Avodah Mailing List

Volume 05 : Number 064

Thursday, June 8 2000

• Re: Boruch Shem
• Re: Adam Before And After The Chet
• Re: Adam Before And After The Chet
• Re: Adam Before And After The Chet
• nezirut
• Re: Adam Before And After The Chet
• Re: Kesuvos 62 Father leaving home to learn Torah
• Re: Telzer Derech
• Re: Ta'am and taste
• Re: Adam Before And After The Chet
• Re: Adam Before And After The Chet
• re: occupy yourself with Torah
• re:Brisker derech
• Re: Adam Before And After The Chet
• Re: Adam Before And After The Chet
• Re: nezirut
• Re: Telzer Derech
• Re: Ta'am and taste
• Re: Kesuvos 62 Father leaving home to learn Torah
• Re: Adam Before And After The Chet

In Avodah V5#63, GDubin wrote:
> My question now is, how do you translate Boruch Shem: if it is in fact the
> same as Yehei Shmei, it would have to be translated as "the Name of Hashem
> __should be__ rather than "blessed is" as is found in most conventional
> translations.

Yes, I like a translation of "Let the Name be blessed...." The plural form
is found in the word "bor'chu," as in "bor'chu...ham'vorach."

> Does this depend on how you interpret the Boruch at the beginning of all
> brochos?

I don't think so: that "boruch" is actually an object (i.e. one could switch
that word and the "atoh"), with "atoh" (i.e. HKBH) the subject, in the
noun phrase. The "boruch" in "Boruch Shaim..." is an imperative (i.e. it's
a verbal, not a noun, construct), as is (as you can guess!) "Bor'chu."

All the best from
Michael Poppers * Elizabeth, NJ

In a message dated 6/7/00 2:27:38 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Gil.Student@citicorp.com writes:
> 1. What is wrong with walking around naked? It is just our subjectivity that  
>  tells us that it is wrong.

Torah was Kadma Alpayim Shana Lolom, in it already said Vloi Yeiroeh Bicha
Ervas Davar, (Ilmolei Nintna Torah, Lomadnu ... Tznius Meichosul is not a
problem as "Nitnah" torah was after the Chet).

> 2. Is there any way for Adam after the chet to see things objectively or are
> we doomed to be subjective because of our internal desires?  

There is Horgoi Btaanis, (and see at lentgh in Tanya)

Gut Yom Tov V'Kol Tuv
Yitzchok Zirkind

In a message dated 6/7/00 12:27:38 PM US Central Standard Time, 
Gil.Student@citicorp.com writes:
> Is there any way for Adam after the chet to see things objectively or are we
> doomed to be subjective because of our internal desires? Is this similar to R.
> Elchanan Wasserman's vort that if one does not fulfill the Torah properly
> one can never see objectively?

What's the difference between seeing things subjectively because of our
"internal desires," or because our brains are (in the grand scale of things)
rudimentary organs that cannot distinguish truth from falsehood without
the guidance of HaShem? Fulfilling Torah helps give us HaShem's insight --
without Torah, we are left to our our miserable devices. I'm not sure that
internal desire has much to do with it, except in the sense that the literal
story-line of the chet addressed such desire.

David Finch 

On Wed, Jun 07, 2000 at 10:22:43AM -0400, Gil.Student@citicorp.com wrote:
: The Rambam (MN 1:2) writes that before Adam's chet he was an intellectual 
: (philosopher?) who saw things objectively in terms of truth and falsehood.

From my pshetl at <http://www.aishdas.org/asp/bereishis.html>:
R' EE Dessler writes that the difference between before and after man's sin
was the internalization of the Evil Inclination. Before eating from the tree,
Chava had to be convinced by a snake to disobey G-d, and Adam in turn had
to be convinced by Chava, neither would have sinned on their own. The snake,
identified with the Satan, was instead of their evil inclination.

These two ideas merge quite beautifully. Before eating the fruit, man had no
Evil Inclination. He had no motivation to sin. It was only the intervention
of an outside force that lead him to sin. It was, therefor, the task of
this outsider to convince man that what is in reality evil, is good. Then,
man's job would be to ascertain the truth. He only had a desire to do good,
but that doesn't mean he always knew what good was. This is the Rambam's
model of truth vs. falsehood.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  6-Jun-00: Shelishi
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 17b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

Since we are are on the topic of nezirut I figure this is as good a time
as any to re-post this question I had asked on another forum before last
Rosh ha-Shanah and have yet to hear a response. 

>Can anyone suggest reasons for the difference in versions of the *hatarat
>nedarim*, wherein some have: [I hereby declare null and void all
>vows,...]va-AFILU nezirut Shimshon; whereas others have: ... .HUTZ mi-nezirut
>Shimshon; still other versions have the last in parenthesis, apparently
>taking no sides on the issue.  This is probably not *merely* a difference
>among, say, Ashkenazim and Sephardim, because, for whatever it's worth,
>the Artscroll *siddur* nusah Ashkenaz has it one way (and the Sephardic
>nusah has it the other way) but the Artscroll *mahzor* (for Rosh
>haShanah)nusah Ashkenaz has it the other way. I haven't had the oppurtunity
>to do any further research regarding nus.ha'ot, but one wonders if the
>same confusion (?) is not reflected in other versions. (I do know of a
>suggestion that posits the difference arose from a printer's error: it
>should have read "im lo nezirut Shimshon" but was mistakenly printed once
>and forever after as "va-afilu...."[letters being nearly similar] Is
>there any value to this suggestion?)

>In light of Rambam Hil Nezirut ch 3 (esp para 14), how does one justify
>annulling a nezirut Shimshon? Just what are the contours of a nezirut
>Shimshon (besides lasting a lifetime)?
>Why bother mentioning "chutz..." if indeed we may not nullify such a vow?
>Many thanks to any suggestions in advance, 

.Hag sameah to all,

Yisrael Dubitsky

RM Berger wrote:

>> : The Rambam (MN 1:2) writes that before Adam's chet he was an intellectual 
>> : (philosopher?) who saw things objectively in terms of truth and falsehood.

>> R' EE Dessler writes that the difference between before and after man's sin 
>> was the internalization of the Evil Inclination.

>> These two ideas merge quite beautifully.

Yafeh kivanta.

R. Dessler's talmid R. Chaim Friedlander connects the two ideas in his Sifsei 
Chaim - Emunah uVechirah vol. 2 2:1.

Gil Student
gil.student@citicorp.com

From: "Carl M. Sherer" <cmsherer@ssgslaw.co.il>
: I'm not sure you can impute our concept of teva to the type of person
: who is ready to leave his wife alone for twelve years and spend all of
: his time learning Torah day and night.
...
: Nishtana haTeva....

The crowd who agreed with RYBS's rebuttal of R' Rackman on "tav lemeisav"
can't go with this answer. If you recall, the point there was that tav
lemeisav is an existential fact caused by HKBH's curse of Chava. It's not
a psychological rule of thumb that might be true for some and not for
others.

IOW, one can't argue a nishtanah hateva and say that tav limeisav didn't
apply to Rachel, R' Akiva's wife.

Rather, this shows gedulasah -- her desire and need to be with her husband
was no less than anyone elses, and yet her love of Torah was still greater.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  6-Jun-00: Shelishi
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 17b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

On Tue, Jun 06, 2000 at 09:21:22AM -0500, Yosef Gavriel and Shoshanah M. Bechhofer wrote:
: Intellectual ideas also consist of chomer and tzura. The chomer of an idea is
: its expression in thought and words. The tzura of the idea is the manner in
: which the idea expands and expresses itself in one's heart.

Related, but not identical:

Amongst the ba'alei machshavah there is a notion of the yichud of the yodei'ah
and the yadu'ah. The reason being that they share tzurah -- the thought about
a horse shares part of the tzurah of a horse.

For example, RYGB posted in the past about the Rambam requiring a person
have a single mitzvah that is fully lishmah, even if only at one time in his
life in order to gain entrance into olam haba. The reason is that a thought
about HKBH shares the element of nitzchius that Hashem himself has. Therefore
a mind that has a tzurah of a perception of HKBH (He Himself has no tzurah)
will also have nitzchius.

This yichud caused by da'as is related to the marital meaning of the word
da'as.

(Aristotle's version of this notion lead to the old chestnut about whether
a thought about a unicorn was a real thought. There is no item in the real
world whose form is being copied in the mind of the thinker. This would imply
that thoughts about fictional objects are different in kind than ones about
real objects -- even if the thinker doesn't know the object is fictional.)

:                          As Reb Yosef Leib explains (in the shiur da'as:
: "Chochma, Bina, Da'as") chochma is knowledge: the warehouse of accumulated
: facts one amasses. Bina is understanding: a Navon categorizes facts in his
: or her heart, depicts them in his or her mind, experiences their full breadth
: and depth, and can extrapolate from them to new intellectual areas. Da'as is
: achieved when chochma, characterized and developed by bina, becomes one with
: a person's essence and being, so much so that a person can conclude that
: this da'as is absolute truth.

This was new to me when I first read RYGB's article. It's different than
the Ba'al haTanya's definition of ChaBa"D, which happens to be identical
to RSRH's.

I wonder how RYL would define haskeil.

: Rabbi Bar Shaul writes that in Telshe there were no mussar shmuessen, rather
: shiurei da'as. A shmuess is emotional, inspirational, and often informal. It
: is an experience of the heart. A shiur da'as is intellectual, educational,
: and covers a topic in a formal and systematic manner....

OTOH, R' Dovid Lifshitz often gave shmuesen. To give an idea of how much he
utilized emotion, shuesen usually included singing a song. I remember once we
sang "Vetaheir libeinu" for over 20 minutes as part of a shmues encouraging
us at the begining of a z'man.

I believe you're saying that he didn't get this facet of his derech from R'
Shim'on Shkup.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  6-Jun-00: Shelishi
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 17b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

RYGB's article on the Telzer Derech included two examples that seem to
support my theory that halachah deals with experience, not physics.

Number 1:
: The possibilities to divide time into still smaller segments are endless. It
: would thus seem impossible to determine an inherent quantitative maximum
: interval that Halacha would regard as linking two events.
: 
: Time, therefore, is measured and divided based on man's senses.

Number 2:
:                                          In Reb Yosef Leib's perspective,
: as long as the condition does not come into play each party has partial
: ownership. Only then will the ownership of the person on the "losing" side
: of the condition end.

This is much like my explanation of a safeik that is not kavu'ah. There,
as per R' Akiva Eiger, the reality is unknown, and yet we need to pasken
about it. We say that since the mind entertains both possibilities, we
have to be chosheid for each. And from there we apply rules like rov.

Here, it is similar in that we don't *yet* no the reality. Therefore each
person has to assume some ba'alus -- we are applying both sides -- even
though "in reality" only one person will end up being ba'al once the t'nai
is cleared up.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  6-Jun-00: Shelishi
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 17b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

In a message dated 6/7/00 2:51:10 PM US Central Standard Time, 
micha@aishdas.org writes:
: These two ideas merge quite beautifully. Before eating the fruit, man had no
: Evil Inclination. He had no motivation to sin. It was only the intervention
: of an outside force that lead him to sin. It was, therefor, the task of
: this outsider to convince man that what is in reality evil, is good. Then,
: man's job would be to ascertain the truth. He only had a desire to do good,
: but that doesn't mean he always knew what good was. This is the Rambam's
: model of truth vs. falsehood.

I have trouble understanding any model of truth vs. falsehood, at least in
purely Judaic terms. Averah vs. teshuva, or teshuva as the concomitant of
averah -- that makes sense. Same with yetzer ha'tov vs. yetzer ha'ra.

Do you think the Rambam's enthusiasm for Aristotelian science led him to
suppose that "truth" has an ascertainability of which, RSRH, for example,
might feel less confident?

David Finch

On Wed, Jun 07, 2000 at 05:34:28PM -0400, DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
: Do you think the Rambam's enthusiasm for Aristotelian science led him to
: suppose that "truth" has an ascertainability of which, RSRH, for example,
: might feel less confident?

I think you're comparing Rambam's view of pre-sin Adam with others' view
of post-sin man. The Rambam agrees that after the first sin, man's challenge
is about deciding between good vs evil and not true vs falue.

-mi

While on this topic, I think it is worthwhile to mention the position of
R'Yaakov Weinberg ZT"L of Ner Israel as he understands the Rambam's
position on this issue. 

The Rosh Yeshiva understood the Rambam to have been very specific in his
chapter divisions.  He saw each perek as having a definite theme and each
halacha in the perek as a subsection of that theme.  This is obvious for
many chapters, but not so obvious for many others.  (See the last chapter
of Hilchos Succah for an example.)

He called Chapter 3 of Hilchos T"T the perek of Kesser Torah and how to
attain it.  He saw this as going beyond the Chiuvim of T"T as listed in
Ch.1 and 2.   So the standards and attitudes to Torah he mentions in
Ch.3, many of which come from Pirkei Avos (e.g. Pas B'Melach Tochail, and
HaOmer K'sh'efneh Eshneh etc.) are not chiuvim in the mitzva of T"T, but
necessary to attain Kesser Torah.   This would also apply to Miyut
S'Chora and the like.  

(This is how I understand the Rosh Yeshiva ZT"L.  There are many NEr
Israel alumni on this list.  If they remember the Rosh Yeshiva's position
differently, please let me know.)

Gut Yom Tov,

Raffy
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From: sadya n targum <targum1@juno.com>
> Better, we can say that the stirah of a n'zirus, where the minyan
> is not nistar, does not require a new n'zirus. It is the growth of hair
> that is required, in order to be mekayem tiglachas d'tahara. This is what
> requires 30 days according to the Rabonon, but only 7 according to Rabbi
> Elozor, as is explicit in Bavli 39b.

From: "Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer" 
> How is what you are saying not the same as R' Chaim, without the 
> nomenclature?

	You asked for the "why" to go with the "what."  What I thought I was
adding was just such a reason: that in n'zirus, there can be no s'tirah
on what has already been completed, since it is already over and done
with. Once the 100 days are over, there is no more minyan left to be
interrupted; however, until the korbonos are brought, the n'zirus is
still in existence, and hence can have s'tirah.

Sadya N. Targum

In a message dated 6/7/00 3:41:44 PM US Central Standard Time, 
micha@aishdas.org writes:
: I think you're comparing Rambam's view of pre-sin Adam with others' view
: of post-sin man. The Rambam agrees that after the first sin, man's challenge
: is about deciding between good vs evil and not true vs falue.

But pre-sin Adam was stupid, not smart. It's absurd to think of pre-sin Adam 
as a "pure" truthseeker or an "intellectual." Without the experience of sin, 
there can be no emotional component to cognitive knowledge -- and thus no 
*meaningful* idea of truth or falsity as refracted through Torah. That's why 
the bare notion of truth vs. falsity -- as opposed to sin vs. goodness, or 
more properly sin vs. redemption -- is not particularly Judaic. 

By sinning, Adam proved himself human. Without sin, the notion of free will 
is extraneous at best. Sin requires Torah. Without Torah, there is no truth. 
So without sin, there is no truth. 

Capice?

David Finch

From: <Gil.Student@citicorp.com>
> 2. Is there any way for Adam after the chet to see things objectively or
> are we doomed to be subjective because of our internal desires? Is this
> similar to R. Elchanan Wasserman's vort that if one does not fulfill the
> Torah properly one can never see objectively?

The GRA in Even Shleima says that if one wants to make a decision informed by
divine inspiration (="objectivity") he should learn two blatt Gemara immediately
beforehand.

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila    ygb@aishdas.org

From: <yidubitsky@JTSA.EDU>
> Can anyone suggest reasons for the difference in versions of the *hatarat
> nedarim*, wherein some have: [I hereby declare null and void all
> vows,...]va-AFILU nezirut Shimshon; whereas others have: ... .HUTZ mi-nezirut
> Shimshon; still other versions have the last in parenthesis, apparently
> taking no sides on the issue....

> In light of Rambam Hil Nezirut ch 3 (esp para 14), how does one justify
> annulling a nezirut Shimshon? Just what are the contours of a nezirut
> Shimshon (besides lasting a lifetime)?
> Why bother mentioning "chutz..." if indeed we may not nullify such a vow?
> Many thanks to any suggestions in advance,

The "chutz" is likely an error based on the mistaken assumption that just as a
chacham cannot be mattir a Nezirus Shimshon (NS), so too one cannot be moseir
modo'oh that one does not want a NS to ever take effect - the two procedures are
not necessarily contingent.

BTW, IIRC, the Gemara does not discuss haforas ha'ba'al by NS - lichora that
might work even if hatoro does not.

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila    ygb@aishdas.org

From: Micha Berger <micha@aishdas.org>
> This was new to me when I first read RYGB's article. It's different than
> the Ba'al haTanya's definition of ChaBa"D, which happens to be identical
> to RSRH's.

What are the differences?

>: Rabbi Bar Shaul writes that in Telshe there were no mussar shmuessen, rather
>: shiurei da'as. A shmuess is emotional, inspirational, and often informal. It
>: is an experience of the heart. A shiur da'as is intellectual, educational,
>: and covers a topic in a formal and systematic manner....

> OTOH, R' Dovid Lifshitz often gave shmuesen. To give an idea of how much he
> utilized emotion, shuesen usually included singing a song. ...

> I believe you're saying that he didn't get this facet of his derech from R'
> Shim'on Shkup.

Lav davka. We do not know R' Shimon's derech in mussar. He & RYLB co-founded the
Telzer derech in lomdus, it could be that in Mussar he deviated. Furthermore, in
Telshe (after the departure of R' Yehuda Leib Chasman) the Mashgi'ach was a
non-entity. In Grodno, R' Shlomo Harkaby was quite influential. One needs to
know more about him. Appropriately enough, he was an afficiando of the Maharal.

Yosef Gavriel Bechhofer
http://www.aishdas.org/baistefila    ygb@aishdas.org

Me:
> Well, I'm trying to say that even without a metzi'us of ta'am, one can still 
> "experientially associate" (EA) the item with basar or chalav. One doesn't 
> have an EA of ta'am; EA is my proposed definition of ta'am. Think ta'am in the
> sense of "ta'am hamitzvah".

On Wed, May 31, 2000 at 10:13:30AM -0400, Gil.Student@citicorp.com wrote:
: I'm still not sure how you can learn this out from dayanim and "acharei rabim 
: lehatos".  You have to answer up Reb Shimon's questions in Sha'arei Yosher 
: 3:4.

As I couldn't find a Sha'arei Yosher (which is why I'm replying over a week
later), I can't answer the questions.

However, I'm not sure why you're introducing questions of rov in a conversation
of ta'am. Ta'am exists despite laws of bitul. The ta'am in the pot is less
than 1/60th of the pot, never mind whatever ta'am actually gets reintroduced
into the food. I would see this as an argument in favor of defining ta'am
as an EA (defined in quote), and not the quantity of food particles actually
in the k'li.

FWIW, there is a mehalech that understands bitul birov to be a din in bitul
that is unrelated to acharei rabbim and azlinan basar rubba.

: If it has been totally kashered and has no ta'am in it at all then IIRC it is 
: only fleishig miderabbanan because if one switches keilim back and forth 
: between milchig and fleishig one might make mistakes (based on the tosafos in 
: Chullin 8b).

The pre-gezeira halachah is exactly what I said. The process of kashuring
allows one to think of the k'li as a beria chadashah, to lose the EA to
anything before the kashuring.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  6-Jun-00: Shelishi
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 17b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

On Mon, Jun 05, 2000 at 01:32:47PM -0400, DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
: Apropos the topic of the time of life best suited to the intense study of
: Torah: See chapter 75 of RSRH's Horeb, particularly section 493. ...
: So . . . the age at which Torah can best be taught so that it can be truly 
: understood and appreciated goes to divrei Torah itself. 

Section 493 seems to me to be an elaboration of "lo am ha'aretz chassid" (an
ignoramous can't be pious). "You must study for a practical life ... you must
study in order to practice ... learning from the law a way of life, which is
its true teaching." (493, poetry elided, point about the role of shelo lishmah
omitted.)

While it could be read to mean one needs to learn halachah in order to know
what to do, it's pretty clear from 494 that RSRH considers all of learning
to be important motivationally. Learning a way of life includes more than
a how-to.

The only thing I deduce from that WRT the question of "when in life should
one learn" it would be that the earlier, the less likely you are to spend years
living incorrectly.

I'd like to share the part of 494 where RSRH addresses the division of learning
by topic. It's not what is said, but the way it is said, that I enjoyed.

    One third devote to the Written Law. Learn from the Torah the origin
    and mission of your people, and the utterances of G-d which reveal to
    you how to fulfil this mission. Learn from the Prophets to know your
    people as the barers of this law, in the fight against the deification
    of wealth and enjoyment and the evil example of the nations; learn to
    know your own destiny as the outcime of this struggle, and let your own
    spirit take fire from the spirit of the Prophets. Learn to contemplate,
    to understand and to love the lofty mission of your people and its
    age-long record of scorn and sorrow, learn to recognize its grandeur
    in its degradation. And in order to support yourself spiritually and
    to guide your steps in your own passage through life attune yourself to
    the sweet harp-notes and the words of the noble writers of the Kethuvim,
    drawn from the fountain of their own life experience.

    Another third devote to the explanations of the Written Law, and especially
    to the codes which instruct you consisely in your about your duties,
    such as the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch, in order that you may not
    stumble in your own life, and that you may learn to practice right and
    justice and love, and to devote yourself to such a life.

    Another third devote to Gemara, to reflect on and deeper penetration
    into the meaning of the laws and their connection and sequence, with
    the help of the Talmud, according to your capacity.

:                                                                      He sees 
: the study of Gemorrah, in particular, to be reflective experience, as opposed 
: to learning Mishneh Torah, SA, or the other codes.

Actually, he's saying that the Talmud is not a code, but a tool to a kind of
study called "gemara". It is different in kind, not just quality, than
studying codes, which is part of "mishnah". RSRH is paralleling the Rambam
(Hil Talmud Torah 1:11) on understanding the Mishnah's guidelines about how
to divide one's learning time: 1/3 mikra, 1/3 mishnah and 1/3 gemara. (Which
was first said before there existed books called "Mishnah" and "Gemara")

Interesting to note that when RSRH speaks about women's obligation to learn,
found later in 494, we writes:
    No less should Israel's daughters learn from the content of the Written
    Law and the duties which they have to learn in their lifetime as daughter
    and young woman, as mother and housewife. Many times have Israel's
    daughters saved the purity of the Jewish life and spirit...

Note the similarity in language to his description of the thirds of learning
obligated of men. To me it looks like he's saying that women are obligated
in Mikra and Mishna, but not in Gemara.

This paragraph has to be understood as to include Horeb itself, the title
page of which addresses it to "Israel's thinking young men and women". So
it would seem (from how I read the latter quote) that to Hirsch, knowing the
what and the ta'am of halachah are both Mishnah. Gemara is limited to the
mechanics of deriving halachos -- not to gleaning their meaning.

I did not get the same conclusion from the Rambam. He says:
    One third he should think and contemplate the conclusion of a thing from
    its premise, derive one thing from another, compare one thing to another,
    and understand the rules of derivation of the Torah until you will know
    what is the principle of those rules and how to reveal what is prohibited
    and what is permitted, and the like -- from those things you heard from
    the mouth who heard [ie learned from a teacher]. This subject is what
    is called Gemara.

While the Rambam includes in "gemara" the rules of derivation of halachah, he
also discusses how the laws connect to their premises as a different item.
Perhaps not the strongest indication, but I took the Rambam to include the
study of ta'am in "gemara", not "mishnah".

:                                               Strauss stresses the high level 
: of sophistication necessary to understand the Rambam's theoretical works, as 
: opposed to Mishneh Torah. His views are nearly identical to those of RSRH, 
: who, in his religiosity, went further and implied that such sophistication is 
: therefore a component of understanding Torah itself.

I don't see how you get that from RSRH, who had little positive to say about
the Guide as an example of Jewish thought.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  6-Jun-00: Shelishi
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 17b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

On Wed, Jun 07, 2000 at 10:08:43PM -0400, DFinchPC@aol.com wrote:
: But pre-sin Adam was stupid, not smart.

Why do you say so? All we know is that "good" and "evil" were foreign
concepts to him. REE Dessler, as I wrote above, understood it that Adam
knew these concepts as well -- but only intellectually, not existentially.
Nothing about him being stupider -- just more objective in one particular
way.

:                                         It's absurd to think of pre-sin Adam 
: as a "pure" truthseeker or an "intellectual."

You seem to be confusing quantity with purity. He had no ulterior motive to
seek evil (according to the Rambam) therefore his search for G-d's will was
purely one of seeking truth. This idea doesn't require claiming anything
about his ability to effectively complete that search. (Although, as I
said above, I have no reason to say he was poorly equipped.)

:                                               Without the experience of sin, 
: there can be no emotional component to cognitive knowledge...

Are good and evil the only emotional axis? Clearly Rambam thought that
Adam was driven by a love of G-d and of His Truth. Which is what motivated
Adam in his search for

That is to say nothing of those emotions that have no inherent axiological
content; it's how you use them, not what they are, that make them right or
wrong. A powerful example is love.

: By sinning, Adam proved himself human. Without sin, the notion of free will 
: is extraneous at best. Sin requires Torah. Without Torah, there is no truth. 
: So without sin, there is no truth. 

I would have said that without truth there's no sin. Torah captures that truth,
and therefore its negation defines sin.

One can sin because one is mislead to think it's good. That has little to do
with man having an innate drive for good or for evil. That's exactly how
the Rambam describes pre-sin Adam. IOW, without "knowledge of good and evil"
there is still sin. 

I think, though, that with the first sin, whatever it would have been, comes
such knowledge. Aveirah goreres aveirah, one sin causes another. According
to REED, this is because one's bechirah point, the point at which one needs
to make conscious decisions about good and evil, moves with each deed. It's
easier for a theif to steal the second time, and someone who routinely cheats
in his taxes will do so again without even thinking it over. Similarly,
the first sin means that man learnt sin.

-mi

-- 
Micha Berger (973) 916-0287          MMG"H for  6-Jun-00: Shelishi
micha@aishdas.org                                         A"H 
http://www.aishdas.org                                    Yuma 17b
For a mitzvah is a lamp, and the Torah its light.         

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