minhag 
permeates all of these processes.

<<Mimeticism is the unconscious propogation of halachah
through culture. As actual "Orach Chaim". When someone wants to restore an
old minhag basedon medrash or create a hanhagah tovah because of something
in the Zohar he is using book-knowledge, not culture.>>

You make an interesting point. Pure mimeticism is unconscious, like Michael 
Jordan sinking a five-footer. So there's no such thing as a chosen minhag, 
because the process of choosing involves comparative analysis based on 
exterior assumptions of value -- in other words, book-knowledge. Wouldn't you 
say, however, that minhag as it really develops is a mish-mosh of mimeticism 
*and* book-knowledge? That these distinctions are more theoretical than real?

Also, what do you do when a lifespan of a minhag is cut short by an 
intervening event, like the Holocaust? There are those who wish to restore 
some of the minhagim of European communities wiped out during the war. Since 
Jews have practiced Judaism in the interim, this restoration would inevitably 
displace more current customs. Is this an exercise in book-learning? Or is it 
a recognition that minhagim reflect something deeper than mimeticism?

David Finch

The question of what actually went wrong at mei merivah was two tempting of
a question for me to resist putting in my 2 cents.

First, looking at the tzivui, what H' says is (20:8):
    Take the mateh, and gather (hakheil es) the eidah, you and Aharon your
    brother, and talk to the stone before their eyes and it will give its
    water; and you bring out for them water from the stone, and you will
    give to drink to the eidah and to their beasts.

Next, what Moshe actually does. Step 1 (20:9):
    And Moshe took the mateh from before H' as He commanded him to.
So far, the pasuk tells us there is no divergence. Step 2 (20:10)
    And Moshe and Aharon gathered (vayak'hilu) the kahal --

A first divergence! The people gathered are a kahal, not an eidah. Note
that the verb in both tzivui and ma'aseh is to make a kahal -- hakheil
and vayak'hilu. What we see is that H' asked Moshe to make a kahal from a
pre-existing eidah, whereas the people gathered were a unit only because of
the gathering.

Step 3 (ibid):
    -- and he [Mosheh] said to them "Listen now/please [na, w/ an aleph]
    the rebels: Can we bring water from this stone for you?"

Second divergence: Hashem doesn't tell Moshe to talk to the people. Many of
the rishonim see the words of this announcement to be the cheit. The Rambam
(on Avos) points to the angry tone. The Ramban objects to the word "notzi"
in firct person, as though Moshe and Aharon were providing the water.

It is hard to understand the Ramban at face value. After all, HKBH Himself
says "vihotzeisa lahem mayim" -- that Moshe should take out the water for them.

Step 4 (20:11):
    And Moshe raised his hand, and hit the sela with his mateh --

Hitting once may or may not have been a divergence. L'fi Rashi it's the
primary cheit. L'fi Ramban, Hashem implied that Moshe was supposed to hit
the rock when He told Moshe to bring the mateh.

Yeshaiah brings this difference into messinic terms, "He will hit a land
*with the sheivet of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips he kill kill
the evil" (Yesh' 11:4). Admittedly, that's shevet, not a mateh, but still,
a very similar image. (R' Shlomo Riskin makes this comparison.)

Step 5 (ibid):
    -- twice --

This, according to the Ibn Ezra, was Mosheh's cheit, that he hit the stone a
second time. The IE's shitah is a variant of the Rambam's. He explains that
it was Moshe's anger that made only a trickle of water be produced from the
first strike, and in anger Moshe hit it again.

Step 6 (ibid):
    -- and a lot of water came out, and the nation drank as did their animals.

No one comments on this, but what happened to Moshe giving them the water
"vihishkisa"? Here they drink themselves "vateisht ha'eidah".


I think there's a unifying picture that could tie together all the rishonim
I mentioned.

Speaking to the rock, the sela, would be an act of bitachon. Hitting the rock
adds an element of hishtadlus. By hitting the rock, Moshe Rabbeinu used the
regular formula of combining the two, instead of Hashem's intent of showing
the power of bitachon.

I think that is p'shat in the Ramban. If Moshe were to speak to the rock,
his tefillos would have brought the water, but one wouldn't confuse that
with "kochi vi'otzem yadi asa li es hachayil hazos". Therefore, Moshe saying
"notzi" is very different in impact than Hashem's "vihotzeisa".

And when are we to live on bitachon with a minimum of hishtadlus? When
"they will sit under his grapevine and under his fig tree and not fear"
(Micha 4:4 c.f. Zecharia 3:10). Again, the connection to yimos hamoshiach.

Unlike the Ramban, the Ibn Ezra complains only about the second strike.
Perhaps lishitaso, the point of the demonstration was to show the combination
of bitachon and hishtadlus. But until then there wasn't enough water. The
IE is saying that when the hishtadlus-bitachon combination failed, Moshe
should have given up. But Moshe Rabbeinu didn't because of ka'as.

Anger is more than sufficient to reduce the kol Ya'akov of talking to the
rock into the yedei Eisav that is hitting it. Therefore the Rambam focusses
on the ka'as.


Moshe Rabbeinu's punishment was to die before entering eretz Yisrael. Chazal
(as repeated by Rashi) explain that this was necessary so that Hashem's
"Anger" could be expressed on stone and wood, and not on people. Because
had Moshe built the Beis haMikdash, it couldn't have been destroyed without
bringing into question the permanence of Moshe's other matanah -- the Torah.
IOW, had Moshe followed Hashem's direction, there would have been no need
for galus! Another connection to yimos hamoshiach.

The first point of divergence that I noted was that B'nei Yisrael were not an
eidah, which RYBS and RSRH define as a faith-community unified by testimony
(as I've repeated here ad nauseum in the past). Tefillah requires a minyan,
which is learnt from gezeirah shavah eidah-eidah. Their not being an Eidah
prevented Moshe's tefillah.

Note also that ka'as is tied to the loss of the eidah, ka'as is ke'ilu
oveid avodah zarah, and perishah min haklal is kefirah. For Moshe Rabbeinu,
this ki'ilu is enough to create a chiyuv misah. (B"H I'm not judged by
that standard!)


Had we been ready, and been an eidah, Moshe would not have been reduced to
ka'as, we would have been ready for support through pure bitachon without
working our gefen ut'einah, Moshe rabbeinu would have lead us in kibbush
ha'aretz and binyan bayis, and malchus Edom, built on yidei Eisav, would
never have had to have ruled.

May this huge historical detour reach its conclusion, bimheirah biyameinu.
The thing we can do to get there would join in "agudah achas la'asos ritzonicha
bileivav shaleim" -- a union with the true singularity of a kehilah, for the
purpose (whether or not we succeed) of providing eidus about the will of HKBH.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 12-Jul-00: Revi'i, Chukas-Balak
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 35b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Yeshaiah 13

On Thursday the great Ohev Yisrael Jan Karski past away. He was one of the 
leaders of the Polish underground and worked day and night to try and stop 
the Holocaust. He risked his life numerous times and he was tortured by the 
Gestapo. A book about his experiences entitled, "Karski: How One Man Tried 
to Stop the Holocaust" was published by Thomas Wood. You can read excerpts 
from the book at http://remember.org/karski/karski.html .

Being as he has no surviving family (to the best of my knowledge), the 
closest "karov" is the man who wrote the book about him, Tom Wood. You can 
contact him at ETWood@worldnet.att.net .

May this great man's memory be a blessing.

Moshe

RYGB writes that the Ran's hefker "can only mean a passivity in the ma'aseh
kiddushin," which procludes the kallah's stating "ani
mekabelles."

However, in the Ran's explanation of how the woman goes about enacting such
a hefker state, he writes "mikaivan shehee maskemmes l'kidushei haish..."
--only then does she assume such a state. It seems that the woman's saying "ani
m'kabelles" could be seen according to the Ran as simply a verbal haskama to
the kidushei haish, as opposed to the umdan da'as that we traditionally employ.

(Of course, my taanos on this point are strictly with regard to the lomdus
of the Ran. As far as the other very serious concerns, i.e. minhag yisrael,
Ba'al HaTania, etc., they must be dealt with when we're in the realm of
l'maaseh.)

-Binyamin Goldman

DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
> question: If, like Rabbi Berman, one poskens on the basis of what one learns,
> and if one's learning is good, are there still countervailing (halacha,
> mesorah, or purely communitarian concerns) to hide the learning and rely on
> the existing minhag? Does the minhag trump the learning for the reasons RYGB
> has focused upon? Where do we draw the line?

Learning should always be spread as far and as wide as possible. I would
encourage Rabbi Berman to impart as much of his knowledge as possible and
his rationale for arriving to his conclusions. Indeed I believe he did
exactly that for this list. It would be a far better world if more of us
would have information. No one can begin to approach ultimate Emes without
knowledge. If after Rabbi Berman has exhausted all pertinent sources on this
issue and has come to the conclusion that a particular act is the ultimate
Emes, then he has an obligation to follow through with that act even if
everyone else disagrees. This is the essence of the school os Shamai.
Shamai believed that he was right and acted accordingly. Had his desciples
violated Shamai's dictates and acted according to Hillel, they would have
violated the Torah. The same thing is true today. If a legitimate Torah
scholar comes to a conclusion that is different than his coleauges he has an
obligation to act according to his own conclusions. Of course this assumes
that the individual scholar has done the legwork and exhaustively studied the
issue. Only somwone with Gadlus can make such determinations. Unfortunately
most of us are not on such a level even though some of us think we are.
(Some people think that they can Paskin just by learning Daf Yomi.)

The problem arises when a scholar does something against the common practice
and then explains himself briefly to the people at hand. This is where
a disservice could happen. In no way can a brief description justify a
radical action. This is where the danger of misinterpretation comes in. I'm
not saying that one should not try and explain himself to a crowd but that
he should be aware of the dangers of doing something that is perceived to be
radical and the dangers of explaining oneself insufficiently and therefore
causing misunderstanding instead.

As to whether Rabbi Berman was right or wrong... I don't know. I've heard
arguments on both sides and have made some of those arguments myself.

The question in Rabbi Berman's case boils down to whether an Halachic
innovation even if it is well founded (not withstanding the Shitas HaRan)
should override other considerations which are also Halachic. Especially when
they impact on eachother. Where is the greater good served.

HM 

From: "Stein, Aryeh E." <aes@ll-f.com>
> RSZA also held that if the minhag of the shatz is to omit Baruch Hashem
> L'olam...in maariv and the minhag of the shul is to say it, the shatz may
> skip it if his omission won't be "nikar."  (I'm not sure how it's possible
> for the omission not to be nikar, but....)

	Someone davened maariv in a local shul for the amud one night a
few months ago and did not say BHL.  Someone else made a major macha'a
pumbis combined with choice epithets for "those kind of people".  I made
a private macha'a to the moche for his tone,  but not nikar is not,
IMHO,  possible.

Gershon
gdubin@loebandtroper.com
gershon.dubin@juno.com

On Thu, Jul 13, 2000 at 12:38:25AM -0500, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
: Sof davar, I am left with my contention that the introduction of devarim
: she'be'al peh on the Kallah's part quite likely contravene the Ran (and the
: Or Samei'ach)'s geder of kiddushin.

I still await an answer to my earlier question.

Most kiddushin today involve SOME activity of kibbul on the part of the
bride. If nothing else, she held her hand still, finger extended, for SOME
reason. So there is some ma'aseh kibbalah which is typically toch kidei
dibur of the "harei at", and in any case, would come closer to the nesinah
than this kallah's "harei ani". So it's not devarim shebaleiv anyway.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 12-Jul-00: Revi'i, Chukas-Balak
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 35b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Yeshaiah 13

Any thoughts on the subject? I sort of took them for granted until I was
pointed to Mo'ed Katan where we see R' Hunah fast 40 days because his
retzu'ah (the part that holds the tefillin on) twisted. As though it's
as awful as dropping a seifer Torah.

And what's the connection, thematically, between Avraham not taking boot
straps for booty and the retzu'ah? The medrash connects them by saying one
earned the other.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 12-Jul-00: Revi'i, Chukas-Balak
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 35b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Yeshaiah 13

A while back, when we were discussing the nature of the yeitzer hara, I posted
(among other things) a translation of the begining of the 2nd perek of Even
Sh'leimah as well as the Maharsha on the medrash about the man who tried to
anger Hillel with foolish questions on erev Shabbos. The former discusses the
three things that remove a person from the world. The latter associates the
questions with the traits of talmidei Bil'am.

Turns out they're connected. See this quote from this week's issue of
Hama'ayan:
: HaMaayan - Parashat Chukat / Balak
: Shlomo Katz
: Project Genesis
...
: We learn in Pirkei Avot (Chapter 5):

: Whoever has the following three traits is among the disciples of our forefather
: Avraham; and whoever has the following three traits is among the disciples
: of the wicked Bilam. Those who have a good eye, a humble spirit and a meek
: soul are among the disciples of our forefather Avraham. Those who have an
: evil eye, an arrogant spirit and a greedy soul are among the disciples of
: the wicked Bilam.

: R' Leib Chasman z"l (1869-1935; mashgiach of the Chevron Yeshiva) explains:
: These three traits -- an evil eye, an arrogant spirit and a greedy soul --
: parallel "jealousy, honor and desire," the three traits which Pirkei Avot says
: can destroy a person. There is nothing inherently wrong with jealousy, honor
: and desire; indeed, all three traits can be put to positive uses. However,
: if these traits become a person's primary aspirations, they will destroy him.

: Why? Because a person's aspirations are manifestations of his spirit, and a
: person has only one spirit. To whatever extent a person's spirit is devoted
: to pursuing wealth and honor, he cannot simultaneously pursue closeness to
: G-d. In the end, someone like Bilam ends up consorting with a donkey (as
: Chazal say he did). On the other hand, to whatever extent one suppresses
: his desire for wealth and honor and instead has a good eye, a humble spirit,
: and a meek soul, he is a disciple of Avraham and close to G-d.
...
: (Ohr Yahel II, p. 132)

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for 12-Jul-00: Revi'i, Chukas-Balak
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 35b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         Yeshaiah 13

I'm posting this d'var torah in total. I know that's against nettiqutte, but
it speaks to the shitah I spent so much time trying to describe during our
discussions of the "Definition of Self". And does it so much better than I did.

-mi

JerusalemViews -- Parshas Chukas
Rabbi Heshy Grossman <grossman@torah.org>
Project Genesis, http://www.torah.org/

"Even the individual who prays alone on Erev Shabbos must say
'VaYechulu'... and the Torah considers him as if he has become a partner
with G-d in the act of creation." (Shabbos 119b)

The prayer of 'VaYechulu' that we add on Friday evening is our testimony
to the creation of heaven and earth, and as witnesses we become part of the
Divine process, participants in the unfolding of the Divine plan.

This prayer has an additional characteristic, as well:

"Said Rav Chisda in the name of Mar Ukva: All those who pray on Erev Shabbos
and say 'VaYechulu' are accompanied by two heavenly angels who place their
hands on his head and say: 'And your sins will be removed and your misdeeds
atoned for' (Isaiah 6:7)." (Shabbos 119b)

It is this added factor -- the capability of cleansing our sins -- that
connects 'VaYechulu' to the red heifer, the subject of this week's Parsha.

The Rishonim allude to this idea, in their own way:

"The word 'Asher' is said three times in 'VaYechulu', just as in the Parsha
of Parah Adumah, teaching that all who say 'VaYechulu' are cleansed."
(Avudraham and Hagahos Maimoni)

Why is it the repetition of the word 'Asher' that signifies a connection to
Parah Adumah and spiritual purification?

Let us explain.

The word 'Asher' also appears three times at the onset of our Parsha.

"Zos Chukas HaTorah Asher Tzivah Hashem Leimor, Dabber El Bnei Yisrael VeYikchu
Eilecha Parah Adumah Temima, Asher Ein Bah Mum, Asher Lo Alah Aleha Ol"
(Bamidbar 19:2)

What does this word mean?

'Asher' is always used as a means of connection, a conjunction that joins
together two diverse elements.

The word itself, however, is of the same root as 'Ishur' -- a permit or
validation. In the Talmud it appears as 'Ashrasa D'Dayni -- the judges'
validation authorizing a document as authentic and binding (the modern
translation of 'Osher' as 'happiness' is incorrect).

A second connotation of Asher is that it serves as an integral part of the
Divine name: "E-hy-eh Asher E-hy-eh". The Brisker Rav pointed out that these
words, revealed to Moshe at the burning bush, are not translated by Targum
Onkelos. Only ordinary words and concepts can be translated, for man has
the capability of relating to the Torah on his own terms. But the Divine
name has no alternative meaning. It exists in its own independent dimension,
and cannot be reduced from the original Lashon HaKodesh.

How then can a word of such lofty implication be utilized as a simple 'that'
or 'since' -- a predicate with no apparent significance?

Perhaps we can answer this question by analyzing the two different meanings of
'Asher'.

An important principle of Lashon HaKodesh is that no one word can have two
separate meanings, and even where that appears to be the case, a closer look
reveals that the two definitions are actually two sides of the same coin.

An Ishur is guarantee that the item in question has been approved of by
higher authorities, and that it conforms to the demanded requirements. Once
doing so, even a trivial matter can reflect the will of G-d, and His word
is equally manifest in both heavenly and earthly spheres.

Hence, 'Asher' is both a conjunction connecting one subject to the next,
and an aspect of the ineffable Divine name, for it serves to attach this
world to the one above.

This connection has three varied aspects.

Man must relate to three aspects of life -- his G-d, his world, and his
very self.

These three dimensions are reflected in the three different parts of his
soul -- Nefesh, Ruach, Neshama. The Nefesh is known as 'Shituffa D'Guffa' --
a partner of the body, the forces that man utilizes in his relationship to
the world around him. The Neshama is the most exalted element of his being,
and it remains eternally in heaven, relating to the G-d of creation. The
Ruach is that part of man known as 'I' -- man as he is meant to be.

These three elements are meant to be perfected, and with them the world arrives
at its intended destination. It is only by refining these three aspects of his
character that man becomes an appropriate vehicle to express the word of G-d.

This is the perfect 'Asher' -- the world connected to G-d, approved and
assured by heaven, and guaranteed to fulfill its mandate of destiny.

This concept finds expression in two seemingly disparate ideas -- the prayer
of 'VaYechulu' recited every Friday evening, and the Parsha of Parah Adumah,
the purification from sin, death, and defilement.

Just as no word in Lashon HaKodesh has two divergent meanings, so too, two
distinct Mitzvos that share a similar theme are united by an inner connection,
a common thread that bonds them as one.

This triad of 'VaYechulu' parallels the three different Shabbos prayers --
'Attah Kiddashtah', 'Yismach Moshe', and 'Attah Echad' -- each one representing
a different aspect of the heavenly Shabbos.

'Attah Kiddashtah' speaks of Shabbos Breishis, our origin and source; the
pinnacle of the act of creation. 'Attah Echad' is the Shabbos that is destined
to be, the goal of all history, a world completely at rest. Finally, a world
that knows from whence it comes -- and is conscious of where it's headed --
merits that the will of G-d be present, and this is the focus of the prayer
on Shabbos day -- 'Yismach Moshe B'Matnas Chelko' -- describing the fusion
of Torah and Shabbos, the day itself -- one most fit for receiving G-d's word.

These three Tefilos together help nurture the perfect human being, one
who is aware of his source and confident of reaching his destination --
"Da MeiAyin Ba'sa U'L'An Attah Holech." (Avos 3:1) He relates to the one
above, understands the purpose of the world around him, and is subsequently
capable of developing his own potential.

In this way, he becomes a full partner with G-d in the very act of
creation - -- "Even the individual who prays alone on Erev Shabbos must say
'VaYechulu'....and the Torah considers him as if he has become a partner
with G-d in the act of creation." (Shabbos 119b)

The same triplicate 'Asher' appears in the command of Parshas Parah, and
there, as well, each of the three aspects we have defined finds expression.

"Asher Tzivah Hashem" -- the command of G-d is the means by which our physical
deeds relate to their source.

"Asher Ein Bah Mum" -- unblemished and pure, the red heifer retains a
connection to the heights of perfection.

"Asher Lo Alah Aleha Ol" -- freed from the bridling influence of external
forces, and unburdened of the obligatory yoke that stunts his growth, the
Parah Adumah is capable of guiding man towards his destination, a pristine
world of purity and truth.

On Shabbos, the world comes to rest. Not a mere hiatus from the busy
affairs of a working world, but at rest after reaching its goal, the entire
congregation rises to say "VaYechulu." Bearing witness and testimony to
the purpose of life, they are enveloped with the purity of eternity --
'MeiEin Olam HaBa'. In this way, they attach themselves to the essence of
existence. Unsullied and without sin, they stand before G-d -- forever pure.

Another snippet from a d'var Torah. This time my excuse is that we've discussed
the meaning of the expression "ta'am hamitzvah" in the past, and thought people
would be interest in another obseration on the subject.

Outlooks & Insights -- Parshas Chukas - Balak
Rabbi Zev Leff
(Reprinted with permission from Artscroll Mesorah Publications, ltd.)
Shema Yisrael Torah Network

Reasons and Tastes
...
The Mishnah (Berachos 33b) rules that one who says, "As Your mercies, G-d,
devolve on the mother bird and its nest, so too, have mercy on us," must
be silenced. The Gemara explains that the requirement of sending away the
mother bird prior to taking her eggs is solely a Divine decree, not based
on the desire to be merciful to the mother bird, as the forbidden prayer
would seem to imply. Yet the Sages themselves say (Devarim Rabbah 6:1):
"...So, too, G-d's mercy extends to the birds, as it says, 'When you discover
a bird's nest...send away the mother...'"

To resolve this contradiction, we must distinguish between a taste and a
reason. If we were asked why we eat, we would answer that we must eat in order
to live. If questioned further why we eat bread and not stones, we might refer
to the necessary nutrients available in bread but not in stones. But if asked
why human beings need these nutrients, or why we are capable to extracting
needed minerals from bread and not rocks, we could say nothing more than
that is how G-d created the world and the answer lies exclusively in His mind.

Even though we eat to stay alive, Hashem created the world in such a way that
our food also has a pleasing taste and aroma. But that taste should never be
confused with our reason for eating. Even if our taste buds were destroyed
we could not taste our food, we would still have to eat. And if we let our
taste buds guide our choice of foods, we might soon die of malnutrition.

The mitzvos are the spiritual nourishment of our neshamah. Why or how a
particular mitzvah nourishes our soul we cannot know any more than why G-d
created bodies which require certain nutrients. But Hashem wanted the mitzvos
to be palatable to us, so he infused them with taste -- ideas and lessons --
that we can understand. We must never confuse, however, the lessons of the
mitzvos, with their underlying reasons. Thus all the extensive literature
explaining the mitzvos always refers to these explanations as Ta'amei Mitzvos,
literally "the tastes of the mitzvos."

In this light, Meiri explains the verse, "For it is chok for Yisrael a mishpat
to the G-d of Yaakov" (Tehillim 81:5). For us, all mitzvos are ultimately
chukim, unfathomable decrees. But to Hashem they are all mishpatim, based
on an overall plan known only to the Divine mind.

If one entreats G-d, Who has mercy on the birds, to similarly have mercy on us,
that entreaty reflects his own determination that he understands the reason
for the mitzvah from G-d's perspective. That is a mistake. We can never know
why G-d decreed a particular mitzvah. But to learn from the mitzvah a lesson
of mercy, as an enhancement to our performance of the mitzvah, is perfectly
acceptable. That is the intent of the Sages in the Midrash mentioned above.
...

In a message dated 7/14/00 12:53:03 PM US Central Standard Time, 
micha@aishdas.org writes [actually, I quoted Hama'ayan which quoted R' Leib
Chasman - Ed.]:
: a person's aspirations are manifestations of his spirit, and a
: person has only one spirit. To whatever extent a person's spirit is devoted
: to pursuing wealth and honor, he cannot simultaneously pursue closeness to
: G-d. In the end, someone like Bilam ends up consorting with a donkey (as
: Chazal say he did). On the other hand, to whatever extent one suppresses
: his desire for wealth and honor and instead has a good eye, a humble spirit,
: and a meek soul, he is a disciple of Avraham and close to G-d.

Once, during one of RYGB's shiurim, I alluded to the Xtian belief that one
cannot serve G-d and Mammon both. RYGB said that we don't posken that way.
But isn't that what you're saying? (Personally, I agree with you. I'm not
sure RYGB really disagrees, either, except in the sense that identifies no
halacha that is violated by the pursuit of wealth and honor.)

David Finch

********************


[ Distributed to the Avodah mailing list, digested version.                   ]
[ To post: mail to avodah@aishdas.org                                         ]
[ For back issues: mail "get avodah-digest vXX.nYYY" to majordomo@aishdas.org ]
[ or, the archive can be found at http://www.aishdas.org/avodah/              ]
[ For general requests: mail the word "help" to majordomo@aishdas.org         ]